by Lex McAulay
3 Squadron soon suffered losses. On 14 September at 18.15 five Tomahawks took off to strafe Gambut, a couple saw a Junkers Ju88 and left formation to attack it. Messerschmitt Bf109s were nearby and the attackers found themselves in trouble.
The Ju88 was last seen streaming black smoke, but two Tomahawks did not return. Pilot Officer ‘Sammy’ Lees was found later by an Army unit and returned, to report that he was attacked by Bf109s and a Bf110, and crash-landed behind enemy lines, but made his way east until found. The Bf110 was hit in a head-on firing pass by Lees, who did not see it go down, as the 109s had his full attention. The other Tomahawk pilot, Flying Officer Burbury, was captured.
Another newly arrived NCO pilot was posted from the squadron to a ferry unit, having been found to be ‘temperamentally unsuited to operational flying’.
In the afternoon, General Brett, of the US Army Air Corps, visited the squadron to discuss operational use of the P-40. Brett had the misfortune to be in Australia in March 1942 and to be considered a possible commander of Allied forces by the Australian government when General MacArthur arrived after the debacle in the Philippines, and much of it due to his command. MacArthur shoved as much of the blame as possible onto Brett and engineered his return to the USA, well away from any possibility of command in Australia.
Flying for 3 Squadron continued with sweeps and escorts, often with no contact with enemy aircraft.
This changed on 24 September, when twelve Tomahawks patrolled, and a Ju88 was seen and attacked by two of 3 Squadron, John Saunders and Sergeant Hiller, but the lethal 109s were there and John Saunders was shot down. He force-landed but was strafed on the ground and had slight wounds.
This created an attitude of retaliation in the squadron. Post-war, of course, no Luftwaffe pilot of any rank would admit to knowing of any such act, but witnesses to them had reported almost from the beginning of hostilities.
Far more important to the campaign and the air war was the arrival of a Gruppe of JG27, II/JG27. This was an experienced unit, led by Hauptmann Wolfgang Lippert, with a personal score of 25, begun in the Spanish Civil War, indicating his experience. The Gruppe had flown in France, the Battle of Britain, Russia and in Greece. Here was another veteran unit, flying a superior fighter, against foes in lesser quality aircraft, hindered by the pre-war concept of tactics – flying in vics of three – and often by men with little real flying time.
An example of the capabilities of the opponents is that on 24 September a formation of eighteen Hurricanes from two squadrons was engaged by Bf109s of I/JG27, and lost six, for claims of two 109s damaged.
Alan Rawlinson, Lindsay Knowles,
Peter Jeffrey (Rawlinson)
October 1941
By the beginning of October, Peter Jeffrey had nineteen Tomahawks, 41 pilots and 421 officers, NCOs and airmen to service the aircraft, attend to maintenance, refuelling, arming, cooking and administration in the field. News arrived on 10 October of DFCs awarded to Alan Rawlinson and Peter Turnbull, and a MiD for Jeffrey.
Next day the pilots were addressed by Air Vice Marshal Coningham, about forthcoming operations. This was followed by a dinner that marked an important change in squadron matters. Peter Jeffrey decided that there would be a combined pilots’ Mess, as it was silly for them to be eating and socialising separately when they flew together and shared the hazards of operational flying.
Despite opposition from the RAF, this gradually spread through all the squadrons in the region. When forced upon them, the RAF Messes insisted that officers drink at one end and NCOs at the other. The stupidity of this was that as soon as a Sergeant was commissioned he was allowed to drink and socialise at the end of the bar where he had not been welcome.
The next combat for the squadron came on 12 October. Twelve Tomahawks from 3 Squadron and others from the South African 2 Squadron patrolled over forward troops when 109s attacked, but Sergeant Alan Cameron shot one down, for his second victory, and another was claimed as a probable and three more as damaged by other squadron pilots. However, Sergeant Dudley Parker was shot down, baled out, but was shot by a 109. Two other Tomahawks were damaged.
The Germans claimed four victories, and, of course, denied that anyone deliberately attacked a man under a parachute. 3 Squadron thought otherwise.
19 October –
on ‘rest’
The audacity of the experienced pilots flying Bf109s was demonstrated on 19 October. Three Tomahawk squadrons were taking off from LG110 and while circling into formation, with everyone giving their attention to this part of the sortie, four 109s appeared, assessed the situation, sped in, shot down a Hurricane of the South African 1 Squadron and departed. The Hurricane pilot pulled his parachute ripcord as he left the cockpit, the parachute streamed and caught on the tail, resulting in his death.
That day Alan Rawlinson was posted on attachment to 71 O.T.U. as an instructor, for a rest from operations. Other pilots had been rotated through this arrangement for some months.
Flying continued, sometimes in Wing formations with RAF and South African squadrons, and practice in the new flying tactics. Some squadrons adopted the practice of the whole formation weaving, because so many of the single aircraft doing this had been picked off by the 109s. Still there was reluctance to adopt the ‘finger four’ formation that worked so well for the Luftwaffe, and was in use in the UK.
The ‘wing’ formations began to be formalised, with 112 Squadron RAF paired with 3 Squadron RAAF and 2 and 4SAAF Squadrons flying together.
Italian Macchi MC202 fighters had arrived and were involved in some combats, and were mis-identified as Bf109s, which they resembled. The MC202 flown by an aggressive capable pilot could out-perform the Tomahawk and Hurricane. The great fault with this agile fighter was that it was not fitted with radio.
3 November 1941-
back in squadron
command
At the beginning of November, the squadron had 34 pilots to fly 21 Tomahawks, supported by twelve officers and 332 NCOs and airmen.
On 3 November, Peter Jeffrey was appointed to command No.2 Operational Wing, of 3 and 112 Squadrons, and so Alan Rawlinson was recalled from his ‘rest’ of about two weeks to assume squadron command, and in the rank of Squadron Leader.
This meant that Peter Jeffrey was probably the first RAAF wing leader of the war.
The squadron provided six Tomahawks to escort a Blenheim carrying the two top generals to Mersa Matruh, something of a compliment to 3 Squadron.
The squadron also was informed of preparations to be made for the coming offensive. Each squadron was to divide into three parts. The Rear Party would be the headquarters, Stores and Workshop elements, and the rest would be in two Service Parties, each self-contained and capable of maintaining the whole squadron complement of aircraft. Additional aircraft would be provided so each squadron had eighteen plus a reserve of seven. The reserve aircraft would be used only with approval from higher headquarters and would be instantly replaced.
It was expected that the Service Parties could be moving 60 to 100 miles (100km-140km) a day.
On 6 November part of 3 Squadron, Service Party 1, moved to LG110, but for the squadron aircraft there was no contact with the enemy for some days.
Flying in wing formation was practised on 9 November, and next day shadow shooting was done by all pilots. This was the ‘invention’ of RAAF ace Clive Caldwell, who did not consider himself a good shot, but one day looked at the shadows of other aircraft while flying over the desert and realised that if he could hit a shadow he could hit an aircraft. This became a standard training program in the Desert and back in Australia. That day the Service Parties went to advanced locations.
Air activity increased by both sides as preparations proceeded for Operation ‘Crusader’, the relief of Tobruk. This was the biggest operation by British forces since the war began. It was hoped that success in the Desert would restore British control of the Mediterranean, relieve pressure on Malta and on the Russians, who were consistently
out-fought by the Germans driving east and south.
The fighter force of each side was about equal in numbers, though some types were outclassed by others in air operations. The RAF and commonwealth fighters provided nineteen squadrons of about twelve fighters each, nominally 228 aircraft. The Axis enemy had 28 flying units of about nine each, nominally a total of 252 aircraft. Of these, about 45 were Bf109s.
18 November –
Operation ‘Crusader’
begins
Fate assisted the British at the beginning of the operation, when heavy rain fell on the Axis airfields during the night of 17 November, making them unusable. The British squadrons took full advantage and ranged far and wide over enemy territory.
At 3 Squadron, the tents were flooded and the area was described as ‘a sea of mud’, but flying was possible. When Alan Rawlinson took off, his engine stopped and he landed straight ahead, wheels up, and was uninjured.
3 Squadron, with 112, 250 and the royal navy fighter unit escorted bombers over targets, but with no fighter combat.
Flying Officer Frank Fischer of 3 Squadron, on 19 November, fell out of formation with engine trouble and returned to LG110. On the way, he saw three Bf109s of II/JG27 strafing LG132, so attacked and was going for the leader when he noticed a fourth diving, but pressed his attack on the first 109. He got some good bursts at it, then the others turned on him and he made some head-on passes, but they damaged his Tomahawk and he force-landed. Fischer was able to get out of the aircraft before the 109s came back and strafed it and also fired at him, as he made clear in the report back at base. The 109 was confirmed shot down by army observers at the scene. Fischer was awarded a DFC for this action.
Heavy fighting on the ground and in the air came about on 20 and 21 November, with both sides taking losses. Rommel had been preparing his own offensive, and was surprised by the British attack. He quickly adjusted and used his radio intercept company to acquire up-to-the-minute information about British plans and intentions.
The Ju87s had severe losses whenever fighters got to them. In turn, when the Bf109s got among RAF bombers many were shot down.
Alan Rawlinson led the squadron as fighter escort to bombers attacking Gambut, bombing from only 3,500 feet, through ‘severe’ anti-aircraft fire.
22 November 1941
This day saw intense fighter to fighter action as each side tried to overpower the other and gain air superiority.
3 Squadron was first away, led by Alan Rawlinson, to escort RAF Blenheims with twelve Tomahawks. The normal procedure was for the bombers to arrive over the fighter base and circle it twice – ‘orbits’ – to allow the fighter escort to take off and get into position. A whole fighter squadron would take off at once, in line abreast, cross wind, so the dust blew away and allowed a clear view for the second squadron.
This time, the RAF bombers made only one orbit then set course, so the tomahawks went after them. Rawlinson divided the squadron, with three on either side of the Blenheims and himself with the other six above in three pairs. The Tomahawks had to fly at the slower speed of the bombers, making them be at a disadvantage if faster enemy attacked.
On the way to the target some Ju87s were seen lower but had to be ignored by the Tomahawks. After bombing the Blenheims turned for home and again saw the Ju87s, now attacking British ground forces.
About twenty Bf109s of I/JG27 attacked from ahead and in a series of passes claimed four Blenheims, of which none were lost, and three Tomahawks, which were shot down.
Rawlinson fired at and hit a 109 coming head-on, but was himself attacked by three 109s, which kept the escort away from the bombers. He looked back later and saw four columns of smoke. 3 Squadron lost Pilot Officer Eric Lane, Flying Officer Mal Watson and Flight Lieutenant John Saunders. The other fire was of a 109, one of two shot down by Derek Scott, and which were confirmed by the Blenheim crews.
Later the commander of 11 Squadron RAF telephoned Peter Jeffrey and thanked him for the escort, by which no Blenheims were lost. Other accounts of the action have Blenheims of 45 Squadron RAF lost in this action, but the above is the truth. The 11 Squadron war diary describes the action, and the victory scored by one of the Blenheim gunners, who was presented with a plan-view of the belly of a 109 pulling up past his aircraft, he fired into it and it was seen to crash.
The war diary of 45 Squadron RAF includes information on a raid during which four Blenheims were lost, but this was later in the day, and was unescorted. It seems the two accounts from RAF and Luftwaffe sides were taken to be on the morning operation, and not two separate actions.
Other combats raged during the day, with the 109s scoring throughout.
3 Squadron took off again with 112 Squadron at 15.40 on a sweep of the Tobruk area, a total of 23 Tomahawks. Peter Jeffrey led the wing with 112 Squadron, to be at 15,000 feet.
Alan Rawlinson and Peter Jeffrey
(AWM 010158)
Alan Rawlinson led 3 Squadron, to be behind and below 112, in pairs, with No.1 leading, No.2 behind, all six line abreast. In Rawlinson’s opinion, there were too many inexperienced pilots flying, but he reminded them to watch and follow the No.1, and if separated, never fly straight and level.
Twenty 109s of JG27 arrived overhead, were seen, dived, and a long dog fight followed, lasting about an hour.
Rawlinson was now an experienced fighter pilot. In combats he did not turn smoothly but slipped and yawed to present a difficult to any potential attacker. He knew targets would appear but had to be engaged in a very small fraction of time.
He was turning left and saw a 109 coming down from the left, but firing too soon, his white tracer streaming past outside Rawlinson’s turn; Rawlinson kept turning, nose high; the 109 flashed past; Rawlinson rolled port after him; there was the 109 100 yards away; a good sight picture was achieved, two bursts fired; flames came from the cockpit area and centre section; two Tomahawk pilots confirmed it, Bobby Gibbs saying was ‘a ball of flame’.
The Tomahawk guns malfunctioned and Rawlinson slipped and yawed while pulling the recharging handles to clear and re-load them. Another 109 attacked and again Rawlinson dodged as before, slid in behind the 109 and fired, but was able only to see it spiralling down and could not follow it.
A third 109 attacked and missed, and again Rawlinson slid in astern and fired but again had gun problems, so he pulled on the gun handles, and fired, but dust and grit came out of the gun housing and into his eyes, a dangerous thing in a dog-fight.
Two more 109s attacked and he engaged them, but the dust and grit in his eyes made them sting, while he flew erratically to not present a good target. Only two wing machineguns were firing and the reflector sight had failed
The Tomahawks were forced into a defensive circle at only 500 feet, with the 109s above, until they turned for base. Six Tomahawks from 3 Squadron were shot down, with one from 112.
Peter Jeffery and Ron Simes were found by ground troops and returned but Flight Lieutenant Lindsay Knowles, Flying Officers Roberts and Bill Kloster and Pilot Officer Lees did not get back. Knowles and Lees were killed and Roberts and Kloster captured. Knowles had collided with a 109.
The squadron claimed two destroyed, four probables and six damaged. The victory claimed by Simes was confirmed by the army unit that picked him up after the combat. Alan Rawlinson claimed one destroyed, one probable and two damaged, with other claims by Scott, Gibbs and Arthur. Luftwaffe losses were six, including one crash-landing at base.
This last was an interesting small action. Hauptmann Ernst Dullberg, the leader of 5/JG27, had seen a Tomahawk in the distance pointing at him but thought it too far away to do any damage, it being at what he termed ‘an Olympic distance’. The 109 was hit twice, one bullet striking Dullberg in the foot and the other passing through his life jacket.
Rawlinson did take a long-distance shot at a 109 but saw no effect and did not mention it in his combat report. When reading Fighters Over the Desert he saw the reference to this incident and wondered if it was
his attack that caused the damage.
3 Squadron had experienced a hard day of operations, with eight aircraft and pilots out of action. There were no operations next day.
On the wider scene, the Luftwaffe also had a bad day. After this, the 109s did not engage in dog-fights, and allow the Tomahawks to apply their superior manoeuvrability in the turn, but confined themselves to dive and zoom attacks.
Next day consisted of more heavy fighting with losses in the air and on the ground. Rommel broke through the British and lunged for the Egyptian border, causing great concern. The British 30 Corps headquarters was over-run.
24-29 November
This was quieter, both air forces having reached a point of exhaustion. Rommel’s forces reached some of the landing grounds, and there were hurried take-offs as the aircraft flew away. About 175 aircraft landed at LG122, past which Rommel’s tanks drove that night, so not being able to destroy most of the opposing air force. Next day they passed some five miles (8km) from LG132, Sidi Omar.
The air forces had one main task on 25 November – attack the Axis ground columns pushing east.
Alan Rawlinson took ‘Woof’ Arthur and went to find the enemy. They were close, only about 20 miles (30km away, and though Rawlinson could see a large force, in the dim light it was difficult to identify them. Rawlinson went low to check and was shot at by a number of weapons, so he returned to base and reported, but as the headquarters still did not believe the force seen was enemy, Rawlinson took off again, with Arthur, and went back. He told Arthur to have a look, to confirm. Arthur also was fired on by what seemed to be every weapon available, took five hits in the wing, they again returned to base and this time it was accepted that the distant force was enemy.