by Paul Van Pul
In those days the position of Prime Minister did not exist yet. The king himself was supposed to preside over the cabinet meetings, which he often did. Instead one minister was unofficially appointed as ‘Chief of the Cabinet’, a post which he held in conjunction with his ordinary cabinet post.
In the period we describe, the Minister of War, Baron – later Count – Charles de Broqueville, fulfilled the role of chief of the cabinet.
Being intuitive, rather inclined towards close cooperation with France, this brilliant but also loyal politician often differed in opinion from his soft-spoken, intelligent monarch on the political course to follow and the military action to be taken. Both men nevertheless knew that they needed each other in order to defeat this national tragedy.
It is in a large measure thanks to their skilful interaction throughout the Great War that Belgium emerged as a mature and respected nation on the world stage at the end of this horrendous armed conflict.
Charles de Broqueville, born in Postel (The Kempen region east of Antwerp) in 1860; in 1914 Minister of War, Chief of the Cabinet and Prime Minister. In large part thanks to the pragmatic and clever interaction between the king and this shrewd but loyal politician Belgium survived the Great War intact.
Onze Helden, R. Lyr, 1922.
The policies King Albert followed and the strategic decisions he took were mainly inspired by two men: first his lifelong mentor, General Harry Jungbluth, who had been recalled for active duty on 6 September 1914 to head the Military House of the king, and secondly Captain Commandant Emile Galet, his aide-de-camp and former fellow at the Royal Military Academy.
The former royal palace on the Meir in Antwerp. On 6 September 1914, during a meeting of the recently established War Council, Minister de Broqueville succeeded in sacking three of the king’s senior officers and replaced them with his own protégé, Colonel Maximilien Wielemans.
Author’s photo archive.
During a ‘palace revolution’ on 6 September 1914 in Antwerp, the Minister for War had managed to have the royalist Lieutenant General Antoine de Selliers de Moranville, Chief of Staff, and his Deputy Chief, Louis de Ryckel, removed in favour of his own confidant Colonel Maximilien Wielemans. Due to his rank Wielemans became Deputy Chief while the post of chief of staff was left vacant for the time being.
With hindsight Wielemans’ character proved to be a rather frail counterweight to the king’s eminent personal military advisers but there were undoubtedly enough pro-French feelings around at High Command and in the military cabinet of the minister to compensate for this personal weakness.
It is in Antwerp that our story starts.
NOTE
1. Albert of Belgium (1875–1934), since 1909 third king of the Belgians. Although Albert II (1934–), grandson of King Albert (I), was sworn in as sixth king of the Belgians on 9 August 1993, we refer in the text to the man often cited as the King-Soldier as King Albert, for simplicity’s sake dropping the roman numeral one.
Chapter I
Farewell to a Fine Fortress
Throughout the centuries mankind has developed an economically acceptable strategy to defend itself against a brutal invader. Remnants of this policy can be found in various forms all over the world. As there was never enough manpower available to defend a whole territory, leaders always prepared certain well located ‘fortified places’. In case of an attack the population would retreat into these enclosures and leave the remainder of the land to the tyranny of the enemy. This practice of constructing strongholds – fortress building – culminated in a mathematical form of art practised by military engineers like the Frenchman Sébastien Le Prestre de Vauban (1633–1707) and later, in Belgium, by Captain Henri Alexis Brialmont (1821–1903).
Although even before the time of Christ, people lived on the banks of the Scheldt River near where now ‘Het Steen’ (The Stone Fortress) stands, the first semicircular earthen bulwark, not 200m in diameter, can only be traced back to 980 A.D. With the continuous expansion of the city subsequent new walls were built. The ‘Spanish Ramparts’, built in the sixteenth century, are certainly the most depicted on old cartographical maps of the City of Antwerp.
In 1859 the city had again spread far outside its fortifications and it was decided to flatten the Spanish walls. The Belgian government nevertheless wanted to keep Antwerp as a fortified place and ordered the construction of no less than two, later three, wider rings of fortresses around the economic heart of the country. So in 1914 the ‘Fortified Place of Antwerp’ was definitely one of the most impressive and elaborate fortified positions in the world.
General Henri Alexis Brialmont, engineer and chief architect of the ring of fortresses around Antwerp in the nineteenth century.
Onze Helden, R. Lyr, 1922.
The outermost ring of forts, some 18km from the city centre, was the most modern and had been built following the late-nineteenth century development of heavier and more far-reaching field guns. This row of concrete forts was nevertheless not continuous. Between the Fort of Breendonck and the one at Wahlern in the south, for instance, a distance of 8.5km, the low laying and wet terrain did not allow for the construction of heavy structures. A similar problem arose west of the Fort of Bornem, near the Scheldt riverbank.
So in the event of war, the engineers of the Garrison Army were to open the drainage gates to the adjacent rivers and flood these vulnerable polders, including areas north and east of the city.
The second row of older, closely spaced forts, 6 to 7km from the town hall, consisted of heavy masonry structures and had been built in conjunction with the inner, continuous fortifications following the plans of the then Lieutenant General Brialmont in 1860.
As planned, when the Imperial German Armies invaded Belgium in August 1914, the military engineers started to prepare these fortifications for the defence of the city. Older conscripts that made up the garrison army manned the forts and by the end of September large tracts of polders along the Rupel and Nèthe rivers were ready to be inundated.
Liège and Namur had also been provided with a belt of fortifications at the end of the nineteenth century. As it was assumed that a large, modern army would not be able to make its way along the narrow, winding forest roads of the Ardennes, the prevailing minds of the day saw an aggressor from the east (i.e. Germany) inevitably pass through the city of Liège while an initial attack from the south (France) would be directed against the city of Namur on the confluence of the Meuse and Sambre rivers. So by either one of these cities the Belgian Army would have to make a stand to hold up its honour and defend its guaranteed neutrality.
Fort number 3, south-east of the city. This is the oldest and only ‘Brialmont’ fortress in the defensive ring around Antwerp that would ever have any tactical value. Strangely enough this would be in another war and, on top of it, for the enemy! In 1941 the German occupier built a concrete runway on the nearby aerodrome of Deurne (see the arrows) with the eastern threshold abutting the fort. Allied pilots were forced to start or end their bombing run over the fortress which had been well equipped with AA-guns by the enemy.
Author’s photo archive.
In a continental context the Belgian fortifications round Liège and Namur were the key to prevent Prussia – later Germany – and France going to war again. It did not turn out that way.
It should be no surprise that Antwerp had been chosen by the government to become the réduit national or National Entrenched Camp, rather than the capital, Brussels. Already Antwerp was one of the most important seaports in the world and a commercial centre second to none. Since 1860 the whole national defence policy of the country had been built around the concept of Antwerp being the operational base and national refuge for the Field Army. But, in 1914, suddenly a major problem arose.
We translate from General Émile Galet’s book S.M. Le Roi Albert:
As established in 1905, at the time of the enlargement of the Fortified Camp [of Antwerp] the way to act, in case of war, will be that Antwerp, as operati
onal base for the Field Army, will become the seat of government, the bulwark that, if it falls, will be our defeat and the loss of our independence.
This official standpoint was a repeat of the concept of 1859 when the original forts had been built as a reaction to the expansionist tendencies of the Second French Empire. It was evident then that, after an invasion from the south, we would stubbornly defend our territory and retreat towards Antwerp where we would make a last stand, protected in the rear by the northern [Dutch] frontier.
This reasoning does not hold entirely if we assume an invasion from the east. In that instance Antwerp is not at the edge of the country but in the middle. If then Antwerp would be the national retreat it would mean that the army would not have utilized all the defensive lines in the country nor that it would have used all chances to be rescued before being eliminated.
In the beginning of the war the cornerstone of our strategy was still the doctrine of Antwerp as ultimate refuge. It was obviously still a viable option. In case of a German attack the clause of guaranteed neutrality was still valid. It was reasonable to assume that, given the expected delays for the invader to reach the fortified place, … our guarantors from the west and the south would still be able to send us reinforcements with whom we would be able to thwart the whole enterprise.
The appropriate moment for the arrival of the allied support did not depend on us. It was even not sure if we would get help. In fact, of the two possible scenarios – a timely or a late arrival – it was the last one that occurred.
If, before the war, someone had predicted that it would take the French and British armies three months before they would come to our rescue it would have provoked indignant outcries from all sides; such a statement would have been unthinkable. Nevertheless that was what happened. The policy of Antwerp was therefore not always suitable.
Antwerp, as a national refuge against an invader from the south (picture right) made sense. Against an aggressor from the east (picture left) the case was rather doubtful.
Since 1860 Antwerp had been the cornerstone of the Belgian defence policy. The city had one of the largest and most modern ports in the world and was the commercial heart of the country. The region within the perimeter of the fortified place was therefore destined to be the operational base for the Field Army and, in case of emergency it could serve as the national retreat.
Since the invasion of the country by the German Imperial Armies on 4 August 1914, the Field Army had fought the defensive war as laid out in 1851:
The role of the Belgian Army is to fight a defensive war, that is a war where the country will be defended stubbornly. This is understood to mean not to lose the enemy from sight, take up position as often as possible so as to force him to deploy and manoeuvre, to keep the enemy close by to observe his movements and be able to seize the opportunity to take the offensive as soon as circumstances are favourable. (Galet p.369)
The Antwerp Roads before the war. The port enjoyed important trading relations with Germany. Foreign warships would regularly call at the city wharf, like the new German battleship Kaiser Karl der Grosse in 1905. These visits were not solely made as a matter of ‘showing the flag’, but they also allowed the officers to acquire the latest nautical information and gain practical experience navigating the winding Scheldt River.
Onze Helden, R. Lyr, 1922.
But against an overpowering enemy, the Field Army could but reluctantly, retreat towards its fortified supply base. Eleven days after the invasion the last bulwark of the Liège Fortified Place, the sentinel against an invader from the east, fell into German hands. On 20 August, not without several bloody clashes and battles, the Field Army had withdrawn within the Antwerp outer line of fortifications.
At that moment, as the hostile forces were coming from the east, most of the western part of the country was still unoccupied. But France and Great Britain, the now friendly powers, on whose goodwill the Belgians had to rely for help, had not been quite as prompt in coming to the rescue as had been anticipated.
Now the terrible prospect of a siege of the National Refuge was looming. The prediction of the Minister for War who had developed the defensive strategy in 1851 rang through the minds of many a military mind:
I am convinced that the siege [of Antwerp] will not take place unless we have been abandoned by God and the world. In that case, the whole army will be united.
Help had been promised, but when would it arrive? The Anglo-French forces were having their own share of troubles in northern France. To relieve these forces somewhat – and in the meantime draw attention to his country’s difficult situation – the king decided to launch a sortie from the almost besieged city into the German right. The raid was carried out at the end of August and involved the Field Army pushing towards Brussels and Louvain.
Another sortie, with the same objectives, was again carried out in the first half of September. Because of the restricted capabilities of the Belgian Army these attacks were limited in scope and lasted only a couple of days: the first sortie on 25 and 26 August and the second from 9 to 13 September.
King Albert launched the second sortie three days after the start of the famous Battle of the Marne. It can safely be said that this bold move by the Belgians deprived German High Command of an additional 60,000 soldiers in northern France. These men, destined for France, were instead diverted to bolster the ‘observation army’ in front of Antwerp.
A young Winston Churchill, in 1914 as First Lord of the Admiralty.
Onze Helden, R. Lyr, 1922.
In spite of this brave war effort by Belgium, substantial military assistance was not forthcoming. The only foreign politician with enough stature to come up with practical plans for immediate and major aid to the Belgians in Antwerp was First Lord of the Admiralty, Winston S. Churchill. At first he wanted the Dutch to open the Scheldt River for any supplies the defenders in Antwerp needed. But the Dutch government insisted on its neutral status and London lacked the political will to enforce such a policy.
The only way left for the British to supply Antwerp would be overland via the road Ostend-Ghent-Antwerp. With the Germans already advancing on Lille this would soon become a treacherous adventure. On 7 September Churchill wrote:
You have only to look at a map to see the folly of trying to feed Antwerp by Ostend and Ghent.
Nevertheless the British had a lot more at stake in the defence of Antwerp than the French. Lord Kitchener, and indeed the rest of the cabinet in London, saw a direct threat to the whole British Empire in a capture of Antwerp by the Germans. The Belgian port was indeed sealed off from the North Sea by the Dutch territorial waters of the Westerscheldt River but, being a deep-water port, the Germans might be enticed to flout Dutch neutrality and make it a homeport for the Heimatflotte. The Britons had never forgotten the level-headed sally used by Napoleon Bonaparte at the end of a speech to Antwerp dignitaries on 19 July 1803:
I will make Antwerp a pistol, pointed at Great Britain.
The entrance to the Royers Lock in Antwerp. Inaugurated in 1907 this sluice is 180m long, 22m wide with a draught of 11m at high tide. The Admiralty therefore feared that the German Hochseeflotte would use the Antwerp docks as a supply warehouse and operating base. Technically this fear was well founded: the Kaiser Karl der Grosse for instance was 125.3m long, 20.4m wide and had a draught of 8.25m.
Author’s photo archive.
Antwerp did possess a vast complex of docks, including two large, brand new ones, connected to the river via a sea lock that would be able to handle the majority of German battleships.
Churchill though, with the support of Kitchener, did what he could.
One characteristic incident should be mentioned here: on 1 October Rear Admiral Henry Oliver, Director of the Intelligence Division at the Admiralty, arrived in Antwerp. With the assistance of one Belgian officer, five soldiers and a local boy scout he managed to disable thirty-eight German merchant ships then in port. As a result none of these ships put to sea for the
remainder of the war.
Guns and ammunition out of naval stores were sent to Antwerp but at the end of September the Germans had their heavy artillery in place around the city and started their siege bombardment.
The British Prime Minister, Lord Asquith, wrote on 30 September:
The Belgians are rather out of ‘morale’ and are alarmed at the bombardment of Antwerp which has just begun. They are sending their archives and treasures over here and talk of moving the seat of Government to Ostend.
Upon this distressing news the government in London dispatched Churchill to Antwerp to investigate the situation first hand. Meanwhile the 1,800 men strong Royal Marine Brigade, already in Dunkirk, was ordered to Antwerp immediately as a first step, awaiting more reinforcements to be sent. Eighty-two London double-decker buses transported the men via Eecloo to Ghent. During the day of 3 October telegrams went back and forth between the British and French governments – the latter then already installed at Bordeaux – dealing with the composition of an Anglo-French Relief Force for Antwerp.