by Dean King
09:38
The C-130H aircraft reported to Reagan Airport that Flight 77 crashed into the Pentagon.
09:42
Ben Sliney, the Command Center’s national operations manager, ordered all aircraft airborne to land at the nearest airport. About 4,500 aircraft landed with no incident.
10:30
American Airlines confirmed that Flight 77 crashed into the Pentagon.
Roaring Inferno of Destruction
Before the aircraft crashed into the Pentagon, its wings knocked over street lampposts, the right wing particularly striking a portable generator. It created a smoke trail before hitting the target.
Flight 77 hit the western side of the Pentagon at the first-floor level. The impact was so forceful that the plane was rolled to the left, the right wing elevated. The front of the fuselage disintegrated and the mid and tail sections moved. It took less than a second to fully penetrate 310 feet into the outermost buildings and for a fireball to erupt and rose to 200 feet above the buildings.
On September 11, around 18,000 people were working at the Pentagon. A large section of the outermost ring collapsed, killing civilian and military personnel alike. There were 92 deaths on the first floor, 31 on the second floor, and two on the third floor. More than a hundred people were injured and brought to hospitals.
United Airlines Flight 93
United Airlines Flight 93 was a Boeing 757-222, a passenger flight taking passengers from Newark International Airport in Newark, New Jersey, to San Francisco International Airport in California. On September 11, it was scheduled for an eight-o’clock departure.
The aircraft had a capacity of 182 passengers, but on September 11, there were 44 people on board. The passengers, including the hijackers, were 37 in all. There were two pilots and 5 flight attendants. All four of the hijackers were seated in first-class. Flight 93 carried 48,700 pounds of fuel.
07:03
Saeed al-Ghamdi checked in at the ticket counter at Newark airport, carrying no baggage. Ahmed al-Nami had two bags.
07:24
Ahmad al-Haznawi checked in with a single bag. He was selected by CAPPS, and so his bag was screened for the second time. It was loaded onto the plane after confirmation that he was on board.
07:39
The pilot, Ziad Jarrah, arrived and checked in at the ticket counter. He did not have any baggage. Haznawi and al-Ghamdi boarded Flight 93, occupying 6B and 3D in first class, respectively.
Ziad Jarrah
07:40
Al-Nami boarded and occupied 3C in first class.
07:48
Jarrah boarded and sat in 1B in first class.
08:00
The Flight 93 pushed back from gate 17A. The flight was delayed for 42 minutes due to air traffic congestion.
08:42
Flight 93 took off.
09:02
The aircraft was cruising at an altitude of 35,000 feet.
09:03
Dispatchers sent ACARS messages to United flights about an aircraft that crashed into the WTC. The messages contained no details or warnings.
09:08
The United flight dispatcher informed United flights that were still on the ground that a ground stop was ordered for all commercial aircraft in the New York area.
09:19
Ballinger, the dispatcher, sent text messages containing warnings to 16 transcontinental flights, including Flight 93. The aircraft received the text message a few minutes later.
09:21
Captain Jason Dahl of Flight 93 sent a reply:
“Good mornin’…Nice clb [climb] outta EWR [Newark airport] after a nice tour of the apt [apartment] courts y [and] grnd cntrl. 20 N EWC At 350 occl [occasional] lt [light] chop. Wind 290/50 ain’t helping. J.”
The United Airlines (UAL) air traffic control coordinator sent a message to UAL dispatchers, saying
“There may be Addnl hijackings in progress. You may want to advise your flts to stay on alert and shut down all cockpit access Inflt. [inflight] Sandy per Mgmt.”
Capt. Jason Dahl
09:23
Ballinger sent an ACARS message to Flight 93, with the following message:
“Beware any cockpit intrusion – Two a/c [aircraft] hit World Trade Center.”
Flight 93, which was then handed off to Cleveland Air Traffic Control Center (Cleveland Center), made a radio contact with the Cleveland Center. Flight 93 reported about an “intermittent light chop” at an altitude of 35,000.
09:25
The captain asked for confirmation for the message sent at 09:23 and received a minute later in the cockpit.
09:27
Flight 93 responded to a routine radio contact from the FAA air traffic control center in Cleveland.
09:28
Hijackers made their move. Reports from callers indicated that the hijackers wielded knives and resorted to violence. There was a reported stabbing, and that the passengers were brought to the rear part of the plane. Flight 93 was cruising 35,000 feet above eastern Ohio before suddenly dropping 685 feet.
The Cleveland Center heard the captain or the first officer declaring “Mayday” and there were sounds of struggle in the cockpit. The controller immediately observed the aircraft’s rapid descent. He replied over the radio, “Somebody call Cleveland?” but there was no reply.
Thirty-five seconds later, the second radio transmission came through. The controller could hear the struggling in the cockpit, and the captain or the first officer shouted:
“Hey get out of here – get out of here – get out of here.”
09:30
The air traffic control reported to the United headquarters that Flight 93 was not responding. The Cleveland controller asked the other flights under his jurisdiction whether they heard the screaming. Some said they had.
09:32
The Cleveland controller overheard a transmission from Flight 93:
“Ladies and gentleman: Here the captain, please sit down keep remaining sitting. We have a bomb on board. So, sit.”
The voice recording also indicated that a female, probably a flight attendant, was held captive in the cockpit. Ballinger sent an ACARS message to his flights: “High security alert. Secure cockpit.” This message was received by Flight 93 at 9:33.
Between 09:34 – 09:38
The Cleveland controller observed that Flight 93 climbed to 40,700 feet.
09:36
A flight attendant called the United Air Lines maintenance facility in San Francisco. She was patched through the manager. The flight attendant reported of the hijacking. The hijackers had knives and a flight attendant was killed. The manager relayed the information to the UAL crisis center. Flight 93 headed east. At this point, the United headquarters believed that the aircraft was hijacked.
09:37
A passenger called his mother, telling her of the hijacking. Another passenger called his wife, also telling her of the hijacking and other details including the death of a fellow passenger.
Between 09:37 and 09:57
In one of the calls of the passenger to his wife, he told her that he and other passengers were thinking of storming the cockpit and retaking control of the plane.
09:39
Another transmission from Flight 93 was heard by the Cleveland controller:
“Uh, is the captain. Would like you all to remain seated. There is a bomb on board and are going back to the airport, and to have our demands [unintelligible]. Please remain quiet.”
Another passenger called her husband and told him of the hijacking.
09:40
Ballinger sent an ACARS message to Flight 93:
“High security alert. Secure cockpit. Two airliner hit NY Trade Center. And 1 aircraft in IAD missing. And one in EWR missing… too. UAL 175/93 missing.”
09:41
The transponder was switched off. The Herndon Command Center informed the headquarters that Flight 93 reversed course. It was descending and heading eastbound.
09:
44
A passenger called GTE air phone operators and reported the hijacking, adding that the plane was going up and down and had changed direction.
09:46
The Herndon Command Center reported to the FAA headquarters that Flight 93 was heading towards Washington, DC and was 29 minutes away. A flight attendant called her husband and told him that the passengers were planning to overpower the hijackers. Other passengers who called to their loved ones also indicated carrying out this plan.
09:55
The pilot hijacker dialed the navigational code for Reagan National Airport in order to head toward Washington, DC. At the same time, a phone operator contacted by one passenger overheard another passenger saying,
“Are you guys ready? Okay! Let’s roll!”
The phone operator heard screaming, then the call was disconnected.
09:57
The cockpit voice recorder recorded sounds of the passenger uprising. The sounds indicated that the uprising began at the rear of the plane and progressed toward the front. The struggle continued.
09:58
Jarrah heard about the commotion and responded by rolling the aircraft to the left and right. He told another hijacker to lock the door and he continued rolling the plane. But the struggle did not stop.
Jarrah pitched the nose of the aircraft up and down. The recorder documented crashes, shouts, and sounds of breaking glass. A minute later, Jarrah stabilized the plane. The recorder captured Jarrah asking,
“Is that it? Shall we finish it off?”
Another hijacker replied,
“No. Not yet. When they all come, we finish it off.”
There were still sounds of fighting outside the cockpit. Jarrah once again pitched the nose of the plane up and down.
10:00
A passenger could be heard saying,
“In the cockpit. If we don’t we’ll die!”
A few seconds later, another passenger said, “Roll it!”
At about this time, the Herndon Command Center reported that Flight 93 was seen at 8,000 feet 11 miles south of Indianhead.
10:01
Jarrah again stabilized the aircraft and was heard over the recorder saying, “Allah is the greatest! Allah is the greatest!” To another hijacker, he asked,
“Is that it? I mean, shall we put it down?”
The hijacker replied,
“Yes, put it in it, and pull it down.”
10:02
The passengers were still revolting outside the cockpit. The plane headed down and the control wheel was turned to the right.
10:03
With the passengers still attacking, Flight 93 crashed into a field near Shanksville, Pennsylvania, traveling at 580 miles an hour.
10:13
The Herndon Command Center informed the FAA headquarters that Flight 93 had crashed.
United Airlines Flight 175
United Airlines Flight 175 was a Boeing 767, scheduled to fly from Logan International Airport at 8 in the morning to Los Angeles International Airport. It had a capacity of 168 passengers. On the day of the attack, there were 56 passengers including the hijackers, 2 pilots and 7 flight attendants. There were 65 people in all.
The hijackers were targeting the WTC. Two of them occupied first class seats and three were in business class section. Flight 175 carried 76,000 pounds of jet fuel.
06:20
Ahmed al-Ghamdi and Hamza al-Ghamdi arrived at the UAL ticket counter at Logan International Airport and checked in. Ahmed had two bags.
06:45
Marwan al-Shehhi checked in with a single bag, which was loaded on the plane at 6:51.
06:52
Marwan al-Shehhi received a call from Atta.
06:53
Fayez Bannihammad and Mohand al-Shehri arrived and checked in. Banihammad boarded Flight 175 and occupied seat 2A in first-class. Mohand also boarded and sat behind Banihammad in 2B.
07:27
Al-Shehhi and Ahmed al-Ghamdi boarded and took their seat in 6C and 9D of business class, respectively.
07:28
Hamza al-Ghamdi boarded the plane and took his seat in 9C in business class.
Hamza al-Ghamdi
08:14
Flight 175 took off from Logan Airport.
08:19
Flight 175 contacted a Boston Center air traffic controller.
08:33
The aircraft was cruising at an altitude of 31,000 feet.
08:37
FAA air traffic controllers advised the cockpit to look for Flight 11.
08:38
Flight 175 spotted Flight 11 at 28,000 or 29,000 feet and reported it to the air traffic control. FAA advised them to turn their aircraft to avoid Flight 11. Flight 175 was handed off to New York Air Traffic Control Center (New York Center).
08:41
The crew of Flight 175 reported to air traffic controllers that they heard a transmission from another plane of someone advising everyone to stay in their seats.
08:42
Flight 175 updated their report on the suspicious transmission from another aircraft. This was the last communication that Flight 175 had with the ground.
Between 08:42 and 08:46
The hijacking began. Reports from the passengers indicated that hijackers used knives, Mace, and threatened them with a bomb. The hijackers also stabbed flight attendants and killed the pilots.
08:47
The aircraft’s transponder code changed twice. David Bottiglia, the air traffic controller responsible for Flight 175 and Flight 11, had already been informed that Flight 11 was hijacked. He did not notice the changes in the transponder code because he was locating Flight 11.
08:50
Bottaglia was informed of the crashes in Pentagon and WTC, and then he noticed that the transponder code was changed. He asked Flight 175 to return to the proper code but he got no reply from the crew.
08:51
Flight 175 changed its altitude.
08:52
Bottaglia contacted Flight 175 to no avail. He observed that Flight 175 turned southwest, then northeast and headed toward New York City. A passenger called his father on the ground and reported about hijacking. The father alerted the Connecticut Police Department.
08:57
Flight 175 turned northeast and cruised at 28,500 feet. A minute later, it headed for New York.
08:58
Bottaglia informed a New York controller that there might be two cases of hijacking taking place.
09:00
The Flight 175 was missing from radar. The passenger who had called his father made another call, saying,
“It’s getting bad, Dad – A stewardess was stabbed – They seem to have knives and Mace – They said they have a bomb – It’s getting very bad on the plane – Passengers are throwing up and getting sick
– The plane is making jerky movements – I don’t think the pilot is flying the plane – I think we are going down – I think they intend to go to Chicago or someplace and fly into a building.”
09:02
New York controllers located Flight 175 rapidly descending into lower Manhattan.
09:03
Flight 175 rammed into the South Tower of WTC at more than 587 miles per hour. The aircraft struck between floors 77 and 85. Everyone on board was killed instantly, along with some people in the building. The impact caused a loud explosion.
Chapter 6 – Rescue and Recovery Efforts
What followed after the collision and crashes will be forever immortalized in the minds of Americans and other countries as well. The north and south towers of WTC burned for several minutes, compromising their internal structures until they collapsed. It must have been an ugly sound, the sound of floors toppling one after another. The towers that once symbolized the power and prestige of America were pulverized in less than an hour.
As thousands of people were trapped in the buildings and elevators, rescuers were faced with the challenge of going up the crumbling towers and lead
ing the survivors out. The following sections will show you the efforts of rescuers to try to save as many people as they could.
How people respond to a crisis is a product of preparedness. On the day of the attack, the people who worked relied on private firms and local public servants including fire, emergency medical service, and police.
Private firms and individuals in the building were among the first to respond. These were the ones working in the tower, and the next events to unfold will directly affect them. Although several changes were implemented and the building was renovated as a result of the 1993 bombing of WTC, no one was fully prepared for the 9/11 bombings. Even after Flight 11 plowed through several floors of the North Tower, the possibility of terrorist attack was far from the people’s minds. Some even thought it was an accident.
The first responders were members of the Fire Department of New York, the Port Authority Police Department (PAPD), the New York Police Department, and the Mayor’s Office of Emergency Management (OEM). The following is a brief description of the responders.
Port Authority Police Department (PAPD)
On the day of the attacks, the Port Authority of New York and the New Jersey Police Department had 1,331 officers. The majority of them were trained in fire suppression methods and law enforcement. A superintendent leads the teams but there was a separate PAPD command for each of the nine facilities under the Port Authority’s jurisdiction, including the WTC.
As part of the protocol, Port Authority police commands must use ultrahigh-frequency radios. But many of the PAPD officers used only one local channel although the radios can use more than one channel. The local channels were lowwattage and were only applicable in the immediate vicinity of the command.
Surprisingly, the Port Authority did not have standard operating procedures that would govern how officers should respond and be utilized should an incident occur at the WTC. Specifically, the Port Authority lacked standard operating procedures that would indicate how commands should communicate via radio during incidents.
New York Police Department (NYPD)
NYPD consisted of 40,000 officers supervised by a police commissioner. The duties of a police commissioner were not entirely operational but he still held operational authority. It was the chief of department who was in charge of operational activities. In major emergencies, the Special Operations Division, which included the Aviation Unit, the Emergency Service Unit (ESU), had a major role. The Aviation Unit provided helicopters for rescues while the ESU provided rescue missions.