In this mood of hope, Hitler threw himself energetically into a revised war plan for victory. As the last even semi-coherent strategy Hitler was to produce, it was bizarre and based on a set of assumptions and conditions which were not true. It assumed that the anti-German alliance would collapse within a few weeks of the death of Roosevelt. All Germany needed to do, Hitler believed, was to hold on until the enemy left the field of battle. Hitler called on the units defending Berlin to form an increasingly tight and determined defensive perimeter. This rock of defiance would be bound to bring upon itself the full might of the Soviet Red Army, but to make doubly certain of this Hitler would stay in Berlin himself. Once the Russians were closing in on the city, they would find the task of the attack so great that they would have to divert men and resources from other fronts. This would give the German forces there the opportunity to break out, attack the Russians around Berlin from the rear and destroy them utterly.
It was nonsense, of course. The Red Army was so large that it could attack Berlin without weakening its forces elsewhere, nor did the plan take into account the British and Americans advancing from the West. In any case, most of the German divisions involved in the plan no longer existed.
When Hitler’s orders went out in the form of an eight page document that was part battle orders and part political pamphlet on 15 April it had a mixed response. Some troops believed the rhetoric and were convinced that Hitler, as so often before, had some surprise that he was about unleash to defeat his enemies. Others viewed it as the ravings of a man out of touch with reality.
‘For the last time,’ wrote Hitler, ‘our deadly enemies the Jewish Bolsheviks have launched their attack. Their aim is to exterminate our people. While the old men and children will be murdered, the women and girls will be reduced to barrack-room whores. The rest will be marched off to Siberia. ... we have foreseen this attack and have done everything possible to construct a strong defence. The enemy will be met by massive artillery fire. Gaps in our infantry have been made good by new units. If every soldier does his duty in the days and weeks which lie ahead, the last assault of Asia will crumple, just as the invasion of our enemies in the west will fail. At this moment, when fate has removed from the earth Roosevelt, the greatest war criminal of all time, the turning point of this war will be decided.’
The day after this message went out, Marshal Zhukov began the final Soviet attack of the war. His vast armies surged forward, brushing aside the feeble resistance of the Germans. The Soviet columns dashed onwards, swooping around the German capital and thrusting deep into the heartland of the Third Reich.
Meanwhile, Hitler drew up detailed plans for the defence of Berlin. Where the regiments were to stand, where the guns were to be sited, how many tanks to be deployed. On 20 April, Hitler celebrated his 56th birthday. A string of important visitors came to the bunker to congratulate Hitler, and to urge him to follow one route or another to victory or surrender. Hitler saw all his visitors, told them emphatically that he was staying in Berlin to direct the final battle that could yet save him, Nazism and Germany.
On 21 April, Hitler sent a direct order to General Felix Steiner who was commanding a small reserve of Waffen-SS panzers north of Berlin. Steiner was ordered to drive his panzers southeast to fall upon the Soviets behind their armoured spearhead where the following infantry would be most vulnerable. He should then encircle the tanks of Zhukov’s advance troops and wipe them out. ‘Officers who do not comply unconditionally with this order are to be arrested and shot,’ concluded the order. Steiner was a good Waffen-SS Nazi, but he knew the order was militarily impossible. He made a half-hearted attempt at an attack, then withdrew his men in good order and prepared to cover the inevitable retreat. Better, he thought, to surrender to the British or Americans than risk being shot out of hand by the Soviets when they saw the SS uniform.
The next day, 22 April, Hitler took his last step as a military commander. He called a conference in the afternoon attended by General Hans Krebs, who had taken Guderian’s place, Keitel, Jodl, Bormann and others. Hitler began with an angry tirade about the liars, traitors and cowards who had let him down time and time again. ‘Where is Steiner?’ he demanded. Krebs replied that the Waffen-SS panzer attack had faltered. Hitler collapsed into a chair. His jaw fell open and his eyes glazed over as his face went deathly white. For some minutes nobody moved. Then Hitler sat slowly upright. ‘All is lost,’ he said. ‘Hopelessly lost. Gentlemen, this is the end. I shall stay in Berlin and shoot myself when the time comes. You must make your own decision on what to do.’
Keitel and Jodl both protested that the supreme warlord of the German people could not just stop directing the war. He had a duty to decide whether to surrender or, if not, how to continue fighting. Hitler would have none of it. He refused to give the order to surrender, refused to give orders to defend Germany and refused to appoint anyone else to take the decisions. Keitel and Jodl, Hitler’s most loyal and dedicated generals, left the bunker that afternoon and made their way to front line units. Their last duty was to get as many German troops as possible out of the way of the vengeance of the Soviets and to surrender to the western Allies. That way at least, lives could be saved.
In the bunker, Hitler was still surrounded by his personal staff. In the field generals and field marshals had no orders other than to carry on fighting. On 27 April General Koller radioed the Berlin bunker from Furstenburg to ask for orders. He spoke to Field Marshal Ritter von Greim, who urged him to hang on to his position as long as possible. ‘Everything will be well,’ urged Greim. ‘I have spoken to the Führer and his confidence has completely inspired me.’ Koller was incredulous and laid his plans for surrender.
By this time, Berlin was completely surrounded. Savage street fighting was costing thousands of lives, both German and Russian. Reports continued to come in to the bunker, but Hitler merely raved at the incompetence and treachery of his generals. Hitler gave no orders, though some were issued in his name. He still inspired those around him with hope and determination, his personal magnetism and will power were still working.
By 29 April the Soviets were less than a mile from Hitler in his bunker. Hitler married Eva Braun. The next day Hitler ate lunch while the Soviets battled down the street next to that under which the bunker had been built. At about 3.30 that afternoon, Hitler killed his new wife, then himself. Berlin surrendered first, then Germany. Hitler’s career as a military commander ended in final and total defeat.
CONCLUSION
In the final analysis Hitler must be seen as a military failure. His military career ended in the ruin of his nation, his dreams and his plans. Few men have seen their careers end in such total and abject disaster.
Yet that is not to say that he was without talent or skill as a military commander. The sweeping victories of 1936 to 1941 are proof that the German military machine was capable of achieving much. As supreme commander, Hitler could justifiably claim some of the credit. Even in 1942 and 1943, when the German war effort was faltering, Hitler was not without some skill and success in manoeuvring his armies. Yet, by the autumn of 1943 the war was clearly lost and for that Hitler must, again, take his share of the blame.
Some people have tried to strip Hitler of his credit for the early victories. They argue that it was the concept of blitzkrieg developed by such men as Manstein and Guderian that won these victories, not Hitler. It is understandable that people seek to remove from a man as unspeakably evil as Hitler any credit at all, but the theory does not stand up. The proponents of blitzkrieg had been pushing their views for some years before Hitler came to power, but had been met with resistance or outright contempt by the army high command. It was Hitler who saw the potential of the combined might of panzer and stuka, and it was Hitler who ensured the necessary government funds and manpower were made available to the army.
Similarly, it has been suggested that it was the army staff which ensured the smooth running of the invasions of Austria, Czechoslovakia, Poland and France. H
itler, it is said, merely accepted the plans of his generals. Again, this is being unfair to Hitler. As supreme commander, it was Hitler’s task to choose which plans to approve and which to reject. One could argue that there was as much luck as judgement in Hitler’s decisions, but it cannot be denied that the decisions did belong to Hitler.
A gaunt Hitler decorates an adolescent Hitler Youth in what would prove to be his last photocall, Berlin 1945
Conversely those who have sought to excuse Hitler from blame for the final defeats have argued that he was simply overwhelmed by sheer weight of numbers. This is undoubtedly true, but then it was Hitler’s decision, against the advice of his generals, to invade Russia before Britain was defeated, a move that has been described as one of the greatest military blunders in history. It was also Hitler’s decision to declare war on the United States after Pearl Harbor, a decision taken on the basis of political expediency, rather than on an assessment of the military potential of the US as an adversary. This decision has been described as another of the great military blunders. Hitler it was, also, who chose to fritter away the manpower of the Wehrmacht in several simultaneous campaigns rather than concentrating them on a single objective.
As this book has shown, Hitler had many successes and many defeats. We have explored why he took different decisions and how they affected the outcome of the war. We have looked at Hitler in good times and in bad, how he interacted with his closest military advisors, how he behaved in victory and how he reacted to defeat.
In conclusion, the author believes that Hitler was a one trick general. Although his plans took many forms, they all conformed to a single pattern. He would identify a weak point and then unleash the greatest force possible against it. It was good trick and it worked well for several years. But once his enemies realised what Hitler was doing, the game was up.
Late in 1940 Churchill took the decision to hold out in Egypt, goad Hitler’s Italian allies in Africa, intervene in Greece, launch commando raids on France and bomb Germany. The aim was to create a diffuse field of battle on which Hitler could not concentrate overwhelming force on a single weak spot. Instead he had to dissipate his forces to react to a number of small threats. Frustrated and unable to pull off his usual trick, Hitler lost interest in Britain and turned on Russia.
On the Eastern Front the pattern was repeated. Hitler again achieved startling victories so long as the Russians continued to fight the war in a conventional way. When they too learned the same lesson as Churchill, they spread their forces across a wide front, launching a limited attack in one place, then in another. Again Hitler was denied a single weak point that he could exploit.
For all Hitler’s undoubted talents as a soldier in the trenches or as a politician, his skills as a military commander were limited. He could achieve great and spectacular victories, but once the enemy learned from their defeats, Hitler was at a loss. Unable to come up with a new war-winning trick, Hitler could only flail about trying to repeat his earlier successes using his earlier tactics, but these had become out of date in a rapidly changing war.
Hitler had been produced by the First World War, and his experiences on a single front, and he developed tactics and strategies to cope with the problems of the First World War. But he could not cope with the Second.
Index
Abwehr 38–41
Abyssinia (later Ethiopia) 49
Africa 61, 62, 64, 165–7, 176, 197
aircraft 90–3, 142, 224–5
Albania 51, 55, 58–9
Allies: Second World War 21, 64–5, 197, 202, 207, 209–14, 216–17, 229, 232
Anglo-German Naval Treaty 34
Antonescu, Gen. Ion 62–3
Arras 151
astrology 223–4
Austria 8, 48, 50, 52, 54, 83
Anschluss 117–21
Austria–Hungary 54, 76, 117
Bad Wiessee 103, 104
Baldwin, Stanley 116
Battle of Britain 38, 129, 164, 193
Bavaria, 16th Infantry Regiment 67, 68–73
Beck, Gen. Ludwig 11, 13, 14, 25
Belgium 39, 60, 147, 157, 169, 213
Berlin 8, 71, 164, 231, 232–4
Bessarabia 58, 62, 63
Bismarck (German battleship) 34, 35–6, 137
Blitz, London 165
blitzkrieg attacks 13, 84–6, 88, 185, 235
Blomberg, Gen. Werner von 13, 14, 99, 100–1, 105–6, 108, 110–12
Bock, Field Marshal Fedor von 19, 20, 177, 180, 187
Brauchitsch, Field Marshal Walther von 16–18, 112–13, 139, 182
Braun, Eva 234
Braun, Werner von 206
Britain 41
declaration of war 137, 161
Hitler’s peace hopes 8, 33, 137, 138, 153, 156, 157, 159, 160–1
Italy declares war on 61
propaganda 43
Versailles Treaty 80, 115
British Army
XXX Corps 214
British Fascist Party 40
Brüning, Heinrich 98–9
Bulgaria 55, 62, 65, 222
Bzura, Battle of 128, 131
Canaris, Admiral Wilhelm 30, 38, 39, 40–1
Chamberlain, Neville 121, 133, 147
Churchill, Winston S. 8, 133, 147, 155, 157, 160, 228, 237
Ciano, Count Galeazzo 49, 59
communism 46, 56, 80, 95, 100
Czechoslovakia 39, 51, 52–3, 83, 121–3
D-Day 21, 209–11, 221, 222
Daladier, Edouard 121
Danzig 127
De Gaulle, Charles 213
Denmark 60, 132, 134, 169
Dollfuss, Engelbert 48–9, 117–18
Dönitz, Capt. Karl 31–2, 37
Dunkirk 151–4
Edward VIII, king (formerly Prince of Wales) 39–40, 115
El Alamein 197
Estonia 58, 59
Falkenhorst, Gen. von 133–4, 135
Finland 31, 62, 64, 172
First World War
and Allies 75, 76
and Hitler 7, 8–9, 29, 42, 66–74, 212, 237
Forbes, Admiral 135
France 39, 169
declaration of war 137
formal surrender 157
German invasion 22–3, 60, 84, 132, 138–9, 141–57
Hitler’s peace hopes 137
Italy declares war on 61, 155
Franco, Gen. Francisco 60–1, 165
Frederick II (Frederick the Great) 203, 219, 223, 231
Fritsch, Gen. Werner von 14, 106, 111–12, 115
Gamelin, Gen. Maurice 116, 149
German army, Hitler as C.-in-C. 182–3, 185, 186–7
German Army formations
Armies
Second Army 187
Third Army 124
Fourth Army 124, 127
Sixth Army 187, 188, 189, 190, 191, 192, 195
Seventh Army 215
Eighth Army 124
Ninth Army 200
Tenth Army 124
Twelfth Army 62
Fourteenth Army 124
Seventeenth Army 187
First Panzer Army 187
Fourth Panzer Army 187, 188, 191
Fifth Panzer Army 215, 216
2nd SS Panzer Army 214
Sixth SS Panzer Army 215–16
Army Groups
Army Group A 140, 187
Army Group B 140, 187
Army Group Centre 19, 177, 179, 222
Army Group North 19, 177
Army Group South 19, 177, 187
First Panzer Group 177
Second Panzer Group 177
Third Panzer Group 177
Fourth Panzer Group 177
Corps
XV Panzer Corps 148
XVI Army Corps 119–20
XIX Panzer Corps 148
XLI Panzer Corps 148
LVI Panzer Corps 23
Afrika Korps 20, 21, 62, 64, 166, 167, 197
Divisions
2nd Panzer Divisions 217
/> 5th Infantry Division 166
6th Panzer Division 191
7th Panzer Division 20, 150, 166
15th Panzer Division 166
17th Panzer Division 191
21st Panzer Division 209, 210
23rd Panzer Division 191
26th Volksgrenadier 217
Panzer Lehr Division 217
German navy (Kriegsmarine) 137
attacks on British shipping 34–7, 169
Hitler’s attitude to 29, 36, 37, 68, 134
and Poland 124, 126, 129
rearmament programme 29–34
and Scandinavia 134
Gestapo 25, 38
Gibraltar 60, 165
Goebbels, Joseph 43, 79, 93
Göring, Reichsmarshall Hermann 44, 77, 90, 91, 112, 193
Gort, Field Marshal Viscount 151, 154
Greece 55, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 175–6
Guderian, Field Marshal Heinz 21–2, 81–5, 119–20, 148, 149–50, 177, 198, 227, 230
Halder, Gen. Franz 14, 18, 26, 140
Halifax, Edward, 1st Earl 110
Hess, Rudolf 223
Heydrich, Reinhard 125
Himmler, Heinrich 11–12, 40, 41, 102, 103, 229
Hindenburg, Field Marshal Paul von 7, 12, 75, 98–9, 104, 106, 107
Hitler, Adolf
appearance and health 198, 216, 229, 231
assassination attempts on 10, 24–6, 202, 222–3
becomes Führer 10, 12, 38, 46, 79, 106
as Chancellor 77–8, 99–100
as Minister for War 112, 185, 195
personality 8, 109
Mein Kampf 42, 73–4, 117
Hitler Myth 77
Holland 39, 60, 146–7, 157, 169
Hood, HMS 36
Horthy, Admiral Miklós 52–3, 62, 64
Hoth, Col.-Gen. Hermann 148, 177
Hungary 39, 51–3, 64, 65, 125
Hungarian forces 65, 187, 190
Iraq 166–7
Italian forces 64, 166, 176, 187, 190, 197
Japan 57
Jews 40, 46–7, 56, 64, 71, 130, 174, 225
Jodl, Gen. Alfred 15–16, 19
Keitel, Field Marshal Wilhelm 7, 14–15, 19, 40, 108–9
Kleist, Field Marshal Ewald von 148, 177
Kluge, Field Marshal Hans von 27, 124
Hitler: Military Commander Page 23