by Mark Zuehlke
Christiansen’s relief came less than twenty-four hours after he wrote to Major General Rod Keller stating his loss of confidence in “leadership and command that kept every unit … in action continuously in spite of severe casualties, and culminated in the launching of several worn-out and disorganized men … into the attack on Tilly La Campagne on 25 Jul 44 .” He unequivocally declared that he would have refused to send the Glens forward and would unhesitatingly do so again. Keller recommended that Christiansen be repatriated with recommendation for “no further employment” by the army. Simonds agreed that he was “unfitted to lead Canadian Troops with determination” because of his “impression that battles can be fought on a ‘limited liability basis.’”8 Seeking some justification for Operation Spring, Simonds could only offer the well-hewn refrain that its primary intention had been to hold German armour in front of Caen, despite the hopes he had earlier held for a limited breakout.9 Given that the Americans had launched Operation Cobra—their full-out assault against German Seventh Army at Saint-Lô—on the same day, Canadian Army analysts heavily emphasized the fact that nine enemy armoured divisions had remained tied down.
Stalemated for weeks in the bocage country, the Americans had unleashed a hundred-mile-long bomber stream that obliterated 3,200 Germans inside a 7,000-by-2,500-yard rectangle held by the Panzer Lehr Division, the 257th Infantry, 5th Parachute Division’s 5th Regiment, and elements of 2nd SS Panzer Division. Panzer Lehr was virtually annihilated, most of its remaining forty-five tanks thrown pinwheeling into the air. All command posts were vapourized. The division suffered at least 70 per cent casualties.10 Plunging into the lunar landscape created by the bombing, the Americans put into play Montgomery’s overarching strategy. Once the Americans romped into the guts of France, Montgomery believed, there would be little the Germans could throw in their way. The British Second Army and First Canadian Army could then punch down the Caen-Falaise highway. Either the Germans must flee behind the Seine River or risk encirclement and complete destruction.
It was true that the Germans had continued to believe, even for two days after Operation Cobra started, that the main thrust was still to come on the Caen front. Not until July 27 was the full extent of the American breakout recognized and 116th and 2nd Panzer Divisions sent to meet it. The only two German armoured divisions close to full strength, they represented a significant force. But as they had to move at night to avoid the Allied fighter-bombers, days would be required for their redeployment.
AS OPERATION SPRING had been nearing its launch, General Montgomery had finally agreed that Lieutenant General Harry Crerar’s First Canadian Army would become operational on July 23. Crerar’s army until Spring concluded consisted of I British Corps and its British 3rd, 49th, and 51st Infantry Divisions, plus 6th Airborne Division. Included in the Airborne’s ranks was 1st Canadian Parachute Battalion. Having jumped into Normandy on the night of June 5–6, the paratroops had spent most of June and all July holding the Allied eastern flank from the coast near Ouistreham inland to Ranville. From July 23 to the battalion’s transfer back to England on September 7 was the only period when Canadian paratroops were connected to First Canadian Army, although they would never serve alongside any other Canadian units.
Sergeant Dan Hartigan recalled this time when neither the facing Germans nor the paratroops were under orders to win ground. They were instead focused on pinning each other in place by engaging in constant fighting. “Casualty lists piling up. Short, wicked encounters between fortified positions and minefields, killing and maiming the soldiers of both sides. Shallow patrols into thick enemy lines … the unit lost numerous men, killed and wounded, to the whims of the so-called ‘static battle.’”11
Montgomery had given I Corps precise marching orders that left Crerar in a steward role. Montgomery had decided that an advance should be made to seize the heights overlooking Ouistreham. This would enable Caen’s port facilities to be opened.12
Having received Montgomery’s instructions on July 22, Crerar duly set about generating paper that included a detailed operational and tactical directive. The following day, he presented this to Lieutenant General John Crocker. In addition to explaining the operation, the long document offered an analysis of German armoured tactics as displayed in June and other commentary drawn from an address Crerar had earlier delivered to his army’s senior staff and officers. Crerar helpfully provided Crocker with multiple copies for distribution throughout the corps.13
Crerar was “astonished” when Crocker dismissed the directive and said the operation was “not on.” In his stern and humourless manner, Crocker told Crerar that freeing Ouistreham from German observation accomplished nothing. There were too many other observation points on the heights east of the Dives. All that would be achieved would be five or six hundred casualties the British could ill afford.14 If Crerar insisted on the advance, Crocker was “ not prepared, personally, to be responsible for carrying it out.”
Crerar turned to Montgomery. Crocker, either for personal reasons or “because of the fact that I am a Canadian … resented being placed under my command,” Crerar argued. Further, he showed “no tact, nor desire to understand my views.” Crocker was “temperamentally unsuited” to serve under a Canadian. Crerar suggested he be exchanged for another British corps commander.
Montgomery vetoed exchanging Crocker but agreed to chat with the “somewhat difficult” officer on July 25. Crerar could then discuss the “tactical problem” with Crocker later that day “with the air cleared and good prospects of mutual understanding.” Montgomery told Crocker to “quit bickering” and be “a loyal subordinate.” He cautioned Crerar against interfering with Crocker’s handling of his corps. Crocker was “a very experienced fighting commander” who needed to be led rather than “driven.” Crerar should also “cut down paper in the field” and deal verbally with his corps commanders while actively soliciting their views.15
In a July 26 letter to the Chief of Imperial General Staff, General Sir Alan Brooke, Montgomery wrote: “Harry Crerar has started off his career as an Army [Commander] by thoroughly upsetting everyone; he had a row with Crocker the first day, and asked me to remove Crocker. I have spent two days trying to restore peace; investigating the quarrel, and so on. As always, there are faults on both sides. But the basic cause was Harry; I fear he thinks he is a great soldier, and he was determined to show it the very moment he took over command at 1200 hours 23 July. He made his first mistake at 1205 hrs; and his second after lunch. I have had each of them to see me—separately of course. I have told Harry in quite clear terms that in my opinion the basic fault lies with him, in this quarrel. I have seen Crocker, and told him he must play 100% … I now hope I can get on with fighting the Germans—instead of stopping the Generals fighting amongst themselves.”16
Montgomery’s intervention worked. On July 27, Crocker dutifully presented a plan that modestly sought to push the Germans back sufficiently to enable use of Caen’s port facilities. It would involve two British divisions and be launched on August 8.
This limited operation accorded with Montgomery’s new intentions for the Caen front. With the American breakout fully under way, Montgomery decided that “any large scale operations … in [the Caen] area are definitely unlikely to succeed.” German attempts to draw armoured divisions away from this front had been frustrated, Montgomery counting six panzer and SS divisions still blocking the road to Falaise.17
All these divisions were east of thethe British sector west of here. British Second Army would therefore regroup and attack with at least six divisions from the area of Caumont-l’Éventé. VIII British Corps would pull up stakes from east of Caen and move in beside XXX Corps. This would place all of Second Army westof the Orne. II Canadian Corps would come under First Canadian Army command, and Crerar would be responsible for the entire front east of the river.
By July 30, Montgomery had reconfigured Twenty-First Army Group by stripping divisions from I British Corps to strengthen Second Bri
tish Army. This left First Canadian Army with two corps comprising one airborne, three infantry, and one armoured division; supported by two commando brigades, three armoured brigades, and three army groups of artillery. Opposing them were three German armoured divisions and a heavy tank battalion, three infantry divisions, and two Nebelwerfer brigades. In reserve, the Germans had another armoured division and heavy tank battalion. West of the Orne, the line was held by the British XII, XXX, and VIII Corps. Together, these fielded five infantry and three armoured divisions. They also had four armoured brigades and three army groups of artillery. Opposing the British were four infantry divisions, one armoured division, one heavy tank battalion, a Panther anti-tank battalion, and a Nebelwerfer brigade with two fresh infantry divisions and another armoured division en route.
The realignment by Montgomery left First Canadian Army facing twice as many armoured divisions as before, but about a third fewer infantry divisions. West of the Orne, infantry ratios were close to equal, but the British had three times the armour. Montgomery also enjoyed overwhelming artillery and air superiority.18
Strengthening British Second Army came at the price of gutting I Corps. Crocker was left with just 6th Airborne and 49th Infantry Divisions. Although this doomed the planned operation towards the Dives River, Montgomery accepted its cancellation.19 The realignment created a robust Second Army that should easily knife through the facing Germans.
Operation Bluecoat was to begin on July 30. Characteristically, Montgomery failed to appreciate the disadvantageous country where XXX and VIII Corps were to attack—bocage at its worst, broken by a “succession of pronounced ridges [that] ran across the axis of advance.” This included Mont Pinçon, which at twelve hundred feet was Normandy’s highest point. “Streams, many of which were tank obstacles, ran in all directions. Numerous deep wooded valleys, small fields surrounded by thick hedgerows, and scarcity of good … roads were features of the terrain to be crossed,” one army analysis stated. “It will be evident … that movement in such country is bound to be difficult and slow, hampering the bringing up [of] reserves, preventing the cross-country movement of anything except men on their feet or Churchill tanks, and hindering supply and replacement.”20
Nevertheless, Montgomery urged Lieutenant General Myles Dempsey on July 28 to press the attack “with utmost vigour and all caution thrown to the winds.” He was to “step on [the] gas.”21 For First Canadian Army, meanwhile, no “large scale effort was immediately required,” Montgomery said, but Crerar needed to keep the Germans east of the Orne “nervous and pinned down.”22
EVEN AS MONTGOMERY reduced First Canadian Army’s strength, he advised Crerar “to be prepared to strike towards Falaise.” Having anticipated this, Simonds had already concluded that to succeed, II Canadian Corps would require two additional divisions—one infantry and one armoured—and full air support for forty-eight hours. He still had only two divisions, 2nd Canadian Infantry Division holding the line from the Orne River to Verrières village and 3rd Canadian Infantry Division east of the Caen-Falaise highway to Tilly-la-Campagne and La Hogue. These heavily fortified villages were held by 1st SS Panzer Division.23
Simonds considered Tilly’s capture “a necessary preliminary to an offensive” towards Falaise, and ordered it taken on the night of July 30.24 But first, 2nd Division’s Essex Scottish Regiment would capture a farm and adjacent orchard that stood on a high point next to the Caen-Falaise highway to the northwest of Tilly. Major T.E. “Si” Steele’s ‘D’ Company with one ‘C’ Company platoon was to carry out the attack. Both 4th and 5th Field Regiments would provide a covering barrage. A troop of British tanks, an anti-tank gun troop, and the Bren guns of the Essex carrier platoon would also assist.
At 1655 hours, the tankers blasted the large, ruined main farmhouse for five minutes. Then the Essex advanced behind the barrage at 1708 hours.25 Lieutenant Walter Pope’s No. 16 Platoon headed for a machine gun on the northern flank, while Sergeant Russ Burdick’s No. 17 Platoon advanced againstone on the opposite side of the orchard. ‘C’ Company’s No. 15 Platoon laid down covering fire while No. 18 Platoon advanced close behind Burdick’s men. After crossing three hundred yards of open ground, No. 16 Platoon was driven to ground when Pope fell wounded. On the right, Burdick’s men eliminated two machine-gun positions. This enabled No. 18 Platoon to pass through and clear the rest of the orchard. When Burdick was killed, Steele reorganized the company and personally led it towards the farm.
The panzer grenadiers offered desperate resistance. Canadians and Germans fought with bayonets and rifle butts. Steele saw a recent reinforcement deflect a bayonet thrust and ram his own blade into the German before suddenly being struck down by a bullet through the heart. Then suddenly the surviving panzer grenadiers fled. Thirteen Essex were dead and another nineteen wounded. Fourteen dead Germans were counted and another eighthad been captured.26
Why the position had been so hotly defended was soon clear. The high ground provided superior observation in every direction for up to five miles. More importantly, the large ruined building proved not to be a farmhouse but rather a waterworks with an adjacent reservoir containing about thirty thousand litres, which supplied Tilly.27
The Essex operation was a welcome success. There had been little recent good news. On 2nd Division’s western flank, attempts to win ground had been consistently frustrated. Although Le Régiment de Maisonneuve had managed to hang on to most of Saint-Martin, it had lost control of the church in the southeast corner. A small field separated the church from the mine complex. The lift tower over the mine shaft provided excellent observation, as did the battered church steeple. Brigadier Hugh Young and Major General Charles Foulkes decided they must regain control of the church. Then they could think about winning the mine.
Two companies attacked on the night of July 28 –29 . Major Jacques Ostiguy’s ‘C’ Company secured a crossroad to cover ‘A’ Company’s assault on the church, only to see Captain A. Angers and his forty-five men stopped cold by machine-gun fire. Angers was ordered to try again the following night. This time, the “reduced company” resorted to stealth and infiltrated two sections into the church. An immediate counterattack threatened to overwhelm the French Canadians, and they fought a running gun battle to regain friendly lines. On July 30, the Maisies were relieved by Les Fusiliers Mont-Royal.28
The relief was part of a major corps reorganization. On July 26, 3rd Division’s senior medical officer had warned Major General Keller that this formation’s front line troops were completely exhausted after seven weeks of continuous fighting. With weariness “greatly impairing their efficiency as fighting soldiers,” he urged that the division be granted a well-deserved rest.29
Normally, Simonds would have baulked at any accommodation of perceived weakness, but passing 3rd Division into reserve meshed with his plans. Accordingly, the division was relieved by the newly arrived 4th Canadian Armoured Division. Simonds planned to gradually allow this division to get “the feel of things” by sending its battalions into small-scale operations.30
The hand-off was carried out on the night of July 30 –31. Because 4th Division would require time to get sorted out on the front line, Simonds decided that 5th Brigade’s Calgary Highlanders should carry Tilly the following night. At the same time, Les Fusiliers Mont-Royal would take the church at Saint-Martin.
Army intelligence later learned that the past two nights’ attacks had greatly worried the Germans. To regain the initiative, they attempted to dislodge the Royal Hamilton Light Infantry from Verrières by unleashing an experimental weapon. At 0845 hours, a heavy smokescreen smothered the village. Everyone could hear the grinding of tracks and braced for another attack by Panthers or Tigers. Suddenly, through the smoke appeared a dozen “miniature radio-controlled tanks … Each measured 12 feet long and five feet wide, weighed four tons and carried 800 [pounds] of explosive. They were seen moving from a small pocket of dead ground southeast of [the Riley’s] position at about 15 miles an hour, clearly
visible despite the mottled camouflage and the wisps of straw from the stacks in which they had lain concealed from the view of … Typhoons. For some reason six of them turned back, but the others rumbled on towards our forward company,” observed an army after-action report.31
At first, Lieutenant Colonel Rocky Rockingham only saw one of the “goddamned things coming across the field.” It looked like a large coffee table on tracks. “Good God,” Rockingham said. “What’s that?” Someone shouted it was a remote-controlled tank. “Shoot it!” Rockingham bellowed.32
Bren gunners cut loose, “but the bullets rattled harmlessly off the armour plate.”33 Then the anti-tank guns fired, and the devices started exploding with massive blasts. “We shot at one several times, but missed,” Rockingham recalled. “Then it got into a slit trench and blew up and there was nothing left there except a churned up patch of ground.” The Canadians inside were vapourized.34 “Two of these robots did actually penetrate the position and explode, causing some casualties from blast and flying pieces,” an intelligence after-action report found. Despite the deaths of the men in the trench, the report continued that the “exciting—if ineffectual—attack was over [by 0930 hours]. Our troops stood to for some hours but the phenomenon did not recur.” This unusual assault proved the last German attempt to regain Verrières.35
WHILE GERMAN ATTENTION focused on Verrières, the Canadians on July 31 concentrated on Tilly-la-Campagne and Saint-Martin-de-Fontenay’s church. To attack the former, the Calgary Highlanders had to march from a rest area at Fleury-sur-Orne across the breadth of the Canadian front. Instead of attacking Tilly from Bourguébus, the Calgaries would start from the water reservoir to the northwest.36