by Peter Church
Mahathir took Malaysia—and indeed, the world—by surprise when he abruptly announced his resignation in front of delegates and on live television at an UMNO party conference on June 22, 2002. Although he withdrew it an hour later, he nonetheless said he would hand over power to his deputy, Abdullah Ahmad Badawi, in a phased transition. He resigned on October 31, 2003, and Badawi was sworn in the following day. Preparations immediately commenced for the March 2004 general election, in which Badawi's ruling Barisan Nasional Party alliance gained 90 percent of the seats in the House of Representatives.
This result was viewed as a ringing endorsement of the new prime minister. Badawi's popular mandate was assisted by his promises to reduce poverty and combat corruption, and via the support of many middle‐class voters disenchanted with Mahathir's treatment of Anwar Ibrahim. Badawi was initially viewed as a consensus builder with impeccable Islamic credentials. But within a couple of years he came to be viewed as weak and indecisive by the electorate, from within his own party and even from Mahathir himself, who said publicly he regretted anointing Badawi his heir. Badawi's many critics also accused him of squandering the strong mandate for change handed to him in 2004; this seemed to be borne out by the results of the 2008 general election in which he led UMNO to victory, but with a much reduced majority. Support for the opposition swelled to unprecedented levels and Anwar Ibrahim reentered parliament late in 2008 as a powerful voice against the government. Badawi accepted responsibility for the ruling coalition's poor performance and in mid‐2008 agreed to step aside in March 2009 in favour of his deputy Najib Razak. Najib is the eldest son of Tun Abdul Razak, Malaysia's second prime minister, and the nephew of Tun Hussein Onn, Malaysia's third prime minister. Najib has been an MP since his early twenties.
Prime Minister Najib's leadership has been rocked by controversies, calamities, and challenges. In 2011, after a huge public protest for constitutional and political reforms, he passed tough laws on public gatherings. He also reinstated the controversial Internal Security Act (ISA) in 2013 after repealing it in 2011 and introduced pro‐Malay policies much to the chagrin of the minority population.
In spite of these reforms, Najib led the National Front coalition to victory in the hotly contested 2013 elections. It was its worst‐ever election performance and the party scraped through by winning 133 out of 222 seats. Anwar Ibrahim and his Pakatan Rakyat party staged a strong challenge by increasing its share of parliamentary seats but was unable to defeat Najib. In March 2014 and before Anwar Ibrahim was due to contest in a key by‐election, a court controversially overturned an earlier acquittal for his sexual offences and sentenced him to five years in jail, effectively ending his hopes of standing for election.
However, at the time of publication, the issue that has significant long‐term consequences for the country is the fallout from the alleged mismanagement of the government's 1Malaysia Development Berhad (1MDB). Set up in 2009 with the aim of transforming the economy, the fund has incurred huge debts and there are serious claims of mismanagement and possible fraud. While Najib and his government have more or less successfully built a firewall in Malaysia around this issue, the Internet and social media are full of blogs and articles digging into the details. Included in these measures is a new law, the National Security Act, which came into force on August 1, 2016. While this law could be used for legitimate purposes such as countering terrorism, there is a concern this law can also be used to suppress opposition to the government and even public discussion of the 1MDB issue. This law grants the Malaysian authorities the power to carry out warrantless arrests, search and seize property, and impose curfews at will. One provision, Section 18, allows the prime minister to arbitrarily designate any area in the country a “security area” if he deems it a potential source of “harm.” Under Section 35, magistrates and coroners will no longer have to carry out inquests into deaths resulting from operations mounted by security forces within these areas.
More worrying for the prime minister and those implicated in the 1MDB scandal is that the US Department of Justice filed a lawsuit in a US federal court in July 2016 which refers to “Malaysian Official 1” and alleges US$681 million from a 2013 bond sale by 1MDB was transferred to the personal bank account of “Malaysian Official 1.” While the prime minister is not referred to by name in the US lawsuit, it is widely understood this is a reference to the prime minister as has been publicly acknowledged by one of his ministers. At this time it is a civil case and no criminal charges have been filed in the US but investigations continue there and in a number of other countries, including Switzerland and Singapore.
Amidst this highly charged situation, a new opposition party has been set up by former Prime Minister Mahathir and former Deputy Prime Minister Muhyiddin Yassin. This poses a real challenge to Najib and UMNO. The new party, Parti Pribumi Bersatu Malaysia (Party of Malaysia's United Indigenous People), restricts membership to Malays. Mahathir has attacked the government for selling national power‐production assets to Chinese companies to bail out 1MDB. The battle between UMNO and PPBM will depend on the loyalty of rural, less‐educated Malays. Both portray themselves as defenders of Malay interests against outside forces. The risk of communal violence is real, and there are striking parallels to past eruptions. The 1969 riots began after the UMNO‐led coalition almost lost a general election as Chinese voters turned to the opposition. Since 1969, racial tensions have risen whenever disunity within the Malay community threatens UMNO's political dominance. The ruling coalition barely held onto its parliamentary majority in the 2013 election despite losing the popular vote.
The modern history of Malaysia since independence has by and large been one of economic prosperity against a backdrop of political stability. As the US lawsuit and international investigations into 1MDB progress and news reaches the Malay heartland, the result might well seriously destabilise the country, depending on how UMNO or PPBM decide to handle the situation.
7
Myanmar
Myanmar, formerly known as Burma, is a unique country in South‐East Asia. For most of the six decades since achieving independence in the aftermath of World War II, Myanmar has isolated itself from the outside world. From its prewar position as a relatively rich agricultural colony and a major exporter of rice, it has slumped to being the poorest nation in South‐East Asia. Mineral rich, in the new century it is dependent on oil imports to keep its shaky economy running. Ruled by a military regime from 1962 to 2015, for 40 years it deliberately isolated itself from the political, social, and economic forces that have swept over the rest of South‐East Asia. While in the early 1990s there were signs that economic imperatives and political pressure from both inside and outside the country were at least leading to more outward‐looking economic policies, by the first years of the new century the Asian economic crisis, continuing unresolved domestic political disputes, and international condemnation by Western governments led to a stagnant economy. And even with the first civilian government taking power early in 2016, significant political, economic, and social issues remain to be solved.
Myanmar is the most ethnically diverse state in mainland South‐East Asia. The Burmese comprise around 68 percent of the population of 54 million, but there are more than 100 ethnic groups in the country. The Burmese dominate the alluvial plains and the major towns and cities. The hills bordering neighbouring countries of India, Bangladesh, China, Laos, and Thailand are populated by ethnic minorities. These peoples have long resisted Burmese domination. The largest of the ethnic minorities are the Shans, the Karens, and the Arakanese (on the Bangladesh border). The multiethnic nature of Myanmar and the antipathy between Burmese and ethnic minorities is one important theme in Myanmar's history.
There is a strong coincidence between religious adherence and ethnic divisions. The Burmese are predominantly Buddhist, whereas the Karen and the Shan are predominantly Christian and the Arakanese are split between Buddhists and Muslims. Buddhism entered Myanmar from India from the seventh cen
tury and along with it came Hindu‐Buddhist cosmological ideas. The ethnic Burmese began their migration from southern China in the ninth century and over the succeeding thousand years steadily spread through the lowland plains of present‐day Myanmar. The Burmese embraced Buddhism. Christianity was introduced during British rule. British missionaries evangelised among the animistic hill peoples, converting the Shan, Karen, and other ethnic minorities to the Christian faith. The coincidence of ethnicity and religion has deepened the divisions between ethnic groups in Myanmar. A second major theme in Myanmar's history is a deep concern about its neighbours. The Burmese and the Thais have competed for territory, power, and wealth over hundreds of years, resorting to war where necessary and thoroughly distrusting each other in periods of peace. The Burmese have also ingrained fears of their huge northern neighbor, China (remembering the Mongol conquest at the end of the 13th century), and still‐fresh memories of the colonial period, when Indian migrants dominated the modern sector of the economy. Ruled by an inward‐looking elite who are wary of their neighbours, fearful of foreign influences, and steeped in distrust of ethnic minorities, Myanmar is very different from any other country in South‐East Asia.
PRECOLONIAL HISTORY
The territorial boundaries of Myanmar are the creation of British colonialism. Prior to British conquest no indigenous kingdom controlled the territory that now comprises Myanmar. The division between the alluvial plains (the lowlands) and the mountainous regions (the highlands) is central not just to the history of Myanmar but to the history of all mainland South‐East Asian states. Lowland Myanmar is dominated by the Irrawaddy River and the rich alluvial plain created and recreated by thousands of years of annual monsoonal flooding.
The first known kingdoms emerged in the lower Irrawaddy valley from the fifth century. They were non‐Burmese kingdoms but strongly influenced by Hindu‐Buddhism ideas. The first major kingdom was founded around 1044, on the banks of the Irrawaddy River at Pagan, north of the present‐day capital of Yangon (formerly known as Rangoon). For over 200 years, until the end of the 13th century, the Pagan empire flourished, at its peak controlling much of the territory of present‐day Myanmar. It was a Buddhist kingdom whose temple remains at Pagan attest not only to its great agricultural wealth but also to its people's knowledge of mathematics, geometry, and engineering. The temples of Pagan stretch along a 40‐square kilometre zone. Some are as large as medieval European cathedrals, though built a century or more earlier. Pagan remains a golden era in the Burmese mind, when a strong, prosperous Burmese kingdom created beautiful temples and religiously inspired works of art, and was a renowned centre for Buddhist scholarship.
The first major Burmese kingdom was destroyed by a northern invader. Pagan was attacked by the Mongols from China at the end of the 13th century. The city of Pagan itself was sacked and subsequently abandoned. Only the temples remained, under the control of Buddhist monasteries. In its place for the next 300 years were a series of small competing rulers all of whom failed to recreate the glories of Pagan. In the middle of the 16th century, a new Burmese kingdom emerged at Pegu, near Yangon, and tried to reunite the Burmese. It quickly exerted control over much of lower Myanmar and north to the Shan states. But it was a short‐lived state, collapsing after only 50 years. Once again the Burmese were divided by a number of small, competing kingdoms.
In the middle of the 18th century, a new Burmese kingdom emerged at Ava (near Mandalay). It gradually extended its control over much of what is now Myanmar, including conquering the hill states of the Shan people. It became a major regional power, competing with the Thai kingdom of Ayudhya for territory and people. The Thai–Burmese rivalry was strong and often bitter. In 1767, Ava was strong enough to despatch an army to Ayudhya. The capital was sacked, treasures were looted (with many finding a home today in Myanmar's museums), and tens of thousands of Thais were captured and transported back to Myanmar as slaves. The Thai kingdom collapsed, to be replaced a few years later by a new kingdom, the Chakri dynasty, which continues today in Thailand and whose capital was built further south at Bangkok away from the threat of Burmese attack.
At the end of the 18th century Myanmar was the strongest state in mainland South‐East Asia. The Chakri dynasty in Thailand was in its infancy, recovering from the Burmese destruction of Ayudhya, and the Vietnamese kingdom was torn by rebellion. The balance changed in the early 19th century: the Thai and Vietnamese kingdoms flourished while the Burmese kingdom declined. The Burmese ruling elite was noticeably more inward‐looking than its Thai and Vietnamese counterparts and less involved in commercial relations with the outside world. As Britain increased its presence in South‐East Asia in the 19th century, the Burmese elite proved less able than the Thais to appreciate the threat posed to them and therefore less able to adopt strategies to cope with them.
THE COLONIAL PERIOD
The English East India Company (EIC) steadily extended its territory in India from early in the 17th century. Bengal, on the east coast of India adjacent to the Burmese kingdom of Ava, was the British stepping‐stone into India. Calcutta was the capital from which emanated EIC influence, territorial expansion, and commercial dealings. Myanmar was primarily seen by the EIC as a buffer zone. It had potential commercial importance but its greater importance was strategic. No other European power could be allowed to gain influence there and the Burmese rulers were expected to acknowledge the superiority of British India and create stable conditions for successful trade. The Burmese king and elite had a very different view of the world and the Burmese place in it. Fresh from the defeat of Ayudhya, in the 1820s the Burmese kingdom extended its control over Arakan, bordering Bengal. Refugees fled across the border, from where they organised resistance to the Burmese. The Burmese king finally demanded the British return them. For their part, the British became increasingly concerned about political instability on their colonial frontier.
The Burmese court greatly underestimated the strength of the EIC. In 1822, Burmese forces invaded Bengal and threatened to march on Chittagong in a dispute over the return of political refugees from Ava. The result was a British expedition to Myanmar. The Burmese were no easy opponents. The first Anglo‐Burmese war lasted two years, from 1824 until 1826. Eventually, superior British weaponry and tactics, backed by a strong rear base in Bengal, ensured a British victory. The Burmese were forced to cede a large amount of territory on the coast of the Bay of Bengal, enabling the EIC to control the Bay from both sides. Over the next two decades, the EIC exploited the agricultural potential of its new territory, increasing rice production fourfold and developing a strong export trade in rice, timber, and shipbuilding.
Despite this defeat and loss of territory, the Burmese elite continued to underestimate British power in Bengal, demanding respect as equals and taking whatever opportunities they could to remind British envoys, traders, and visitors of their equal status. In the 1850s, a second Anglo‐Burmese war broke out, the immediate cause of which was a conflict between British traders and the Burmese governor of Yangon. The result was that Bengal acquired more territory in lower Myanmar. The final act in the British acquisition of Myanmar occurred in 1885 when Mandalay was captured and the King and his family exiled to Calcutta. Myanmar was formally annexed by Britain on January 1, 1886.
The British impact on Myanmar was profound. At the political level, the monarchy was abolished and the Burmese aristocracy was stripped of their power. Myanmar was ruled from Calcutta, as a minor part of the British Indian empire. Indian models of administration were imposed by Englishmen, who by and large, had no understanding of or respect for local social structures. Lower Myanmar, that is, the alluvial plains which were ethnically Burmese and the heart of the Burmese empires, was ruled directly by the colonial government, with the powers of traditional regional and local elites destroyed. It was here that the full force of British political and economic policies were felt. In Upland Myanmar, in areas populated by ethnic groups such as the Shan and Karen, a policy of indirect r
ule was introduced. Social structures and local elites were more or less left intact, with administrations separate from that of the Burmese heartland. A major consequence of this was a strengthening of the division between the Burmese and ethnic minorities, with the latter developing a stronger sense of identity under British rule.
It has been argued that one of the most important consequences of British conquest was that the two most vital institutions of Burmese society, which together defined what it meant to be Burmese, were destroyed or seriously weakened. The exile of the king and his family meant that the ritual and symbolism of the court was abruptly ended. The Burmese state no longer had a centre; indeed, the throne itself was transported to a museum in Calcutta. The king was also the patron and in many senses the head of the Buddhist hierarchy. His demise reduced the authority of the religious hierarchy, leaving Buddhist religious institutions with a much‐weakened central leadership. As a consequence, Burma became fragmented. These two binding forces in Burmese society were eliminated, with no indigenous replacements.