‘Our avoidance of Nà Sản radar was not our concern at this point in the flight. By this time a warning would have been issued from the Hànôi side of the mountains that a leaflet dropping intruder was moving westward toward Điện Biên Phủ. Consequently this early warning radar would be scanning in a NW direction, expecting the emergence of our ‘Blackbird’. Nà Sản’s detection of our flight at this time could actually assist in the accomplishment of the second portion of our mission. Our resupply drop was what we called a ‘notional’ drop or a diversionary drop. There was no friendly team to receive the two resupply bundles. These bundles were carefully planned by imaginative minds at SOG to confuse the enemy and to have him expend considerable resources searching for infiltrators that did not exist. So the resupply bundles were meant to be captured by the enemy. Nà Sản’s detection of our aircraft’s slow down could assist the enemy in locating this bogus cargo.3
‘By the time we finished with our planning, we learned that augmented S-01 crew would fly the mission. It was S-01’s turn to take the next mission, but there were some questions about the possibility of having this crew skip its turn. Major Dick Day, its Aircraft Commander and one of the crew’s loadmasters were on duty not involving flying (DNIF). His senior navigator, Lieutenant Colonel Don Fisher, was not yet back from his R&R (rest and recreation) in Hawaii. His earliest expected return was on that day, 26 December. Earlier on this day, the other crew load master departed with S-03 crew on that crew’s flight to our parent 314th Wing in Taiwan. He had made arrangements with Staff Sergeant Ed Darcy from S-03 crew to switch places. Ed Darcy, a quiet, conscientious young man, planned to save some money by staying in Nha Trang. He did not want to spend it on a three to five day stay in Taiwan while the ferried ‘Blackbird’ went through its scheduled inspection and repair as necessary (IRAN) in a maintenance facility that was equipped to handle C130 aircraft. The crews looked forward to their turn to ferry a ‘Blackbird’ for an IRAN in Taiwan. It was a most welcomed vacation break from the wartime conditions in Việtnam. So, Ed Darcy became a volunteer replacement for one S-01 loadmaster. Sergeant James Williams agreed to take the place of the other load master who was also DNIF.
‘This mission provided an opportunity for Captain Edwin Osborne to take command of the S-01 crew and for Captain Gerald Van Buren to move up to the first pilot’s position. The second pilot’s slot was filled by Major Charlie Claxton from my S-05 crew. He had missed an earlier combat mission when he was DNIF, so this would become a make-up mission for him. I made up my mind that I would take Lieutenant Colonel Don Fisher’s place if he did not return in time from Hawaii. I would have been the logical replacement in any case because I already knew the route and mission details and could be used to step in to replace him up to the last minute. Later on that evening I heard that Don Fisher was back. I went to see him and found him in a most jovial mood. He had just returned from a memorable R&R in Hawaii with his whole family. He had just had the greatest of Christmases and repeated to me and to others that he was ‘in love with the whole world.’ He was ready to fly combat.
‘Edwin Osborne was also ready to fly as an aircraft commander of a combat mission. All our first pilots were highly experienced as C-130 airlift aircraft commanders before becoming qualified in the Combat Talon ‘Blackbirds’. Many felt that to become a highly qualified co-pilot in the Combat Talon programme was somewhat of a career regression even though they understood the need for such demanding pilot qualification. As experienced pilots, they were simply outranked by others with more impressive pilot credentials that became Combat Talon Aircraft Commanders. Edwin Osborne was clearly a pilot who should not be taking a back seat to anyone. He was an excellent pilot qualified as an instructor pilot in the ‘Blackbirds’.
‘The next day John Lewis and I rode with the S-01 officer crew to the mission planning room. Van Buren drove the crew van. He normally drove whenever his crew went places. I was told that as our Commissary Officer he even drove through Sàigòn on his crew’s periodic commissary runs when his crew’s ‘Blackbird’ got extra ground time at Tân Sơn Nhứt to accommodate his grocery shopping. Since Charlie Claxton was destined to inherit that duty from him, it meant that my S-05 crew would get the long ground time on some future transits through Sàigòn.
Lieutenant Colonel Tom Hines, Ops Officer and John Gargus at Nha Trang Air Base. (John Gargus)
‘On the way to our secure mission planning room, I sat right across from Captain Frank Parker, a tall blond young man who was the crew’s EWO. He was telling several of us how fortunate we were in having missions where we could sneak in and sneak out without stirring up a hornets’ nest. He had recently returned from Thailand where he ran into several of his EWO classmates who were flying the RB-66s. Their mission was to deliberately challenge the enemy’s electronic detection systems and deadly retaliation in their efforts to pinpoint locations of enemy radars. He used the term we sometimes applied to those situations when one would prefer to be on the ground rather than in the air. He said that his friends were ‘eating their livers’ on their RB-66 missions.
‘Roy Thompson had everything ready for us when we arrived. All the charts we prepared the day before were either posted on easels or laid out on worktables. Fresh, unmarked charts, flight plan logs and other necessary mission forms were placed on tables where the crewmembers would use them. Roy gave a brief overview of what the mission entailed. About the only unusual thing that he noted was that TOTs (times on targets) were not prescribed because neither drop zone had a reception team. The psy-ops (leaflet) drop had a fixed drop leg at altitude of 30,000 or more feet, depending on the wind velocity and direction. Weaker winds would require a higher altitude. The heart of Hànôi would be from 65 to 70 miles away and it was hoped that some of the leaflets would make it that far before the sunrise. Lack of TOTs also explained to them why their flight plan was not completed with time of arrival at turning points. They were to calculate these by themselves, planning on a 260-265 true air speed at high altitudes and a standard 230 ground speed at terrain following levels.
‘Once Roy Thompson was finished with his mission introduction, I joined Don Fisher and Gordie Wenaas, the two crew navigators, to work on the flight planned route. John Lewis and Frank Parker got together to work on the enemy’s defences. Roy joined the three pilots. Our enlisted crew members: two flight engineers, two load masters and one radio operator, normally did not participate in mission planning.
John Gargus at his navigator’s position. (John Gargus)
‘Gordie Wenaas thought the mission would be a ‘piece of cake.’ He quickly noted that there were practically no threat circles anywhere near our track. Then he started crunching out flight plan times between turning points. Don and I went over each low level turning point, examining the terrain in its vicinity. Practically all were river bends or rivers that would show up well on radar. Some turning points had been used on previous missions and were reported to be good ones. Selected drop zone for the second drop was a location with good radar targets everywhere. He was satisfied with everything and began to prepare his own navigational chart. In this task, Gordie was way ahead of him. Gordie was a man who undertook every single task very seriously. I remember him going around our hotel taking care of chores whenever his S-01 crew was scheduled to be the hotel’s duty crew. Each crew was regularly scheduled for hotel crew duty by the Ops Scheduling as if it were a flight assignment. These duties consisted of servicing our two electrical generators, bringing in fresh potable water from the Air Base, taking care of mail; stocking the rooftop bar and performing whatever maintenance chores were needed at the hotel. Gordie Wenaas was conspicuous by keeping himself occupied with these chores. He showed me how to start up and switch our two noisy generators.
‘I was then drawn into a conversation with the pilots. Osborne liked the route and had only one concern. It was the time interval between the end of the first drop and the start of the second one. Would his two loadmasters have enough time t
o move the cargo to the ramp for this drop? How many bundles would there be? How much would they weigh? And, of course, ‘What is this notional stuff?’ The answer to this question could only be provided by our cargo rigger, a Warrant Officer from the First Flight. Van Buren was dispatched to go next door to get him. Van returned alone, but he had the information we needed. He also succeeded in making arrangements for the loadmasters and the flight engineers to be at the aircraft next morning to witness the cargo loading. He commented that the Warrant Officer reminded him that no one was to mess with the cargo and question its rigging. Everything would be set up by the First Flight crew just the way it should be dropped. Anything non-standard or out of place should be ignored. Our job was to fly it there and drop it just as it was configured.
‘Ed Osborne showed much interest in the terrain following portion of flight. So the pilots gathered around Don Fisher who had already drawn his chart. He walked through every leg of flight and explained each turning point. Charlie Claxton had the weight of the aircraft calculated at the point of acceleration and climb to high altitude. There were questions about how much of the area west of Hànôi the crew would be able to see. Aircraft’s track was over the eastern slopes of the central highlands. Numerous peaks with elevations of up to 9,000 feet were immediately to the left and the sprawling Red River Valley with level terrain west of Hànôi to the right. It was to be a dark night with new moon beginning on 30 December. There would be total darkness. Some lights would no doubt be lighted towards Hànôi. Our prior flights noted that North Việtnam did not have a complete night-time blackout. The night would be perfect for the two map-readers - Gordie Wenaas on the right and Charlie Claxton on the left - to use the somewhat cumbersome starlight scope to monitor the terrain below. The scope was of little use at terrain following levels because it had excessive tunnel vision. This made the terrain whiz by so fast that it caused the images to blur. But at drop altitude, where the ‘Blackbird’ would seem to be at a standstill in relation to the ground below, the scope would give its user a fascinating view of terrain otherwise hidden in total darkness. Very little cloud coverage was predicted for that night.
‘We pointed out the location of Yên Bái Air Base that would be at the aircraft’s 1 to 2 o’clock position during the drop. If there were any MiGs on night alert, that base would pose their greatest threat. This would also be Frank Parker’s greatest challenge that night. He would have to defend against a possible interceptor activity.
‘Ed Osborne examined the terrain into which the aircraft would have to descend after the leaflet drop. He was concerned about the rapidly approaching ground during their maximum rate of descent when the radar stabilization was habitually, but only temporarily, lost and the Doppler limits were also exceeded. Here I pointed out that a rapid descent should not be executed unless the aircraft was in jeopardy due to SAM or interceptor attack. All crews seemed to have the same Pope AFB training mind set. During our training there, each short look was followed by a maximum rate descent, a manoeuvre which put a lot of stress on the aircraft. This needed to be practiced at every opportunity. Now in real life, if a threat to our aircraft did not materialize, there was no need to put it through such a stressful manoeuvre where the crew experienced weightlessness and everything not tied down started floating about. Then at the point of level off, the tremendous G load would force the standing crewmembers down to their knees. On this mission there would be additional cargo just behind the EWO and the radio operator compartment. We did not want any of it to break loose during such a stressful manoeuvre.
‘Ed was concerned with the time remaining before the second drop. His loadmasters and the second flight engineer would have to move the cargo to the back of the aircraft and get it set for the drop. Normally, the cargo would be all set from the point of take off. But not this time. The back of the aircraft would have to be cleared of any remaining restraining straps from the leaflet drop. Then the resupply bundles would have to be moved into place. Normally this would not be that difficult because the palletized bundles were on rollers. But being on rollers in straight and level flight is one thing, being on rollers in an up and down terrain following flight is another. Great care was needed to avoid an injury or have a cargo slip off the rollers at an angle where the pallet would jam. This would no doubt be a new experience for these loadmasters. Ed noted with some satisfaction that the terrain following leg going westbound along the 22nd parallel was relatively level because we were taking advantage of the break between 10,000 feet high peaks on the right and 9,000 feet ones on the left.
‘At a prominent turning point over the Black River the mission would turn south. The ‘Blackbird’ would fly almost due south hiding behind the high terrain west of the river. This would keep it west of the valley’s populated areas. Ahead at the aircraft’s 10 to 11 o’clock position would be the Nà Sản early warning radar. This radar would be looking for the reappearance of the intruder that was sure to excite the radars on the Hànôi side of the mountains in the Red River valley. This radar was not capable of directing MiG interceptors and none were expected to come west out of the Red River valley.
‘Our drop zone was in an isolated area just north of Highway 6. It was a logical place for a drop zone. This would no doubt add to the credibility to the nonexistent team’s presence. Roy Thompson explained the deceptive nature of this drop. There would be no ground markings or signals. The drop would occur on Don Fisher’s green light command when his Doppler distance to go ran out. After this drop the crew would continue terrain following into Laos where the high altitude route home would resume at the Skyline beacon. North Việtnam’s western early warning radar at Nà Sản would have an unobstructed scan of our aircraft’s pre drop slow down and the post drop acceleration on its escape heading. The enemy would have a good indication for where to look for whatever the intruding aircraft delivered. We planned it that way.
‘At some point during this low-level route review we were joined by Frank Parker and John Lewis who had concluded their study of the enemy’s electronic air order of battle. They pointed out correctly that once the aircraft crossed into the Black River region the enemy defences were such that a return home at any altitude would be safe. That was a good thought in case of any in-flight problems, such as navigational, mechanical, or outside visibility degradation due to weather.
‘Then the whole group gathered around Frank Parker’s chart. His chart differed from those of Don Fisher and the map-readers Charlie Claxton and Gordie Wenaas. Theirs had smaller threat circles along the flight-planned track. They represented lethal ranges of SAMs and AAA. Frank’s chart had the mission flying through much larger circles that outlined scan ranges of various radars. His chart showed that the aircraft would be exposed to many types of radar throughout its northbound portion of flight along the Red River. He estimated that even before the aircraft would reach its drop altitude of 30,000+ feet, all available radars would be alerted to their presence and that he would be saturated with a tremendous amount of visual and aural signals. He acknowledged that he would have to rely on very able assistance from Gean Clapper, the crew radio operator, who would be sharing his console behind the cargo compartment curtain.
‘Gean Clapper was a true professional in his field. He had many years of experience as a HAM radio operator. As such he had contacts with colleagues throughout the world. On flights over international waters, where it was permissible, he would raise his contacts and relay personal greetings and messages to families back home. He was also very good at electronic warfare. He could positively recognize the chirping sounds of various radars. This should be a great asset on a flight such as this one where sound-wise things would get extremely noisy for Frank. Frank concluded that with Gean’s help he should be able to detect anything out of the ordinary and call for evasive action before any harm could come to the ‘Blackbird’. It would be Don Fisher’s task to find a safe evasive flight path through the mountains on the left.
‘After that
each crewmember went on his own, putting finishing touches on all paperwork he was producing. We three mission planners assisted them with anything they needed and insured that all mission documents they produced were properly stamped TOP SECRET. None of the documents could leave with the crew. They were collected by us and locked in First Flight’s safe. They would not be released to the crew until the next night before the pre-departure mission briefing.
‘The next day’s mission briefing was a whole crew affair attended by our Commander, Lieutenant Colonel Dow Rogers and our Operations Officer, Lieutenant Colonel Tom Hines. This would be the first time the enlisted crewmembers learned about the target area. All five, the two engineers, two loadmasters and the radio operator, were present when the First Flight’s cargo handlers loaded the aircraft. Flight engineer Tech Sergeant Jack McCrary gave us thumbs up on the condition of the aircraft. He was a very meticulous crewmember, well regarded, not just by Ed Osborne, but also by his flight engineer peers. I wondered how much sleep he had gotten during the day. His eyes looked red as if he had not slept at all. But we all knew that his nickname was ‘Red Eye.’ He had an eye condition that made them look red and blood shot all the time. His second, Staff Sergeant Wayne Eckley, was an engineer of lesser experience, but not short on enthusiasm. His nickname was ‘Bones.’ The jungle fatigue uniforms (designed as one size fits all) exaggerated his lean and bony body. There was so much more space left for him inside his fatigues.
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