by Mark Zuehlke
The Winnipegs ended their march in woods midway between Olenden and Tassily, while the Can Scots pushed on a mile to Point 175. Reveille was sounded by German machine guns hidden in nearby farm buildings “strewing lead all through our lines,” Lieutenant T.A. Burge reported. Assisted by supporting tanks, the Can Scots soon drove the Germans off.10
At 1000 hours, Major R.M. Lendrum, temporarily commanding because Lieutenant Colonel Fred Cabeldu had been sidelined by enteritis, received a coded summons to an O Group. Unable to decrypt the code, Lendrum requested the meeting location sent in the clear. That informed him that the Can Scots had been placed under 2nd Armoured Brigade command, its headquarters at Montboint.11
Lendrum and Burge arrived there to find the brigade also under a temporary commander—the 1st Hussars’ Lieutenant Colonel Ray Colwell. Brigadier John Bingham, who had taken over after Brigadier Bob Wyman was wounded, had been sent to the rear for a rest by the brigade’s medical officer.12 Colwell said the Can Scots were to lead 3rd Division’s advance by seizing Point 168 at 1130 hours. This would bring it parallel with 4th Division at Épaney.
Point 168 lay a mile south of the battalion’s present position and held a commanding view of Falaise. While emphasizing speed, Col-well could offer no information on enemy defences. The battalion was out of range of any possible supporting artillery, but Colwell assured Lendrum the hill was believed only lightly defended.13
Persuading Colwell to set the attack back to 1230, Lendrum sent Burge to brief the battalion while he worked out armoured support details with 1st Hussars’ Major Brandy Conron. The 1st Hussars had ended the August 14 “Mad Charge” with ‘A’ Squadron mustering seven tanks, ‘B’ Squadron thirteen, and ‘C’ Squadron only four. The two weakest squadrons were merged into one in order to support the Can Scots.14
Just before Lendrum returned to Point 175, Colwell reported that medium artillery could range on Point 168 and would provide a preassault bombardment. Lendrum arrived at the battalion just two minutes before the attack was to begin. He was still briefing company commanders when the bombardment fell.15 The Can Scots crossed the start line thirty minutes late.16
They advanced in box formation, ‘D’ Company leading on the left, ‘B’ Company the right, followed respectively by ‘A’ and ‘C’ Companies and with Lendrum’s tactical headquarters in the middle. They advanced into a checkerboard of small fields surrounded by dense hedgerows, so that each company ended up isolated and fighting its own battle.17
A battle began the instant the Can Scots crossed the start line and, in Burge’s words, “stepped into a molten fire bath.”18 Captain Harvey Bailey, ‘D’ Company’s second-in-command, “watched tracer bullets go between my legs.” Pressing on despite the intense fire, ‘D’ Company advanced through a hedgerow and came up against a Tiger tank stationed behind the facing hedgerow. Major Larry Hen-derson summoned the Hussars to engage it.
With no time to resupply, the Hussars were fighting with little ammunition and even less fuel. Not that it mattered. As the eleven tanks emerged from the first hedgerow, several fell prey to hidden anti-tank guns and burst into flame. The survivors reversed into the hedgerow’s cover, ignoring the Can Scots’ pleas for help.
Henderson sent one of ‘D’ Company’s PIAT teams crawling towards the hedge to range in on the Tiger. Their first round exploded harmlessly inside the hedge, and the Tiger’s machine gun killed the two men. After raking the field and firing 88-millimetre rounds into ‘D’ Company’s position, the Tiger prowled off.19
‘D’ Company advanced again, only to be pinned on the edge of the next field. This time two Tigers were firing downslope from the cover of an orchard about four hundred yards distant. Knowing his remaining PIAT team would never get within range, and with casualties mounting, Henderson had no idea what to do next.20
Unbeknown to Henderson, one 1st Hussar tanker had recognized ‘D’ Company’s plight. In a move that earned a Military Medal, Sergeant Arthur Boyle advanced in a wide arc to get within range of the Tigers undetected. Although one Tiger spotted the Sherman and disabled it before Boyle’s gunner could fire, the sergeant ordered the men to stay on board. Their first shot sent one Tiger up in flames, convincing the other to retreat.21
In the smoke and dust, the Can Scots knew nothing of Boyle’s heroic intervention. They believed, mostly correctly, that the battalion fought alone. Again they faced the young 12th SS Division fanatics. “More than once,” Burge wrote, someone “would see a tank through a hedgerow and conclude it was one of ours come to assist us. He would dash through the intertwined brambles and thorns to pound on the side of the tank thus attracting the attention of the occupants. Too late realizing he was pounding on a large black swastika!”
The SS “fought … bitterly but could not stop the momentum of our advance. Few prisoners were taken—the enemy preferring to die rather than give in. Snipers were posted in hedgerows covering each tiny field with rifle and [light machine guns]. Heavier MGs were dismounted from tanks to cover positions until they were almost overrun. Then they would mount the tanks and retire to another hedgerow. More enemy tanks plowed back and forth spitting both heavy and light calibre ammunition into our advancing formations.”
Advancing to the right of ‘D’ Company, ‘B’ Company “slugged its way through all opposition to be the first … to consolidate on its objective, where they were counterattacked.”22 A fter the counterat-tack was repulsed, Captain David Pugh crouched in a ditch and called for support on the wireless. Due to some atmospheric anomaly, a BBC announcer introduced a musical program called “Music While You Work.” No matter how Pugh twisted the dial, the wireless remained jammed with lively music.
By 1530 hours, the Can Scots had won Point 168 and were digging in on the forward slope. ‘D’ Company’s Company Sergeant Major John Stanley Grimmond was consolidating the headquarters section in an orchard when the 12th SS counterattacked with two tanks and infantry. Gathering a small force armed with Brens, rifles, and PIATs, Grimmond led such a fierce charge that the tanks withdrew, leaving their infantry to be killed or taken prisoner. Grimmond was awarded a Distinguished Conduct Medal.23
A lull ensued that the Can Scots used to dig as deeply as possible into the rocky soil. Sergeant Ron Bland and two other men of ‘D’ Company looked into a large valley “with no cover but grass.” He, Sergeant George Lorimer, and Private Peter Smolkoski dug individual slit trenches. Bland had just dropped his web gear and was turning to pick up a shovel when he was suddenly flat on the ground, unable to move. He called to Lorimer and Smolkoski, but neither responded. Then Corporal Leo Netzel appeared and reported that Smolkoski was dead, Lorimer unconscious—apparently both severely concussed by a shell explosion. Bland was bleeding from eleven penetrating wounds. All three men were loaded on a carrier and evacuated to the RAP. Lorimer died en route. The twenty-six-year-old Lorimer was the younger brother of Lieutenant Duncan Lorimer, who had been wounded on July 8 at Cussy.24 “Slaughter Hill,” as the survivors called Point 168, cost thirty-seven dead and ninety-three wounded, the heaviest casualty rate the Can Scots suffered in a single day.25
Despite their hesitance to join the fray, the Hussars lost six tanks. “The morale of the unit that night was low,” Conron noted. “The men were dog-tired and it seemed as if a very determined effort was being made to beat the [2nd Armoured Brigade] right into the ground. All the regiments in the brigade had terrific casualties in both tanks and men.”26
Lieutenant Colonel Colwell next ordered the Winnipeg Rifles to assault Soulangy, a village astride the Caen-Falaise highway and roughly parallel to Point 168. Only the 17th Duke of York’s Hussars’ armoured cars were available, but again minimal resistance was promised. Instead, more 12th SS infantry and Tiger tanks waited. Only ‘A’ Company managed to gain the village, immediately being set upon by two Tigers. After half its men were killed or wounded, the company retired at 2100 hours. The Yorks wisely opted to steer well clear of the Tigers, staying out of the fight entirely. Dismiss
ed by Corps intelligence as shattered, the 12th SS ended the day holding the field.27
Under pressure to keep moving, Colwell sent the Regina Rifles from behind the Can Scots towards Aubigny-sur-Nère—another village beside the Caen-Falaise highway.28 Unable to contact the supporting Fort Garry Horse, however, Lieutenant Colonel Foster Matheson stood his men down. The Garrys, meanwhile, had four tanks immediately knocked out upon arriving at what they mistakenly thought was the start line. Seeing no infantry, Lieutenant Colonel Ronald Morton ordered the squadron back to harbour.29
RECOGNIZING BY LATE morning that the two divisions advancing on Falaise from the north were being checked, Simonds ordered 2nd Division to carry the town from the west. The order caught Major General Charles Foulkes in the midst of relieving the 1st Polish Armoured Division, which had seized Fontaine-le-Pin and Potigny during the night. Foulkes was acting on a previous instruction from Simonds to take over the Polish sector to free them for a move across the corps front to come up alongside 4th Division’s left flank.
This move required the Poles to shift about eighteen thousand men and their vehicles, tanks, and equipment. However, “during this crossing the Division passed through the formation of the whole Corps … without any difficulty,” Lieutenant Colonel L. Stankiewicz wrote. “This definitely proves that the Division had, by this time, become an efficient piece of machinery, in which the work of the staffs and the accomplishments of the units were performed smoothly.”30
As the Poles departed, 2nd Division’s 4th and 5th Brigades had taken their positions. This left the division’s two freshest brigades misplaced for an advance on Falaise.
Suddenly handed a new priority, Foulkes could only turn to 6th Brigade, despite its having won the Clair-Tison river crossing the day before, on August 14 . At 1100 hours, Brigadier Hugh Young briefed his tired battalion commanders. As patrols had detected a “withdrawal of the enemy” in progress from west of Falaise, Young expected weak opposition. However, having been fooled in the past, Young arranged artillery support and a squadron of Sherbrooke Fusiliers for each battalion. The advance would follow the road from Clair-Tison to Falaise. South Saskatchewan Regiment would be on the left, the Queen’s Own Cameron Highlanders the right. First objective was the village of Ussy. If no fight developed, the two battalions would then continue to Villers-Canivet, about four miles northwest of Falaise.
About noon, both battalions moved with companies strung out in single file alongside the road. By 1400 hours, Ussy was secure.31 The push to Villers-Canivet proceeded well. Then, as the Sasks entered it at 1800 hours, they came under fire from Germans dug into farm fields and adjacent farmhouses.32 ‘ B’ Company became entangled with an MG-42 position situated behind a stone fence. Attempting to close on the gun, Private Chic Goodman’s section reached a gap in the wall where a gate had been. When Goodman’s section leader stepped into the gap, an MG-42 burst killed him. That left the survivors with a choice. They could run past the gap, together, surely drawing fire but also ensuring that some men got through. Or they could stagger things—two men duck across, then someone crawls past, then maybe three dash through—each variation forcing the German gunners to try to anticipate the next move. The section did this, and Goodman decided to crawl—the slowest option, but hugging the ground meant possibly getting past unseen. Cradling his rifle across his arms, Goodman worked elbows and knees frantically and made the crossing in seconds.33 Clearing Villers-Canivet took two hours and yielded fourteen prisoners.34
By the time 6th Brigade secured Villers-Canivet, the Polish division had already gained the corps’s left flank and gone straight into battle. Attacking at two separate crossing points, 10th Regiment of Motorized Riflemen and First Armoured Regiment surprised the Germans defending the opposite shore of the Dives River. Jort, a village on the south bank that was also astride a main road running from Falaise north through Saint-Pierre-sur-Dives and on to Lisieux, was captured. The Poles had cut one possible German escape route from the pocket.
During the night, the 3rd Brigade of Riflemen expanded the bridgehead. “Sappers built a bridge and cleared the mined terrain. The artillery … was brought up [and] set in readiness to defend the bridgehead.” The brigade was also well positioned to begin closing the gap between Falaise and Argentan.35
By evening, Simonds decided that events had outpaced the plan to advance 4th Armoured Division towards Falaise. The town should fall easily enough to 2nd and 3rd Divisions, so 4th Division would join the Poles in a southeastward advance to cut the most direct route out of the pocket—a road running due east from Falaise through Trun and on to Chambois.36
Arriving at Kitching’s headquarters in Bretteville-le-Rabet at 1000 hours on August 16, Simonds ordered him to first take the wooded Monts d’Eraines Ridge north of Damblainville, which looked down upon the Falaise–Saint-Pierre-sur-Dives road. It was from this ridge that German anti-tank guns and tanks had significantly contributed to blocking the division’s advance from Épaney. Once the ridge was clear, the division would cross the Ante and Train Rivers south of Damblainville and cut the highway connecting Falaise and Trun. Here it would turn east to capture Trun and then, finally, close the gap between First Canadian Army and Third U.S. Army.
Kitching was in no position to swing the division about so rapidly. With Halpenny commanding the armoured brigade, a turtle’s haste was more likely. Kitching again asked for Bob Moncel and again Simonds demurred. Kitching’s armoured brigade desperately needed a firm hand on the tiller. Every regiment had a new commander, most with little experience. They were also in contact with the Germans around Épaney, so extracting the regiments and routing them to a new axis of advance was going to take time. This move would not be completed until the early morning hours of August 17.37
WHILE 4TH ARMOURED Division was reorganizing, 2nd and 3rd Infantry Divisions spent August 16 closing on Falaise. The Royal Winnipeg Rifles and Regina Rifles led 3rd Division’s advance. Supported by 17th Duke of York’s armoured cars, the Winnipegs bypassed Soulangy and headed for Aubigny, gaining its outskirts within thirty minutes. By 1355 hours, Aubigny was clear, the one prisoner captured from 85th Infantry Division.
From here on, “it was a very subdued enemy they met, and an enemy who withdrew with far more alacrity than on 15 August,” one Canadian officer noted. At 1900 hours, the Winnipegs and Yorks reached the crossroads running out of Falaise to Saint Pierre-sur-Dives and were looking down on the town.38
When the Reginas passed through the Can Scots on Point 168 en route to Point 159 and Versainville beyond, they met “a little more determined” German opposition than the Winnipegs had encountered.39 What was left of the 1st Hussars were in support, Major Brandy Conron’s composite force on the left and ‘B’ Squadron, under Major G.W. Gordon, on the right.40
A screen of 88-millimetre guns firing from woods northeast of Épaney “were so well situated that whenever one of our tanks so much as showed itself on the crest line it was either knocked out or the near miss took the tank crew’s breath away,” reported 7th Brigade’s war diarist.41 The Reginas, with ‘A’ and ‘B’ Companies leading, hid behind tank-fired smoke shells and their own mortars during the advance to Point 159 and suffered few casualties. As they descended the long slope leading to the road and Versainville beyond, however, heavy machine-gun fire stalled their advance. It took the 3-inch mortar platoon’s laying down a concentration of fire to silence the enemy positions. Fighting remained stiff all the way to the road. Here the Reginas dug in for the night. Another costly day—eighty-five casualties, including seven officers.42
When the Reginas halted, the 1st Hussars withdrew. “At the termination of this day’s operation the Regiment could hardly field one complete [squadron] and many of these tanks were not battle worthy,” their war diarist reported.43
Prisoners were a mixed bag, including personnel from 1st SS Panzer, 89th Infantry, and 85th Infantry Divisions. The 7th Brigade intelligence officer thought this “confirmed what we already knew, that th
e enemy was grabbing troops from anywhere and forming them into battle groups in a desperate last effort to hold up our advance.”44
Falaise, however, was defended by 12th SS Division’s K ampf-gruppe Krause. Sturmbannführer Bernhard Krause had 150 Hitler Youth infantry, two Tiger tanks, and two 75-millimetre anti-tank guns inside Falaise. There was also a small 12th SS force of two Tigers and infantry armed with heavy machine guns near the crossroads that the Winnipegs were approaching when 2nd Division assaulted the town.45
Falaise was the birthplace of William the Conqueror, whose castle stood on a high crag overlooking the Ante River and ancient market town below. On the night of August 12 –13, Bomber Command had struck with 144 aircraft in an attempt to block the German escape route through the town with rubble. About two-thirds of Falaise was destroyed. Fortunately, the inhabitants had earlier evacuated. Since the bombing, First Canadian Army’s medium artillery had further battered Falaise. The castle miraculously escaped significant damage throughout.46
After a series of delays, 6th Brigade’s South Saskatchewan and Queen’s Own Cameron Highlander Regiments attacked from the northwest. Les Fusiliers Mont-Royal was in close support, and both leading regiments were backed by squadrons of Sherbrooke Fusiliers. Tank losses had resulted in its three squadrons being collapsed into two.47
The South Saskatchewan Regiment on the left came under fire from the Tigers and machine guns dug in near the crossroads. While the infantry ducked for cover, two of Major Sydney Radley-Walters’s ‘A’ Squadron tanks were knocked out. But a concentration of heavy artillery forced the Tigers and their supporting infantry to withdraw into Falaise.
Soon both battalions reached the outskirts. Two bridges crossed the steep Ante River valley. The 12th SS had heavily barricaded each with girders and rocks. An anti-tank gun and machine guns covered the one the Sasks approached, while machine guns defended the one assigned to the Camerons. Ten Shermans supported the Camerons, but as these closed in, they became mired in the soft wet ground or stuck in huge craters created by the earlier bombing. An armoured bulldozer attempted to reach the tanks to drag them free with chains, but so much traffic had built up on the road behind the leading troops that the route became gridlocked. Without supporting tanks, the Camerons were unable to silence the machine guns, and their attack stalled.48