by Paul Van Pul
Regarding coastal floods, however, the story is totally different. Imagine a German officer standing close to the German seafront at a location indicated on his map as having an elevation of +1.00 m. We can then well imagine that at high tide his feet will still be dry since Normal Null measures from ‘0.00’ at high tide. If, however, the same officer were in Ostend, holding a Belgian map, or its German reprint, and standing at a ‘Belgian’ elevation of +1.00 m he would actually be one metre above low water, or 1.40 m below his own Normal Null. The man would be swept off his feet by rising tide!
Accordingly, when the Germans arrived in the Belgian coastal region their (Belgian) maps showed contour lines with elevations that were, in regard to the German Normal Null, well above high water. They were unaware though that these lands were in reality polders situated between high and low water, thus prone to flooding at high tide.
By 1940 the Germans had definitely learned from their mistake in 1914. All German reprints of Belgian ordnance maps then carried a clear message: ‘To adjust the Belgian elevation marks to the German Normal Null please subtract 2.4m.’
One typical feature – easily recognizable from the air – to determine if the land is lying lower than sea level is the existence of flood doors – four double mitre doors instead of two – in a canal entrance lock. It can only be attributed to the inexperience of the German aerial observers at the time that this fact went unnoticed, especially in Nieuport where three locks with this equipment were located practically side by side.
Why did the Germans, irrespective of the flood threat, not occupy the locks after the French had evacuated the Nieuport bridgehead on 26 October? According to Jos Vols, the Germans at the time were preparing for their assault on Ramscappelle the next day. This operation took so much of their attention that they never had the time or the manpower to force ahead on the Ostend-Nieuport road towards the locks.
The real reason is perhaps more complex. Certainly the menacing presence and lethal activities of the British flotilla offshore played a decisive role. The Germans had been heavily bombarded for so long that they had given up any hope of advancing along the coastal road to take Nieuport and subsequently Dunkirk. Irrespective of the possibilities to inundate, the Germans must have concluded that Nieuport and its waterways were of strategic importance to the French and that as such they would not let go easily of this advanced position to Dunkirk. The closer they would come to the locks the fiercer they expected the French resistance to be. That the French would simply abandon the bridgehead without a fight was for them definitely unthinkable.
For a combination of the above reasons the Germans concentrated all their efforts on a flanking manoeuvre by attacking Ramscappelle.
How was it that the Germans, evidently up to the last minute, never realized that a man-made flood was at hand? There are two generally accepted reasons on the German side for the sudden rise of the water level.
1. The Germans assumed that their heavy shelling of Nieuport and its drainage sluices had somehow damaged the structures insofar as one or more gates had been destroyed with the result that the seawater had gained access to the polder accidentally. This does not in itself mean that the land could be permanently inundated by seawater.
A wartime view from within the lock chamber of the Furnes Lock towards the tidal bay at low water. Across the bay we see part of the so-called Paling [Eel] Bridge. At the time it was the only remnant of the ancient fortifications around Nieuport. Today the area is an industrial zone and a sprawling marina.
Nieuport 1914–1918, R. Thys, 1922.
2. As Otto Schwink wrote in Ypres, 1914: ‘The rise of the waters was attributed to the torrential rain of the previous few days, and it was hoped that on approach of dry weather the excellent system of canals would soon drain it off.’
In this the Germans were partly right. With the weir on the Great Beaverdyke Vaart still in place and the North Vaart Gates closed since the departure of lockmaster Dingens a lot of rainwater had already collected in the polder.
From an historical point of view it would be interesting to set up a computer terrain model of the battle site and with the available data determine exactly how far the rainwater did actually contribute to the flood effort. We might then also be able to settle another old dispute: how much seawater actually passed through the Spanish Lock versus the North Vaart Gates?
Appendix V
Other Belgian Floods in 1914
Between the World Wars several authors have been rather critical concerning the knowledge of the Belgian military engineers in flood matters. Military authors like Bernard, Deguent and Greindl were the first to admit that the army, in 1914, was not acquainted with the complex hydraulic system that it encountered in the coastal area. But that did not mean that the officers were ignorant about flood techniques in general.
The principles and techniques of flooding as a means of defence against an advancing enemy were still taught at the Royal Military Academy. Proof of that can be found in the treatises of H. Girard and Victor Deguise. And it was not only a matter of theory. For example in November 1868, tests had been carried out at the Field Artillery College firing range to determine the resistance of dykes to heavy calibre bombardment.
The following are a few examples of other floods prepared and executed by separate engineer units prior to the arrival of the Belgian Army in the Furnes-Ambacht region. They demonstrate that the Belgian engineers were well aware of the possibilities and techniques of flooding, even in the midst of a field campaign. The historical research on the details of these – and other – hydraulic projects is still ongoing.
The Schyn flood
On 20 August 1914 the Military Governor of the Antwerp Fortified Place delivered a note to King Albert on the state of readiness of the Place. In it he wrote: ‘Past Fort number 1 the fortification was to be extended [northward] by a continuous rampart; this only partially begun we had to set the flood of the Schyn [river] to finish off the fortification to the north’.
The Schyn River drains to a large extent the whole Antwerp metropolitan area. Centuries ago it ended in the Scheldt near the historical site of the city. With the growth of the urban area the downstream end of the Schyn river was diverted northward, finally circling around the new harbour in the north and ending in the Scheldt river some 13km downstream from the city centre. This northern section, through flat, open polder could easily be inundated by holding up the drainage water at the Twelve Sluices in the Scheldt dyke.
The Durme Flood
At the beginning of September 1914, German troops were already advancing south of Antwerp. On the 4th they attacked the town of Termonde on the Scheldt, halfway between Antwerp and Ghent. If the enemy succeeded in crossing the river the communication lines of the Antwerp Fortified Place with the coast would be in jeopardy. King Albert therefore ordered a flood to be set along the Durme river. This would provide for a second line of defence, five to six kilometres north of the Scheldt. Apparently the attempt failed mainly because of sabotage by local farmers.
The Senne Flood
The region of Brussels drains its water northward through the Senne River. In its 10km downstream section it runs parallel to the Willebroek Canal, also coming from Brussels but 4 to 5km to the west of it. The land in between is low lying and drains at ebb tide through a multitude of small sluices in the Senne dyke. As there was an 8km gap between the Breendonck Fort to the west and the Waelhem Fort to the east this sector had been flooded over a width of 4km as part of the outer defence of the Antwerp Fortified Place.
The Nèthe Flood
Where the Senne river meets the Rupel from the south, another river also ends, coming from the east. It is the Nèthe, itself made up of the Large and Small Nèthe rivers that come from the higher sandy soils farther east. This river, together with the chain of outer fortresses, formed the backbone of the 1914 southern and eastern barrier around Antwerp. In preparation for the defence, its banks had been flooded all the way upstream past the t
own of Lierre. At that time a Lierre inhabitant, Frans Verschoren, wrote confidently: ‘Behind the new modern fortifications the people were safe. Added to that the sluices that had been opened and the grasslands being flooded with water on the south side of town and the enemy, with his heavy guns could impossibly pass or get around. The people were sitting here pretty safe and free.’
The Berlaere Flood
With the threat of the enemy cutting off the Belgian Army’s escape route to the coast a flood of the area around the town of Berlaere had been prepared by a detachment of sapper-pontoneers cyclists of the First Cavalry Division between 29 September and 6 October. This operation was carried out in order to prepare for a possible defence of the north bank of the Scheldt river east of Ghent. They had opened the drainage gates in the north dyke of the river between the towns of Wetteren and Berlaere.
We describe the procedure they used in some detail since it is quite typical for a chance flood.
Over the centuries the river here had built a wide flood plain and by 1914 had produced a few complicated meanders in this spot. Through human and natural activities these meanders had been cut off and the riverbed had been stabilized between artificial levees. As, at this location, the river is still subjected to tidal activity, the adjacent land at the time was drained at low water through small gates with lift doors operated by a simple rack and pinion gear.
The Kalken [Lime] Vaart east of van Ghent. Today a pumping station near the Scheldt River guarantees the drainage of the region. Close by, hidden in the dyke, a remnant from 1914 when drainage was accomplished by gravity through several small and manually operated lift gates, (next picture)
Author’s photo archive.
This rusted gearbox of a small lift gate near the Kalken Vaart is all that remains of the hydraulic history of this waterlogged region. We estimate this archeological gem to date back to at least the end of the nineteenth century.
Author’s photo archive.
First the sappers evacuated all barges and boats from the river and the adjoining creek. Then, when the rising water level in the river equalled the level in the ditches, they raised the doors and let the water invade the drainage system. At high tide they closed the doors again until they could repeat the process with the next cycle. This they did until the Calcken Canal and the Old Scheldt arm had reached their highest level without overflowing. Once inundation would be decided on, it would only take one or two more operations to flood the polder.
Due to the rapidly changing tactical situation the actual flood never materialized but it is interesting to glance at the map and note that the result would have created an important obstacle for the enemy to cross. Over a front of some 13km a muddy lake would have been created with a width of up to 3km.
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