Marine (1996)

by Clancy, Tom - Nf

  * A fiber-optic computer network using the new super-fast asynchronous transfer mode (ATM) protocol. This replaces tons of copper wire.

  * A full Landing Force Operations Center, so that the LPD-17 can conduct independent "split ARG" operations.

  * Over 25,000 cubic feet of cargo stowage space.

  * Three full-sized vehicle decks with over 25,000 square feet of vehicle storage space.

  * A well deck with room for a pair of LCACs.

  * A VTOL flight deck with up to four landing spots.

  * A helicopter hangar with room for two CH-46s, or a single CH-53E or MV-22B

  As mentioned earlier, the LPD-17 will be among the most comfortable warships ever built. This is important when you consider that cruises of over six months are typical of ARG operations. It also will be the first warship ever designed from the keel up, with facilities for female crew members. This reflects the Navy's "Women at Sea" initiative, and is the biggest cultural change for the Navy since President Truman integrated the armed forces in the late 1940s. Crews of ships like the amphibs will be between 10% and 25% female. As existing ships enter their major overhauls, they receive a package of upgrades generically known in the fleet as "Fem Mods." Once they are completed, up to 25% of the crew accommodations can be assigned to women, without disrupting normal ship operations.

  As stated earlier, the LPD-17 will be the first U.S. Navy ship with the Women at Sea features designed in from the start. The LPD-17's habitability improvements include:* Berthing in organizational units. For example, the berthing for an entire Marine platoon, including armory and recreation areas, will be together.

  * Berthing spaces for same-sex personnel with attached heads. This will include petty officer/senior non-commissioned officer berthing compartments with only six bunks, and enlisted berthing compartments with just forty-two bunks.

  * Unisex heads for use by all crew member regardless of their sex. At the time of this writing, no urinals are planned aboard the LPD-17s, though options are still under study. Shower facilities will be segregated.

  * Medical facilities with heads and examination facilities suitable for both men and women.

  While designers and engineers have worked hard to make the LPD-17s good for the people who will be on board, that is not the only customer the Navy has to satisfy. There's the American taxpayer. Ships need to be affordable. Remember, cost overruns are why there are only five LHAs instead of nine. For this reason, LPD-17 program officials are positively vicious about cost containment. On a "per ton" basis, the LPD-17s will be exceptionally economical to build. Current budget projections have the lead ship of the class costing $974 million in FY-96 dollars; and later ships in the class are expected to cost between 15% and 20% less. The planned production rate will build the entire class of twelve in just eight fiscal years. With the contract going to a single contractor, this should go a long way towards keeping costs under control.

  Two teams are competing for the contract. One team has Litton-Ingalls (builder of the LHDs and DDG-51s) and Tenneco-Newport News Shipbuilding (nuclear-powered aircraft carriers and submarines), with Hughes GM as the systems integrator. The other team combines General Dynamics-Bath Ironworks (they build DDG-51s) and Avondale (the construction yard for the LSD-41 s/49s), with Loral as systems integrator. The competition is already fierce, and given the probable rewards, will become even hotter. Total value of the contract will probably exceed $10 billion. The winning team will be selected in the summer of 1997, with the first unit funded in FY-96, for delivery to the fleet in 2002. After several years of testing, LHD-17 will enter service with an ARG around 2004. Subsequent ships will be procured, two a year, until all twelve have been built.

  At the same time that the Navy is looking at the cost of buying the LPD-17s, it is closely examining the costs of operating them. Not all of the costs are financial. One hidden cost is environmental pollution. No warship is worth having if it attracts protests every time it goes out to sea. For this reason--and for other, more altruistic ones--the Navy has put major effort into reducing the amount of pollution and waste ships generate. Current plans have the LPD-17s being powered by medium-speed marine diesels, which are very efficient to operate. But diesels generate pollutants that can damage the ozone layer, so there will be systems to reduce the emission of the LPD-17's power plants. The LPD-17 will also be fitted with several features to reduce adverse environmental impacts. These will include:* Environmental control systems (air-conditioning, refrigeration, etc.) completely free of CFCs that can harm the ozone layer.

  * Oil-pollution control systems, including an oil/wastewater separator, and no oil drains into the bilges.

  * A hazardous-materials storage locker, which will allow storage of sixty days worth of such materials. There will be a compactor for the containers.

  * To reduce the volume of solid waste, there will be a food-waste grinder/pulper. A plastic grinder will be installed, with provisions for storage and recycling of plastic containers.

  * A series of "Black Water" (sewage) and "Gray Water" (shower runoff, dishwashing water, etc.) storage tanks, allowing the storage of up to twelve hours worth of such waste, so that sewage dumps can be made in deep water offshore, rather than close inshore.

  Many of these systems will eventually be retrofitted into older ships like the Wasp and the Whidbey Island. But the LPD-17 will be the first designed from scratch to reflect these new values. Maybe you're thinking that concern for "environmental correctness" outweighed combat capability in the LPD-17's design. Nothing could be further from the truth. In fact, the LPD-17 program manager, Captain Maurice Gauthier, would tell you the Navy is simply coming to the realization that we cannot have a fleet that protects our society and nation while it strangles the planet. Remember that the LPD-17s will probably retire around 2050, long after many of you reading this have passed away! Navy/Marine planners have to think a half century or more into the future.

  A Guided Tour of the

  26th MEU (SOC)

  It had been a rough week for Air Force Captain Scott O'Grady. On June 2nd, 1995, while flying Basher 52, a F-16C Fighting Falcon fighter of the 555th Fighter Squadron (FS) of the 31st Fighter Wing out of Aviano Air Force Base, Italy, his aircraft had been hit by an SA-6 Gainful missile from a Bosnian Serb SAM battery. O'Grady had ejected from the dying aircraft as it fell into the cloud base below, denying his wingman any knowledge of whether he had survived or not. Over the next six days, the young Air Force officer had done a textbook job of escape and evasion, while hoping to reach a friendly aircraft on his rescue radio. Then, the night before, another F-16 from Aviano had finally found him and had stayed overhead until just a short time earlier. After authenticating his true identity, the pilot had contacted NATO Allied Forces Southern Region, and told O'Grady to hang tough and there would be someone to get him out soon.

  The morning of June 8th, 1995, dawned cool and foggy as O'Grady began his sixth day on the ground in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The first indication of action came around 6:00 A.M. local time, when a pair of two-seat Marine F/A-18Ds roared over him, fixing his position and setting up top cover for what was about to begin. About this time, the young flyer was probably beginning to wonder just who was coming to get him out. Would it be one of the big MH-53J Pave Low helicopters from the USAF's Special Operations Group escorted by huge AC-130 Combat Talon gunships? Or would it be a team of Army Rangers, flown in by MH-60K Blackhawks, escorted by AH-60 attack helicopters? Then, the answer came. Through the wet morning fog at around 6:40 A.M. came the familiar "whomp-whomp" sound of twin-bladed helicopters, Marine AH-1W Cobras. Like their menacing namesakes, they surveyed the area around O'Grady, looking for any threat to the rest of the rescue force that was approaching. Overhead, a flight of AV-8B Harrier II attack jets joined the F-18s in covering the operation. Then, after contacting O'Grady on his rapidly dying radio and marking his position with a smoke grenade, they called for the rescue force.

  On the ground O'Grady heard the dull roar
of helicopters. Big helicopters. Through the wispy ground fog came a pair of Marine CH-53E Super Stallion assault helicopters, loaded with Marines and Navy corpsmen from the 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit-Special Operations Capable MEU (SOC). As the first CH-53 flared in for a landing, the 3rd Battalion/8th Marine Regiment's mortar platoon dashed off to set up a security perimeter for the rescue force along with their battalion commander, Lieutenant Colonel Chris Gunther. Then, as the second Super Stallion came into land, O'Grady made his move. Wearing a Day-Glo orange "beanie" cap, and clutching his radio and 9mm pistol, he dashed for the second helicopter, and was pulled aboard by the crew chief, Sergeant Scott Pfister. Several minutes later, after retrieving the mortar platoon, Lieutenant Colonel Gunther ordered the two helicopters to lift off and head home.

  Inside the second helicopter, O'Grady was being taken care of by more Marines, including the 24th MEU (SOC)'s commander, Colonel Martin Berndt, and his senior NCO, Sergeant Major Angel Castro, Jr. After O'Grady was given some water, part of an MRE, and Colonel Berndt's Gortex parka, he settled in for the ride home. But even this task was to prove an adventure for the young pilot and his rescuers. As the CH-53s and AH-1Ws passed near a small town, anti-aircraft and small-arms fire erupted, hitting both transport helicopters. And then three man-portable SA-7 Grail SAMs were fired from below, requiring evasive maneuvering by the four choppers. It didn't take long after that for the airborne task force to break clear of the danger and go "feet wet" over the Adriatic, headed for home aboard the USS Kearsarge (LHD-3). Twenty minutes later, all were safely aboard, and another page had been written into Marine history.

  What had saved the young Air Force captain was not a special operations force in the traditional sense. From our experience of movies and television, we tend to think of such forces as supermen, rescuing hostages and "taking down" terrorists in their lairs. Built around clandestine units like the Army's Delta Force and the Navy's SEa-Air-Land (SEAL) teams, these units maintain a low profile and tend to keep out of the public view. The MEU (SOC)s are different. While quite capable, they are not special operations forces per se. On the contrary, they are regular Marine units, drawn from around the Corps, which are given special training to make them capable across a limited but important range of conventional and special operations missions. This distinction is the reason why the MEU (SOC)s have remained independent at a time when most American special operations forces are under the unified command of the U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), located at MacDill AFB near Tampa, Florida.

  The story of the MEU (SOC)s is the story of how the Marine Corps has enhanced its ability to make "kickin-the-door" forced entries (i.e. invasions and raids) into enemy territory. This is a lot to ask from just seven battalion-sized units, of which only three or four are deployed on cruise at any particular time. General Krulak likes to call the Marines "the risk force"; the MEU (SOC)s are the diamond-tipped point of that force's spear. As it exists today, the MEU (SOC) can be seen as the evolutionary result of over two millennia of experience in amphibious warfare. More immediately and practically, it is one of the most compact, responsive, and capable military units in the world today, with multiple means of delivering its weapons and personnel onto or even behind an enemy coastline. The MEU (SOC)'s special training gives it versatility across a finite but significant range of possible special missions, including raids, rescues, and security operations. And its ability to plug itself into a variety of "joint" military operations makes it a valuable addition to any military force. Thus, regional CinCs covet a MEU (SOC) whenever they can get one. Finally, because it can be, and usually is, forward-deployed into possible trouble spots along with its own aviation and logistical components, it is fast, mobile, and self-contained. It needs nothing to get the ball rolling on an operation and keep it going for up to fifteen days without external support. So let us look at this unique family of units, and get to know their organizations, missions, and history.

  Beginnings: The Road to the MEU (SOC)

  The beginnings of the MEU (SOC) concept date to just after the end of the Second World War. As early as the late 1940s, the need for forces based close to potential trouble spots was already posing a problem for the U.S. and its Cold War allies. One result was the Marine afloat battalion, which became something of a standard unit in the decades ahead. These were created by using some of the vast amphibious shipping tonnage that had been built up in World War II and a few battalions of the dwindling Marine Corps of the time. Quickly, they began to prove their worth. Each one was a typical Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF), with ground, air, and logistical units (or components as they are called), matched together into a fighting team. This turned out to be an excellent idea. In the Taiwan Straits (1957), Lebanon (1958), Cuba (1961 and 1962), and the Dominican Republic (1965), the forward-deployed Marine units aboard U.S. Navy ships were to make themselves felt. Even during the height of the Vietnam War, amphibious ready groups (ARGs) with their Marine units aboard prowled the oceans and seas of the world, protecting American interests.

  Following the end of the Vietnam war and the rough years of the 1970s, things began to become a bit more regular within the Marine afloat battalions. Redesignated as Marine Amphibious Units (MAUs), they now had a formal headquarters unit, which would then fill out its component parts from regular Marine units from around the Corps. Previously, the units just were thrown together for the duration of their cruise afloat. This move to a formal headquarters structure was more than just cosmetic; it meant that the Corps had begun to consider the MAUs one of their premier MAGTF organizations. Now they would become fully integrated MAGTFs under the command of a full Colonel (O-6), capable of a wider variety of tasks and missions. In fact, with the drawdown of Navy and Marine forces in the late 1970s during the Carter Administration, the compact MAUs aboard their ARGs quickly became the only U.S. military units that could begin to rapidly respond to a crisis around the world.

  The coming of the Reagan Administration in 1981 brought the MAUs the opportunity to prove themselves in combat. Initially, the results were decidedly mixed. On the plus side was Operation Urgent Fury, the invasion of Grenada in October 1982. The 22nd MAU provided much of the combat muscle for that operation. Things unfortunately did not go so well for the 24th MAU. Two days before Urgent Fury hit the beaches of Grenada, while it was on "peacekeeping" duty in the war-torn city of Beirut, Lebanon, an Iranian driving a truck bomb wiped out much of the 24th's ground component. Over two hundred Marines were killed in the explosion, which occurred early on a Sunday morning. It today remains one of the worst disasters in U.S. military history, and had a variety of effects on the Marines and their MAUs.

  The Beirut disaster and problems in other operations began to show that the Marines had some problems in their combat doctrine. Much like their sister services, who had seen such difficulties following the Vietnam War, the Corps was beginning to experience some serious shortcomings in its ability to carry out even traditional missions like amphibious invasions and raids. Grenada, while successful, had been costly and poorly coordinated. Luckily, the solution to these shortcomings came in the form of a new senior Marine Corps leader, General Alfred M. Gray, who would eventually become the 29th Commandant in 1987. While he was the commander of Fleet Marine Force, Atlantic (FMFLANT), General Gray began his campaign to promote "warfighting" as the primary task of the Marine Corps in the 1980s and 1990s. Much like visionary thinkers in the other services, Gray helped promote the idea that combat was the core ability of the Marines (this earned him the nickname "the warfighter"). What made his effort unusual was that he felt it was not enough just to know how to shoot and blow things up. He urged Marines of all ranks, officer and enlisted, to apply intellectual power as a force multiplier for the Marine ethos. This began to pay immediate benefits. He also promoted the use of the word "expeditionary" to describe the inherent characteristics of Marine units of all sizes. In particular, he pushed renaming the MAUs as MEUs (the E obviously standing for "expeditionar
y"), to reflect the kinds of missions he wanted the Marine Corps to be ready for.

  Along with these intellectual developments, General Gray began to think about the kinds of units that the Marines had formed over the years, and just what kinds of missions each was capable of. One particular kind of mission which had come to be vital in the 1980s was special operations. The failed Iranian hostage rescue mission in 1980 had forced all of the services to look at their capabilities in this area. Out of this came a 1983 study that examined what the Marine Corps would need to become a credible player in future low-intensity ("short-of-war") conflicts. Unlike the other services, there was no drive within the USMC to create new and separate special operations units. Instead, it was decided that regular units within the Corps would be given special training prior to a deployment. This would make them "special operations capable" (SOC) across a fixed range of missions and tasks.

  In 1984, Marine Corps Headquarters ordered FMFLANT (at the time commanded by General Gray) to put together a program to create a special-operations-capable Marine unit, and deploy it on an ARG for an overseas cruise of some six months duration. General Gray and then-Colonel James Myatt (who eventually rose to the rank of Major General and commanded the 1st Marine Division during Desert Storm), came up with a list of special missions and equipment that they wanted to put into the unit assembled. Along the way, Gray and Myatt made several key decisions. These included:* FMFLANT would modify one of the MEUs to produce a battalion-sized SOC-capable MAGTF that could carry out the special missions that they had in mind.