Hitler: Military Commander

by Rupert Matthews

  CONTENTS

  Introduction

  ONE Hitler’s High Command

  TWO The Other Services

  THREE Military Alliances

  FOUR Corporal Hitler

  FIVE Rearming the Reich

  SIX Taking Control

  SEVEN Early Victories

  EIGHT France 1940

  NINE Operation Sealion

  TEN Operation Barbarossa

  ELEVEN The Eastern Front

  TWELVE Kursk

  THIRTEEN The Western Front

  FOURTEEN The Road to Berlin

  Index

  INTRODUCTION

  ‘Hitler is the greatest military commander of all time.’

  Field Marshal Wilhelm Keitel

  ‘Hitler is a jumped up Bohemian Corporal.’

  Field Marshal Paul von Hindenburg

  As a military man Hitler won victories that many professionals considered impossible to achieve. He formulated plans that were bold to the point of rashness. He enthused his men with a confidence and morale that took them through defeats and reverses that would have broken other armies. The sheer scale of Hitler’s military achievement is breathtaking.

  Yet Hitler led his superb armed forces to total and crushing defeat. With the world seemingly at his feet, Hitler threw it all away and ended his days as the demented commander of a few square yards of rubble in what had once been his capital city. Whatever qualities Hitler had for good or for bad, he had them in abundance: for Hitler there was rarely a middle way or a reason to compromise. That is what brought him his successes and what caused his downfall.

  There are many attributes which are essential in a military commander. Napoleon, for instance, thought that luck was the most important asset in a general. Hitler had plenty of luck, but other qualities essential to a commander were entirely lacking. He had no real empathy with the men he commanded. Despite having served in the trenches of the First World War, Hitler could without any remorse send an entire army to their deaths, as at Stalingrad. The sufferings of those he commanded were as nothing to him, and as a result he had no real idea of their morale and abilities. Nor did he have any real competence in the business of moving his forces and getting them into action. Supply lines and logistics were closed books to Hitler. Where he relied on his staff officers to work out these mundane practicalities, and listened to their opinions of what was and was not possible, Hitler did well. But where he organised these matters for himself, his efforts were doomed to failure.

  Yet there can be no doubting Hitler’s gifts. His grasp of strategy was, almost to the end, superb. He could correctly identify the essential objectives for his attacks and, very often the best way to secure them. Even during his last days in Berlin, Hitler could foresee that the continent of Europe would soon be split between capitalist west and communist east, and that Germany would eventually rise again to hold the balance between the two.

  His ability to foresee the reactions of his opponents was also highly developed. He correctly predicted that the French would not oppose the remilitarisation of the Rhineland and that Austria would welcome the German troops when they marched over the border. Not until 1940 was he confounded. He expected the British to make peace once France was defeated, but these expectations were disappointed: Hitler had failed to take Winston Churchill into account.

  Perhaps what Hitler had working for him most was the tremendous influence of his willpower and personality on the performance of the German armed forces. He could inspire devotion in the hardest of men and stir thoughts of victory in those facing abject defeat. More than once it was Hitler’s blind refusal to accept defeat that held the German army together. But then it was that same refusal to accept the inevitable that caused him to take Germany down to ultimate destruction.

  Hitler was in reality a better politician than military commander. It was when he was using military force to resolve political disputes that he was at his best and when attempting to use politics to solve military problems that he was at his most useless. He was also a better soldier than he was a commander. In the trenches of the Great War, Hitler excelled as a front line infantryman. His courage and skills were never in doubt, though it is telling that despite being awarded the Iron Cross Second and First Class, he was never put forward for promotion above the rank of corporal.

  Nor can the true evil of the uses to which he put his military gifts be overlooked. Hitler did not use his gifts to save a peaceful nation from sudden danger nor to overcome tyranny. He used his military abilities, and the superb fighting machine of the German Wehrmacht, to spread evil, death and destruction across Europe. Even if Hitler had been a far greater military figure than in truth he was, these facts could be neither forgotten nor forgiven.

  For Hitler military power was merely a means of furthering his agenda of retribution, extermination and conquest. He was always a Nazi first and a commander second.

  CHAPTER ONE

  Hitler’s High Command

  When Hitler became Führer in 1933 he automatically became the head of the German armed forces. At that time the high command of the armed forces was a complex organisation of planners, staff officers and field commanders organised into a series of structures and chains of command supported by a feeling of solidarity among the officer corps. There was space for group decision making, discussion and even dissent, although once a decision had been made the command structure was such that it could be carried out quickly and efficiently. Hitler was to change everything. He wanted absolute power over the military. The way in which he achieved this was ultimately to drive some officers to resign, others to question their duties and some to attempt the murder of the Führer.

  During the Nazi rise to power, the army officer corps were not wholly hostile to Hitler and his party. Indeed, Hitler’s failed 1923 putsch in Munich numbered the Great War hero General Erich von Ludendorff among its leaders. Nor were the generals opposed to one of the Nazi Party’s central policies, that the Versailles Treaty which ended the Great War was unfair and needed revising. The treaty had put severe constraints on the German military and many senior officers wanted to shake these off.

  Once Hitler came to power, his desire to win over the military to whole-hearted support of himself was a dominant influence in persuading him to destroy the power of the Nazi storm troopers, the brown-shirted Sturmabteilungen or SA. The army officers jealously guarded the army’s traditional right to be the only body in Germany authorised to carry arms and, as such, the ultimate guarantors of the constitution. Under the Versailles Treaty the army was allowed to be only 100,000 men strong. Ernst Röhm, the SA leader, had 3 million followers in uniform and wanted his SA to form the basis of the armed might of Nazi Germany.

  On the night of 30 June 1934, in an action that was to become infamous as the ‘Night of the Long Knives’, Hitler ordered the murders of Röhm and dozens of other leading SA men, together with the disbanding of large numbers of stormtroopers. The immediate reaction of the army officers was to support Hitler’s actions and welcome the overthrow of the SA. Some officers opposed the brutal and illegal methods used but most were prepared to overlook them.

  One of the officers who turned a blind eye to what was done to the SA on the Night of the Long Knives was General Ludwig Beck. As adjutant general in the War Ministry, Beck was second to the Chief of the Army Staff, Kurt von Hammerstein-Equord. In the days preceding the murders of Röhm and others, Beck had taken Hitler’s comments to mean that the members of the SA leadership were to be arrested on charges of treason and put in prison. He had, therefore, offered the army as an instrument to arrest the SA leaders and disarm the members, an offer that won Hitler’s favour. Although in the event the SS was used to carry
out the killings, that they had logistical support and weapons supplied by the army is undeniable; it is highly likely that the army were passed lists of those to be executed, and were able to confirm or veto a number of names.

  At the time this decision of Hitler’s seemed unimportant, but by 1936 it was clear that the SS had come to include a number of paramilitary units armed in similar fashion to the regular army. In 1938 Hitler grouped these various units together to be the Waffen-SS, or armed SS, as a private army under the orders of himself, through Heinrich Himmler. Thus the army ended by getting, in the shape of Waffen-SS, the rival to their monopoly of armed power that they had feared from the SA. The following years saw endless disputes between Himmler and the army high command as both tried to get the best of the new panzers and other equipment for their troops.

  These difficulties were exacerbated by the very different internal morale of the two organisations. The army was officered by professional soldiers who were classically trained and usually came from aristocratic or wealthy families. The Waffen-SS took in recruits at the lowest level from all classes, and promoted exclusively from within. Even the most senior officers had worked their way up through the ranks and, unlike their army counterparts, were often from working class families. Nor were Waffen-SS relations with the army helped by the fanatical Nazism of the SS men, a fanaticism often considered ‘poor form’ amongst the aristocratic Prussian officer class.

  Hitler himself resolved the dispute when war broke out. He gave Himmler the task of administrating the Waffen-SS, but put the combat troops under direct army command. In time the Waffen-SS would grow in numbers. When the invasion of France took place about 120,000 men served in the Waffen-SS. When Russia was invaded there were about 210,000 and by autumn 1944 over half a million men were Waffen-SS. Friction with the army continued throughout the war. Hitler’s obvious preference for SS men did little to help his increasingly strained relationship with the army commanders.

  In 1934 the German President and aging hero Field Marshal Paul von Hindenburg died. Within hours, Goebbels had announced the abolition of the office of president. Supreme political power in Germany now rested in the person of the Führer: Adolf Hitler. At the same time, Hitler appointed himself head of the armed forces, changing the traditional oath taken by army officers from one of loyalty to the ‘people and the fatherland’ to one of personal loyalty to ‘the Führer and Chancellor’. At the time the change was opposed by only a few officers, but this new focus of loyalty was later to be used as the basis for a ruthless imposition of Hitler’s will on the army.

  Hitler reorganised the armed forces. Under the new regime at the top was the Oberkommando der Wehrmacht, the OKW, of which he was head, responsible for the armed forces on behalf of the War Ministry. Detailed organisation and planning for each service were undertaken by their own staff. The Oberkommando des Heeres, OKH, ran the army; the Oberkommando der Luftwaffe, OKL, ran the air force and the Oberkommando der Kriegsmarine, OKK, ran the navy.

  Field Marshal Werner von Blomberg

  Minister of Defence Werner von Blomberg, a conservative aristocrat, along with Beck, now chief of the general staff of the army, formulated plans to expand the army to about 30 divisions, with many more trained men in reserve. This, the two generals calculated, would be enough to defend the Reich against an attack by any two neighbouring countries. Their plans had barely begun to be implemented when in 1936 Hitler marched troops into the Rhineland. Beck and Blomberg both warned Hitler against the move explaining that the army would be unable to defend Germany if France retaliated. France did not retaliate, so the credibility of Beck and Blomberg in Hitler’s eyes was seriously damaged.

  In the views of the senior, more conservative army officers, the Beck-Blomberg years were looked back on with favour. The army had been formulating its doctrine of Blitzkrieg (lit. lightning war) and was expanding rapidly, but the senior generals had still been in control. At this time the top generals were able to speak up against Hitler at meetings and to formulate their own plans. Perhaps more importantly, the Nazis were kept out of internal army matters including discipline. All that changed in 1938.

  In February of that year Blomberg was forced to resign after Hitler discovered that the general’s new, and much younger, wife was a former prostitute. At the same time, the commander-in-chief of the army General Werner von Fritsch was forced to resign over allegations of homosexuality, charges trumped up by Himmler and the SS. Both generals had been opposed to Hitler’s military adventures in the Saarland and the Rhineland, and Hitler was glad to be rid of them; they were altogether too independent for his taste. In the wake of these resignations, the true extent of Hitler’s plans for political and military dominance, and for foreign conquests was becoming clear to Beck, but it was not until the crisis over the Sudetenland in September of 1938 that Beck finally became disillusioned with Hitler. Friends of General Fritsch had appealed to him to persuade generals to mass resignation in support of Fritsch, and General Franz Halder, his soon-to-be successor as army chief of staff even went so far as to urge a raid on Gestapo headquarters, only to be bluntly told by Beck: ‘Mutiny and revolution are not words in the dictionary of a German officer!’ In August he resigned, after submitting a paper highly critical of Hitler’s apparent war intentions, but continued to keep in touch with the more traditional army officers.

  The new figures then placed in the high command were more congenial to Hitler, and were more in tune with the views of the majority of junior army officers. Tens of thousands of young men were brought into the armed forces during the massive German rearmament of 1934 to 1938. Most of these saw only the growing confidence of the German nation and the way Hitler seemed to overcome insuperable odds and great obstacles.

  Hitler chose as the new head of OKW the leader of Blomberg’s private staff, an officer named Wilhelm Keitel. Keitel came from the proud class of old landowning families known as the Junkers, as did most of the conservative, professional officers. Until 1933, Keitel had shared most of the views and opinions of Blomberg and his fellow professionals, but after meeting Hitler for the first time, Keitel became overwhelmed by the sheer force of the Führer’s personality. At one point, as the invasion of Russia seemed to be going well, Keitel described Hitler as the ‘grosster Feldherr aller Zeiten’, (the greatest military leader of all time), a term contemptuously abbreviated by many of the great leader’s soldiers to ‘Grofaz’.

  General Willhelm Keitel, head of the OKW

  One observer said of Keitel, ‘Constantly in Hitler’s presence after war began, he succumbed to his influence. From being an honourable, respectable general he developed into a servile flatterer.’ Others were less kind. They called the new head of OKW not Keitel but Lakeitel, or ‘toady’. Keitel, was, however, an efficient staff officer who was able to ensure that even the more bizarre of Hitler’s plans were carefully transformed into detailed orders for the army commanders and officers to follow. Keitel was to remain as head of OKW until after Hitler’s death, being promoted to Field Marshal in 1940.

  Another key appointment at OKW was the chief of the planning staff, responsible for the strategic planning and supervision of campaigns. Hitler gave the job to General Alfred Jodl, a professional soldier who had served with distinction in the trenches. Jodl had known Hitler since 1923, though he was never close to the Führer and always avoided getting involved in politics. Even in his new post, he would severely reprimand any officer who talked politics on duty. For Jodl the task of OKW, and himself, was simply to carry out the wishes of the Führer in the military sphere.

  Like Keitel, Jodl retained his position right to the end of the Third Reich, but in the later years his job became almost redundant. As Hitler took a greater and greater role in the detailed planning of operations, Jodl had less to do. He was completely excluded from the planning of Operation Barbarossa, the attack on Russia in 1941, and was rarely consulted about events on the Eastern Front. He did however continue to serve Hitler loyally by planning
campaigns elsewhere, such as the invasion of Greece and the Ardennes Offensive of 1944.

  General Alfred Jodl, Keitel’s deputy and chief of the planning staff at OKW.

  As head of the OKH, Hitler chose another outwardly conservative officer who in reality could be relied upon to do as Hitler wanted. This was Walther von Brauchitsch, born in 1881 to one of the proudest of the Prussian military families. Like Hitler, Brauchitsch won the Iron Cross 1st Class in the trenches of the Great War. Unlike Hitler, he stayed in the army during peace time rising to become a senior figure at OKH, thus conveniently on hand in 1938 when Hitler was suddenly in need of a new head of OKH.

  Göring, Brauchitsch and Raeder, respective heads of the Luftwaffe, army and navy.

  Hitler seems to have picked Brauchitsch not because the man was any more or less gifted than other officers, but because Hitler knew Frau Brauchitsch. The general’s wife was a fanatical Nazi and besotted admirer of Hitler’s. Nevertheless, Brauchitsch began his career at OKH by voicing concerns about the practicality of Hitler’s plans to take over Austria. Although the army did, indeed, suffer some logistical problems as Brauchitsch had predicted, the overwhelming success of the operation made his earlier caution seem excessive. In March 1939 he again voiced private doubts to Hitler about the invasion of Czechoslovakia. Hitler attacked Brauchitsch with a furious tirade of words and insults. Again, Brauchitsch was proved to be wrong.

  After being wrong twice, Brauchitsch decided to keep quiet in future. In the build up to the attack on Russia, Brauchitsch loyally drew up the details needed by Hitler’s general strategy. In the height of summer 1941, when the panzers were being repaired, he urged Hitler to launch a single drive on Moscow to end the war quickly. Hitler ignored him and thereafter treated his advice with some contempt. In December 1941, Brauchitsch took advantage of heart trouble to resign.