by Adel Beshara
One can refer briefly to the reasons for this intellectual abstention and lack of concern for the truth by saying that they were caused by utter fear – fear of depravation in a highly restricted job market; fear of retribution from the government; fear of being humiliated or retaliated against by those who wished Sa’adeh no other ending; fear of being branded as unpatriotic or sans-patries as Dreyfusards before them were labeled by their opponents in France. Fear everywhere acts as a brake on the freedom and creativity of the pen. That much is true. Nonetheless, intellectuals are expected to overcome such limitations, to put courage ahead of fear. As a credible sector of society, it is up to the intellectuals to expose government corruption and the misuse of power in high places. Doing justice or undoing justice to one person or more is and should be among their primary concerns. What meaning and what value would intellectuals otherwise have if they remained passive onlookers in the face of evil?
Other reasons for abstention come to mind: a lack of experience in intellectual activism; social indifference to human and political justice; the absence of a general sense of community or commonality even among intellectuals; and the predominance of a subservient mentality and a tradition of deference to authority. The saga’s overtly political character was also obstructive. Comparatively few people paid attention to the underlying issue of justice, and most Lebanese either believed the government or cared little about what happened. Since the country was in the throes of newfound independence, they were too intoxicated by their recent success against the French to care about something that seemed anathema to them. Political continuity was thus put ahead of government accountability in the name of national interest.
The third factor in the unmaking of the Sa’adeh affair was the absence of sufficient opposition. At the beginning of the affair, the Lebanese state was severely divided. Although bound by a central government, it was nevertheless much fragmented by sectarian, regional, and ideological differences which made its supposed unity an illusion. People in many parts of the country felt more reason for attachment to their own sect than they did to the claims of Lebanese nationalism. They were not an integral nation-state but a composite bound together by necessity or convenience. In the six years that the Khoury regime had been in power a sense of commonality had slowly evolved based upon but by no means resting entirely on a gentleman’s agreement dubbed the National Pact. By 1949 a national Lebanese identity had become better established but its conflict with sectarian and regional particularism had not disappeared. Old, familiar forms of state corruption aggravated the problem as politicians vied to enrich themselves individually without care for morality, law, or the interest of Lebanon as a whole. A vocal opposition did slowly form but it was scarcely distinguishable in political orientation from those holding the reins of power. Its antipathy to the regime involved a complex of reactions against current practice that coalesced in 1947 with rigged elections. After that, the opposition renewed itself and assumed a vigorous, reshaped form, on the basis of a definite program. The immediate focal point of that program was the apparent corruption and ineffectuality of the government: it did not concern itself with the organic defects associated with the mediocre National Pact and viewed widely as responsible for the country’s slow political progress. In other words, the Lebanese opposition was part and parcel of the Establishment and belonged to the same ruling elite as the regime in power.91
This political compatibility between the regime and the opposition precluded the possibility of a political affair. It served as a corrective, defensive reaction to the saga in two ways. First, it reduced the receptivity of the political process to an affair since both sides stood at an identical distance from Sa’adeh. Reasonable persons neither from the government nor from the opposition, therefore, felt compelled to pursue the saga or to seek to have it placed on the political agenda. Some politicians, like Jumblatt and Chamoun, may have voiced disgust at the conduct of the trial but they were scarcely taken seriously by the general population. Most cared too little for discovering truth. Second, political compatibility between the regime and the opposition over the governing political formula insulated the public from the saga and helped to ensure a gradual return to normality. The process was aided by the passive reaction of the general population which, in the usual tumult of events, had more important problems to think about. Although ordinarily skeptical of politicians, most Lebanese had definite negative convictions about Sa’adeh and wanted desperately to sustain the governing political formula, although some variations were discernible. Moreover, for many, the ideas and values associated with the saga seemed very much strange to them. Making sense of the affair required knowing its underlying causes, the sequence of events, and why things turned out the way they did, all of which were beyond the reach of most ordinary Lebanese.
Naturally, the case was confounded by the secrecy and speed with which it happened. Both elements precluded the possibility of public involvement since the details were scant and unclear. It left critics with little time and space to deal with the fundamental legal and political principles which formed the fulcrum of the saga. Moreover, the government’s refusal to publish the trial transcripts after the execution all but killed off the potential for political crisis and effectively isolated the process for participation and mobilization. In so doing, it deprived the Lebanese polity of an exceptional opportunity, or even a necessity, to re-evaluate itself and reap the potentially high benefits that flow from political affairs:
The political affair [is] a form of democratic ritual highlighting questions of public sovereignty and trust in a representative government. It may create the notion that in one redeeming act of politics – doing justice or undoing injustice to one person or more – society can cleanse itself and regain a new measure of authority over its elected leaders.92
Moreover, by dodging a political affair the government did not seriously consider the potential for greater hazards. Instead of petering out as it widely anticipated, the Sa’adeh case became a lingering problem that kept leaping back and forth to haunt the regime at every turn. No sooner had Sa’adeh’s followers regrouped and the political pendulum swung back in their favor, which happened quickly with Zaim’s overthrow in Syria, than the case spun out of control and became a political nightmare for the Khoury regime. It refused to go away; it has not gone away to this day.
Conclusion
Reactions to Sa’adeh’s trial and execution exceeded all expectations. No doubt, the action of the regime was made in the incredible belief that any hostile response, from the public or the polity, would scarcely matter since the main centres of power in the state, namely the army and the political institutions, were firmly under its control. The fact that Sa’adeh had the backing of none of the major sects that supported the political system was also important and precluded the possibility of a public backlash. There was also the real chance that the government was encouraged by its principal regional and international allies.
It was left primarily to the national press to expose the regime’s transgressions. The press enabled ordinary Lebanese to gain a real idea of how the Sa’adeh case was actually conducted and to sense the injustice that was done. The regime tried to intimidate editors but to no avail. Every response provoked more criticism until local newspapers became glutted with negative news about the regime. This bred cynicism for and distrust in the government. More importantly, it emboldened other public figures to step forward and speak more openly about the case. An example is that of Lieutenant Colonel Zahran Yameen, who was jailed for two months on charges of aiding the rebellion and released without trial. Yameen published a four-part series on his role in the rebellion that cast additional doubt on the government’s version of events.93 He could not ignore the dishonesty and opportunism of some people. The publication of such personal recollections as those of Yameen, alongside regular reports on the subsequent trials of Sa’adeh’s supporters and official harassment of local editors exercised a fundamental effect o
n public opinion and added powerfully to the drama and the ironies of the case.
Still, the question remained: why would a government, any government, execute a person who, in its own estimation, had lived on the margins of the political system and exercised no significant influence over the various sectarian communities that supported and helped to bring it into existence? The question is intriguing. It has given risen to several theories about Sa’adeh’s execution, some believable and some fanciful.
Notes
1 John Dugard, “The Political Trial: Some Special Considerations.” South African Law Journal, 91 (1974): 60.
2 Otto Kirchheimer, Political Justice: The Use of Legal Procedures for Political Ends. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1961: 6.
3 Laurence H. Tribe, American Constitutional Law. 2nd ed. Mineola, N.Y.: Foundation Press, 1988.
4 Alan Donagan, The Theory of Morality. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1977: 65–74.
5 Al Qabas, Damascus, 12 July, 1949.
6 Ibid. Sa’adeh did once himself say that the nations that squander their talented individuals are like children who break their toys and then cry over them.
7 See Gitta Yaffe, “Suleiman al-Murshid: Beginnings of an Alawi Leader.” Middle Eastern Studies, 29 (4):624–640.
8 Itamar Rabinovich, “The Compact Minorities and the Syrian State, 1918–45.” Journal of Contemporary History, Vol. 14, No. 4 (Oct., 1979): 693.
9 See by Abd al-Aziz Karam, Al-Rabb al-Buzayyaf Salman al-Murshid (The False God Salman Al-Murshid). Damascus: Maktabat Dimashq, 1947.
10 Hashim Uthman, al-Muhakamt al-Siyassiyah fi Suria (Political Trials in Syria). Beirut: Riad El-Rayyes Books, 2004: 117–142.
11 Ibid. The Archbishop likened prosecutor Youssef Sharbel to Andry Vishinski, who gained worldwide notoriety as an aggressive and vengeful courtroom lawyer during the purges of the 1930s.
12 An-Nahar, Beirut, 19 July, 1949.
13 Reproduced in Abdul Ghani al-Atari, Sa’adeh wa al-Hizb al-Qawmi (Sa’adeh and the National Party). Damascus: Al-Dunia Printers, 1950: 158–205.
14 Nadhir Fansah, Ayyam Husni Zaim: 137 Yawman Hazzat Suria (Days of Husni Zaim: 137 Days that Shook Syria). Beirut: Dar al-Afaq al-Jadidah, 1983.
15 See Hani el-Kheir, Adib al-Shishakli Sahib al-Inqlab al-Thalith fi Suria (Adib al-Shishakli: Leader of the Third Coup in Syria). Damascus: Dar al-Sharq al-Jadid, 1995: 42–27; and Ali Rida, Suria min al-Istiqlal hatta al-Wihda al-Mubaraka, 1946–1958 (Syria from Independence to the Sacred Union, 1946–1958). Aleppo: Dar al-Insha’, 1983: 96–97.
16 New York Times, 9 July, 1949.
17 Ibid.
18 Kirsten E. Schulze, Israel’s Covert Diplomacy in Lebanon. London: Macmillan Press Ltd, 1998: 32. Schulze writes: “In spring 1948 a meeting between a Lebanese-American Maronite priest, Joseph Awad, and Eliahu Ben-Horin and Sulamith Schwartz of the American Zionist Emergency Council resulted in direct Zionist funding of Father Awad’s visit to Lebanon in April and May 1948. Father Awad from Waterville, Maine was militantly anti-Arab and anti-Muslim. He favoured outright military alliance between Israel and Lebanon. The purpose of his visit was to sound out Lebanese opinion in the war against Israel and the Maronites’ opposition to the as-Sulh government. It was at this point in time that the Kataib or Phalange Libanaise entered into unofficial Israeli-Lebanese relations. The Kataib became the core of opposition to the Riad as-Sulh/Bishara aI-Khoury government. Awad, who was a cousin of the patriarch and nephew of Sheikh Tewfic Awad, met with Patriarch Arida, Lebanese President Bishara aI-Khoury and Kataib leader Pierre Gemayel. On his return to the US, he reported to Gideon Ruffer (Rafael), counsellor in Israel’s delegation to the United Nations.”
19 The New York Times, 5 August, 1949.
20 In his letter to The New York Times, the reverend describes the Kataib as a “strong, progressive Christian youth movement.” Ibid.
21 The Times, Saturday, 9 July, 1949.
22 US Department of State 89OE.88/7-1849 (Cable dated 12 July, 1949) According to Mansour Azar, the Arabic community in the Ghanian capital closed their commercial and trading premises in protest against Sa’adeh’s execution. See al-Bina’, Beirut, 17 July, 1999.
23 See Joseph Lash, Eleanor and Franklin. New York: W.W. Norton, 1971.
24 US Department of State 89OE.88/7-1849.
25 An-Nahar, Beirut, 19 July, 1949.
26 An-Nahar, Beirut, 23 July, 1949.
27 An-Nahar, Beirut, 10 July, 1949.
28 Ibid.
29 Al-Hayat, Beirut, 9 July, 1949.
30 An-Nahar, Beirut, 9 July, 1949.
31 Ibid.
32 Nada Raad, “Tueini talks about his turbulent relationship with SSNP.” Daily Star, Saturday, May 22, 2004.
33 As-Sayyad, Beirut, No. 267, 1949.
34 Al-Haqeeqah, Beirut, 30 July, 1949.
35 Ibid.
36 Ibid.
37 Ibid.
38 Ibid.
39 Ibid.
40 Al-Huda, Beirut, 22 July, 1949.
41 Ibid.
42 Al-Amal, Beirut, 7 July, 1949.
43 The New York Times, 11 July, 1949.
44 Al-Amal, Beirut, 13 July, 1949.
45 The New York Times, 11 July, 1949.
46 Ibid.
47 Ibid.
48 An-Nahar, Beirut, 17 July, 1949.
49 Ibid.
50 Ibid.
51 Ibid.
52 An-Nahar, Beirut, 17 July, 1949.
53 All three interpellations can be found in Antoine Butrus, Qissat muhakamat Antun Sa’adeh was i’damehe (An Account of Antun Sa’adeh’s Trial and Execution). Beirut: Chemaly & Chemaly, 2002: 223–240.
54 Lebanese Parliamentary Record, 16 August, 1948: 613–614.
55 Ibid.
56 Ibid.
57 See Jumblatt’s “First Interpellation”.
58 See Jumblatt’s “Second Interpellation”.
59 Ibid.
60 Ibid.
61 Lebanese Parliamentary Record, 16 August, 1948: 613–614.
62 An-Nahar, Beirut, 17 September, 1949.
63 L’Aurore, Paris, Thursday, 13 January, 1898.
64 See Norman Podhoretz, “J’accuse!”, Commentary, Vol. 74, No. 3 (Sept. 1982): 21–31.
65 The Times, 15 July, 1949.
66 An-Nahar, Beirut, 12 July, 1949.
67 An-Nahar, Beirut, 15 July, 1949.
68 An-Nahar, Beirut, 20 August, 1949.
69 An-Nahar, Beirut, 22 August, 1949.
70 Ibid., 2.
71 New York Times, 12 July, 1949.
72 An-Nahar, Beirut, 16 July, 1949.
73 An-Nahar, Beirut, 17 July, 1949
74 The New York Times, 19 July, 1949.
75 An-Nahar, Beirut, 20 July, 1949.
76 An-Nahar, Beirut, 11 August, 1949.
77 An-Nahar, Beirut, 23 July, 1949.
78 Al-Sharq, Beirut, 15 July, 1949.
79 Albert Lindemann, The Jew Accused: Three Anti-Semitic Affairs (Dreyfus, Beilis, Frank) 1894–1915. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991: 5.
80 Nathan Yanai, “The Political Affair: A Framework for Comparative Discussion.” Comparative Politics, Vol. 22, No. 2 (Jan., 1990): 185.
81 Ibid.
82 Ibid.
83 Ibid., 187.
84 Ibid.
85 Ibid., 187–188.
86 An-Nahar, Beirut, 1 September, 1949.
87 See Rashid I. Khalidi, “Edward W. Said and the American Public Sphere: Speaking Truth to Power.” Boundary 2, Vol. 25, No. 2 (Summer, 1998): 161–177.
88 Noam Chomsky, ‘A Special Supplement: The Responsibility of Intellectuals.’ The New York Review of Books, Vol. 8, No. 3 (23 February, 1967).
89 On the role of each of these figures in the Dreyfus Affair see Robert L. Hoffman, More than a Trial: The Struggle over Captain Dreyfus. London: Collier Macmillan Publishers, 1980: 96–116.
90 Ibid.
91 See Eyal Zisser, “The Downfall of the Khuri Administration: A Dubious Revolu
tion.” Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 30, No. 3 (Jul., 1994): 486–511.
92 Yanai, op. cit., 196.
93 See an-Nahar’s August–September issues, 1949.
6 THE SCENARIOS
Sa’adeh’s execution by the Lebanese State on 8 July, 1949, evoked a torrent of questions inside and outside Lebanon: What were the real reasons for the killing of Sa’adeh? Why did the Lebanese government opt for the death penalty rather than for the more conventional life imprisonment or exile? Was there a conspiracy against Sa’adeh? Was it a purely Lebanese domestic issue, the outcome of a political struggle that went very wrong, or was the regime simply a tool in a much larger plan? What did the regime hope to gain from executing Sa’adeh? Who were the principal beneficiaries from Sa’adeh’s execution? The Sa’adeh trial provides no conclusive answers to these questions, but it does offer insight into all of them.