by Adel Beshara
Of course we cannot know just how different history could have been with Sa’adeh. The game of ‘what if?’ yields different answers for different people and for different political persuasions. And there will be many who ask: do individuals really matter so much in history, compared with mass social movements? Yet, we can say with certainty that had Sa’adeh lived, the trajectory of Lebanese politics would have been different. For one thing, the sectarian politicians, both the individuals who held the reigns of power and those who wanted to take it away from them, would not have had it as easy as they did. In Syria, Zaim may have remained in power, at least for longer than he did, and his regime may not have collapsed with the SNP by his side. The SNP would have profited more from Sa’adeh and probably become a political force in its own right. Assessing the event from this perspective brings Sa’adeh’s killing into clearer focus and allows for systematic exploration of whether it produced its intended effects.
Notes
1 Clifford Bob and Sharon Erickson Nepstad, “Kill a Leader, Murder a Movement? Leadership and Assassination in Social Movements,” American Behavioral Scientist, Vol. 50, No. 10 (June 2007), 1370–1394.
2 See Adel Beshara, The Politics of Frustration: The Failed Coup of 1961. London: Routledge, 2005: 37–47.
3 Most of these censorship rules dated back to the Ottoman era of the late nineteenth century. See Donald J. Cioeta, “Ottoman Censorship in Lebanon and Syria, 1876–1908,” International Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol. 10, No. 2 (May, 1979), pp. 167–186.
4 The most notorious case in this respect was the truncated publication of a condemnatory note cabled by the Syro-Lebanese community in Brazil: censors deleted the condemnation in the cable and left only the names and signatories for an-Nahar to publish!
5 An-Nahar, Beirut, 29 August, 1949.
6 An-Nahar, Beirut, 31 August, 1949.
7 An-Nahar, Beirut, 27 July, 1949.
8 An-Nahar, Beirut, 23 July, 1949.
9 Ibid.
10 The New York Times, 18 July, 1949.
11 The New York Times, 19 July, 1949.
12 On 17 July, police raided and sealed the building and other Beirut offices of that organization. Twenty-five members of the organization were arrested, and Pierre Gemayel, chief of the Phalange, was summoned by the public prosecutor for questioning. The New York Times, 19 July, 1949.
13 Ibid.
14 See N. E. Bou Nacklie, “Les Troupes Speciales: Religious and Ethnic Recruitment 1916–1946,” International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 25, No. 4 (Nov. 1993): 645–660.
15 US Department of State Incoming Telegram, 890E.00/7-749.
16 The New York Times, 21 July, 1949.
17 Ibid.
18 Francis G. Wilson, “Political Suppression in the Modern State,” The Journal of Politics, Vol. 1, No. 3 (Aug., 1939): 245.
19 Ibid., 237.
20 Vilfredo Pareto, The Mind and Society, tr. from the Italian, 4 vols., Sec. 1757. New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1935: 12.
21 Ibid.
22 Many rumours about Abd Al-Massih’s whereabouts were reported in the local press. One report had him hiding in Turkey; another that he had sought political asylum in Israel. He turned up in Syria. See an-Nahar, 28 July, 1949.
23 In its issue of 4 September, 1949, an-Nahar carried a report on the election of Sa’adeh’s successor. On another occasion, it published an interview with the Party’s new Dean of Propaganda, Issam al-Muhairy.
24 The New York Times, 10 August, 1949.
25 Ibid.
26 Ibid.
27 See an interview with the assailant Tewfic Hamdan in Sabah el-Kheir, 7 July, 1984: 49–51.
28 See Abdullah Qubarsi, Qubarsi Ya Tazakar (Recollections), Vol. 4. Beirut: al-Furat 2004: 122.
29 The New York Times, 17 July, 1951.
30 The New York Times, 30 July, 1951.
31 Ghassan al-Khalidi, Sa’adeh wa al-thawrah al-Ula (Sa’adeh and the First Revolution). Beirut: Dar wa Maktabat al-Turath al-Adabi, 1997: 242.
32 Eyal Zisser, for example, writes: “Indeed, news of Sulh’s death precipitated a wave of violence in Lebanese cities. The Sulh family implicitly accused Khuri of being responsible for the murder.” E. Zisser, “The Downfall of the Khuri Administration: A Dubious Revolution.” Middle East Studies, 30 (1994): 286–311.
33 Eyal Zisser, “The Downfall of the Khuri Administration: A Dubious Revolution.” Middle East Studies, 30 (1994): 286–311.
34 In its 1947 discourse, the SSNP publically questioned the integrity of the Khoury regime and spoke openly about its incompetence. In it, the party warned of “corruption in the administration, a never-ending clawing for power, economic stagnation, deterioration in ethics” and of “a danger that foreign interests might impose their will with the help, of course, of their veteran local allies.” For more details see Antun Sa’adeh, al-Athar al-Kamilah (Complete Works), Vol. 14. Beirut: Syrian Social National Party Information Bureau, n.d.: 93.
35 Historical scholars do not make more than a passing reference to the SSNP’s part in the 1952 events. Instead, they tend to focus on four other principal groups: 1. The Maronite leadership which abandoned the Khoury administration because of personal disputes or ambition. The two outstanding figures in this respect were Camille Chamoun and Hamid Franjiyyeh. 2. The National Progressive Socialist Party of Kamal Jumblatt. 3. The Nationalist Bloc of Emile Edde under his son’s leadership. 4. Non-Maronite politicians like Majid Arslan, Sabri Hammada, Gabriel al-Murr and Adel Asairan, who were angry because they had lost their positions in the government.
36 For example, in 1947, the leader of the SSNP wrote: “The first measures by [the Khoury] government leave little doubt that it has almost modelled its tactics on some by-gone feudal principality out to extinguish every concept in the state that may go against the whims or interests of its leaders, and to abort all autonomous strength in our people lest they pose problems for their designs.” (Ibid., 103.) Echoing Sa’adeh, Kamal Jumblatt of the PSP declared during the general election of 1951 that, under Khoury, “the state has become the property of a few parasites with an insatiable appetite . . . Those who call themselves heroes of the independence regime . . . who were raised to power by General Spears should be ejected by the people.” (Quoted in Wade R. Goria, Sovereignty and Leadership in Lebanon: 1943–1976. London: Ithaca Press, 1985: 34–35.) Jumblatt’s remark, just like Sa’adeh’s, led to a series of prosecutions and to the suspension of those newspapers which reprinted it.
37 Ibid., 93.
38 Ibid.
39 For a description of the assassination plot see Adib Kaddoura, Haqa’iq wa mawaqif (Facts and Stances). Beirut: Fikr, 1989: 133–136.
40 Wade R. Goria, Sovereignty and Leadership in Lebanon 1943–1976. London: Ithaca Press, 1985: 34.
41 Michael C. Hudson, ibid., 273.
42 Sulh’s resignation was preceded by a personal scathing attack on the President and his brother before parliament. He described both of them “as men of authority who rule without being responsible [and] intefere in every aspect of the state.” See Sami Solh, Memoirs, 224–27, cited in F. I. Qubain, Crisis in Lebanon. Washington D.C.: The Middle East Institute, 1961: 23.
43 An-Nahar played a key role in criticizing and showing the corruption of the Khoury administration. Louis el-Hage relates in his book Min makhzoun al-zakirah (Old Memories; Beirut: Dar an-Nahar, 1993: 11–27) that President Khoury was incensed by the sarcastic reporting and editorials published in the paper. He recalls how Khoury was infuriated by two article headings (“God’s mercy upon [Sultan] Abdul Hamid and upon his era” – which appeared after one of the Sultan’s descendants died and was buried in Beirut, and “It seems that even in Latin America the idea of a second presidential term is unpopular” – a reference to the turmoil which occurred in one of the Latin American countries after the parliament amended the constitution to allow the president to stay on for a second term) which appeared at the height of his presidential crisis.
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44 Pierre Emile Edde was a Maronite candidate representing al-Kutla al-Wataniyyah (the National Bloc of his deceased father, Emile Edde). The SSNP supported him against Pierre Jumayyel, leader of the Kataib Party, who had the backing of al-Kutlah al-Dasturiyyah (the Constitutional Bloc of President Khoury).
45 Although still outlawed, the SSNP ran the election in the Matn openly under the banner “the battle of Jummaizeh.” Jummaizeh, it will be remembered, was the place where the attack on the SSNP printing headquarters took place in 1949 by members of the Kataib Party. See Chapter 5 for more details about this incident.
46 For example, the ninth article in the program of the Front demanded the restoration of freedom of thought and the right for “all political parties” to operate freely and openly in Lebanon. For an outline of the program of the National Socialist Front and its minutes and regular meetings leading up to the general strike in 1952, see The Progressive Socialist Party: A Quarter of a Century in Struggle, Vol. 1. Beirut: Markaz al-Bouhouth al-Istiraqiyya, 1974: 56–7 and 65–76.
47 The rally was estimated at 30,000. See George M. Haddad, Revolutions and Military Rule in the Middle East: the Arab States, Vol. II. New York: Robert Speller and Sons, Publishers, 1971): 404.
48 Mustafa Abd al-Satir, Ayyam wa Qadiyya (The Cause We Lived For). Beirut: Fikr Research Centre, 1982: 112.
49 The party’s relationship with the Lebanese regime after 1949 did not improve, despite the public outcry caused by Sa’adeh’s tragic death in July of that year. For example, less than two weeks after its leader was put down, six of its members were executed in the same manner. Moreover, the ban that was imposed on the party after the infamous incident at Jummaizeh was never lifted and the army, in conjunction with the internal security forces, kept a tight control on its activities across the Syrian-Lebanese borders.
50 Eyal Zisser, Ibid., 504.
51 The New York Times, 10 August, 1949.
52 Ibid.
53 Ibid.
54 Nadhir Fansah, Ayyam Husni Zaim: 137 Yawman Hazzat Suria (Days of Husni Zaim: 137 Days that Shook Syria). Beirut: Dar al-Afaq al-Jadidah, 1983: 85.
55 See Al-Ayyam, Damascus, 23 August, 1949.
56 Referring to a remark which Zaim made during an address before a group of officers at the Damascus officers club where a party was given to celebrate Evacuation Day (17 April, marking the evacuation of Syria by the French Army), he said: “I am a son of the people. I was born poor, grew up poor, and now I assume the administration while I am poor. I promise to leave it, also while I am poor . . .” An-Nasr, 18 April, 1949.
57 See Ibrahim Yammut, Al-Hisad al-Mur (The Bitter Harvest). Beirut: Dar al-Rukin, 1993.
58 Clifford Bob and Sharon Erickson Nepstad, “Kill a Leader, Murder a Movement? Leadership and Assassination in Social Movements,” American Behavioral Scientist, 50 (2007): 1375.
59 Ibid.
60 See Centre for Asian Studies, Martyrdom and Political Resistance: Essays from Asia and Europe (Comparative Asian Studies, 18) Amsterdam: Vu University Press, 1997.
61 Clifford Bob and Sharon Erickson Nepstad, “Kill a Leader, Murder a Movement? Leadership and Assassination in Social Movements,” American Behavioral Scientist, 50 (2007): 1379.
62 Examples: “Life is but an honourable stand”; “the noblest sacrifice is the sacrifice of blood”; and “I don’t care how I die but what I die for.”
63 The SNP’s survival lends further empirical evidence to the hypothesis that killing a movement’s leader doesn’t always yield its intended results.
64 See Margaret Bodran, “Violence in the Syrian Social Nationalist Party,” MA, American University of Beirut, 1970.
65 Jukliet al-Mir Sa’adeh, Mudhakarat al-Amina al-Oula (Memoirs). Beirut: Kutb Publications, 2004: 111.
66 Ibid.
67 Ibid., 112.
68 Ibid.
69 Ibid., 112–113.
70 Ibid., 113.
71 Ibid.
72 Ibid., 114.
73 Ibid., 116.
74 Ibid.
8 VENERATION
Execution transformed Antun Sa’adeh from a controversial figure into a sacred emblem. The esteem suddenly shown Antun Sa’adeh after his demise re-affirmed the continuing power of his ideas and turned him into an object of reverence at a time when some people still held him in mixed or low regard. His reputation rose more dramatically than any other public figure not only in Lebanon but in the Arab world as well. Patrick Seale did not err when he said “Sa’ada inspired devotion as probably no other leader in Arab politics has done.”1
For enemies of Sa’adeh, his death did little to alter their opinions. But for contemporary critics and supporters his death was an act of martyrdom that gave greater substance to his image as a heroic, self-sacrificing figure. He was declared a martyr because he chose to suffer and die rather than give up his convictions, and that made him a hero. Two things are important here. The first was Sa’adeh’s willingness to place his cause above the value of his own life; the other, and most impressive, is the serenity and inner peace that he felt at the moment of his execution. His moral courage was there to the end:
We believe that it would be a great honor for anyone able to place his life and destiny in one pan of a scale that would face the cause for which he strives in the other and that he could completely sacrifice himself to win either a martyrdom that will light up the path for others or overwhelming victory.2
Sa’adeh has been commemorated in all sorts of ways – prose, drama, paintings, plays, music, poetry, and even opera. The vision of Sa’adeh, based on these forms, was that of the patriot hero, the courageous individual who had fought the Western imperialists and their domestic cronies and thus redeemed the national honor. This vision was not constructed in a cultural-political void, and has to be placed in context and explained in relation to Lebanese society and politics. A number of developments, therefore, have to be kept in mind, particularly Sa’adeh’s execution and how it was cultivated and received. Many aspects of his complex political ideology are also relevant. They provide a framework for understanding public perceptions of his image and how they have shifted over the years.
Ultimately, the heroic mystique that grew around Sa’adeh was used not only to sanction certain political ends but also to ensure that Sa’adeh would remain a revered figure in death as much as he was in life.
Creating the Myth
The explosion of affection for the murdered Sa’adeh was initially displayed in dailies. The public was blitzed by a wave of critical editorials revealing details of his execution and of the miscarriage of justice that had preceded it. Among the people who wrote publicly about Sa’adeh were political figures, newspaper editors and commentators, clergymen, poets, and essayists addressing a narrow audience of educated readers. All the writers provided useful information not only on his execution but also on general beliefs about Sa’adeh, although some articulated them better than others. Most writers typically included brief remarks about Sa’adeh’s moral character, his service to the country in a troubled time, and his heinous execution. Statements issued by friendly newspaper editors followed no traditional design, but they covered the same ground as the politicians. Unfriendly editors paid their respects, too. They acknowledged their differences with Sa’adeh but dwelled on the merit of his ideas. Almost all condemned his execution.
An illustration of this would be the following extract from a long commentary by Said Freyha, a traditional critic of Sa’adeh:
Sa’adeh’s arrest took him by surprise. He never expected that six men would get into his car and arrest him. Nevertheless, he did not protest or shriek. He only turned around to one of the men and said “thank you”.
He remained silent and calm throughout the journey. At the border-crossing he was received by Amir Farid Chehab and several officers of the Lebanese army. Sa’adeh was first taken to a Lebanese police station and then to the interrogation room at the military tribunal.
The man retained his
composure and calm not only when he was arrested but throughout his ordeal from the interrogation to the trial to the pronouncement of the death sentence, to the execution.
He remained cool, calm and collected from beginning to end. He stood for eight hours in the dock without bending a knee or leaning forward.
He improvised a defense for an hour and a half without stuttering or uttering one offensive word. He received the death sentence as if he was receiving an invitation for lunch.
After hearing the sentence, he went back to prison where he slept the sleep of the just . . . as if he had been sentenced to sleep not to death.
When awakened, they asked him: “What would you like to have before execution?” He requested a cup of coffee!
He drank the coffee with the same calm, nerve, and temperament as he always did. Then he walked to the post to which he was tied. And when they were about to cover his eyes, he said: “There’s no need”. They said, “It’s the law”. He replied: “So let it be”.
He was forced to kneel down and his hands were tied. He asked his executioner to slacken the tight rope a bit and to remove the pebbles under his knees as they were hurting him.
Then, the bullets blasted and Antun Sa’adeh was finished.
He fell after he had proved in the most critical moments that he was a man of genuine decency and composure. Indeed, these attributes were an integral part of the man, who was a genius.
Yet, even genius and manhood are subject to eccentricity.
If it was not for his eccentricity and for breaching the law, Sa’adeh would not have ended up where he did. The man played his card and lost. Had he won, many Lebanese would have lost their fathers, sons, brothers and friends!