On 19 November the Russians attacked just where Zeitzler had feared they would, on the weakly–held flanks of the Sixth Army. Just three days later the Soviet pincers closed and Paulus with most of the Sixth Army was surrounded in Stalingrad. Hitler’s first decision was to sack the entirely blameless General Heim, whose panzer division happened to be the closest to the Soviet breakthrough. In giving the orders to Keitel, Hitler announced, ‘I want my generals to understand once and for all that they’re expected to do their duty like everyone else. If not, they will be held responsible for their actions.’
Nobody present pointed out that the reason Heim had not moved his tanks was that Hitler had given orders that no panzers were to move without his authorisation, which had not been given.
On 24 November, Zeitzler was in the Wolfsschanze, the Wolf’s Lair, along with most of the senior OKH and OKW staff discussing the situation at Stalingrad. General Paulus had requested permission to break out of the closing Russian pincers to rejoin the main German forces west of the Don. Zeitzler read out Paulus’ message and concluded by expressing his own opinion in favour of the move. ‘Never!’ snapped Hitler and demanded of Zeitzler what could be done.
True to his background in logistics, Zeitzler’s reply was based on the fact that the 300,000 Germans and Rumanians cut off in Stalingrad would need 300 tonnes of supplies a day just to survive the winter. At this point Göring stepped in to promise that his Luftwaffe would have no trouble getting such a quantity of supplies into Stalingrad. Göring failed to mention that to do so the Luftwaffe would need access to Stalingrad airport. If the airport was lost, so was Stalingrad. In fact, the Luftwaffe managed to supply more than this bare minimum on only three days during the siege, achieving on average no more than seventy in any one day; nor was there ever any likelihood of their being able to do so: Hitler took Göring at face value more through loyalty than any objective logistical assessment.
Nevertheless, Hitler agreed with Göring’s proposal, then added his own touch. Erich von Manstein, the master of manoeuvre, was recalled from his work elsewhere and put in charge of the Third and Fourth Rumanian Armies and Fourth Panzer, with orders to reach Stalingrad by Christmas. At first Manstein was optimistic that he could reach Stalingrad and strengthen the defences so that the city could be held through to the spring. But by 10 December he had changed his mind. With only Hoth’s 17th and 23rd Panzer Divisions reinforced by the 6th Panzer hurriedly brought by rail from France, Manstein thought he would be lucky to do as much as open a corridor to Stalingrad along which Paulus could retreat.
Manstein’s attack, codenamed Winter Storm, was launched on 12 December. On 18 December, Manstein sent a message asking Hitler to order Paulus to make an assault on the Russians from his side so that the two German forces could link up south of Stalingrad. Hitler refused to give an answer. On 19 December, Manstein asked again. He asked again the next day, and the next. But Hitler still gave no answer. On 23 December, Manstein asked Paulus directly if he could break out. The gloomy reply was that the Sixth Army had enough fuel and ammunition to advance about 20 miles towards Manstein. The gap between the two forces was 35 miles. Paulus was also extremely reluctant even to make the attempt without a direct order from Hitler; an order which Hitler simply would not give. The following day Manstein had to pull back to respond to a Russian attack on his flank.
On 10 January 1943 the Soviet attack on the isolated German Sixth Army began. Ten days later Paulus knew that he was finished. German units began to surrender to the Russians. In desperation Paulus flew out a trusted staff officer, Major Zitzewitz, to describe conditions to Hitler and beg for help. Hitler listened to Zitzewitz, then dismissed him without a word. Minutes later Hitler sent a message to Paulus, ‘Surrender out of the question. Resist to the end.’
On the same day Hitler sent Paulus the order not to surrender, he received news that his nephew had been wounded in Stalingrad. Paulus offered to send the young man to an improvised air strip if Hitler sent a light aircraft to pick him up. Hitler refused. ‘Leo is a soldier’ was his only comment.
On 30 January Hitler promoted Paulus to the coveted rank of Field Marshal. The message giving Paulus the news was followed by another which noted that no German field marshal had ever surrendered to the enemy. There was, however, little Paulus could do. His men were throwing down their weapons. On 31 January Paulus surrendered. The Russians had taken 91,000 prisoners, including 24 generals, but many thousands more had died.
Hitler’s reaction to the disaster was to fly into a rage with the absent Paulus. Hitler accused him of cowardice, of treachery and of disobedience, before stating it would have been better all round if Paulus had shot himself.
CHAPTER TWELVE
Kursk
In the wake of the disaster of Stalingrad, Hitler began holding two military conferences each day instead of one. He distrusted his generals and staff officers even more than before, blaming them for the fact that his grand plan for 1942 had not been successful. Hitler insisted that all decisions of any importance had to come to his conferences for approval by himself. This inevitably slowed up the pace at which decisions could be made and led to some decisions being put off day after day as more urgent matters took precedence on the agenda. Slowly the German command structure was becoming paralysed by indecision.
The man Hitler distrusted more than any other was Göring. The two men had been firm allies since the earliest days of the Nazi Party in the wake of the First World War. Göring had been wounded in the failed putsch of 1923 and later used his contacts in business and the armed forces to smooth the path for Hitler’s rise to power. He had built the Luftwaffe up from scratch in the 1930s and supervised the supine Reichstag in the pre-war years, being rewarded with the unique title of Reichsmarschall. But he had failed Hitler in the Battle of Britain and now failed again at Stalingrad. Despite his close friendship and past loyalty, Göring was ousted from Hitler’s inner circle. He retired to his extensive hunting estates and lived a life of luxury amongst his looted treasures until arrested for war crimes in 1945. After dominating the Nuremberg war crimes trials with his wit and charm, Göring was condemned to death, but committed suicide first.
Hitler began laying plans for the defence of his vast conquests, but he still had a taste for the grand scheme and innovative strategy. The crushing of the Sixth Army at Stalingrad had done nothing to dampen Hitler’s belief in his own ability to achieve a single war-winning master stroke. In 1943 he looked to the area around Kursk for that great victory.
Before he began planning Operation Citadel, the name for the attack at Kursk, Hitler realised he had to make some serious strategic decisions about the war. He tore himself away from his operational responsibilities at OKH and reapplied himself to his tasks as Defence Minister and strategic commander at OKW.
His first task as Defence Minister was to order new weapons able to combat the surprisingly advanced Soviet T-34 tank. In December 1941, as soon as the T-34 had emerged as a problem, Hitler had ordered design work to begin on a similar German panzer, the Panzer V Panther. As usual the army put out performance specifications and asked different manufacturers to come up with designs. The contract was won by the conglomerate Maschinenfabrik Augsberg Nuremberg, better known as MAN, and in June 1942 the tank prototypes were put through extensive tests.
The Panther proved to be a revolutionary vehicle. It copied from the T-34 the concept of sloping armour to cause incoming shells to bounce off. Also copied from the Soviet tank were the wide tracks and large road wheels which gave better traction on snow and mud, both of which had caused problems for the Panzer IV. The Panther took the ideas further by mounting a powerful engine and advanced gear box along with a robust suspension system. Together these allowed the Panther to move cross-country at a much greater speed than any other tank on the battlefield. Also better than anything else in action at the time was the tank’s 75mm gun, which had been designed specifically to punch through armour.
In July 1942 Albert
Speer presented Hitler with the finished prototypes of the Panther. The Führer was impressed, but his attention was distracted by the developing offensive in southern Russia. He approved an order for 1,000 Panthers. By January 1943, however, Hitler’s priorities were changing and he took a much closer interest in the Panther. He demanded that 250 of the new tanks be ready by May, another 750 later that summer and another 1,000 in time for the summer of 1944.
Panzer Mark V Panther (Ausf. A) in action on the Italian Front
Also tested in prototype form in June 1942 was the Panzer VI Tiger, perhaps the most famous, and the most fearsome tank of the war. The Tiger had been conceived in May 1941, even before the attack on Russia began, as a heavy tank with impenetrable armour and the most effective gun on the battlefield. Designed to be invincible, the Tiger turned out to be almost unbeatable, but was never produced in enough numbers to turn the tide of war. The prototypes tested in the summer of 1942 had heavy armour, able to withstand most armour-piercing shells of the time, and were equipped with the famous 88mm gun as well as with machine guns. The engine and gearbox, however, were below standard and broke down with distressing regularity.
Even while changes to the Tiger were underway, Hitler ordered that the new weapons be deployed on the Eastern Front. Predictably they broke down and some were captured by the Soviets. By the spring of 1943, when over 200 Tiger tanks were ready for action the element of surprise had been lost. Nevertheless, the Tiger was to prove a major advantage to the Germans in their battles against the Soviets, and they were even more effective when deployed in the West.
Tiger (Ausf. E) belonging to SS-Leibstandarte, Normandy 1944
Hitler’s role as head of OKW and the global strategic overview that it brought him were also causing problems in the first months of 1943. In North Africa, Rommel with his Afrika Korps and Italian allies had been defeated at El Alamein and were in headlong retreat. Rommel’s skilful use of his panzers delayed the Allied victory in North Africa, but it was clearly inevitable. In March 1943 Hitler recalled Rommel and was shocked to find the general in defeatist mood. He told Hitler that not only was North Africa lost, but that Italy was on the verge of collapse. Hitler’s response was to send more German troops to Italy and the Balkans to guard against an Allied invasion from North Africa. This, of course, reduced the German forces available to fight the Russians.
In February Hitler made some changes to the command structure in preparation for the coming summer campaigns. He summoned Manstein to the Wolf’s Lair and gave him command of the entire southern front in Russia. Hitler gave Manstein a free hand to conduct the war in the area as he wished. Manstein was taken aback by the apparent freedom of action he was being given and specifically asked if he could undertake tactical withdrawals if necessary. Hitler agreed. In the event Manstein was not to enjoy a completely free hand for Hitler was to issue direct orders from time to time, but he had more freedom than most.
Guderian was the next to be summoned to see the Führer. General Heinz Guderian had been at the forefront of the development of blitzkrieg ideas in the 1930s and was one of the most respected panzer commanders. Nevertheless, he had been sacked over a year earlier after he broke Hitler’s ‘Standfast Order’ in the winter of 1941. Hitler’s opening words amazed Guderian, long accustomed to Hitler’s refusal to accept criticism. ‘Since 1941,’ said Hitler, ‘our ways have parted after numerous misunderstandings at that time which I now much regret. Please come back. I need you.’
When told that he was to be put in overall charge of the armoured troops, their training, equipping and tactical development, Guderian leapt at the chance. He knew about the new Panthers and Tigers and was keen to be involved. Equally surprising, and more worrying, was Hitler’s physical appearance. ‘He has aged greatly,’ noted Guderian. ‘His manner is less assured than it was and his speech was hesitant. His left hand trembled.’
The third general to be subjected to the new, reasonable face of Hitler as a military commander was Zeitzler. At the very end of February, Hitler ordered that the exposed salients which pushed deep into Russian lines between Leningrad and Moscow were to be abandoned. The army, he declared, was to pull back to a new and much shorter defensive line running from Kirov, through Smolensk to Lake Ilmen. One of the positions abandoned was the town of Demyansk, the site of a supremely heroic resistance by Waffen-SS units in the face of overwhelming Russian numbers. If Hitler was willing to relinquish such a position to gain a better defensive line, some generals hoped, perhaps he was becoming more reasonable at long last. They were to be disappointed.
With an army equipped with new tanks and top class generals at his side, Hitler faced the task of planning the war for 1943. In February Manstein launched an attack with the new panzers which captured the city of Kharkov. This convinced Hitler that the new panzers were the secret weapon he had been waiting for. He dismissed the cautious defensive plans of the staff officers and instead looked for an opportunity for a major offensive that would knock the Russians out of the war before the Allies could attack in the Mediterranean or across the English Channel.
Hitler took up a plan first mooted by Zeitzler, who had noted that no less than five entire Soviet armies were grouped together to defend the strategic rail and road centre of Kursk, south of Moscow. There was a bulge forward in the German line to the north of Kursk at Orel and another to the south at Belgorod, offering the possibility of launching a double envelopment to cut off the armies in Kursk and destroy them. On 13 March, Hitler ordered Zeitzler and the OKH staff to draw up plans for a giant pincer attack around Kursk for mid-May.
Once again, however, Hitler undermined his chances of success by dividing his objectives and his forces. Not only was Kursk to be attacked, so was Leningrad. As before on the Eastern Front, Hitler was so confident of success that he dissipated his forces between two objectives instead of concentrating them against one. As a result he lost both and gained nothing.
The forces mustered to attack Kursk in Operation Citadel were, arguably, the finest fighting force the Germans assembled in the entire war. Half a million men were gathered for the assault, made up of the best units drafted in from other commands and other areas. There were a total of 17 panzer divisions, including the elite panzer units of the Waffen-SS – the Leibstandarte, Das Reich, and Totenkopf divisions. All of them were concentrated on a narrow front to achieve a single objective, unlike the wide-front assaults of the previous two years. Nor was equipment anything but the best. The attack was to be mounted with the latest artillery, assault guns and, crucially, panzers.
SS-Totenkopf trooper, Russian Front
On 4 May Hitler met with his senior generals in Munich to discuss the details of the imminent attack. Manstein and Kluge, who would be commanding the troops on the ground, wanted to start operations on 20 May. They argued that the best chance of success was to move as soon as the mud of the spring thaw had dried out, but before the Soviets could prepare any serious defences. Zeitzler, however, argued that victory would be more likely if the new panzers were present in large numbers. Problems with production meant that the Panther and Tiger would not be ready in mass until mid-June. At this point Walter Model intervened. As commander of the Ninth Army, he was under Kluge’s orders and would be leading the bulk of the non-panzer units in the northern pincer. He agreed with Zeitzler that it would be better to wait for the new tanks.
Hitler had great faith in the new panzers, the first of his ‘secret weapons’ to enter service, and he had respect for Model. He ordered the Citadel attack to take place in mid-June, as soon as the panzers arrived. In the event the Panthers and Tigers did not arrive with the front line units until the very end of June. Citadel began on 5 July.
From the moment the attack began, it was clear things were going badly for the Germans. The delay had given the Russians time to prepare defences against the attack their scout planes and British intelligence had warned was coming. Over a million men were entrenched behind mines and gun emplacements, and they we
re supported by vast swarms of tanks. The German attack made little headway, and casualties were high. The men being lost were the trained, veteran elite of the German army and they were irreplaceable.
On 12 July a vast tank battle, the largest in history, took place at Prokovka when 450 panzers ran into 800 Russian tanks. The Soviets lost more than 400 tanks, the Germans just 100. But the Germans had been stopped. The action at Kursk stalled. On the following day Manstein asked Hitler for permission to stop the attack. Hitler was furious. ‘These generals calculate and examine every aspect of a problem, but never take action!’ he raged. ‘When things don’t go quite as well as they’d hoped, they want to give up immediately. I can’t trust Manstein. He is intelligent, but he is not a National Socialist. These generals have no stomach for a fight.’ That evening, however, as he read the reports coming in from the front line, he accepted reality and called a halt to the operations.
Stalingrad had shown the Germans could be halted. Kursk showed that they could be beaten. After Kursk there were to be no more bold, daring projects with the expectation of outright victory to the Germans. There was only to be a long, deadly grind as the Soviets brought their massive superiority in numbers to bear on their invaders. By the autumn of 1943 the Soviets believed they had a superiority of about four to one.
The Soviet attacks began the day the Germans’ stopped. The first strike was on Orel, then five days later came an assault on Belgorod. As these offences began to slow down, a new one took place further south as the Russians crossed the Donetz river.
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