by Peter Church
THE BRITISH IMPACT
In the first half of the 19th century the interest of the British government and the English East India Company in South‐East Asia was limited to the protection of the China trade routes from interference by other European nations and the provision of minimum conditions for the expansion of British trade in the area. The Anglo‐Dutch Treaty of 1824, under which Britain acquired Melaka from the Dutch and relinquished Benkulen on the south‐west coast of Sumatra, and the Dutch withdrew all objections to Britain's occupation of Singapore, contained articles which guaranteed British traders entry to the Dutch‐administered ports and laid down maximum rates of import duties. The failure of the Dutch to carry out the commercial clauses of the Treaty led to a growing agitation by merchants in Singapore and Britain that Britain should directly challenge the Netherlands' position in the archipelago by opening an entrepot to the east of Singapore. The unsuccessful settlements in northern Australia—Melville Bay, Raffles Bay, and Port Essington—had been made partly with this end in view, but in the late 1830s attention was focused on the north‐west coast of Borneo, the only part of the archipelago not recognised as lying within the Dutch sphere of influence.
Into this situation of a decaying Sultanate of Brunei, facing rebellion in Sarawak, and a growing commercial interest in the north‐west coast of Kalimantan by the British community in Singapore, arrived in August 1839 a remarkable Englishman named James Brooke. Brooke was in the mould of the early 19th‐century Romantics: he admired what he saw as the simple and unsophisticated life of the peoples of the Malay archipelago and wanted to improve it by bringing to them what he saw as the benefits of British civilisation, without destroying the basic simplicity of their lives. He became convinced that he had a divinely appointed mission in the Malay archipelago. With the proceeds of his wealthy father's estate, he bought a boat and journeyed first to Singapore and then to the north‐west coast of Kalimantan. His timely arrival at the head of the Sarawak river with an armed yacht in August 1839 brought the rebellion of the local chief to an end. In return he received the Governorship of Sarawak.
Over the next 30 years Brooke established a personal fiefdom in Sarawak, remorselessly extending its borders at the expense of the Sultanate of Brunei. He was adroit at persuading British naval commanders in Hong Kong and Singapore to support him in forcing the Sultan of Brunei to make concession after concession. However, his attempts to persuade the British government to make Sarawak a British protectorate for the moment fell on deaf ears. The “White Rajah” was one of the more colourful oddities in the history of British colonialism.
A weakened Sultan of Brunei made further concessions of territory in 1877. This time it was to a private company, the American Trading Company, owned by an Austrian and an Englishman. The Austrian sold out to the Englishman in 1881. In order to keep the French and the Germans out of a strategically important area, Britain then granted a royal charter for the establishment of the British North Borneo Company. Further Brunei territory was successfully claimed by Sarawak in 1882, reducing the Sultanate to two small areas: the core around Brunei town and a small pocket of land inside Sarawak. In order to protect what was left of the once‐great Sultanate of Brunei and finally to ensure that rival European powers were kept out, in 1888 Britain declared a protectorate over Sarawak, Brunei, and North Borneo. After a series of arrangements between the British North Borneo Company and Sarawak, which saw Sarawak add further territory, in 1906 Britain appointed a Resident to Brunei in order to supervise the state, modernise its administrative structures, and ensure its survival against its predatory Sarawak neighbour.
Brunei had been territorially reduced to a shadow of its former self. But oil and gas were discovered beneath its land and under its territorial waters in the 1920s. The history of Brunei from then on has revolved around the enormous wealth created by oil and gas. The Sultan and his family became very rich very quickly. By the 1960s, access to such a strong revenue stream enabled the Sultanate to provide free health, education, and social welfare services of a high standard to all its people, and all with very low rates of taxation.
After World War II and the defeat of Japan, Brunei continued to be a British protectorate with the Sultan ruling with advice from a British resident and under the protection of Gurkha troops. As Britain steadily decolonised in Asia and Africa, this arrangement came to be seen in Britain as anachronistic. In 1959 Brunei achieved self‐government, at the insistence of Britain. A constitution was drawn up which provided for elections to a legislative council. In 1962 the first elections were held. They were won by the Partai Rakyat Brunei, a party which opposed the monarchical system and demanded full democratic rights. It also advocated that Brunei join the neighbouring states of Sabah and Sarawak in the mooted Federation of Malaysia. The Partai Rakyat Brunei was strongly opposed by the Sultan and the ruling elite. Its demands were rejected. Brunei was to remain a monarchy.
As a consequence, the Partai Rakyat Brunei launched a revolt. This was quickly crushed by the Gurkha troops stationed in Brunei. The Sultan declared a state of emergency, suspended the constitution, declared the recent elections void, and banned the Partai Rakyat Brunei.
This was the only election ever held in Brunei. In 1962 and early 1963 the Sultan became involved in discussions about joining the new Federation of Malaysia. But when Malaysia was formed in September 1963 Brunei elected to remain outside. Disagreements over the distribution of oil and gas revenues (Brunei was determined to protect its revenue) and concern about the relative status of the royal family among the other Malaysian Sultans, all of whom were constitutional monarchs with limited powers, finally decided the Sultan to remain a British protectorate.
The protectorate arrangements were changed in 1971, but Britain still retained control of foreign affairs and defence, although all costs were now met by a very wealthy Sultanate. At the insistence of Britain, embarrassed by the continuation of this relic of colonialism, Brunei became a sovereign state on 1 January 1984.
Independence brought with it few perceptible changes for the people of Brunei. Political parties remain banned. State ministries essentially remain in the hands of members of the royal family and trusted members of a tightly knit elite.
Since the 1960s, Brunei has become increasingly involved with its South‐East Asian neighbours. Its relations with ASEAN states since the formation of ASEAN in 1967 have been extremely good, although from time to time there has been some debate in sections of Malaysian society about the merits of Brunei's benevolent but authoritarian monarchy, and in 2003 and 2004 the two countries became involved in a dispute over rival claims to oil fields off the coast of Borneo.
In 1987 Brunei joined ASEAN as a full member, thereby formalising the already close relationship, and in November 2001 staged the seventh ASEAN summit meeting, with representatives of China, Japan, and Korea in attendance. In July 2002, the country hosted the ASEAN Regional Forum in which ASEAN's members and the United States signed a pact pledging to “prevent, disrupt, and combat” global terrorism. In December the same year, the Sultan met President George W. Bush in Washington and affirmed the two countries' close ties, although Brunei has discreetly sought to distance itself from the US invasion of Iraq.
In 1998 the business empire run by the Sultan's brother, Prince Jefri, collapsed amid allegations of fraud and mismanagement. The failure of his conglomerate is believed to have resulted in debts to the Sultanate of US$15 billion. Prince Jefri had formerly been finance minister between 1986 and 1997 and was dismissed as head of the Brunei Investment Agency—which manages the country's overseas investments—in 1998.
BRUNEI IN THE NEW MILLENNIUM
Brunei's revenues are almost entirely dependent on royalties from oil and gas. Conscious of the eventual exhaustion of oil and gas (predicted to occur around 2025), since the mid‐1980s Brunei's government has placed priority on developing the agricultural sector so that it can cease to be a net importer of food.
In 2009, it launched
a nationwide campaign to promote its locally produced halal‐branded rice with the goal of exporting to foreign markets. Brunei and the Philippines signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) that seeks to strengthen the bilateral cooperation of the two countries in the fields of agriculture and farm‐related trade and investments. According to the Department of Agriculture and Agrifood, the agricultural sector has increased its output over 113 percent in the last decade with more than 50 percent coming from the livestock sector. In the pipeline are plans to develop more technology‐driven and export‐focused agribusiness industry by partnering with foreign investors.
Efforts have also been made to develop light manufacturing. But realistically, the country's inherent structural and capacity constraints mitigate against the development of a diversified industrial base. These include high labour costs, a shortage of skilled labour, a small domestic market, the lack of an entrepreneurial class, and a large (relative to the population) bureaucracy.
Policies aimed at economic diversification and weaning the population off government dependency have been only partially successful and approximately 70 percent of the workforce remains on the state payroll. The government has also invested tens of billions of petro‐dollars in the West in order that the accrued income will act to cushion the economic—and no doubt, social—effects brought on by declining fossil‐fuel revenues. Such diversified long‐term offshore investments have helped to smooth out unpredictable short‐term fluctuations in the global price of oil in the past, but the ongoing oil crisis and global economic downturn have slowed down the growth of this small sultanate considerably. Its annual GDP has contracted consecutively for two years since the sharp decline of oil prices in December 2014. With oil prices continuing to remain low, measures are needed to boost productivity and focus on other parts of the economy. To grow its economic base outside of its oil and gas sectors, an ambitious development plan—Vision Brunei 2035—was introduced to drive economic expansion to develop its private sector and strengthen its banking and tourism industries. As the unemployment rate continues to rise, the challenge is to upgrade its labour force and reduce the heavy reliance on its energy industry.
The social composition of Brunei has changed rapidly over the past five decades, most noticeably in the growth of an educated middle class. This educated middle class will continue to increase in numbers. Since 1990, in an effort to intertwine a sense of nation‐building, culture, a love of the monarchy, and an observance of Islam, the Sultan has promoted an ideology encapsulated by the catchphrase Melayu Islam Beraja, or “Malay‐Muslim‐Monarchy.”
In 2004, a partially elected parliament with 45 members reopened after 20 years. There was a cabinet reshuffle in 2005 that included younger ministers and those with experience from the private sector. A small step toward democracy was also undertaken in the same year when a new party, National Development Party, was allowed to be registered as a political party though no timetable has been set for elections.
The importance of the observance of Islam was pushed further in 2014 when Shariah (or Islamic) law was introduced with punishments including (at least in theory) amputation of limbs for theft, stoning for adultery, and flogging for alcohol consumption and sodomy. The introduction of this law makes Brunei the first and only country in South‐East Asia to introduce Shariah law into its national penal code. The Sultan decided such law should be implemented in three phases. The initial phase, which came into effect in May 2014, introduced fines or jail terms for offences including indecent behaviour, failure to attend Friday prayers, disrespecting the month of Ramadan, propagating religions other than Islam, and out‐of‐wedlock pregnancies. The second phase that was to commence in late 2014 has been delayed until June 2017. This phase will cover crimes such as theft and robbery with more stringent penalties such as severing of limbs and flogging. Current indications are that the third phase will be implemented in 2018 and will introduce the death penalty for offences including sodomy, rape, blasphemy, and adultery.
The most pressing issue for Brunei is to find alternative sources of income should the oil and gas sectors (as at the time of writing) remain in the doldrums for an extended period. And in the years ahead many in Brunei and beyond will be closely observing how Shariah law is in practice implemented.
2
Cambodia
No country in South‐East Asia has a more imposing early history than Cambodia. The temples of Angkor, erected between the 9th and 13th centuries, are a testament to the creative energy, wealth, and power of Khmer society in that era. But no country in the region has had a more tragic recent history. Ravaged by war and revolution in the 1970s, a decade in which more than one in seven Cambodians died, Cambodia remained a victim of international Cold War rivalries in the 1980s. It is only now that a semblance of peace and economic security is reemerging in Cambodia.
One striking theme in Cambodia's history is the country's almost‐continuous entrapment in the rivalries of outside forces. Until the 19th century, these forces were regional. Since then, Cambodia has been tossed and tormented by world forces, to a degree that sometimes seems inexplicable given Cambodia's small population and poverty. Cambodia's population was assessed at 15.7 million in 2015. Its GDP per capita was just US$1,158.
Another striking historical theme, intertwined with the first, concerns the perennial struggles for power within Cambodia at the expense of the country's general well‐being. Traditionally, in a matter of ruling class rivalries, the power struggles have been grotesquely magnified by this century's global ideological collisions.
Cambodia has known peace, sometimes for extended periods, but always under rulers who enforced peace. French colonial rule achieved a kind of peace in Cambodia, as did King Sihanouk in the 1950s and 1960s. Today the Cambodian government works hard to maintain social cohesion while promoting economic growth but there are always tensions lying just below the surface and which can easily become inflamed such as recent conflicts with Thailand and labour strikes have shown.
EARLY HISTORY AND THE EMPIRE OF ANGKOR
The first glimpses into Cambodian history come from the early centuries of the Christian era. By then Khmers—direct ancestors of Cambodia's modern population—and related Mon peoples occupied a broad band of mainland South‐East Asia, stretching across what is today southern Burma, Thailand, Cambodia, and southern Vietnam. Early Chinese records mention trade with a society on the lower Mekong which they term “Funan” (perhaps a transcription of the Khmer word phnom, meaning “hill”). Funan flourished from the third to seventh centuries as a port of call on the sea‐trading route between India and China. Its Hindu‐Buddhist religious life, writing system, irrigation technology for wet rice‐growing, and other skills were probably developed from Indian sources. Families claiming high Brahman status became a feature of Khmer society, providing priests for Hindu rituals and senior officials for Khmer rulers. Khmer society did not adopt the caste system of Indian Hindu society, but it did become strongly hierarchical in structure.
The Chinese records mention two other early societies in the Khmer area—“water Chenla,” in the Mekong delta, and “land Chenla,” further up the Mekong, possibly in what is now southern Laos. The records indicate that the latter attacked Funan, bringing about its demise. However, there is insufficient evidence to determine whether the two Chenlas and indeed Funan were coherent states, or rather loose collections of farming and trading communities under warlords—albeit warlords aspiring to be seen as divinely ordained warrior kings, identified with Hindu deities such as Siva and Vishnu.
The consolidation of Khmer society is more clear from the ninth century, when the first of the kings to rule over the state now generally known as Angkor, Jayavarman II (reigned c. 802–850), established the state cult of Devaraj, or “god‐king.” This cult, while incorporating Khmer animist beliefs, centred on the worship of a linga relating the king to Siva and symbolising the king's ability to confer fertility and prosperity on his land and people.
A temple built to house the linga represented the mythical Mount Meru, centre of the universe and home of the gods. Thus the king was identified with the divine world and could lay claim to universal authority. At the king's death his temple could serve as his mausoleum.
Jayavarman II built several such temples at widely spaced sites in what is now Cambodia. For the next four centuries his successors would build their temple‐mausoleums, the successive foci of South‐East Asia's greatest state until the 13th century. The temples of the Angkor region are still South‐East Asia's most imposing historical remains.
From the mid‐ninth century, Angkor's heartland became the region along the northern end of the Tonle Sap, near the modern city of Siem Reap. The Tonle Sap (“great lake”) floods each year, fed by the rushing waters of the Mekong. Angkor's rulers and people gradually built a system of reservoirs and canals to control the inundation and provide year‐round water for multiple rice harvests. The system eventually watered an area of about 5.5 million hectares and supported a large population. A bureaucracy of regional magnates and officials harnessed the labour and product of this population for the king's projects and their own—temple‐building, the lavish decoration and upkeep of temples and palaces, the expansion and maintenance of the irrigation works, trade with merchants sailing up the Mekong/Tonle Sap, and warfare.
The degree of power personally exercised by the “god‐kings” remains uncertain, despite the rich information about Angkor provided by temple inscriptions and bas‐reliefs. Modern scholars' characterizations of Angkor's rulers vary from Stalinesque tyrants to ceremonial figureheads always in danger from court rivalries and regional challenges. Two men of immensely strong personality stand out from the long line of monarchs—Suryavarman II (reigned 1113–1150) and Jayavarman VII (reigned 1181–c.1219). The former took the empire which Angkor had been developing to its greatest extent. Under him it encompassed much of modern Thailand and Laos, Cambodia, and southern Vietnam. For a time he also held the territory of Champa, today's central Vietnam. Appropriately, Suryavarman II initiated the construction of Angkor Wat, sometimes described as the largest religious building in the world, and Angkor's best known monument.