Following the Khobar Towers attack, the Clinton administration sought additional intelligence about Iran’s role and warned Tehran against engaging in further attacks against US interests. According to former CIA and National Security Council official Bruce Riedel, “The administration also took targeted actions against the Revolutionary Guards and Iranian intelligence personnel around the world.” One of these, Operation Sapphire, was a CIA operation that identified Iranian intelligence officers operating abroad and disrupted their activities in early 1997.133 A January 1997 cable sent from the Office of the FBI Director to the CIA, the White House, and several FBI Legal Attaché offices abroad, among others, provided intelligence it described as “sensitive and singular in nature” warning that Hezbollah was funding “Saudi opposition elements in Kuwait for possible support of terrorist operations.” The warning was set against information that a Hezbollah spiritual leader had produced a videotape for distribution to opposition party members in Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and Kuwait that reportedly called for “Hezbollah supported suicide operations in defense of the [tenets] of Islam in the Gulf region.”134
Meanwhile, the activities of Iranian MOIS agents continued to worry US officials, prompting a disruption campaign targeting the MOIS in late 1999. Former CIA director George Tenet would later recount, “In one memorable example, John Brennan, our liaison to the Saudis, handled the local MOIS head himself. John walked up to his car, knocked on the window, and said, “Hello, I’m from the U.S. embassy, and I’ve got something to tell you.”135
Such approaches spooked Iranian intelligence, Tenet notes. “Just being seen with some of our people might cause MOIS officers to fall under suspicion by their own agency.” Nor was Iran concerned only about its own operational security. Even as it continued to target US interests, Iran feared that after the Khobar attack, US or other intelligence services would accelerate their efforts to collect information about, and possibly target, Hezbollah. According to an American intelligence report, in November 1996 the director of the counterintelligence directorate within MOIS personally visited Mughniyeh in Beirut to assess Hezbollah’s security.136 Such activity continues. Testifying before Congress in 2008, Adm. William J. Fallon, then–commander of US Central Command, noted that Iran employs surrogate terrorist groups in the region and continues to engage in “confrontational activity in the Gulf.”137
Iran would increasingly use Hezbollah in the years to come as a strike force through which it could operate with probable deniability. In the 1990s, several such operations used Europe as a launching pad from which to deploy operatives into Israel to conduct attacks or collect operational intelligence. In fact, seven months before MOIS assessed Hezbollah’s security, the first of a string of Hezbollah operatives to infiltrate into Israel through Europe would be caught red-handed assembling a bomb in an East Jerusalem hotel room. Undeterred, more Hezbollah operatives would soon follow.
Notes
1. US Department of Defense, Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense, Downing Assessment Task Force, “Report of the Assessment of the Khobar Towers Bombing,” August 30, 1996 (hereafter cited as Downing Assessment); Rebecca Grant, “Khobar Towers,” Air Force Magazine 81, no. 6 (June 1998), 41–47.
2. United States of America v. Ahmed Mughassil et al., Indictment, United States District Court, Eastern District of Virginia, Alexandria Division, No. 01-228-A, June 2001; Federal Court of Canada, In the Matter of Hani Abd Rahim al-Sayegh, and In the Matter of a Referral of the Immigration Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. I-2, Court File: DES-1-97; US Congress, 104th Cong., 2d sess., House, National Security Committee Staff Report, “The Khobar Towers Bombing Incident,” August 14, 1996; Grant, “Khobar Towers,” 41–47; US Department of Defense, “Report of Investigation Concerning the Khobar Towers Bombing, 25 June 1996,” Prepared by the Inspector General Lt. Gen. Richard T. Swope and the Judge Advocate General Byran G. Hawley, July 31, 1997.
3. United States of America v. Ahmed Mughassil et al., Indictment; Federal Court of Canada, In the Matter of Hani Abd Rahim al-Sayegh; House, National Security Committee Staff Report, “Khobar Towers Bombing Incident”; US Department of Defense, “Report of Investigation Concerning the Khobar Towers Bombing.”
4. House National Security Committee Staff Report, “Khobar Towers Bombing Incident”; Downing Assessment, 55; Grant, “Khobar Towers,” 46–47.
5. US Department of Justice, FBI, “Terrorism Charges Have Been Brought against 13 Members of the Pro-Iran Saudi Hizballah,” press release, June 21, 2001. For a discussion on the analysis of the yield of the explosive, see Lt. Gen. James F. Record, USAF, “Independent Review of the Khobar Towers Bombing,” (Washington, DC: Headquarters US Air Force), October 31, 1996.
6. US Department of Justice, FBI, “Terrorism Charges against 13 Members”; Heiser et al. v. Islamic Republic of Iran consolidated with Campbell et al. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, Memorandum Opinion, United States District, Court for the District of Columbia, December 22, 2006.
7. Federal Court of Canada, In the Matter of Hani Abd Rahim al-Sayegh.
8. United States of America v. Ahmed Mughassil et al., Indictment.
9. Louis J. Freeh, “Khobar Towers,” Wall Street Journal, June 23, 2006.
10. Federal Court of Canada, In the Matter of Hani Abd Rahim al-Sayegh.
11. US Department of Justice, FBI, “Terrorism Charges Have Been Brought.”
12. International Crisis Group, “The Shiite Question in Saudi Arabia,” Middle East Report no. 45, September 19, 2005; Human Rights Watch, “Denied Dignity: Systemic Discrimination and Hostility toward Saudi Shia Citizens,” September 3, 2009.
13. Federal Court of Canada, In the Matter of Hani Abd Rahim al-Sayegh.
14. Teitelbaum, “Shiites of Saudi Arabia”; International Crisis Group, “Shiite Question in Saudi Arabia”; Matthiesen, “Hizbullah al-Hijaz.”
15. J. E. Peterson, Historical Dictionary of Saudi Arabia, (Lanham, MD: Scarecrow Press, 2003), 122.
16. Matthiesen, “Hizbullah al-Hijaz.”
17. Ibid.
18. Ibrahim, Shi’is of Saudi Arabia, 142.
19. The government claimed it was an accident, but it was later tied to Saudi Hezbollah. Matthiesen, “Hizbullah al-Hijaz; see also US CIA, “Saudi Diplomat Assassinated.”
20. Federal Court of Canada, In the Matter of Hani Abd Rahim al-Sayegh, 13.
21. US CIA, “Iran: Uses of Terror.”
22. US CIA, “Shootdown of Iran Air 655.”
23. US CIA, “South Korea [redacted].”
24. Matthiesen, “Hizbullah al-Hijaz.”
25. Ibid.
26. Adel Darwish, “Saudis Overhaul Secret Service after Terrorist Killings,” Independent (London), January 14, 1989.
27. US CIA, “Saudi Diplomat Assassinated.”
28. Ibid.
29. Matthiesen, “Hizbullah al-Hijaz.”
30. United States of America v. Ahmed Mughassil et al.
31. Ibid.
32. US CIA, “Rafsanjani’s Report Card.”
33. Marschall, Iran’s Persian Gulf Policy, 38.
34. United States of America v. Ahmed Mughassil et al.
35. Matthiesen, “Hizbullah al-Hijaz.”
36. See International Crisis Group, “Shiite Question in Saudi Arabia”; Human Rights Watch, “Denied Dignity.”
37. Matthiesen, “Hizbullah al-Hijaz.” See also Ibrahim, Shi’is of Saudi Arabia.
38. United States of America v. Ahmed Mughassil et al.
39. Ibrahim, Shi’is of Saudi Arabia.
40. United States of America v. Ahmed Mughassil et al.
41. Federal Court of Canada, In the Matter of Hani Abd Rahim al-Sayegh.
42. US CIA, “Khobar Bombing [redacted].”
43. Paul A. Blais et al. v. Islamic Republic of Iran et al., United States District Court for the District of Columbia, Civil Action No. 02-285, May 26, 2006, Testimony of Bruce D. Tefft.
44. Downing Assessment.
45. US CIA, Memorandum for the DCI, �
�Iranian Support for International Terrorism.”
46. US CIA, “Iran and the Radical Palestinians.”
47. US CIA, “Shootdown of Iran Air 655.”
48. US CIA, “Attacks against Saudi Interests.”
49. United States of America v. Ahmed Mughassil et al.
50. Campbell et al. v. The Islamic Republic of Iran, United States District Court for the District of Columbia, Case No. 00-CV-02104, November 25, 2003, Testimony of Patrick Clawson.
51. Ibid.
52. Heiser et al. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, United States District Court for the District of Columbia, Civil Action nos. 00-2329, 01-2104, December 18, 2003, Testimony of Dale Watson.
53. Blais et al. v. The Islamic Republic of Iran et al., Testimony of Bruce Tefft.
54. FBI Director Louis Freeh underscored this point as well, noting that members of the 4404th Wing risked their lives to enforce the no-fly zone over southern Iraq “to stop Saddam Hussein from killing his Shiite people.” See Freeh, “Khobar Towers.”
55. United States of America v. Ahmed Mughassil et al.
56. US Department of Justice, FBI, “International Radical Fundamentalism.”
57. United States of America v. Ahmed Mughassil et al.
58. Ibid.
59. Ibid.
60. Human Rights Watch, “Denied Dignity”; United Nations, High Commissioner for Refugees, Minorities at Risk Project, Chronology for Shi’is in Bahrain, 2004.
61. Campbell et al. v. The Islamic Republic of Iran, Testimony of Patrick Clawson.
62. US CIA, “Iranian Surveillance of US Persons and Facilities 1995.”
63. Clarke, Against All Enemies, 113.
64. Con Coughlin, “Iran Builds Up Network of Terror Schools,” Daily Telegraph (London), July 13, 1996; Jack Kelley, “Terrorist Camps Seen in Iran Likely Tied to Saudi Blasts,” USA Today, August 2, 1996.
65. US CIA, “Lebanon’s Hizballah.”
66. US Department of Defense, “Report of Investigation Concerning the Khobar Towers Bombing.”
67. National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, 9/11 Commission Report, released July 22, 2004, 60; Scheuer, Through Our Enemies’ Eyes, 141.
68. “State Dept. Warns Americans to Be Careful in Saudi Arabia,” Washington Post, December 10, 1995.
69. “U.S. Says Americans Threatened in Saudi Arabia,” Washington Post, February 1, 1996.
70. Downing Assessment.
71. “Iranian Reports on the War in Brief: Saudi Ulema in Qom Call for Uprising against USA,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, January 24, 1991.
72. Downing Assessment.
73. Ibid.
74. US Department of Defense, “Report of Investigation Concerning the Khobar Towers Bombing”; regarding criticism over how and when commanders made requests of the Saudis, see Record, “Independent Review of the Khobar Towers Bombing,” 9.
75. Record, “Independent Review of the Khobar Towers Bombing.”
76. US Department of Defense, “Report of Investigation Concerning the Khobar Towers Bombing.”
77. Ibid.; Record, “Independent Review of the Khobar Towers Bombing.”
78. US Department of Defense, “Report of Investigation Concerning the Khobar Towers Bombing.”
79. Record, “Independent Review of the Khobar Towers Bombing.”
80. Downing Assessment.
81. United States of America v. Ahmed Mughassil et al.
82. Ibid.
83. Ibid. Regarding al-Sayegh obtaining an international driver’s license in Syria, see Federal Court of Canada, In the Matter of Hani Abd Rahim al-Sayegh.
84. United States of America v. Ahmed Mughassil et al.
85. Ibid.
86. Ibid.
87. US CIA, “Khobar Bombing [redacted].”
88. United States of America v. Ahmed Mughassil et al.
89. Heiser et al. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, Testimony of Louis Freeh.
90. US CIA, “Khobar Bombing [redacted].”
91. James Risen, “A Nation Challenged: A Suspect; US Traces Iran’s Ties to Terror through a Lebanese,” New York Times, January 17, 2002.
92. Nicholas Blanford, “Not If, but How,” NOWLebanon, February 16, 2008.
93. Baer, See No Evil, 263; US Treasury Department, “Treasury Designates Hizballah Leadership,” press release September 13, 2012.
94. United States of America v. Ahmed Mughassil et al.
95. US Congress, House, National Security Committee Staff Report, “Khobar Towers Bombing Incident,” August, 14, 1996.
96. Downing Assessment.
97. United States of America v. Ahmed Mughassil et al.
98. Ibid.; US Congress, House, National Security Committee Staff Report, “Khobar Towers Bombing Incident.”
99. United States of America v. Ahmed Mughassil et al.
100. Ibid.
101. US CIA, “Khobar Bombing [redacted].” The CIA report refers to a shipment of explosives from Lebanon to Saudi Arabia seized in March 1995, though that appears to be a typo that actually references the March 1996 seizure.
102. United States of America v. Ahmed Mughassil et al. Regarding the concealment of the bomb in the truck bomb, see Blais et al. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, Testimony of Bruce Tefft.
103. United States of America v. Ahmed Mughassil et al.
104. Thomas Friedman, “Stay Tuned,” New York Times, March 25, 1997.
105. Blais et al. v. Islamic Republic of Iran et al., Testimony of Bruce D. Tefft.
106. Thomas Friedman, “Where Is Jaafar?”; New York Times, January 8, 1997.
107. Elaine Sciolino, “U.S. Rebuffed by Syrians over Bombing,” New York Times, March 26, 1997.
108. Ibid.
109. Friedman, “Stay Tuned.”
110. Joshua Teitelbaum, “Holier than Thou: Saudi Arabia’s Islamic Opposition,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy (Washington, DC), 2000, p. 88.
111. United States of America v. Ahmed Mughassil et al.
112. Howard Schneider, “Jailed Saudi Denies Role in Bombing: Suspect in 1996 Attack Says He Was in Syria,” Washington Post, March 25, 1997.
113. US CIA, “Khobar Bombing [redacted].”
114. Youssef M. Ibrahim, “Saudi Rebels Are Main Suspects in June Bombing of a U.S. Base,” New York Times, August 15, 1996.
115. Atwan, Secret History of al Qaeda, 36.
116. National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, 9/11 Commission Report, released July 22, 2004, pp. 60–61.
117. Heiser et al. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, Testimony of Louis Freeh.
118. Heiser et al. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, Testimony of Dale Watson.
119. R. Jeffrey Smith, “Saudis Hold 40 Suspects in GI Quarters Bombing; Sources Say Riyadh’s Evidence Suggests Iranian Role,” Washington Post, November 1, 1996; Elsa Walsh, “Louis Freeh’s Last Case,” New Yorker, May 14, 2001.
120. Freeh, “Khobar Towers.”
121. Sciolino, “U.S. Rebuffed by Syrians”; Anthony DePalma, “Canada Links Pro-Iranian Group to Saudi Attack on U.S. Barracks,” New York Times, March 28, 1997.
122. Freeh, My FBI, 19.
123. “Suspect in Khobar Towers Bombing Fights Deportation to Saudi Arabia,” CNN, October 5, 1999.
124. Freeh, My FBI, 19.
125. Statement of Louis J. Freeh, Joint Investigation into September 11th, October 8, 2002; see also Freeh, My FBI, 30–31.
126. Walsh, “Louis Freeh’s Last Case.”
127. US CIA, “Rafsanjani’s Report Card.”
128. Freeh, My FBI, 29.
129. Heiser et al. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, Testimony of Louis Freeh.
130. Freeh, My FBI, 31.
131. Amnesty International, “Saudi Arabia: Assaulting Human Rights in the Name of Counter-Terrorism,” July 22, 2009.
132. “Saudi Militants Are Sentenced in ’96 Bombing,” New York Times, June 2, 2002.
133. Bruce Riedel, “The Clinton Administration,”
in Robin Wright, ed., The Iran Primer: Power, Politics, and U.S. Policy (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2010), 139–42.
134. US Department of Justice, FBI, “Hizballah: International Terrorism Lebanon, Warning: Inform,” January 28, 1997.
135. Tenet, At the Center of the Storm, 124.
136. James Risen, “A Nation Challenged: A Suspect; U.S. Traces Iran’s Ties to Terror through a Lebanese,” New York Times, January 17, 2002.
137. US Congress, Senate Committee on Armed Services, Hearing: United States Central Command and United States Special Operations Command in Review of the Defense Authorization Request for Fiscal Year 2009 and the Future Years Defense Program, 110th Cong., 2d sess., March 4, 2008, Statement of Admiral William J. Fallon.
8
Unit 1800
Targeting the Israeli Heartland
IN THE EARLY TO MID-1990S, with the Oslo peace accords signed and Palestinian autonomy slowly growing in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, opponents of peace funded, supported, and executed terrorist attacks to undermine the prospects for peace. Iran was especially active in promoting terrorism targeting Israel at this time. According to the Canadian Security Intelligence Service, “in February 1999, it was reported that Palestinian police had discovered documents that attest to the transfer of $35 million to Hamas from Iran’s Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS), money reportedly meant to finance terrorist activities against Israeli targets.”1 Iran’s primary proxy group, however, has always been Hezbollah. It should therefore not be surprising that Hezbollah increased its support for Palestinian groups in the 1990s, invested in its own terrorist infrastructure in the West Bank, and went to great lengths to infiltrate operatives into Israel to collect intelligence and execute terror attacks. Hezbollah established a dedicated unit to pursue these goals—Unit 1800.
While Israel occupied southern Lebanon, Hezbollah largely satisfied itself with targeting Israeli forces there or at the border. Carrying out attacks along the border with Lebanon in Israel’s far north was one thing, but to effectively undermine the peace process, Hezbollah leaders decided they needed to target key Israeli decision makers, symbolic sites, or ordinary Israeli civilians in downtown shopping districts. Hezbollah was out to hit the Israeli heartland.
Hezbollah Page 35