The Impeachment Report

  Multiple witnesses testified that another former Ukrainian prosecutor, Mr. Shokin, was also considered to be corrupt. For example, Mr. Kent testified during his deposition that Mr. Lutsenko and Mr. Shokin were “corrupt former prosecutors” who were “peddling false information in order to extract revenge against those who had exposed their misconduct, including U.S. diplomats, Ukrainian anticorruption officials, and reform-minded civil society groups in Ukraine.”621 Ambassador Volker testified at his public hearing that Mr. Lutsenko was “not credible, and was acting in a self-serving capacity.”622 Mr. Holmes further noted that Mr. Lutsenko “resisted fully empowering truly independent anticorruption institutions that would help ensure that no Ukrainians, however powerful, were above the law.”623

  After the call, the White House press office issued a short and incomplete summary of the call, omitting major elements of the conversation. The press statement read:

  Today, President Donald J. Trump spoke by telephone with President Volodymyr Zelenskyy of Ukraine to congratulate him on his recent election. President Trump and President Zelenskyy discussed ways to strengthen the relationship between the United States and Ukraine, including energy and economic cooperation. Both leaders also expressed that they look forward to the opportunity to meet.624

  Concerns Raised by Lieutenant Colonel Alexander Vindman

  Prior to President Trump’s July 25 call with President Zelensky, Lt. Col. Vindman had prepared—with Mr. Morrison’s review and approval—a call briefing package, including talking points for President Trump’s use. This was consistent with the NSC’s regular process of preparing for the President’s phone calls with foreign leaders.625 The NSC-drafted talking points did not include any reference to Biden, Burisma, CrowdStrike, or alleged Ukrainian interference in the 2016 U.S. election.626

  Lt. Col. Vindman testified during his deposition that, prior to the July 25 call, he was aware of concerns from former National Security Advisor John Bolton and other U.S. officials that President Trump might raise these discredited issues with President Zelensky.627 Indeed, Ambassador Bolton had resisted scheduling the call because he believed it might be a “disaster.”628

  As he sat in the White House Situation Room listening to the leaders, Lt. Col. Vindman quickly recognized that the President’s conversation was diverging from the talking points he helped prepare based on the interagency policy process, and “straying” into an “unproductive narrative” promoted by Mr. Giuliani and other “external and nongovernmental influencers”629—topics that Lt. Col. Vindman dubbed “stray voltage.”630

  Lt. Col. Vindman knew immediately that he had a duty to report the contents of the call to the White House lawyers. He explained, “I had concerns, and it was my duty to report my concerns to the proper—proper people in the chain of command.”631 Lt. Col. Vindman testified that President Trump’s request that a foreign leader dependent on the United States open an investigation into his U.S. political opponent constituted a “demand” that President Zelensky had to meet in order to secure a White House meeting:

  So, Congressman, the power disparity between the President of the United States and the President of Ukraine is vast, and, you know, in the President asking for something, it became—there was—in return for a White House meeting, because that’s what this was about. This was about getting a White House meeting. It was a demand for him to fulfill his—fulfill this particular prerequisite in order to get the meeting.632

  Lt. Col. Vindman further testified that President Trump’s demand of the Ukrainian leader was “inappropriate” and “improper,” and that it would undermine U.S. national security:

  Chairman, as I said in my statement, it was inappropriate. It was improper for the President to request—to demand an investigation into a political opponent, especially a foreign power where there’s, at best, dubious belief that this would be a completely impartial investigation, and that this would have significant implications if it became public knowledge, and it would be perceived as a partisan play. It would undermine our Ukraine policy, and it would undermine our national security.633

  Within an hour of the call ending, Lt. Col. Vindman reported his concerns to John A. Eisenberg, the Deputy Counsel to the President for National Security Affairs and the Legal Advisor to the NSC, and Michael Ellis, a Senior Associate Counsel to the President and the Deputy Legal Advisor to the NSC.634 Lt. Col. Vindman recounted the content of the call based on his handwritten notes and told the lawyers that he believed it was “wrong” for President Trump to ask President Zelensky to investigate Vice President Biden.635

  Concerns Raised by Timothy Morrison

  After 17 years as a Republican Congressional staffer and approximately a year serving elsewhere on the NSC staff, Mr. Morrison assumed his position as the NSC’s Senior Director for Europe and Russia on July 15, 2019, only 10 days before President Trump’s call with President Zelensky.636

  Before he transitioned into his new role, Mr. Morrison met with his predecessor, Dr. Hill. She advised him to stay away from efforts orchestrated by Mr. Giuliani and Ambassador Sondland to pressure Ukraine into investigating a “bucket of issues” that included “Burisma the company,” and “Hunter Biden on the board.”637 Dr. Hill also warned Mr. Morrison before the July 25 call about the President’s interest in alleged Ukrainian interference in the 2016 U.S. election related to the DNC server.638

  Mr. Morrison testified that he had no knowledge of any investigations at the time, but after performing a Google search of “what is Burisma?” and seeing the name Hunter Biden, Mr. Morrison decided to “stay away.”639 Even though he was new to the portfolio, Mr. Morrison promptly concluded that because “Burisma” involved Hunter Biden, and because former Vice President Biden was running for President, such investigations could be a “problematic” area.640 Mr. Morrison further explained that he tried to stay away from requests related to Burisma and the 2016 U.S. election because these investigations were not related to “the proper policy process that I was involved in on Ukraine,” and “had nothing to do with the issues that the interagency was working on.”641

  With that background in mind, Mr. Morrison admitted he was “concerned” when, while listening to the call on July 25, he heard President Trump raise “issues related to the [DNC] server.” Ultimately, Mr. Morrison said, “the call was not the full-throated endorsement of the Ukraine reform agenda that I was hoping to hear.”642

  In “fairly short order,” Mr. Morrison reported the contents of the call to Mr. Eisenberg and Mr. Ellis, the NSC lawyers. He asked them to review the call, which he feared would be “damaging” if leaked.643 Mr. Morrison stated that at the time of the call, he “did not have a view” on whether the call was “appropriate and proper.”644 He also stated that he “was not concerned that anything illegal was discussed.” 645 During his deposition, however, Mr. Morrison clarified, “I did not then and I do not now opine…as to the legality” of what happened on the call.646

  In a second meeting with Mr. Eisenberg, Mr. Morrison requested that access to the electronic files of the call record be restricted. This was an unusual request. Mr. Morrison confirmed to the Committee that he had never before asked the NSC Legal Advisor to restrict access to a presidential call record.647 It was also unusual because Mr. Morrison raised restricting access with Mr. Eisenberg despite the fact that Mr. Morrison himself had the authority, as an NSC senior director, to recommend restrictions on the relevant files to the NSC’s Executive Secretariat.

  Lt. Col. Vindman also discussed restricting access to the July 25 call summary with Mr. Eisenberg and Mr. Ellis. At some point after the call, Lt. Col. Vindman discussed with the NSC lawyers the “sensitivity” of the matters raised on the call and “the fact that…there are constant leaks.”648 Lt. Col. Vindman explained that “[f]rom a foreign policy professional perspective, all of these types of calls would inherently be sensitive.”649 But the July 25 call was particularly sensitive because it co
uld “undermine our relationship with the Ukrainians” given that it “would implicate a partisan play.”650 The NSC lawyers, therefore, believed that it was “appropriate to restrict access for the purpose of the leaks” and “to preserv[e] the integrity” of the transcript.651 Lt. Col. Vindman recalled that Mr. Ellis raised the idea of placing the call summary on the NSC’s server for highly classified information and Mr. Eisenberg “gave the go-ahead.”652

  Some weeks after his discussions with the NSC attorneys, Mr. Morrison could not locate the call record. He contacted the staff of the NSC’s Executive Secretariat in search of an explanation and was informed that “John Eisenberg had directed it to be moved to a different server” utilized by the NSC staff for highly classified information.653 This transfer occurred despite Mr. Morrison’s view that the call record did not meet the requirements to be placed on the highly classified system.654

  Mr. Eisenberg later told Mr. Morrison that the call record had been placed on the highly classified system by “mistake.”655 Even after Mr. Eisenberg stated that the call record was moved to the highly classified system by “mistake,” it nevertheless remained on that system until at least the third week of September 2019, shortly before its declassification and public release by the White House.656

  Concerns Raised by Jennifer Williams

  Vice President Pence’s advisor, Ms. Williams, had listened to nearly a dozen phone calls between President Trump and other heads of state prior to July 25, 2019, as well as Vice President Pence’s April 23 call with President Zelensky.657 As she sat listening to President Trump’s July 25 call, she was struck by his requests relating to Vice President Biden. She stated that she believed that President Trump’s comments were “unusual and inappropriate.”658

  Ms. Williams testified that she thought that “references to specific individuals and investigations, such as former Vice President Biden and his son” were “political in nature, given that the former Vice President is a political opponent of the President.”659 The comments struck her as “more specific to the President in nature, to his personal political agenda,” as opposed to “a broader foreign policy objective of the United States.”660 She added, “it was the first time I had heard internally the President reference particular investigations that previously I had only heard about through Mr. Giuliani’s press interviews and press reporting.”661

  Significantly, Ms. Williams, who had learned about the hold on security assistance for Ukraine on July 3, also said that the Trump-Zelensky call “shed some light on possible other motivations behind a security assistance hold.”662

  “Burisma” Omitted from Call Record

  Mr. Morrison, Lt. Col. Vindman, and Ms. Williams all agreed that the publicly released record of the call was substantially accurate, but Lt. Col. Vindman and Ms. Williams both testified that President Zelensky made an explicit reference to “Burisma” that was not included in the call record. Specifically, Lt. Col. Vindman testified that his notes indicated President Zelensky used the word “Burisma”—instead of generically referring to “the company”—when discussing President Trump’s request to investigate the Bidens.663 Ms. Williams’ notes also reflected that President Zelensky had said “Burisma” later in the call when referring to a “case.”664

  Lt. Col. Vindman indicated that President Zelensky’s mention of “Burisma” was notable because it suggested that the Ukrainian leader was “prepped for this call.” He explained that “frankly, the President of Ukraine would not necessarily know anything about this company Burisma.” Lt. Col. Vindman continued, “he would certainly understand some of this—some of these elements because the story had been developing for some time, but the fact that he mentioned specifically Burisma seemed to suggest to me that he was prepped for this call.”665

  The Substance of the Call Remained Tightly Controlled

  Ms. Williams testified that staff in the Office of the Vice President placed the draft call record in the Vice President’s nightly briefing book on July 25.666

  Separately, and following established protocols for coordinating U.S. government activities toward Ukraine, Lt. Col. Vindman provided Mr. Kent at the State Department with a readout. Because Mr. Kent had worked on Ukraine policy for many years, Lt. Col. Vindman sought Mr. Kent’s “expert view” on the investigations requested by the President. Mr. Kent informed him that “there was no substance” behind the CrowdStrike conspiracy theory and “took note of the fact that there was a call to investigate the Bidens.”667 Recalling this conversation, Mr. Kent testified that Lt. Col. Vindman said “he could not share the majority of what was discussed [on the July 25 call] because of the very sensitive nature of what was discussed,” but that Lt. Col. Vindman noted that the call “went into the direction of some of the most extreme narratives that have been discussed publicly.”668

  Ambassador Sondland Followed Up on President Trump’s Request for Investigations

  Soon after arriving in Kyiv from Brussels on July 25, Ambassador Sondland asked the U.S. Embassy to arrange a meeting the next day with Ukrainian presidential aide Andriy Yermak.669

  On the morning of July 26, Ambassadors Sondland, Volker and Taylor—accompanied by Mr. Holmes, who acted as their official notetaker—went to the Presidential Administration Building in central Kyiv for meetings with Ukrainian officials.670 Contrary to standard procedure, Mr. Holmes and Ambassador Taylor did not receive readouts of the July 25 call, so they were unaware of what President Trump and President Zelensky had discussed.671 Ambassador Volker also did not receive an official readout of the July 25 call from the NSC staff. He testified that Andriy Yermak, a senior aide to President Zelensky, simply characterized it as a “good call” in which “President Zelensky did reiterate his commitment to reform and fighting corruption in Ukraine.”672

  The first meeting on July 26 was with Chief of Staff to President Zelensky Andriy Bohdan.673 Regarding the July 25 call, Mr. Holmes recalled Mr. Bohdan sharing that “President Trump had expressed interest…in President Zelensky’s personnel decisions related to the Prosecutor General’s office [PGO].”674 Mr. Holmes further testified that Mr. Bohdan then “started asking…about individuals I’ve since come to understand they were considering appointing to different roles in the PGO.”675 Mr. Holmes explained that he “didn’t understand it,” and that “[i]t wasn’t until I read the July 25th phone call transcript that I realized that the President [Trump] had mentioned Mr. Lutsenko in the call.”676

  Subsequently, Ambassadors Sondland, Taylor, and Volker met with President Zelensky and other senior officials. Mr. Holmes once again took notes.677 He testified “During the meeting, President Zelensky stated that, during the July 25th call, President Trump had, quote, ‘three times raised some very sensitive issues’ and that he would have to follow up—he, Zelensky—would have to follow up on those issues when he and President Trump met in person.”678 After he read the transcript of the July 25 call, Mr. Holmes determined that President Zelensky’s mention of “sensitive issues” was a reference to President Trump’s demands for a “Burisma Biden investigation.”679

  Catherine Croft, Special Advisor to Ambassador Kurt Volker, was also in Kyiv on July 26. Although she did not attend the meeting with President Zelensky, she received a readout from Ambassadors Volker and Taylor later that day, as they were traveling in an embassy vehicle. Ms. Croft testified that her handwritten notes from that readout indicate “the President [Trump] had raised investigations multiple times” in his July 25 call with President Zelensky.680 Ambassadors Sondland and Taylor told the Committee that they did not recall President Zelensky’s comments about investigations.681 Ambassador Volker similarly did not recall that the issue of investigations was discussed, but testified that he did not dispute the validity of “notes taken contemporaneously at the meeting.”682

  Ambassador Sondland Met One-on-One with Ukrainian Presidential Aide

  The meeting with President Zelensky ended around noon.683 After the me
eting, Ambassadors Taylor and Volker departed the Presidential Administration building for a visit to the front lines of the war with Russia in eastern Ukraine.684 Ambassador Sondland separately headed for Mr. Yermak’s office. Mr. Holmes testified that, at the last minute, he received instruction from his leadership at the U.S. Embassy to join Ambassador Sondland.685 By that point, Mr. Holmes recalled, he “was a flight of stairs behind Ambassador Sondland as he headed to meet with Mr. Yermak.”686 Mr. Holmes continued, “When I reached Mr. Yermak’s office, Ambassador Sondland had already gone in to the meeting.”687 Mr. Holmes then “explained to Mr. Yermak’s assistant that I was supposed to join the meeting as the Embassy’s representative and strongly urged her to let me in, but she told me that Ambassador Sondland and Mr. Yermak had insisted that the meeting be one on one with no note taker.”688 Mr. Holmes “then waited in the anteroom until the meeting ended, along with a member of Ambassador Sondland’s staff and a member of the U.S. Embassy Kyiv staff.”689

  Ambassador Sondland’s meeting with Mr. Yermak lasted approximately 30 minutes.690 When it ended, Ambassador Sondland did not provide Mr. Holmes an explanation of what they discussed.691 Ambassador Sondland later testified that he did not “recall the specifics” of his conversation with Mr. Yermak, but he believed “the issue of investigations was probably a part of that agenda or meeting.”692

  Call Between President Trump and Ambassador Sondland on July 26, 2019

  After a busy morning of meetings with Ukrainian officials on July 26, Ambassador Sondland indicated that he wanted to get lunch. Mr. Holmes interjected that he would “be happy to join” Ambassador Sondland and two other State Department colleagues accompanying him “if he wanted to brief me out on his meeting with Mr. Yermak or discuss other issues.”693 Ambassador Sondland accepted the offer. The diplomats proceeded “to a nearby restaurant and sat on an outdoor terrace.”694 Mr. Holmes “sat directly across from Ambassador Sondland,” close enough that they could “share an appetizer.”695