Against the Gods: The Remarkable Story of Risk

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Against the Gods: The Remarkable Story of Risk Page 33

by Peter L. Bernstein


  Incidentally, recent research has punched a hole in the tales of the notorious mania for tulips in seventeenth-century Holland, supposedly fueled by the use of options. Actually, it seems, options gave more people an opportunity to participate in a market that had previously been closed to them. The opprobrium attached to options during the so-called tulip bubble was in fact cultivated by vested interests who resented the intrusion of interlopers onto their turf 2

  In the United States, options appeared early on. Brokers were trading put and call options on stocks as early as the 1790s, not long after the famous Buttonwood Tree Agreement established what was to become the New York Stock Exchange.

  An ingenious risk-management contract was issued on June 1, 1863, when the Confederate States of America, hard up for credit and desperate for money, issued the "7 Per Cent Cotton Loan." The loan had some unusual provisions that gave it the look of a derivative instrument.3

  The principal amount was not repayable in Confederate dollars nor was it repayable at the Confederate capitol in Richmond, Virginia. Instead, it was set at "3 Millions Sterling Or 75 Millions Francs" and it was repayable in forty semiannual installments in Paris, London, Amsterdam, or Frankfurt, at the option of the bondholder-who was given the additional option of taking payment in cotton rather than money, at the rate of sixpence sterling per pound, "at any time not later than six months after the ratification of a Treaty of Peace between the belligerents."

  The embattled Confederate government was using a sophisticated form of risk management to tempt English and French investors to lend them urgently needed foreign exchange to finance their armament purchases abroad. At the same time, it was building up a foreign constituency with a vested interest in the Confederacy's survival. The risk of devaluation of the Confederate dollar was covered by the option of repayment in British or French money.* The option of collecting the debt in cotton was a hedge against inflation and was sweetened by offering cotton at sixpence when the prevailing price in Europe was 24 pence. Furthermore, as the obligation was convertible "at any time" into cotton, this option was something of a hedge against the fortunes of war for those lenders nimble enough to pick up their cotton before the Confederate States collapsed.

  The Confederate States were the sellers of these options: they took on uncertain liabilities because they had no choice in the matter. A promise to repay the loan in Confederate dollars would have been laughed out of the credit markets or would have necessitated an intolerable double-digit interest rate. The premium the Confederates received in return from the lenders who acquired these options was a reduction in the interest rate on the loan: 7% was only about a percentage point more than the U.S. government was paying for longterm money at that time. The introduction of the options made this a transaction in which uncertainty itself was an integral part.

  The history of these bonds is interesting. The subscription books were opened in March 1863, but, in keeping with the conventions of the times, the proceeds were not to be received by September. The bonds sold above their offering price for a brief period after the March offering, but then the price broke sharply as stories began to circulate about Jefferson Davis's connection with some repudiated bonds in Mississippi. Concerned that subscribers would reneg on the payments due in September, the Confederate Treasury went into the market to support the price by buying up some C1.4 million of the C3 million issued. The Confederates met the payments due in September 1863 and the two semiannual payments in 1864, but that was the end. Only about £370,000 par value was ever redeemed in cotton.

  Many people are willing but unwitting buyers of options. Anyone who has ever taken out a mortgage with a prepayment privilege owns an option. Here it is the borrower-the homeowner-rather than the lender who has the option to determine the conditions of repayment. What is the price of that option? The interest rate the borrower pays to the bank is higher than it would be without the prepayment option. If mortgage rates fall, the homeowner will prepay the old mortgage and take out a new one at a lower rate, leaving the banker with the loss of a high-interest loan replaced by a low-interest loan. This option is such a conventional feature, often a mandated feature, of home mortgages today that most homeowners are not even aware that they are paying extra for the privilege-and neither are most of the bankers!*

  There is more than meets the eye in the design of the cotton bond, the farmer's futures contracts, the tulip options, and mortgage prepayment privileges. Most business and financial transactions are a bet in which the buyer hopes to be buying low and the seller hopes to be selling high. One side is always doomed to disappointment. Riskmanagement products are different. They exist, not necessarily because someone is seeking a profit, but because there is a demand for instruments that transfer risk from a risk-averse party to someone willing to bear risk. In the case of the cotton loan, the Confederacy took on a foreign-exchange risk and even the risk of victory itself in order to save the difference between 7% and the interest that would have been demanded without the options; it may even have received money that would not have been forthcoming under other conditions. The lenders-the buyers of the Confederate bonds-acquired options that reduced their risk sufficiently to compensate for the lower interest rate or for the possibility that the Confederates would lose the war. By trading uncertainty, both parties were winners.

  What is an option worth? How did the traders in tulip options decide how much to pay for a call or a put, and why did those values change over time? How did the lenders to the Confederates decide that the options to receive payment in sterling or francs or cotton were sufficient to hedge the risks they took in making the loans? How much extra is the homeowner with a prepayment privilege paying the mortgage banker?

  The answers to these questions may become clearer if we look at an example of an actively traded option on a stock. On June 6, 1995, when AT&T stock was selling at 50, there was an option outstanding on AT&T stock that gave the owner the right to buy one share of stock at 50 1/4 until October 15, 1995. The stock was selling for less than 50 1/4-the "strike price"; if the stock remained below the strike price for the duration of the option, the option would be worthless and its owner would lose the entire premium paid for it. Yet that premium is all that the buyer of the option had at risk and all that the seller of the option could hope to gain. If AT&T stock rose above the strike price before October 15 by an amount greater than the option premium, the option would generate a profit. In fact, the potential profit on the option would be limitless.

  The option on AT&T stock was selling for $2.50 on June 6, 1995. Why $2.50?

  Resolving Paccioli's unfinished game of balla was kid stuff compared to this! We can only wonder whether two quants like Pascal and Fermat could have come up with an answer-and why they did not even try. The Dutch tulip mania, a striking example of what happens when "oldfashioned human hunches" take over, had occurred only twenty years before Pascal and Fermat first laid out the principles of probability theory; the memory of it must still have been vivid when they began their historic deliberations. Perhaps they ignored the challenge of valuing an option because the key to the puzzle is in the price of uncertainty, a concept that seems more appropriate to our own times than it may have seemed to theirs.

  The first effort to use mathematics rather than intuition in valuing an option was made by Louis Bachelier back in 1900. In the 1950s and 1960s, a few more people tried their hands at it, including Paul Samuelson.

  The puzzle was finally solved in the late 1960s by an odd threesome, none of whom was yet thirty years old when their collaboration began.' Fischer Black was a physicist-mathematician with a doctorate from Harvard who had never taken a course in economics or finance. He soon found his scientific academic studies too abstract for his taste and went to work at the Boston-based management consulting firm of Arthur D. Little. Myron Scholes had a fresh Ph.D. in finance from the Graduate School of Business at the University of Chicago, to which he had fled to escape his family's publishing enterprise; he had
just joined the MIT faculty. Robert C. Merton, whose first published paper was titled "The `Motionless' Motion of Swift's Flying Island," had received a B.S. degree in mathematical engineering at Columbia but was teaching economics at MIT as an assistant to Samuelson and was as yet without a Ph.D.

  Black died in 1995 at the age of 57. He was a cool man of few words; his presidential address to the American Economic Association in 1985 had a one-word-one-syllable title-"Noise"-and took less than fifteen minutes to deliver. Scholes is dark, intense, and voluble. Merton is friendly and irrepressible. All three have been brilliant innovators in finance, beyond their contribution to option theory.

  The story begins in 1965, when Black made friends with a colleague named Jack Treynor; Treynor was just starting on a path that would lead him to become a theoretical powerhouse in the field of finance. At the time, he was studying economics on the side under the guidance of Franco Modigliani of the MIT faculty, who would later earn a Nobel Prize in economics. When Treynor showed Black his early work on a model to explain how the markets trade off risk and return, Black was fascinated. A passionate believer in free markets, Black decided to apply Treynor's ideas to the valuation of options, and, to help himself along, he took Treynor's advice to join a Thursday evening finance workshop at MIT.

  Three years later, Black was still staring at equations that refused to produce an answer. Treynor's analysis of how market fluctuations influence the valuation of individual securities simply did not fit the bill. At that point, Black recalls, "Myron Scholes and I started working together." They had met each other at the Thursday evening workshops, where Black discovered that Scholes had been frustrated in taking the same approach to the same problem. The more they worked together over their equations, the clearer it seemed that the answer had nothing to do with Treynor's models of risk and reward.

  In the spring of 1970, Scholes told Merton about the troubles he and Black were having. The problem appealed to Merton immediately. He soon resolved their dilemma by pointing out that they were on the right track for reasons they themselves had failed to recognize. The model was soon completed.

  Despite its complex algebraic appearance, the basic ideas behind the model are easy to understand. The value of an option depends on four elements: time, prices, interest rates, and volatility. These elements apply to puts as well as to calls; in what follows, I explain how they work in terms of a call option, which gives the owner the right to buy the stock at a specified price.

  The first element is the period of time until the option is due to expire; when the time to expiration is long, the option will be worth more than when the time is short. The second element is the spread between the current price of the stock and the price specified in the option contract at which the owner can buy or sell the stock-this is known as the strike price; the option will be worth more when the actual price is above the strike price than when it is below the strike price. Third, the value also depends on the interest the buyer can earn on his money while waiting to exercise the option as well as the income the seller can receive on the underlying asset over the same time period. But what really matters is the fourth element: the expected volatility of the underlying asset, such as the AT&T stock in the example above, where AT&T was selling for 50 and the owner of the option had the right to buy it at 50 1/4 any time between June 6 and October 15, 1995.

  The probability that the price of AT&T stock might go up-or down-is irrelevant. The only thing that matters is how far the stock price might move, not the direction in which it moves. The notion that the direction of price change is irrelevant to the valuation of an option is so counterintuitive that it explains in part why Black and Scholes took so long to come up with the answer they were seeking even when it was right in front of them. But it unlocks the puzzle because of the asymmetric nature of the option itself. the investor's potential loss is limited to the premium, while the potential profit is unlimited.

  If AT&T stock goes to 45, or 40, or even to 20 during the life of the option, the owner of the option still stands to lose no more than $2.50. Between 50 1/4 and 52 3/4, the owner will gain less than $2.50. Above 52 3/4, the potential profit is infinite-at least in theory. With all the variables cranked in, the Black-Scholes model indicates that the AT&T option was worth about $2.50 in June 1995 because investors expected AT&T stock to vary within a range of about 10%, or five points, in each direction during the four months the option would be in existence.

  Volatility is always the key determinant. By way of contrast to AT&T, consider the stock of software leader Microsoft. On the same day that AT&T stock was at 50 and its option was selling for $2.50, Microsoft stock was selling at 83 1/8, and an option to buy a share of Microsoft within four months at 90 was trading for $4.50. The price of this option was 80% above the price of the AT&T option, although Microsoft stock was selling at only about 60% above AT&T. The price of Microsoft stock was nearly seven points away from the strike price, compared with the mere quarter of a point difference in the case of AT&T. The market clearly expected Microsoft to be more volatile than AT&T. According to the Black-Scholes model, the market expected Microsoft to be exactly twice as volatile as AT&T over the following four months.

  Microsoft stock is a lot riskier than AT&T stock. In 1995, AT&T had revenues of nearly $90 billion, 2.3 million shareholders, a customer in just about every household and every business in the nation, a weakened but still powerful monopolistic position in its industry, and a long history of uninterrupted dividend payments. Microsoft stock had been available to the public only since 1982, its revenues at the time were just $6 billion, it had a much narrower customer base than AT&T, it had brilliant competitors straining to break its hold on the software industry, and it had never paid a dividend.

  Option traders understand such differences. Anything that makes a stock move at all is what matters, because stocks that tend to drop fast also tend to rise fast. Buyers of options are looking for action; investors who sell options like stocks that stand still. If Microsoft goes to 100 and the owner of the option exercises his right to "call" the stock at 90 from the seller of the option, the seller is going to be out ten points. But if Microsoft hangs in around 83, at which it was trading when the transaction took place, the seller of the option would walk away with the entire premium of $4.50. By the same token, the right to prepay a home mortgage is worth a lot more when interest rates are jumping around than when they are stable.

  Options bear a strong family resemblance to insurance policies and are often bought and sold for the same reasons. Indeed, if insurance policies were converted into marketable securities, they would be priced in the marketplace exactly as options are priced. During the time period covered by the premium payment, the buyer of an insurance policy has the right to put something to the insurance company at a prearranged price-his burned-down house, destroyed car, medical bills, even his dead body-in return for which the insurance company is obliged to pay over to him the agreed-upon value of the loss he has sustained. If the house does not burn down, if the car never has an accident, if the policyholder enjoys perfect health, and if he lives beyond his life expectancy, he will be out the premiums he has paid and collects nothing. The premium itself will depend on the degree of uncertainty surrounding each outcome-the structure of the house, the age of the car (and its drivers), the policyholder's medical history, and whether the man is a coal miner or a computer operator. The derivatives we call options, by expanding the variety of risks that can be insured, help to create Kenneth Arrow's ideal world where all risks are insurable.

  Derivatives are not transactions in shares of stock or interest rates, in human lives, in houses vulnerable to fire, or in home mortgages. The product in derivative transactions is uncertainty itself. That is why options on Microsoft cost more than options on AT&T, why earthquake insurance is more expensive in California than in Maine, why the lenders to the Confederate States were able to extract such onerous terms, and why bankers worry about a decline in mortgage rate
s.

  Black and Scholes set down their ideas about option valuation in an article that they mailed in October 1970 to The Journal of Political Economy, a prestigious journal published by Chicago University. The editors promptly rejected the paper, claiming that Black and Scholes had put too much finance into it and too little economics.* Harvard's Review of Economics and Statistics was equally prompt in returning the paper. Neither publication even bothered to have a referee review it. The paper finally saw the light of day in the May/June 1973 issue of The Journal of Political Economy, but only after two influential members of the Chicago faculty had interceded. The article turned out to be one of the most influential pieces of research ever published in the field of economics or finance.

  In one of those strange coincidences in which events seem to happen in bunches, the Chicago Board Options Exchange opened for business in April 1973, just one month before the Black-Scholes paper appeared in print. That exchange, more familiarly known as the CBOE, began its operations in the smoking lounge of the Chicago Board of Trade, the established center for trading in commodities. The CBOE, for the first time, provided traders in stock options with standardized contracts and with market-makers who gave the options liquidity by standing ready to buy or sell them on demand. The CBOE also promised strict regulation of trading practices as well as prompt, public reporting of all transactions.

 

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