by Paul Van Pul
In anticipation of the arrival of the French 42nd Division the Belgians tried to put back some order in the arrangement of their units facing the attackers in the bend. But gradually the dislodged troops had to retreat. The First Army Division, on the north side, fell back on the winding Great Beaverdyke Vaart, the main drainage canal in the polder. The Fourth Army Division had to let go of the Yser embankment south of Tervaete, in the process losing the hamlet of Stuyvekenskerke.
At General Headquarters all the staff officers were pessimistic about the final outcome of this breach in the front line. It seemed time to prepare an alternative line of defence. In this respect a telephone message was sent out to both cavalry divisions at 08:20. The First Cavalry Division, billeted in the village of Alveringhem was ordered to reconnoitre possible bridgeheads on the Loo Canal near the localities of Oeren and Steenkerke (see map p. 171). The Second Cavalry, stationed at Hoogstaede, was to do the same with bridgeheads at Loo and Forthem. These investigations were aimed at preparing the potential crossing points by building field works so they could be manned at first notice by a couple of cavalry squadrons.
Two hours later First Cavalry Headquarters received further instructions. Its company of pionniers-pontonniers cyclistes had to move to Forthem in order to double the crossing capacity by throwing a second bridge across the canal at this point. It also had to build the necessary access roads and infantry footbridges. An engineers company of the Sixth Army Division would reinforce the pontoneers.
At 15:00 the report of the cavalry scouting mission arrived in Furnes. It showed the pontoneers had put in a hard day’s work. The Loo Bridge was ready but no bridgehead had been prepared since the hamlet was straddling the approach route to the bridge on the east side. At Forthem a bridgehead, large enough to accommodate a battalion, had been organized around the existing bridge, a pontoon bridge and a footbridge. At Oeren Bridge the pontoneers had built two bridges and established a bridgehead while at Steenkerke the defence of the crossing had been prepared with earthworks.
Despite the unyielding shelling of Dixmude by the enemy, Belgian forward observers noticed that the main danger lay more to the north, between km 14 and 14.5 where the Germans were crossing the river in large numbers. Apparently they were fortifying Den Toren Farm, 200m from the river levee and 900m due east of Old Stuyvekenskerke.
Since Admiral Ronarc’h’s left flank in Dixmude now became extremely exposed, he sent one of his battalions north to reinforce the defence of Old Stuyvekenskerke. But by the time the fusiliers made their approach at 13:00 the hamlet was just falling into German hands. Helpless, the marines could only stop at Rode Poort Farm, a kilometre south of the hamlet.
By now the troops of the French 42nd had arrived from the Nieuport bridgehead, passed west of Pervyse and turned east to hold the village on their left. In the early morning Grossetti, still accompanied by Nuyten had set up his headquarters at a farm a few hundred metres south of Pervyse, on the road to Oostkerke. Shortly after dawn Colonel Tom Bridges, the British liaison officer, joined both men at their field headquarters. While the French troops were digging in more to the east the German artillery was, for some inexplicable reason concentrating its fire on the village of Pervyse itself.
Following the troops the three men hiked through the soaked fields towards the railway line running east of Pervyse. This single railway track on a low embankment ran straight from Dixmude to Nieuport. On top the officers would have a good overview of the battlefield.
In time Grossetti, sitting on his legendary camp chair, Nuyten and Bridges watched the French marines moving slowly away through the open fields towards the Vicogne Farm and the enemy.
Closer to Nieuport, in front of St Georges the situation for the 14th de Ligne Regiment became untenable. Being exposed to heavy frontal German shelling and having lost touch with the First Army Division on its right it too had to fall back on the Great Beaverdyke Vaart.
The same day, 100 kilometres south of Dunkirk in Doullens, officers and soldiers of the staff were packing up General Foch’s headquarters to move it north to Cassel, a town 16km north-east of St Omer. Here Foch would be halfway between Sir John French’s HQ and that of his own immediate subordinate, General d’Urbal.
Leaving all the tribulations of this packing to his staff, Foch left and shortly after lunch arrived in Furnes to investigate the seriousness of the situation for himself. He had already met with d’Urbal in Rousbrugge and had then continued to Dunkirk. There he had encountered Baron de Broqueville who had taken the opportunity to accompany Foch to Furnes. After a meeting with Grossetti at the French Mission he proceeded to Belgian General Headquarters where de Broqueville, Colonel Wielemans and General Hanoteau awaited him.
Since General Harry Jungbluth had left for Le Havre to join the government in exile, Élie Hanoteau was the highest-ranking officer in the Military Cabinet of the king. In this role he was the face that had to defend the Royal Grand Strategy in front of the French and British war leaders. After the war Hanoteau reflected upon his role to his brother-in-arms and historian, Professor Henri Bernard:
Every time there was an unpleasant message to be delivered to our allies, for example in October 1914 to tell them that we were tired out, … Wielemans, very diplomatic and Galet, eager to stay in the shadow, always asked me to take the lead under the pretext that a lieutenant general would have more weight than they would. So, innocent as I was, I did …
After the customary formalities Hanoteau was quick to take over from the always-conciliatory Wielemans, developing the ideas put down by the king the previous evening. Foch was flabbergasted. Did these people not understand what the term résistance à tout prix meant? Colonel Maxime Weygand, Foch’s Chief of Staff and witness to the encounter, later described the ‘unforgettable terms’ Foch used:
All you talk about is the past. What is important now is the present. – Concerning reinforcements, I am not the master over it. – You held out for eight days; you will still hold for another eight days.
With his by now well-known gestures the French general underlined his phrases: ‘One needs energy, and more energy. One does not talk about retreat when it comes to the very existence of his country …’
When he got over his rhetoric outburst Foch’s pragmatic side re-surfaced. Now that the winding Yser River had been lost as a front line he was willing to fall back on an alternate defence. Consulting his ordnance map Foch pointed to a railway line running straight from Dixmude to Nieuport, some one to two kilometres west of the river. Would this straightforward line on the ground be worthwhile to be considered? Of course he had never seen the railway so he did not know but he thought it would be worth contemplating.
After all his pomposity – and presumably eager to get to his new headquarters – Foch prepared to leave without meeting with His Royal Highness, thereby flouting protocol. But the Belgian Commander-in-Chief was upstairs and having been informed, expressed the wish to meet the French general. Subsequently both men had a short and apparently rather formal conversation. Upon the remark by Foch that the Belgians should not think that they were the only ones suffering severely in this immense conflagration the king responded politely: ‘You are right.’
After taking leave Foch and his officers descended the hard stone spiral staircase. At the bottom Foch turned around and said to his interpreter, Lieutenant André Tardieu:
Someone, who is not a part of our [official military] Mission, has to stay here. Missions are only a reflection of the high commands with which they work. You will stay. You will take care of two things: organize the installation of the Territorials and see how the floods are ‘set’, as the engineers use to say.
Historians have sometimes taken this last sentence, later quoted by André Tardieu, out of context. For these – often French – authors, it proved that General Foch was the man behind the idea of the Belgian floods along the Yser. We hope by our exposé to have brought Foch’s so-called ‘intervention’ into perspective.
First Foch referred to the French Territorial Division he was sending to the Belgian front. Then of course he talked about the French flood he had ordered the Governor of Dunkirk to set that same day. To prevent the flood from spreading over Belgian territory the French engineers had to block several border-crossing waterways. Obviously his junior staff officer was to supervise these French manoeuvres from the Belgian side of the border. Besides, back in Cassel, Foch cabled Joffre: ‘I have ordered, this evening, that the floods on the eastern front of Dunkirk should be set. The remainder will follow, if necessary.’
Back on the Market Square, when Colonel Wielemans had closed the door to Foch he turned to Tardieu and said in an admiring and tactful tone: ‘The determination of your General is an extraordinary thing … really extraordinary!’ …
It was also on this occasion that Colonel Bridges had his first encounter with Foch. He described the General perhaps quite accurately:
At first sight a horsey-looking little man chewing a cigar which he constantly tried to light, and with a little stick that he always carried. He was a model of simplicity, directness and apt criticism, helped out by expressive and frequent gesture. One soon began to feel that fiery spirit within, which would never allow that France could possibly be beaten …
The Field Marshal of the BEF meanwhile was quite worried about the strategic dangers emanating from this divided command in Flanders. This was indeed the central issue of the French, the British and even the Belgians. Although everyone was fighting a common enemy, three independent high commands – each with their own agenda – were now converging on Dunkirk.
The divided command held the biggest risks, especially for the British. The BEF was the only force that was not fighting on its own soil and it had had the explicit orders not to endanger its existence. With the move from Soissons on the Aisne River to the north the BEF had indeed dramatically shortened its supply lines on the continent but the ultimate goal, getting back on the extreme left flank of the Western Front, had still eluded its commander, Sir John French.
The British Royal Engineers were always very interested in the Belgian inundations. Here is a high-level visit: in the foreground to the left Lord Athlone, brother of Queen Mary, in the middle (with white scarf) Colonel Tom Bridges, to the right Lieutenant Colonel A.C. Macdonald. Notice also the large, upright osier mats to the left and right used as a screen against enemy observation. During the Second World War Lord Athlone would be Governor Generai of Canada. Nieuport 1914–1918, R. Thys, 1922.
Perhaps it was still acceptable that the Belgians were now holding this enviable position – was it not for them that the BEF had been sent to the continent? But French divisions, now sent anew to be inserted in the north, thwarted the British plans. The tactical situation in Flanders remained precarious and the field marshal still took into account an eventual retreat towards the Channel ports. With the king of the Belgians he could, quite possibly, reach an agreement but the French troops in the coastal region could literally cut off such a move.
Sir John French had indeed reason to be worried. Not surprisingly then that a few hours after Foch’s visit to St Omer, he himself went to see General d’Urbal of the DAB in Rousbrugge to enquire about French intentions.
In the dunes north-east of the Yser Mouth the French 42nd Division was making progress, albeit not at a fast pace. Some units had reached the outskirts of Westende and in the morning started an additional line of advance in the polder along the Bruges Canal towards Bamburgh Farm.
Admiral Hood was also back, off the coast with his vessels. Two old cruisers and a variety of smaller vessels now supplemented his two monitors. He had sent the monitor Severn home for repairs, but besides the gunboat Bustard now had Brilliant and Sirius at his disposal together with two sloops, eight British and five French destroyers. They bombarded the targets indicated until about 15:00 when word came to cease fire as units of the 42nd, having occupied Bamburgh Farm, were about to push into Westende.
As the French were seemingly making good progress along the coast it was decided in London to wait a day or two before wrecking the quays and docks in Ostend. Nevertheless, orders went out for Hood to steam up to the city and shell the railway station and deal with any naval activity in the harbour itself. But by the time the message reached Hood the weather had turned bad so the instructions could not be carried out.
From the railway levee east of Pervyse, Grossetti and Nuyten followed the French advance towards the river. Grossetti, also a reliable disciple of l’offensive, had confidence in his troops: they would swiftly deal with the Germans and throw them back across the Yser. But Nuyten, used to the reality of constant retreat, could not share his optimism. Instead he tried to plan a secure alternative line of defence.
The author crouched down behind the railway embankment near Pervyse. A recumbent infantryman would indeed have some relative cover while still enjoying a decent field of fire. Closer to Nieuport the levee was even higher, providing better cover. As such soldiers would soon build numerous improvised shelters along it.
Author’s photo archive.
In fact, as the day progressed, it dawned on him that the railway embankment itself, slightly elevated above the empty plain, could serve as a new line of defence. Here, near Pervyse, the levee gave enough protection to a kneeling rifleman while still allowing an adequate field of fire without too much dead depression. It was not much of an entrenchment but it could serve as an alternate line of resistance until, with reinforcements, something better could be established.
While studying the ordnance map another advantage caught his eye. Along the winding Yser front from Nieuport to Dixmude the infantry had been exposed to flanking fire in many locations. With a repositioning as he now saw it, the 17km long exposed riverfront would be cut down to a straight 12km defence line, at right angles to the enemy advance. With continuous loss of manpower and equipment, such a reduction would be quite welcome.
By day’s end Grossetti’s predictions had not materialized. The French infantry, pinned down by the German machine guns had suffered heavy casualties. As a result they too had to fall back on the soggy and shallow Belgian rifle pits, hastily dug along the Great Beaverdyke Vaart.
Most of the French rank and file were not that impressed with the offensive spirit of their superiors. As a more down-to-earth Commandant Delage of the Marines wrote in his carnet de campagne after a rigorous inspection by Grossetti in Dixmude:
The gates alongside the Ypres Lock see from upstream, just before the war. To the left, behind the median wall, is the lock chamber. To the right, in the background, one can see the gantry of the lift gates. These waterways were excellent fishing grounds.
City archive Nieuwpoort
Seen General Grossetti. Ideas about the Belgian Army and the mission of the French Army. The offensive.
At the guard detachment in Nieuport in the late afternoon, Second Lieutenant François received the following order from Captain Commandant Borlon:
Will you please immediately open the lock doors of the canalized Yser in order to provoke a violent current in the river and as such get the result Major Le Clément requested yesterday.
You will let me know if you have been able to carry out this order. That is to say, if the tide is at a sufficiently different level than that of the Yser to incite the desirable current.
You will send me immediately by messenger complete information on the situation.
Major Le Clément being ill, I replace him as commander of the battalion. October 24, 1914.
P.S. If the tide permits you to get a noticeable result the order has to be carried out whatever the danger. The situation of our entire army can depend on it. The lift gates and lock doors must be opened to obtain a maximum flow. You will warn the lieutenants Rotsaert and Anciaux by messenger.
Shortly afterwards François did get some additional information:
I think it would be best to drain the Yser during two (possibly three) consecutive ebb tides in order to obta
in a sufficiently low water level.
One can then raise the level during three or four high tides. Evidently, when you lower the water level, you will have to close the doors at rising tide and vice versa when you want to raise the level. You will please study attentively the question of how many ebb tides you will need in order to achieve a sufficiently important lowering so that the first flood that we will use to raise the water level will create an important upstream tidal wave.
Password: Liège 24-25. 17:00, October 24,1914.
By 21:00 François and his men1 were at the Ypres Lock and started to prepare for the upcoming manoeuvre.
No further details of the draining and subsequent accelerated flooding of the riverbed as executed on 24 October have been found. We have nevertheless found a description of a similar action taken at the same lock the following month. It is this written account that we have used to make a reconstruction of the events of 24 October. The Ypres Lock – unlike the Spring Sluice – was never designed to be used as an inundation lock. Therefore such a manoeuvre did entail great hydraulic risks and was something every lockkeeper would strongly condemn – not to mention Gerard Dingens!
Since the three navigation locks in ‘The Goose Foot’ complex end up in the tidal Yser Channel, they all have ebb- and flood doors. So with the flood doors closed during rising tide François and his men opened and locked the ebb doors in their recesses. Then with strong ropes they rigged the flood doors in such a way that they would not automatically open once the receding tide was lower than the canal water level. As a result, by the time low tide arrived, around 22:15, the flood doors were under some 70cm of ‘reverse’ water pressure from the canal side. A situation the heavy wooden doors were never designed to undergo.