87. Ana Maria Luca, “Out of Africa.”
88. US Department of the Treasury, “Treasury Targets Hizballah Financial Network.”
89. US Department of the Treasury, Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, “Finding That the Lebanese Canadian Bank SAL Is a Financial Institution of Primary Laundering Concern,” February 10, 2011.
90. United States of America v. Hassan Hodroj et al., Smemo Affidavit, United States District Court, Eastern District of Pennsylvania, November 24, 2009.
91. Global Witness, “For a Few Dollars More: How al Qaeda Moved into the Diamond Trade,” April 2003, 24.
92. Gberie, “War and Peace in Sierra Leone.”
93. Douglas Farah, “Hezbollah’s External Support Network in West Africa and Latin America,” International Assessment and Strategy Center, August 4, 2006.
94. Hudson, “Lebanese Businessmen and Hezbollah.”
95. Farah, “Hezbollah’s External Support Network.”
96. US CIA, “Lebanese in Sub-Saharan Africa.”
97. Ibid.
98. Global Witness, “For a Few Dollars More,” 24.
99. Associated Press, “Hezbollah Extorting Funds from West Africa’s Diamond Trade,” Haaretz (Tel Aviv), June 30, 2004.
100. Global Witness, “For a Few Dollars More,” 9.
101. Ibid.
102. Douglas Farah, “Al Qaeda Cash Tied to Diamond Trade; Sale of Gems from Sierra Leone Rebels Raised Millions, Sources Say,” Washington Post, November 2, 2001.
103. Statement of Alan W. Easthman, U.S. Government Role in Fighting the Conflict Diamond Trade.
104. US Senator Dick Durbin, “Durbin Hearing Confirms Conflict Diamond-Terrorist Link,” press release, February 13, 2002.
105. Douglas Farah, “Liberian Is Accused of Harboring Al-Qaeda,” Washington Post, May 15, 2003, A18.
106. Global Witness, “For a Few Dollars More,” 20. Also see report endnote 53: “Angolan Diamond Smuggling: The Part Played by Belgium,” Service General du Renseignement et de la Security (Sgr), July 2000.
107. Global Witness, “For a Few Dollars More,” 21.
108. Statement of Alan W. Easthman, U.S. Government Role in Fighting the Conflict Diamond Trade.
109. Global Witness, “For a Few Dollars More,” 21.
110. Ibid., 21–24.
111. Author telephone interview with former US intelligence and law enforcement official, January 21, 2011.
112. Global Witness, “For a Few Dollars More,” 42; Farah, “Al Qaeda Cash Tied to Diamond Trade.” Global Witness places Bah in Afghanistan in the late 1980s, while Farah has him there in the early 1980s. While there is discrepancy regarding the specific dates, these and other sources concur on the places where Bah trained and fought.
113. Farah, Blood from Stones, 71–72.
114. Farah, “Al Qaeda Cash Tied to Diamond Trade.”
115. Ibid.
116. Douglas Farah, “Digging up Congo’s Dirty Gems: Officials Say Diamond Trade Funds Radical Islamic Groups,” Washington Post, December 30, 2001.
117. Farah, Blood from Stones, 60–61.
118. Antwerp, Belgium, Belgian Police Diamond Section, GDA Antwerp, “Case LIBI,” September 10, 2001.
119. United Nations, Special Court for Sierra Leone, Office of the Prosecutor, “Presence of al-Qaeda in West Africa: Independent Source Findings,” 2004.
120. Author interview with Douglas Farah, email, November 23, 2011.
121. Global Witness, “For a Few Dollars More,” 43–44; Peter Finn and Pamela Rolfe, “Calls Central to Spain’s Sept. 11 Case: Indictment Reveals Cryptic References,” Washington Post, November 21, 2001.
122. Farah, “Hezbollah’s External Support Network.”
123. Global Witness, “For a Few Dollars More,” 24.
124. Statement of Frank C. Urbancic, Hezbollah’s Global Reach.
125. Ora Cohen, “Israelis in West Africa: We Live in Hezbollah State,” Haaretz (Tel Aviv), August 5, 2008.
126. United States of America v. Lebanese Canadian Bank SAL et al., Verified Complaint, 11 CIV 9186, United States District Court, Southern District of New York, December 15, 2011.
127. Ibid.; Jo Becker, “Beirut Bank Seen as a Hub of Hezbollah’s Financing,” New York Times, December 13, 2011.
128. Jacque Neriah, “An Iranian Intelligence Failure: Arms Ship in Nigeria Reveals Iran’s Penetration of West Africa,” Jerusalem Issue Briefs 10, no. 35 (April 7, 2011), Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs.
129. US CIA, “Overview of State-Supported Terrorism in 1985.”
130. US CIA, “Lebanese in Sub-Saharan Africa.”
131. Farah, “Hezbollah’s External Support Network.”
132. Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center at the Center for Special Studies, “Hezbollah (part 1),” 91.
133. Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center at the Center for Special Studies, “Iran’s Activity in East Africa, the Gateway to the Middle East and the African Continent,” July 29, 2009.
134. Global Witness, “For a Few Dollars More,” 24.
135. Agence France Presse, “Morocco Cuts Ties with Iran: Foreign Ministry,” March 6, 2009.
136. Claude Salhani, “Special Report: Hezbollah Active in Nigeria,” Middle East Times, June 3, 2008.
137. Neriah, “Iran Steps Up Arming Hizbullah against Israel.”
138. Universal Strategy Group, Directed Study of Lebanese Hezbollah, produced for the United States Special Operations Command, Research and Analysis Division, October 2010, 41.
139. Israeli intelligence report, “Iranian Intelligence Activity in Uganda,” undated. Corroborated in separate author interview with Israeli intelligence official, Tel Aviv, July 2003.
140. Ibid.
141. See, for example, United Nations Monitoring Committee, Panel of Experts Established Pursuant to Resolution 1929 (2010), final report, May 17, 2011; Neriah, “An Iranian Intelligence Failure.”
142. Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, IDF Spokesman, “Shaul Mofaz Regarding Interception of Ship Karine A,” January 4, 2002.
143. See Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, IDF Spokesman, “Seizing of the Palestinian Weapons Ship Karine A,” January 4, 2002.
144. Choksy, “Iran Takes on the World,” 62.
145. Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Seizing of the Palestinian Weapons Ship Karine A”; Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center, Israel Intelligence Heritage & Commemoration Center, “Iranian Support of Hamas,” January 12, 2008, 16n9.
146. Amos Harel, “Hezbollah Paid for Karine A, PA Paid for Arms,” Haaretz (Tel Aviv), February 1, 2002. A “senior U.S. official” confirmed then–Israeli defense minister Binyamin Ben-Eliezer’s contention regarding Mughniyeh’s role. See Matthew Lee, “Top Israeli Security Official Calls Palestinian Arms Ship Probe ‘Absurd,’” Agence France Presse, January 10, 2002.
147. Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Seizing of the Palestinian Weapons Ship Karine A”; Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center, “Iranian Support of Hamas,” January 12, 2008, 16n9.
148. Israel Defense Forces, Military Intelligence, “Iran and Syria as Strategic Support for Palestinian Terrorism,” September 2002. Report based on the interrogations of arrested Palestinian terrorists and captured Palestinian Authority documents.
149. Harel, “Hezbollah Paid for Karine A.”
150. Jennifer Griffin, “Prison Interview with Palestinian Ship Captain Smuggling 50 Tons of Weapons,” Fox News, January 7, 2002.
151. Sharon Sadeh, “EU Says Karine-A Affair Changed Mideast Conflict,” Haaretz (Tel Aviv), February 7, 2002.
152. Israel Defense Forces, Military Intelligence, “Iran and Syria as Strategic Support.”
153. Greg Myre, “Israel Says Explosives Expert Was on Fishing Boat It Seized,” New York Times, May 22, 2003.
154. “How Israel Foiled an Arms Convoy Bound for Hamas,” Time, March 30, 2009.
155. Reuters, “Hamas Military Commander Killed in Sudan Air Strike,
” Jerusalem Post, April 6, 2011.
156. Amos Harel and Avi Issacharoff, “Sudan Opposition: Bombed Arms Factory Belongs to Iran’s Revolutionary Guard,” Haaretz (Tel Aviv), October 24, 2012.
157. “Alleged Israeli Attack Draws Attention to Sudan’s Ties to Iran,” VOA News, April 1, 2009.
158. US CIA, “Hizballah Ties to Egyptian Fundamentalists.”
159. Aidan Hartley, “U.S. Says Hizbollah May Plan Car Bombs in Somalia,” Reuters, November 15, 1993.
160. United Nations Security Council, Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia pursuant to Security Council resolution 1676 (2006), S/2006/913, November 22, 2006.
161. Ibid.
162. Tenet, At the Center of the Storm, 352.
163. US Department of State, Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, Office of the Secretary of State, “Overview of State Sponsored Terrorism,” Patterns of Global Terrorism 1999, April 2000.
164. National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, 9/11 Commission Report, released July 22, 2004, 240.
165. Ibid., 61; US CIA, “Al-Qa’ida in Sudan, 1992–96.”
166. US CIA, “Al-Qa’ida in Sudan, 1992–96.”
167. United States of America v. Ali Mohamed, Guilty Plea in US Embassy Bombings, Criminal No. 1023, United States District Court, Southern District of New York, October 20, 2000.
168. Ibid.
169. “Wikileaks: Sudan Designates Hezbollah as a Terrorist Organization,” Sudan Tribune, September 8, 2011.
170. Ibid.
171. “Sudan Says Rebels May Have Assisted Hezbollah in Arms Smuggling,” Sudan Tribune, April 20, 2009.
172. Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center, “Hamas and Hezbollah Expressed Sympathy with President of Sudan,” July 25, 2010.
173. Talal Ismail, “Hezbollah Places Army at the Disposal of Government in Darfur,” Al-Ahram (Sudan), September 23, 2010.
174. “Wikileaks: Sudan Designates Hezbollah.”
175. US Department of State, “Country Reports on Terrorism 2010,” August 18, 2011.
176. National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, 9/11 Commission Report, released July 22, 2004, 240–41.
177. Edith M. Lederer, “UN: W. Africa Cocaine Trade Generates $900M a Year,” Associated Press, February 22, 2010.
178. Statement of James Clapper, Worldwide Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community, February 10, 2011.
179. US Department of State, Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, “International Narcotics Control Strategy Report,” Drug and Chemical Control 1, March 2010, 312–14.
180. Marco Vernaschi, “Guinea Bissau: Hezbollah, al Qaida and the Lebanese Connection,” Pulitzer Center on Crisis Reporting (Washington, DC), June 19, 2009.
181. Ronald K. Noble, opening remarks, 20th Americas Regional Conference, Viña del Mar, Chile, April 1, 2009.
182. Ronald K. Noble, keynote speech, 9th Meeting of the West African Police Chiefs Committee, Accra, Ghana, October 3, 2007.
183. US Department of the Treasury, “Treasury Designates Two Narcotics Traffickers in Guinea-Bissau; Treasury Targets Emerging West African Narcotics Transit Route,” press release, April 8, 2010.
184. Robert Booth, “Wikileaks Cables: US Fears Over West African Cocaine Route,” Guardian (London), December 14, 2010.
185. Marco Vernaschi, “The Cocaine Coast,” Virginia Quarterly Review 87, no. 1 (Winter 2010): 43–65.
186. Statement of Michael A. Braun, Confronting Drug Trafficking in West Africa.
187. Michael Braun, “Drug Trafficking and Middle Eastern Terrorism Groups: A Growing Nexus?” PolicyWatch 1392, Washington Institute for Near East Policy (Washington, DC), July 25, 2008.
188. Statement of Michael A. Braun, Confronting Drug Trafficking in West Africa.
189. Adm. James Stavridis, “U.S. Southern Command 2009 Posture Statement,” US Southern Command, 2009, 15; see also Adm. James G. Stavridis, Partnership for the Americas: Western Hemisphere Strategy and U.S. Southern Command (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 2010), 11.
190. “Hezbollah Will Profit from the Cocaine Trade in Europe,” Der Spiegel (Germany), January 9, 2010.
191. United States of America v. Lebanese Canadian Bank SAL et al., Verified Complaint, 11 CIV 9186, United States District Court, Southern District of New York, December 15, 2011.
192. Ibid.; United States v. Maroun Saade et al., Indictment, 11 Cr. 111 (NRB), United States District Court, Southern District of New York, February 8, 2011.
193. United States of America v. Lebanese Canadian Bank SAL et al., Verified Complaint, 11 CIV 9186, United States District Court, Southern District of New York, December 15, 2011.
194. Jo Becker, “Beirut Bank Seen as a Hub of Hezbollah’s Financing,” New York Times, December 13, 2011.
195. Author interview with West Africa expert, Washington, DC, November 28, 2011.
196. US CIA, “Prospects for Hizballah Terrorism in Africa.”
10
Unit 3800
Hezbollah in Iraq
IN THE EARLY EVENING OF JANUARY 20, 2007, American military officers and their Iraqi counterparts met at the Provincial Joint Coordination Center in Karbala, about thirty miles south of Baghdad, to coordinate security for the upcoming celebrations of the Shi’a holiday of Ashura. It was just after nightfall when a five-car convoy of black GMC Suburban trucks—the preferred vehicles of US government convoys—was waved through three checkpoints approaching the Coordination Center. The trucks carried about a dozen English-speaking men dressed in US military-style fatigues, carrying American-type weapons and fake identity cards. At the checkpoints, Iraqi soldiers assumed the convoy was just another US security team.1 It was not.
The assailants, trained to carry out “terrorist-style kidnappings” by Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Qods Force and Lebanese Hezbollah, knew exactly where American soldiers would be situated on the compound and headed directly there.2 After they entered the compound, the vehicles split up, with some parking in front and others circling to the back of the main building where the meeting was taking place.3 Once near American soldiers, the assailants threw grenades and opened fire with automatic rifles. One US soldier was killed and three others were injured by a grenade that was thrown into the Coordination Center’s main office, an upper-floor office that also contained the provincial Iraqi police chief’s office. While some assailants attacked the Coordination Center’s main building, others set off explosives throughout the compound, damaging three US military Humvees. After grabbing two soldiers and an unclassified US military computer inside the compound, the team jumped atop an armored US Humvee, captured two more soldiers, and fled the compound.4 The convoy drove east, crossing into Babil province, where it sped through an Iraqi police checkpoint, prompting police to trail the suspicious vehicles. Continuing east, the convoy crossed the Euphrates River and then turned north toward Hillah. The attackers abandoned the five SUVs near the town of Mahawil and fled. Not far behind, Iraqi police caught up with the abandoned vehicles, where they also found uniforms, boots, radios, a rifle, and the four abducted US soldiers, only one of them still alive. Two of the soldiers were found in the back of one of the SUVs, handcuffed and shot dead. A third soldier was found dead on the ground, also shot. Nearby, the fourth soldier, who had been shot in the head but was alive, was rushed to the hospital but died on the way there.5
Just days after the attack, Lt. Col. Scott Bleichwehl, spokesman for Multi-National Division–Baghdad, said, “The precision of the attack, the equipment used and the possible use of explosives to destroy the military vehicles in the compound suggests that the attack was well rehearsed prior to execution.”6 Bleichwehl’s suspicions were confirmed three months later when Hezbollah operative Ali Moussa Daqduq and Qais al-Khazali, leader of one of the radical Shi’a “Special Groups” that broke away from Moqtada al-Sadr’s Mahdi Army, were captured in southern Iraq on March 20.7 Docu
ments captured with al-Khazali showed that the Qods Force had gathered detailed information on “soldiers’ activities, shift changes and defenses” at the US base in Karbala, “and this information was shared with the attackers.”8 One document seized in the raid in particular caught the attention of US analysts: a twenty-two-page memorandum that “detailed the planning, preparation, approval process and conduct of the [Karbala] operation,” among others.9 Shortly thereafter, the trade magazine Aviation Week & Space Technology reported, US spy satellites spotted a training center in Iran complete with a mockup of the Karbala Provincial Joint Coordination Center. “The U.S. believes the discovery indicates Iran was heavily involved in the attack, which relied on a fake motorcade to gain entrance to the compound. The duplicate layout in Iran allowed attackers to practice procedures to use at the Iraqi compound, the Defense Department believes.”10
In time, US forces would learn that the attack on the Karbala Provincial Coordination Center was commanded by Sheikh Azhar al-Dulaymi, a Sunni convert to Shi’a Islam and wanted Iraqi militant tied to Qais al-Khazali. Al-Dulaymi, the military learned, was trained by Hezbollah operatives near the city of Qom, Iran, where he learned how to execute military-style, precision kidnappings. The goal was to kidnap US or British military personnel and take the captives to the Shi’ite stronghold of Sadr City in Baghdad.11 Although a tactical success, the Karbala operation was a strategic failure, given that the goal had been to kidnap, not kill. And in the aftermath of the attack, coalition forces exposed the extent to which Iranian and Hezbollah agents were involved in training, equipping, organizing, and in some cases directing Shi’a militants in Iraq.
Hezbollah and the Qods Force in the Gulf
Hezbollah’s activities in Iraq since the 2003 invasion are a function of the group’s close alliance with Iran in general and the Qods Force in particular. Iran’s strategy in Iraq—and Hezbollah’s role in that strategy as Iran’s primary militant proxy group—is a logical extension of its covert activities in Iraq and the region throughout the 1980s and 1990s.
In the years following the Islamic Revolution of 1979, the Tehran regime sponsored terrorist acts both to export the revolution and to further its national interests. Iran gave special focus to its own backyard, where Shi’a minorities lived under Sunni monarchies that not only oppressed Iran’s co-religionists but also stood in the way of the new regime’s regional ambitions.
Hezbollah Page 48