Brigadier General Dan Shomron (later to become the IDF’s Chief of Staff), presented the rescue plan to Lieutenant General Mordechai Gur the Chief of Staff, Shimon Peres the Defence Minister and Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin for final authorization to complete the highly secretive rescue mission. The incredible was deemed possible, as the IDF’s plan was based on a few advantages that Israel held over the terrorists. The Entebbe airport terminal at which the hostages were being held was, coincidentally, built by an Israeli construction firm. This company provided blueprints allowing the IDF to erect a partial replica of the airport terminal to assist in planning the rescue. Additionally, the captors had released the non-Jewish prisoners, who were able to describe the terrorists, their arms, their positioning and the amount of help provided by the Ugandan military forces. As a result of this information, the IDF decided to send in an overwhelmingly powerful force: over 200 of its best soldiers. Finally, the element of surprise was probably the biggest edge that Israel held. According to Shomron: ‘You had more than a hundred people sitting in a small room, surrounded by terrorists with their fingers on the trigger. They could fire in a fraction of a second. We had to fly seven hours, land safely, drive to the terminal area where the hostages were being held, get inside and eliminate all the terrorists before any of them could fire.’
With this, designated forces quickly organized in preparation, bringing together pilots, paratroopers and a special operations detachment known as ‘The Unit.’ Led by 30-year old Lieutenant Colonel Yonatan ‘Yoni’ Netanyahu (the older brother of Benjamin (Binyamin) ‘Bibi’ Netanyahu, the Prime Minister of Israel 1996-1999 and again, from 31 March 2009) its official name was Sayeret Matkal (Israeli special forces). Binyamin Netanyahu served for five years as a commando in Sayeret Matkal, which gained a reputation for bold and creative raids during the War of Attrition. ‘Yoni’ Netanyahu, who had been born on 13 March 1946 in New York City, had joined the Sayeret Matkal in the early 1970s and in the summer of 1972 was appointed as the unit’s deputy commander. During the Yom Kippur War in October 1973, Netanyahu commanded a Sayeret Matkal force in the Golan Heights that killed more than forty Syrian commandos in a battle which thwarted the Syrian commandos’ raid in the Golan’s heartland. For the raid on Entebbe ‘The Unit’ would don French ‘lizard’ camo uniforms - the same kind worn by Ugandan soldiers - and blackened their faces and hands. They would also carry similar weapons such as Chinese made AK-47s. Some of the guns had a crude mount with a small flashlight positioned atop the receiver. The rest of the force would don standard Israeli Defence Force clothing and equipment. The Sayeret Matkal was chosen to lead Operation ‘Thunderbolt’, undergoing final polishing at that very moment.1
General Moshe Dyan (left) and Aluf (Major General) Benny Peled (standing) who had become commander of the Israeli Air Force (IAF) in 1973.
Map showing the outbound and return routes for Operation ‘Entebbe’. The Israelis lacked the logistical capacity to air refuel four to six Hercules aircraft so far from Israeli airspace but the Israeli government finally secured permission from Kenya for the IDF task force to cross Kenyan airspace and refuel at the Jomo Kenyatta International Airport in Nairobi.
Once he received the plan Netanyahu put his men immediately to work over the next two days, practicing breaching and entering mock ups like the building in Entebbe. They ran each rehearsal as many times as possible, tweaking how they would commence the rescue with the fewest minutes between start and finish. When the time came for the men to be briefed on the operation, they listened as the officer muttered one word amidst his others which formed the crux of ‘Thunderbolt’.2
While planning the raid the Israeli forces had to figure out how to refuel the C-130 aircraft they intended to use while en route to Entebbe. The Israelis lacked the logistical capacity to aerially refuel four to six aircraft so far from Israeli airspace. While several East African nations, including the logistically preferred choice Kenya, were sympathetic, none wished to incur the wrath of Amin or the Palestinians by allowing the Israelis to land their aircraft within their borders. The raid could not proceed without assistance from at least one East African government. The Jewish owner of the Block hotels chain in Kenya, along with other members of the Jewish and Israeli community in Nairobi, may have used their political and economic influence to help persuade Kenya’s President Mzee Jomo Kenyatta to help Israel. The Israeli government finally secured permission from Kenya for the IDF task force to cross Kenyan airspace and refuel at the Jomo Kenyatta International Airport.3
Four C-130Hs would depart Israel, the first carrying 29 men of Sayeret Matkal and 52 paratroops. It also carried a black Mercedes limousine configured to look like Amin’s personal vehicle and two Land Rover escorts to accompany the car to the terminal. There the Unit members would assault the building as the paratroops secured the airport. Hercules No.2 would carry seventeen more paratroops, two armed jeeps and a communications jeep. These were to occupy a newer terminal building and fuel depot along with the entrances to ward off Ugandan counterattacks. Shaul Mofaz, who years later would become Israel’s vice prime minister, was in charge of the group who would destroy the small contingent of Soviet-built MiG-17s and MiG-21s at the airport. Hercules No.3 would depart thirty men of another Special Forces unit, the Sayeret Golani to provide security and another vehicle. The Golani were to help escort the hostages. Hercules No.4 would be the last to land carrying a medical team, two vehicles to transport hostages and wounded, along with a seventeen-man security element. It was this aircraft the hostages would leave on. Two Boeing 707 jets would follow the C-130s. The first contained medical facilities and General Peled and the Head of the Operations Branch of the IDF. Major General Yekutiel ‘Kuti’ Adam the commander of the operation was on board the second Boeing.
C-130H 4X-FBQ-420 (75-0534), one of four Israeli C-130Hs used on the highly successful Entebbe raid lands in Israel following the operation. The other three C-130Hs used on Operation ‘Thunderbolt’ were 4X-FBB/106 (71-1375); 4X-FBT/435 (75-0536) and C-130H 4X-FBA/102 (71-1374).
Captain (later Lieutenant Colonel) Avi Mor’s talent for navigation was about to be put to the test. In the middle of the night on the Wednesday before the mission he had received a house visit from a friend and fellow soldier in the Israel Air Force. ‘My wife answered the door. My friend told her ‘Norit, I suggest you go to your room and close the door.’ By 6 the following morning, I was at an exercise with Sayeret Matkal. From that moment on, every single person who was in some way relevant to the mission was in a period of intensive brainstorming for the best possible rescue scenario to present to Israel’s governing officials. By pinpointing these advantages, the IDF was able to use the element of surprise in its favour. Keep in mind it was the Sabbath, during which the IAF does not hold exercises or routine operations - making the rescue aircraft more likely to stand out. We had to fly slowly and in very low altitudes to remain unnoticeable. We had 103 Jewish hostages in Entebbe and over 200 IDF soldiers heading to rescue them. It was essential for us not to blow our cover: It is enough for the terrorists to have any sort of suspicion and not only would there have been no rescue mission, but there would have been a tragedy.’
Mor too knew what it meant to fight for freedom. Born in Poland he had escaped to Israel with his parents and seven siblings during the Nazi regime. He had enlisted in the Israeli Air Force and passed the rigorous Flight Academy course. ‘The process by which the terrorists selected their hostages, it hurts me to say it - it was a similar selection process ‘the Nazis administered when selecting who would go work and who would be sent to the gas chambers. One of the biggest problems we had was that we were operating with minimal clarity throughout the entire mission, as we had no reliable source of information. And, when faced with an ultimatum, time is of the essence.’
Peled had left Joshua Shani with the impression that a rescue at Entebbe would be possible. ‘I had the great honour of being the leading navigator for aircraft two, three and four. I was
in the second aircraft and, whether the first was successful or not, we had to land at the airport precisely six minutes after them. The rest of us had no details about the first aircraft and what was going on down there. The second and third Israeli planes were to arrive six minutes later, carrying reinforcements and troops assigned to help fight the Ugandan forces surrounding the airport. The fourth aircraft - the only aircraft with enough fuel to fly to Entebbe and back to Israel - would arrive empty, ready to evacuate the hostages and take them home.’
With the operation receiving its final review and approval, the force transferred and began boarding the aircraft at 2:20 pm on 3 July, Israeli time. ‘We began our journey from Sharm el-Sheikh, Egypt, which at the time was under Israeli control’ says Joshua Shani. ‘Matan Vilnai was in the cockpit with me. Ephraim Sneh was on the plane as a doctor. The takeoff from Sharm was one of the heaviest ever in the history of this aircraft. I didn’t have a clue what would happen. I gave the plane maximum power and it was just taxiing, not accelerating. At the very end of the runway, I was probably two knots over the stall speed and I had to lift off. I took off to the north, but had to turn south where our destination was. I couldn’t make the turn until I gained more speed. Just making that turn, I was struggling to keep control, but aircraft have feelings and all turned out well.
‘We had to fly very close to Saudi Arabia and Egypt, over the Gulf of Suez. We weren’t afraid of violating anyone’s air space - it’s an international air route. The problem was that they might pick us up on radar. We flew really low - 100 feet above the water, a formation of four planes. The main element was surprise. All it takes is one truck to block a runway and that’s all. The operation would be over. Therefore, secrecy was critical. At some places that were particularly dangerous, we flew at an altitude of 35 feet. I recall the altimeter reading. Trust me, this is scary! In this situation, you cannot fly close formation. As flight leader, I didn’t know if I still had planes 2, 3 and 4 behind me because there was total radio silence. You can’t see behind you in a C-130. Luckily, they were smart, so from time to time they would show themselves to me and then go back to their place in the formation, so I still knew I had my formation with me.’
‘Night stretched out over the darkened African continent as the C-130s maintained their designated intervals. Mostly they flew at a height of no more than 100 feet to avoid radar detection by Egyptian, Sudanese and Saudi Arabian forces. Near the south outlet of the Red Sea the C-130s turned south and passed south of Djibouti. From there, they went to a point northeast of Nairobi, likely across Somalia and the Ogaden area of Ethiopia. Hours passed by and a monotonous hush pervaded the force until they received word Entebbe was minutes away. They turned west, passing through the African Rift Valley and weapons and equipment were rechecked and soon the planes vectored over Lake Victoria for the trail of lights which shone over the wet, grey sheen of the runway.
No.1 crew on the Entebbe mission with Joshua Shani centre, front row.
At 23:00 IST wheels bounced as Joshua Shani began braking and throttling back as he landed the first C-130 at Entebbe with cargo bay doors already open, dovetailing behind a British cargo flight and followed by the other C-130s without arousing suspicion in the control tower. ‘I stopped in the middle of the runway and a group of paratroopers jumped out from the side doors and marked the runway with electric lights, so that the other planes behind me could have an easier time landing. The paratroopers went on to take the control tower. The Mercedes [Ugandan flags fluttering from the front bumpers] and Land Rovers drove out from the back cargo door of my aircraft and the commandos stormed the old terminal building where the hostages were.’
‘The Unit’s’ weapon selectors were set to single shot. Netanyahu and his men began a steady pace of 25 mph along the approach road to the old terminal. 250 metres from the building a Ugandan soldier appeared on either side of the road. Netanyahu sitting in the front passenger seat raised a silenced .22 pistol and began firing along with a comrade at the two men. One of them collapsed to his knees while the other bolted into the darkness. The wounded man rose back to his feet and fired a shot from his AK, the crack echoing into the night. A stutter from a machine gun on a Land Rover tore into him felling him by the road. Surprise was lost.
The motorcade revved into a high speed dash toward the building. Tyres slid to a stop on the wet pavement as the element jumped out of the limousine and Land Rovers. Netanyahu shouted for his men to assault the building. As they approached the terminal, two Ugandan sentries, aware that Idi Amin had recently purchased a white Mercedes, ordered the vehicles to stop. The commandos shot the sentries using silenced pistols, but did not kill them. As they pulled away, however, an Israeli commando in one of the following Land Rovers killed them with an unsuppressed rifle. Fearing the hijackers would be alerted prematurely, the assault team quickly approached the terminal. The Israelis sprang from their vehicles and burst towards the terminal. The hostages were in the main hall of the airport building, directly adjacent to the runway. Entering the terminal, the commandoes shouted through a megaphone, ‘Stay down! Stay down! We are Israeli soldiers,’ in both Hebrew and English. Jean-Jacques Maimoni, a 19-year-old French immigrant to Israel, stood up and was killed when Israeli company commander Muki Betzer and another soldier mistook him for a hijacker and fired at him.
Another hostage, Pasco Cohen, 52, the manager of an Israeli medical insurance fund, was also fatally wounded by gunfire from the commandos. A third hostage, 56-year-old Ida Borochovitch, a Russian Jew who had emigrated to Israel, was killed in the crossfire. According to hostage Ilan Hartuv, Wilfried Böse was the only hijacker who, after the operation began, entered the hall housing the hostages. At first he pointed his Kalashnikov rifle at hostages, but ‘immediately came to his senses’ and ordered them to find shelter in the restroom, before being killed by the commandos. According to Hartuv, Böse fired only at Israeli soldiers and not at hostages. One of the German terrorists screamed ‘the Ugandan’s have gone crazy. They are shooting at us!’ He fired a burst through a glass window pane before a fusillade of bullets ripped into Yonatan Netanyahu’s chest and would soon die in the arms of Ephraim Sneh, commander of the mission’s medical unit.. Doors flew open and the team stormed into the terminal, shooting well aimed shots into the seven terrorists before making their way through the building, killing Ugandans trying to hide and fire back. In the hostage room megaphones barked, ‘Everybody lie down! We are the Israeli Army! At one point, an Israeli commando called out in Hebrew, ‘Where are the rest of them?’ referring to the hijackers. The hostages pointed to a connecting door of the airport’s main hall, into which the commandos threw several hand grenades. Then, they entered the room and shot dead the three remaining hijackers, ending the assault. Muki Betser the second in command, radioed from the terminal. ‘Hostages secure. Team intact. No casualties.’
The black Mercedes limousine configured to look like Idi Amin’s personal vehicle which was carried in one of the Hercules on the Entebbe mission.
The Hercules crews were mobbed on return to Tel Aviv by the joyful hostages rescued from Entebbe Airport.
‘Yoni’s down,’ came the reply.
They retrieved Netanyahu’s body and began filing the living hostages and bodies of four killed in the shootout out toward Hercules No .4, where Sayeret Golani formed a funnel to guide them in.
Meanwhile, the other three C-130s had landed and unloaded armoured personnel carriers to provide defence during the anticipated hour of refuelling. The Israeli paratroopers then destroyed Ugandan MiGs to prevent them from pursuing and conducted a sweep of the airfield for intelligencegathering. Across the rest of the airport, the paratroopers occupied the new terminal without firing a shot. Hercules No.4 roared down the runway and lifted off before the remaining forces began returning to board the final three aircraft. The entire operation lasted 53 minutes - of which the assault lasted only thirty minutes. In all, 99 minutes had been spent on the ground before the last C-130 left. T
he cost of Entebbe was as follows: One commando killed and at least five other commandos were wounded; four hostages killed; ten hostages wounded; seven terrorists killed; Approximately 45 Ugandan soldiers killed; Unknown number of Ugandan soldiers wounded; eleven MiG fighters destroyed.
After about fifty minutes on the ground in Entebbe Joshua Shani gave the order: ‘Whoever is ready, take off. I remember the satisfaction of seeing plane number 4, with the hostages on board, taking off from Entebbe - the sight of its silhouette in the night. It was then that I knew. That’s it. We did it. The mission succeeded.
‘Now we had a little problem. We needed fuel to fly back home. We came on a one-way ticket! We had planned for a number of options for refuelling and I learned from the command-and-control aircraft flying above us that the option to refuel in Nairobi was open. I saw the freed passengers during the refuelling stop. I looked inside their plane and I saw all the expressions in the world, from total hysteria and crying to singing.
The old Entebbe Terminal in 1994 with bullet holes and scars from the 1976 raid still visible.
‘The plane with the hostages landed at Ben-Gurion Airport, where they were reunited with their families. The three other planes remained for a debrief.’
‘Our mission was accomplished the instant the hostages had left Entebbe’ Captain Mor recalled. ‘I did not register it then, as we were still in mission mode but we landed at Ben Gurion to a sea of Israelis swarming with pride, elated to welcome us home. It marked one of the best times in Israel’s history in terms of international recognition and respect.’
Yitzhak Rabin, Prime Minister of Israel, walked up to Joshua Shani, who recalled: ‘I had been in my flight suit for 24 hours straight, in temperatures over 100 degrees in the airplane, sweating and smelly and here walks the Prime Minister with big open arms. I’m thinking - please don’t hug me - he may die from this! He hugged me for what felt like a full minute and said only ‘Thanks.’
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