by Josef Steiff
Keeping these distinctions in mind, James names cases where the choice between beliefs is a belief option that is live, forced, and momentous as genuine belief options. The idea of a genuine belief option allows James to state his answer to the question of whether or not it is legitimate to believe in a hypothesis when we do not have enough evidence to show that it is true or most likely to be true. It is, says James, but only if believing the hypothesis is a case of a genuine belief option. If so, then one may let passion decide which option to believe and act on. By “passion,” James means something broad that not only includes emotions and affections but also values and concerns. For the sake of his point, James sees no reason to account for these. He simply takes it that the concerns of a Ross or an Armitage are peculiar to them. And so to let passion decide is to choose according to what is most important to you. Borrowing a phrase from Pascal, James calls the passions the reasons of the heart (or in Armitage’s case, reasons of the CPU, I guess) of which reason knows nothing.
Martians Believing Badly
James admits his answer is controversial. It seems that it would not be legitimate under any circumstance to believe in a hypothesis without enough evidence upon which to base that belief. For example, Ross came to Mars by space shuttle. Suppose the company that maintained the shuttle believed that the shuttle was overdue for a major inspection from routine wear and tear on the ship. If the company thought that since the shuttle still made successful interplanetary trips and worked fine, they might let the ship fly anyway without the inspection. If then the shuttle had blown up because of jet flames coming through an old and brittle seal, we would certainly blame the company for neglecting the inspection. But even if the shuttle made it to Mars, we would still think that the company would be just as guilty. The crime would be that the company let the shuttle fly without sufficient evidence that the flight would be safe. So it seems that one morally ought not to believe something unless there is sufficient evidence for it. One only ought to believe what one can see, whether it is a genuine belief option or not.
Certainly, this standard makes sense if applied to a very important practice of belief forming, namely science. At Conception, a Martian robotics corporation, Dr. René D’anclaude and Dr. Asakura are scientists with passions for the development and use of artificial intelligence and cybernetic technology, for military purposes or for terra forming respectively. Yet their passion for achieving breakthrough developments is balanced as scientists against the desire to avoid error. According to James, this is reasonable because science deals with the physical world and its uniform properties about which we can only observe and record. (He wrote before the advent of quantum mechanics, but his point remains germane to it.) In science there is no special concern to rush matters and we have the luxury of waiting for all the facts to be discovered, and so there is no motivation to take risks by believing hypotheses in advance of all the evidence. So in science, the idea of not believing anything without sufficient evidence makes sense. Given the great achievements of science—interplanetary travel, terra forming, artificial intelligence, and what not—Ross’s feeling that he should not accept beliefs without evidence is understandable.
Still, is it always right to wait until all the evidence is in before accepting a belief? One problem: what about believing that we should only believe a hypothesis that has sufficient evidence for it? Do we—could we—have sufficient evidence for that as a hypothesis? If not, then it fails its own standard, and we could not apply it consistently. But in particular, aren’t there cases of genuine belief options where judgment cannot be suspended and where momentous possibilities are at stake and where we cannot expect that inquiry will present the needed evidence in time to make the right decision? Consider the previous case where Armitage has to decide whether to permit surgery for Ross or not. If she follows the prescription not to believe without sufficient evidence, then she should suspend judgment about whether to permit surgery and thus not permit it. But if she did this, then Ross will die. Suppose that Lt. Randolph, on behalf of the late Ross, asked Armitage for the reason why she did not permit surgery. If she answered that it is wrong to believe anything without sufficient evidence, we would expect moral disapproval from the Lieutenant rather than approval.
In cases of android research, Dr. Asakura may choose between accepting a hypothesis, say that artificial life forms can be based on silicon, denying that hypothesis, or suspending judgment between the two until he has more evidence. If he opts to either accept or reject the hypothesis before the evidence is all in, the worst case is that he would simply be wrong and is perhaps on a snipe hunt and wasting time and resources, but if he suspends judgment, he is at least not at the risk of being wrong. In Asakura’s case, the value of not being wrong is greater than risking that he might be right since he would have to go on testing and researching either way.
But in Armitage’s case, she does not have the option of suspending judgment, since that would have the same effect as not believing in the surgery. Her belief options are forced. Yet the possibility of success is theoretically sound even though not confirmed, making the option of permitting surgery a live option for her. But the value of not being wrong does not seem so valuable compared to the possibility that Ross might be saved. And unlike Asakura, Armitage would not be able to go back on her commitment once it is underway. The option is momentous. In short, it is the fact that Asakura’s case is not a genuine belief option and Armitage’s is, that makes sense of why suspending judgment makes sense for Asakura but not for Armitage. The value of avoiding error has been trumped by the value of not missing out on an even more important truth, in Armitage’s case.
In the case of Ross’s shuttle trip mentioned earlier, not only would the shuttle owners have risked believing falsely that the shuttle was safe, but they would also have risked the lives of their passengers, including the last country singer in the universe. If they had been right it would have been a normal trip. But the shuttle owners also had the option of suspending judgment. In this case, avoiding being wrong and avoiding people getting killed is even more worthwhile than risking being right about the shuttle’s safety, which is the morally valuable consideration here. This is not a genuine belief option then because it lacks one of the essential conditions. It is not a forced option. So James’s account seems to make sense of why we think about Armitage’s surgery case differently than the case of Asakura’s silicon hypothesis or the shuttle case. In Armitage’s situation, being wrong is worth the risk, and this is the case because her situation is a genuine belief option and the other two are not.
You Bet Your Life
Another way to state this is to say that according to James, what makes it appropriate to believe, without enough evidence in a situation where we must choose whether or not to act on that belief, is that the risk of believing and being right is more worthwhile than the security of not being wrong, even to the extent of being obligatory rather than merely permitted. James’s view is similar to Blaise Pascal’s famous “Wager” argument for deciding in favor of belief in God. According to Pascal, even if arguments for and against God fail to show us whether God exists or not, it would still be rational to believe in God and not just suspend judgment, since if I believe in God and I’m wrong then I lose the handful of pleasures I give up to be religious, but if I don’t believe in God and I’m wrong then I lose the infinite good of God. “Believing in God” means gambling that God exists and living your life according to this belief rather than doing as you please.
Suspending judgment by being agnostic, according to Pascal, would be the same as choosing not to believe in God, since I would still lose the good of God. So I cannot refrain from choosing; to maximize the good I can expect, it is reasonable for me to believe in God more than not. Pascal’s wager, assuming it is apt, is a candidate for being a genuine option according to James because if God is so infinitely different from us, belief in God cannot be settled by evidence one way or the other. But choosing to
believe in God is an option that is live for some people, momentous because an infinite lot is at stake and because we must commit our lives to our belief since we cannot really know the truth before we die, and forced because we cannot avoid committing ourselves one way or another. Certainly, James thought that religion provided one of the most important cases of a genuine belief option and his idea of genuine belief options helps us see Pascal’s wager as an instance of type of belief adoption that applies to more than just religion.
If this is right, then not only does James’s account of genuine belief options speak to beliefs about the moral standing of Armitage and the Thirds, it also addresses other decisions about adopting a moral point of view or even a religious point of view. In the original four part OVA version of the Armitage story, when the assassin is chasing Ross into one of the many abandoned church buildings in Saint Lowell, the assassin asserts that there is no God on Mars. In a previous scene in which Ross and Armitage walk through the pleasure district where male customers satisfy their desires by utilizing Seconds, one lecherous patron with a Second designed to look like a mermaid seems envious of Ross over Armitage. The focus on these settings suggests that the secularity and hedonism are part and parcel of the ethical climate of Martian society, a society that tends also to view the Thirds as “obviously just machines.” It seems as if the ethical culture of Mars would find James’s account of genuine belief options unacceptable. This would be an explanation for the empty churches, boy toy Seconds, and dead Thirds. Ross’s commitment to Armitage makes him a fugitive not only from the law but also from the general public. If Martians changed their minds and proactively endorsed something like James’s “will to believe,” we would expect not only Ross’s situation to be much different but also the other aspects of daily life in Saint Lowell.
Mars Needs Women
In deciding to apply William James account of genuine belief options to Ross and Armitage, there are several things to keep in mind. One is that it only comes into play in cases where there really is insufficient evidence. If there is sufficient evidence to decide whether to believe a claim or not, then that settles it no matter what else may be said. An option being momentous and forced does not undermine sufficient evidence when we have it, rather having sufficient evidence rules such a case out as a live option. Further, when there is no sufficient evidence, one still has to satisfy jointly the qualifications James gives for being a genuine belief option. For example, if an option to believe is a live one and momentous but not forced, like the case of the space shuttle company, then according to James it isn’t a time when your passions can play a role in choosing what to believe. In such cases, one ought to suspend judgment rather than believe.
Let’s now see if this will help Ross with the question faced by him, the Martian police force, and the larger political society; whether or not the Thirds have moral standing, including having rights. To review, unregulated robot technology is illegal on Mars and the surplus of robots has led to rioting and unrest from loss of jobs. Because of violent attacks by the assassinroid D’anclaude (named after his inventor), Mars discovers Thirds, an even more sophisticated and illegal type of android that has been living amongst the Martians in secret. If they are mere machines, then terminating them is not so morally problematic since shooting up a Third would be no different than crushing a car. However, they seem to act like free agents. They form judgments and make decisions. They are typically professional creators: novelists, singers, dancers, and so on. And they form relationships with the humans in various degrees of intimacy. There is no discernable way to tell them apart without cutting them open. They cannot be biologically like humans, but they may still be persons.
When Ross arrived on Mars, he was teamed up with Armitage to investigate the murder or termination of the Thirds. He takes for granted that Armitage is another human like himself. Armitage is a lively and independent woman who treats Ross with respect but works often on her own by her own lights. Yet they become good partners, and Armitage starts to fill the void left by the loss of Ross’s previous partner on Earth. When Ross discovers that Armitage is not human but a Third, he must decide whether to maintain his loyalty to the police (and keep his job) or do what he can to help her. This decision depends on whether he decides that being a robot means that she is just a tool or if she is a person with moral standing. The evidence indicates that she has a robotic frame and a sophisticated AI unit and that she behaves like persons do, but there is no evidence and no prospect of evidence in the future that will tell if she is a fake person or a real person.
Does James’s account of genuine options shed any light on this? Sure it does. To help Armitage, Ross must quit being a good cop and become a terrorist by blowing up Shinora State Hospital and abducting Dr. Rene D’anclaude. Ross is convinced that as a result of Armitage’s being declared illegal robot tech, the police cannot help them and no one else has the means or will. Unless Ross takes matters into his own hands, there is no one else who can protect Armitage, help find her “father,” and find out whom she is. Time is running out before the government, the police, or another D’anclaude assassin catches up to them. This decision is certainly forced. If the police capture Armitage, she is most likely to be scrapped. Suspending judgment by not acting would lead to the same result as deciding that she is just another android.
It’s a living option for Ross because Armitage plausibly behaves like an independent deliberative and feeling person, maybe even more so than bona fide humans. Time and again, Ross admits in situations where he must be telling his true view that Armitage is more human than human. In leaving his first meeting with his department head after the truth about Armitage has been discovered, Ross can only think “Armitage is not just a good cop. She’s a great one.” Later, when they are camping together at Asakura’s secret laboratory, he tells her, “Hey. I know a human, and he isn’t even asking the questions you’re asking.” In spite of being aware that she is a machine, Ross still cannot fail to be impressed with how much more character and depth Armitage displays than many humans.
It’s also a living option for him because Ross knows that even as a machine, Armitage’s design indicates that she is much more sophisticated than a standard model machine and that even Asakura was on the border of reproducing artificial life when he made her, so it may be that she’s not a standard machine in the same sense that we are not standard machines.
Last, Ross himself through successive injuries and repairs is progressively finding his fleshly parts being replaced by cybernetic parts so that the distinction between himself and Armitage is getting vaguer. The impact on Ross of these states of affairs makes the belief that Armitage is a person a living option for him.
Finally, it’s a momentous choice since if Armitage is a moral person, scrapping her would be taking an innocent life. On top of that, we learn that the reason why the Thirds like Armitage were all (except Julian Moore) made female was to be mothers and give birth in order to make the Martian population stronger without having to depend on Earth immigration. As Asakura saw it, this required more than just reproduction; it required true maternal affection which had to be as authentic as possible. With her being able to bear children, and with Ross’s sadness over the death and loss of Jennifer back on Earth, it may be possible for Ross to marry Armitage and flourish together as a family. At least, Ross cannot fail to respond to the feelings of affection growing for Armitage as she confesses her feelings for him. Also, he knows there would be no turning back once he did help her. He would be considered a terrorist and spend the rest of his life as a fugitive if he decides to help her. So saving Armitage is a momentous decision for him.
Therefore Ross’s situation includes all the necessary features—live, momentous, and forced—of a genuine belief option according to William James. With respect to the moral standing of the Thirds and to Armitage as a Third, Ross seems not merely permitted but even obliged to believe in their moral standing as persons, since in this case it i
s better to err on the side of being mistaken about that than to risk the possibility of a person being killed or enslaved. Beyond that, Ross is a least permitted to believe personally in Armitage’s standing as a genuine person in order to commit himself to her as husband to wife. In Armitage the Third: Poly-Matrix, after the last battle, Ross carries Armitage, already pregnant, across the desert back to Saint Lowell. His final soliloquy on what he expects his future home will be like makes clear that the question has been put completely behind him.
Questioning the Question
Coming back to Ross’s frustration in the car, we can understand it more clearly as based on a narrow interpretation of Armitage’s question. But when people ask for a reason, they may not be asking for evidence. It could be that they are asking for prudential grounds that guide decision-making and action. Ross was thinking about reason as a fact or proof of Armitage’s moral standing. In this case, no conclusive evidence was forthcoming, but action required making a decision about Armitage anyway. William James’s account, allowing for exceptions to the general rule of believing only on sufficient evidence in cases of genuine options, provides Ross with a response to Armitage’s request for a reason. Ross could answer her question by explaining how her situation counts as a genuine belief option to him by being momentous, live, and forced, thus allowing him to decide based on what really matters to him. Or he could simply say what she no doubt really wanted to hear: “Because I love you.”