Outright Assassination

by Adel Beshara

  The Government would have been better inspired to answer this paper with evidence calculated to convince public opinion of the justice of its policy in the measures which it took to execute the leader of the Syrian Popular Party, under conditions which excluded the public from knowledge of the realities of the case and its accompanying circumstances. To persecute journalists and throw them into prison for the simple reason that they expressed their opinions is contrary to the pretension of the Government that its policy is to respect liberty of opinion.71

  More damaging to the government was the bad publicity it subsequently received from an-Nahar. The morning following Tueini’s imprisonment the editorial column in the popular Beirut daily carried a defiant article sardonically entitled “Freedom” that poured ridicule on the ruling clique:72

  There is a faction in this country that is intoxicated with freedom and independence, but it knows not the meaning of either. This faction extols freedom, glorifies it, and idolizes Lebanon because Lebanon is the country of freedom. But this faction has done absolutely nothing for Lebanon’s freedom. It has conspired with those who seek to subjugate the Lebanese people by drugging the people with resounding words and enthralling symbols and aphorisms that have almost pulled the people away from the real issues.

  Any country whose rulers subjugate the people, whose rights are violated, and whose law is trampled on, is not a free country and its independence is hollow. Independence does not mean the evacuation of foreign armies, or the establishment of authorities that lurk behind the formalities of the Law, or the erection of a tower in one of the city’s public squares under which people gather to discuss their power lusts.

  Independence is not merely to say to the masses at every turn: we have ceased to be a passage or a landing-spot for colonialism. Neither is independence to hound the people that we have struggled for over a quarter of a century for its independence!

  Those who struggle for independence and freedom know who the free-thinking men are, appreciate their demands, and listen to them with an open-mind.

  Those who were persecuted in the cause of freedom do not persecute freemen!

  Those who struggle in the cause of the people and homeland do not exploit the people and homeland, but remain devoted to the people. They share its tribulations and exert all effort to make the homeland a happier place.

  Those who struggle in the cause of the people and freedom know exactly that popular anger cannot be treated through terror and that its challenge cannot be put down with force!

  Those who rule by force do not rule the hearts of the people, but subtly intimidate them. If the people do not rise up right away they will eventually do so when the powerful have lost their strength.

  Those who struggle in the cause of freedom rule the people with their free assent, building up their self-confidence and striving to set their minds at ease. They strive to budge the people out of any rejection they may voice by reassuring them that the country is being taken care of by an honest and dependable hand.

  But those who use terror as their means to power renounce freedom, subjugate the people, and create a gulf between the people and its rulers. They end up with only the submissive by their side, those who have neither honor nor self-respect, and, eventually, are abandoned by everyone once their power has diminished.

  Every power has its day save that of God and the people.73

  An-Nahar continued to upbraid the government with witty remarks and aggressive editorials. On 18 July, the regime raided the offices of the Lebanese Phalange after two port workers were shot by armed guards of the party “for making undue noise in the street”74 and found a cache of hand-grenades and other light weapons. An-Nahar remarked: “Will the government have the audacity to deal with the Kataib as it did with Sa’adeh’s party during the al-Jumaizzaih incident, given the stark similarity between the two situations?”75 Of course, it did not. All of an-Nahar’s previously bottled-up political emotions then seemed to surge forth. Its incarcerated editor, Ghassan Tueini, spearheaded the crusade from his prison cell with short commentaries nicely blending exaggeration with understatement. At one point Tueini, using the kinder, gentler type of Horatian satire, derided the government as stupid and cruel and still maintained something that resembled a continuous plot. The following imaginary conversation between two characters, a youth and an imprisoned qawmi (nationalist), is a case in point:

  The youth: Why are you in prison and what are they accusing you of?

  The qawmi: They are accusing me of taking part in a conspiracy against the State and endeavoring to overthrow the government by force.

  The youth (smiles and looks at the qawmi, a slender university student and derisively) says: You? Do you know how to use a weapon?

  The qawmi (smiling): I don’t know how, but there are those among us who do know and they have staged an armed revolution and engaged government forces in battle, but were defeated and their weapons were confiscated. Six of them were executed on top of their leader [Sa’adeh] and many others had their death sentence commuted. And it is not over yet.

  The youth: How many rifles were confiscated from the group?

  The qawmi replying with a tone of pride: More than twenty rifles and about ten guns. The youth (with a loud burst of laughter): You really thought that you could topple the government with weapons like these? And is this the conspiracy you have been planning all these years? God forgives you. Why did you not come to me, for I could have sent you to a million families and clans that own hundreds of guns and rifles. In fact, I personally would have been able to organize a gang with fewer weapons than what you had and yet it would have been sufficient to chase the government away . . .76

  Another commentary that deserves to be put on record deals satirically with the issue of human rights in Lebanon:

  Let it be known that Lebanese citizens fall into two categories, a category that exercises its rights to embezzle the state and to trample on the laws and systems of the country and a category that exercises its right to beg if impoverished, to be content if it is better off, and to take its own life if it is downcast and has grown weary with God’s mercy. What’s more, our citizen can enter jail anytime he wants. All he has to do is say or write down something critical of [a government] ministry and it is all the way to jail. Our citizen even has the right to choose the way he might like to die. Should he choose death before a firing squad all he has to do is refuse to submit to the ways of al-qabadayyat and henchmen of the ministry and his desire comes through . . .77

  Critical editorials damaging to the incumbent administration also appeared in other Lebanese newspapers. Al-Sharq wrote: “It is often said journalism can lead to everything, by which it is meant that journalism can lead to the highest level of political and social glory . . . but here in Lebanon it leads only to jail.”78

  The publicity which swirled about the imprisoned editors, particularly about Tueini, severely damaged the regime’s reputation. Consequently, it found itself on public trial and forced to answer a stream of criticism that would not go away. The regime’s pretension as defender of democratic freedom was exposed as hypocritical and many Lebanese were upset by the imbalance that its actions were creating between their individual liberty and the state’s right to protect itself. More importantly, the arrest of Tueini and others succeeded in breaking open the Sa’adeh issue again. It dragged some politicians into the fray, ensuring almost daily reports and comments on Sa’adeh. These politicians may have acted out of political self-interest to unsettle the regime, but their evaluations in the Lebanese press were most useful.

  A Political Affair Averted

  A political affair transpires when a trial develops into something more than a strictly legal issue of innocence or guilt. To become an affair, writes Albert Lindemann,

  . . . a trial must engage powerful and also conflicting emotions in large numbers of people over an extended period. It must attract important numbers of prominent individuals who are willing to devote thei
r energies to winning ‘justice’, a concept that has diametrically opposed meanings for the opposing sides, since each side sees itself as motivated by selfless, high ideals. An affair must mobilize large numbers of ordinary citizens to the extent that they are willing to sign petitions, attend rallies, or engage in action in the streets. They must passionately believe in the guilt or innocence of the accused and also be persuaded that justice is not being served.79

  A classic example of a political affair is the Dreyfus case. It underscored and intensified bitter divisions within French politics and society and threatened to destroy the young French Republic. The controversy involved critical institutions and issues, including monarchists and republicans, the political parties, the Catholic Church, the army, and strong anti-Semitic sentiment. Likewise, the Beilis Affair in Kiev in 1913 provided the occasion for open and sharp discussions among the various Jewish and Russian groups on profound societal issues transcending the original problem of ritual murder. Such discussions over small details often provoked sharp conflicts. In a nutshell, a political affair “occasions, legitimizes, and intensifies demands for major or minor corrective changes in the existing political formula.”80 In the process, society is apt to disagree over the nature and extent of the required change and, in some cases, over whether change is necessary at all. As the groups debate, fundamental issues pertaining to social and political life in general, and to state institutions in particular, come to the fore and legitimate political and bureaucratic leaders increasingly are dragged into the controversy.

  As a drawn-out event, a political affair can be a cumbersome risk for any government. However, notes Nathan Yanai, if managed within the boundaries of the law it may serve as “an extraordinary, nonstatutory catalyst for irregular political change:”81

  The affair coalesces various cumulative tensions and brings them to a head, thereby creating an exceptional opportunity, or even a necessity, to redefine, confirm, or modify the existing political formula governing a democratic polity – the particular choice of leaders and political parties in power and their interaction with other political groups and social elites and the treatment of existing rules and institutions. Hence the affair.82

  The Sa’adeh case contained at least four properties that were capable of turning it into a major political affair:

  The transgressions relate to the condition of the political society as a whole: national identity, established authority, individual and democratic rights, sectarian politics, and social justice – all issues that struck deep roots in the soil of Lebanon.

  There existed substantial evidence of serious misconduct committed for personal and political ends by, or at least with the tacit approval of, the legitimate political, bureaucratic, and military leaders.

  The case included within its folds cumulative tensions and grievances that previously lacked either a common, legitimate focus or sufficient resiliency.

  There was a clear obstruction of justice in the investigation and litigation of the initial offense including, as we shall see later, fabrication of evidence.

  As well, the “interactive factors”83 that go into the making of a political affair were readily obtainable in Lebanon: (1) an active press to “pursue and expose the properties of the incipient affair, to define sharply the issues involved, and to strive persistently to turn it into a full-fledged political affair.”84 (2) Sufficient opposition to the regime “to justify the exposure of the affair, to sustain public interest in it, and eventually to vindicate their own professional judgment and performance.”85 Another factor is the presence of a vocal intellectual stratum whose use of the case can, in one way or another, help to build and sustain it as a living issue. Intellectuals may be drawn in either to defend the Establishment or to fight its enemies. Some may even be dissenters against the Establishment. Certainly, in Lebanon, there was no shortage of intellectuals. Many of those who became involved in the Sa’adeh saga were, on the whole, professional intellectuals with some or strong political ambitions. In fact, the categories “intellectuals,” “journalists,” and “politician” overlapped so much that they were at times indistinguishable.

  Yet, for all these factors, the political and journalistic commotion that followed Sa’adeh’s execution failed to crack open the case as some Lebanese may have hoped. It did not have a drastic effect on the status of the Khoury regime or give birth to procedural reviews even when the press campaign seemed to pose a serious threat to the stability of the government. There were no public demonstrations, no disruption to political life, and no international outcry to speak of. Even more ironic was the silence of Lebanon’s judicial and human rights bodies, which recognized the injustice that was done but did nothing. The only recorded exception was that of Emile Tian, the Attorney General, who resigned in protest against what he saw as government interference in the judicial system.86 However, the controversy was diffused at the initial stage, without any larger impact on the political process.

  To understand why the Sa’adeh case remained just that – a case – it is necessary to look more closely at the time and political context within which the saga unfolded. The press is an ideal starting point. Overall, most Lebanese dailies keenly followed the conflict between Sa’adeh and the regime to its final stages. Each newspaper actively promoted the case by writing continuously about it or by extensively repeating and commenting upon each other’s material. Some newspapers, like an-Nahar, adopted a proactive stance and devoted their primary energies to exposing the regime’s transgressions. Collectively, those newspapers that prioritized the goal of exposing government corruption and cover-ups fostered an awareness of a political scandal even when this was far from their intention. They may even have succeeded in making a political affair out of Sa’adeh’s case if not for government harassment of editors and owners after the execution. As a result of this harassment, many newspapers abandoned their search for the truth.

  Another issue is this: back then the Lebanese press was very different from the press today, anywhere. Most newspapers were short, only four pages, with eight pages just beginning to be adopted, slowly; most were creating, slowly but surely, the thought of an independent Lebanon and so were not predisposed to Sa’adeh; most had small readerships and a limited, select clientele, whose prejudices they addressed with similarly slanted journalism. Few of them circulated outside the metropolitan centres of Beirut or other main towns or reached the countryside and outlying areas. Public visibility, therefore, was poor and many Lebanese missed out on or only belatedly discovered the injustice that was done. Furthermore, most newspapers in that era were – and still are today – given over to what may best be described as propaganda efforts. They concentrated their journalism on invective rather than on substance and, on the whole, were reluctant to reveal the details correctly or to publish critical editorials contrary to their sponsor’s financial and political interests. As a result, after Sa’adeh was executed, his story slowly slipped into obscurity and the whole notion of justice was crunched-up between abstract principle and immediate practical considerations. Its intrinsic meaning was lost to political rhetoric or used for partisan and personal political advantage, to the general detriment of justice. Eventually, as the press passed into abstention, interest in the case as a critical matter of criminal justice fizzled out.

  Standing up for Sa’adeh was no easy matter. The conflict was too bitter and too often violent. The Lebanese press played a crucial role in keeping the issue alive, but it was not able to prolong the controversy or to produce a lasting sensation. Part of the reason for this was due to the weakness and pusillanimity shown by the Lebanese intellectuals during the saga. As stated earlier, a political affair needs strong embrace from society’s intellectuals. It is the intellectuals who bestow political and cultural credibility on issues and bring forward a new tone of debate in the public sphere. This desire for a critical discussion is exemplified by what Edward Said called “speaking truth to power.”87 To do such a thing, intellectuals
need to position themselves outside the masses and question in a radical way the very idea of the public sphere itself. As Noam Chomsky had once noted:

  Intellectuals are in a position to expose the lies of governments, to analyze actions according to their causes and motives and often hidden intentions. In the Western world, at least, they have the power that comes from political liberty, from access to information and freedom of expression. For a privileged minority, Western democracy provides the leisure, the facilities, and the training to seek the truth lying hidden behind the veil of distortion and misrepresentation, ideology and class interest, through which the events of current history are presented to us. The responsibilities of intellectuals, then, are much deeper than . . . the “responsibility of people,” given the unique privileges that intellectuals enjoy.88

  When we take a look at the birth of intellectuals in Europe (and more specifically after the Dreyfus affair), we see that intellectuals are the most important sociological actors of change. As a matter of fact, their struggle for critical rationality and civil liberties goes hand in hand with their critique and refusal of instrumental rationality and spirit of domination. The Dreyfus Affair itself would not have been if not for the French intellectuals and the active participation of exemplary figures like Georges Clemenceau, Joseph Reinach, Jean Jaures and Emile Zola, in particular.89

  In contrast, the Sa’adeh saga suffered deeply from intellectual abstention. In those days, Lebanese intellectuals constituted a small but substantial force; though a minority, they were numerous enough to be weighty in the much fragmented political system, and they were a growing movement. Yet few are the intellectuals who adhered to the campaign against the regime or who were easily moved by the struggle waged at first mainly through the press. Even those who dared to clamor displayed only flickers of interest in the case. There was, on the whole, a reluctance to diagnose the facts or to “speak truth to power” – to use Edward Said’s phrase again. This was a serious shortcoming in more ways than one. By distancing themselves from the deceit and distortion surrounding the saga, Lebanese intellectuals, especially the most able of them, dragged the general public down with them since the “power of the government’s propaganda apparatus is such that the citizen who does not undertake a research project on the subject can hardly hope to confront government pronouncements with fact.”90 It was also important for allowing the government a sense of collective strength and giving it added force in national politics. When finally something did happen, it came chiefly from semi-intellectual journalists and politicians rather than from the cultivated men of words – or men of letters – whose opinions generally carry more weight than any others and, occasionally, determine outcomes.