27.For more information on Fleet Problem VII and other Fleet Problems, consult chapter 7, this volume, by Dr. Al Nofi. While twenty-two Fleet Problems were initially scheduled, the twenty-second and last Fleet Problem was cancelled due to the outbreak of World War II in Europe.
28.Wildenberg, All the Factors of Victory, p. 200–201. This book by Wildenberg is an outstanding consideration of the entire career of Admiral Joseph Mason Reeves.
29.Ibid., p. 212.
30.Ibid., p. 224.
31.Ibid., pp. 224–26.
32.Ibid., pp. 230, 235.
33.Ibid., pp. 224–25.
34.Ibid., p. 259.
35.Ibid., p. 261.
CHAPTER 7
Aviation in the Interwar Fleet Maneuvers, 1919–1940
Albert A. Nofi
Between the world wars, the U.S. Navy conducted twenty-one “Fleet Problems,” free maneuvers in which enormous forces “fought” on an oceanic scale to secure specific tactical, operational, and even strategic objectives.1 Together with occasional Grand Joint Army and Navy Exercises (GJE) and many smaller maneuvers, the Fleet Problems shaped the Navy’s understanding of the complexities of transoceanic operations and refined its mastery of the tools of sea power, while introducing innovative technologies and doctrines and honing the skills of those who would command and staff the fleet in wartime—creating the integrated “naval force” that successfully prosecuted the Pacific War.2
The Fleet Problems were critical to new developments in all naval warfare areas—offensive and defense operations, amphibious warfare, coast defense, surface tactics, convoying, mine warfare, submarine and anti-submarine operations, communications, intelligence, underway replenishment, cryptology, special operations, and more, even fleet postal services—but it was the evolution of naval aviation from a minor auxiliary to the backbone of the naval force that was the most important legacy.
The Fleet Problems provided experience in all types of naval air operations under more or less wartime conditions, helping aviators and the fleet’s senior leadership better understand the capabilities and limitations of naval aviation in all types of missions, strike, reconnaissance and patrol, land attack, fleet defense, and more. The simple need to operate under realistic warlike conditions provided invaluable experience to the aviators and the leadership of the fleet. Perhaps equally important, however, was the careful management of aviation’s role in the problems by the more air-minded officers so that they were able to instill across the Navy an appreciation and understanding of the capabilities and limitations of air power as an instrument of naval warfare as it evolved over the years.
While not neglecting other forms of naval aviation—battleship and cruiser floatplanes, flying boats, land-based aircraft, rigid airships—this essay will focus on the Fleet Problems and the evolution of carrier aviation, the backbone of naval air power.
PATTERNS, 1923–1941
In an invaluable analysis of air power and the development of the fleet battle doctrine between the world wars, Mark Allen Campbell observed that the participation of carriers in the Fleet Problems unfolded in four phases.3
•Fleet Problems I–II (1923–1924). Surrogates provided some useful ideas about the potential of carrier operations.
•Fleet Problems III–VIII (1924–1928). USS Langley (CV-1) permitted more realistic experimentation and provided experience in carrier operations, despite limitations as an improvised experimental vessel.
•Fleet Problems IX–XV (1929–1934). USS Lexington (CV-2) and USS Saratoga (CV-3) permitted more realistic experimentation, leading to the evolution of the independent Carrier Task Force.
•Fleet Problems XVI–XXI (1935–1940). As more carriers joined the fleet, increasingly complex experiments helped refine carrier doctrine.
GETTING STARTED: FROM EUGENE ELY TO FLEET PROBLEM II, 1910–1924
Eugene Ely’s 1910–1911 experimental operation of airplanes from ships led the Navy to procure several aircraft and arrange flight training for some officers. In January 1913, a half-dozen seaplanes and flying boats took part in the Caribbean maneuvers, garnering useful experience in operating in support of the fleet under realistic conditions, lessons put to good use the following year during the occupation of Vera Cruz. Aircraft took part in subsequent maneuvers until 1917, by which time the armored cruiser USS North Carolina (CA-12) had been fitted with a catapult and become the first ship in the fleet to regularly operate airplanes.
World War I (1917–1918) put an end to large-scale maneuvers, but also led to an enormous expansion of naval aviation. By war’s end the Sea Services had some two thousand airplanes of various types and a handful of lighter-than-air craft, with a half-dozen ships adapted to serve as aircraft tenders, and several battleships had been fitted with flying-off platforms for seaplanes while serving with the Royal Navy.
War’s end brought drastic reductions in the fleet and its aircraft inventory, but also a resumption of maneuvers on a small scale, involving some air operations.4 In January and February 1921 the Navy resumed full-scale maneuvers, bringing both the Atlantic Fleet and Pacific Fleet to the Gulf of Panama for exercises in which aircraft played a small role.
In 1922, reductions by the Washington Naval Arms Limitation Treaty caused the operating forces of the Navy to be organized into a single “United States Fleet” under the “Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Fleet” (CinCUS), with a “Battle Fleet” based in Southern California and a smaller “Scouting Fleet” in Virginia. This set the stage for the Fleet Problems.
In concept, procedure, and execution, the Fleet Problems were similar to the annual maneuvers that the Navy had conducted since 1903. But whereas in the prewar period major elements of the fleet were often diverted to support American diplomatic goals, after the Great War “real-world” problems rarely intruded on the fleet’s routine, making it “a giant training center and laboratory, and its operations giant training drills and fleet battle experiments.”5 Aviation—particularly carrier aviation—played an increasingly important role in these maneuvers and in the overall life of the fleet.6
USS Langley in Pearl Harbor in 1928.
The Navy had initiated the conversion of the collier Jupiter (AC-3) into an aircraft carrier in 1920. Commissioned in 1922, the USS Langley (CV-1) did not take part in the first of the Fleet Problems, requiring nearly two years to become fully operational. In her absence, surrogates were used, to surprising effect.
During Fleet Problem I (FP I) (February 1923), a small American force (“Blue”) had to defend the Pacific side of the Panama Canal from a major attack, to gain time for the Atlantic Fleet to make a transit.7 Two battleships were designated surrogate aircraft carriers on the Langley model and assigned to “Black,” the attacking force. By 22 February skirmishes were taking place between destroyers as Black reached a position about four hundred air miles northwest of the canal entrance. That morning the Black “carrier” USS Oklahoma (BB-37) catapulted a single airplane, representing a squadron of fifteen aircraft. The attack achieved total surprise, “destroying” the locks on the Pacific side, preventing the Blue movement into the Gulf of Panama. Black then conducted a mock assault on the canal, securing an advanced base. CinCUS Hillary P. Jones praised the performance of the fleet, and was particularly complimentary to its airmen.8 Some officers criticized Black’s decision to use its aircraft offensively, arguing that it left the fleet without air cover, but Jones noted that Blue had no aircraft suitable for use as bombers, and thus Black was not at risk from air attack. Jones, however, criticized Blue for neglecting to use its superiority in aircraft (over thirty airplanes) to conduct patrols that might have detected Black’s approach. He called for more aircraft carriers, more observation planes for battleships, and improved air defense of the canal. Captain John F. Hines of USS Pennsylvania (BB-38) provided a very perceptive critique of Black’s air tactics, arguing that waiting until daylight to launch Oklahoma’s “air strike” was an error, since “both plane carriers might be lost without any pla
nes getting off” in the event of an enemy surface attack; moreover, launching the strike at 0200 would have permitted an approach to the canal under cover of darkness, and a dawn attack, with greater chances for successes.9
The three Fleet Problems held in January 1924 represented linked phases of an ongoing naval campaign. FP II involved the movement of the Battle Fleet from the West Coast to Panama, as the initial phase of an advance across the Pacific from Hawaii. Although a surrogate carrier was assigned to the fleet, air operations played only a marginal role in the problem. This set the stage for the debut of Langley.
LANGLEY POINTS THE WAY: FLEET PROBLEMS III-VIII, 1924–1928
The first Fleet Problem in which Langley took part, FP III (4–18 January 1924) incorporated GJE No. 2, a test of the defenses of the Panama Canal against attack from the Caribbean. Blue (U.S.) with light naval forces, including an aircraft tender, on the Caribbean side, was supported by some Army aircraft. The attacking Black (European) fleet was accompanied by Langley, constructively assigned seventy-five aircraft, making her a surrogate for Lexington-class ships, then under conversion from incomplete battle cruisers. While Langley’s efforts to bomb the locks were effectively blocked by Blue Army pursuit planes, her aircraft were ruled to have beaten off an attack on the Black fleet by Blue Army bombers, providing excellent air cover while the battleships bombarded the locks with the help of their spotter aircraft, and then covered the landing of a notional expeditionary force.
FP IV (23 January–1 February) required Blue to conduct an offensive across the Caribbean (representing the China Seas) from Panama (the Philippines) to Vieques (Okinawa).10 Although assigned Langley and greatly superior overall, Blue was inferior in aviation assets, having fewer than sixty airplanes, against nearly one hundred for Black, most of them Army aircraft. Nevertheless, when Blue arrived off Vieques, energetic efforts by Army aircraft to inflict damage on the attacking fleet were effectively countered by the fleet’s anti-aircraft fire and Langley’s fighters.11
Critiquing the three 1924 problems, Black commander Vice Admiral Newton A. McCully praised Langley’s performance, writing, “Great credit is due her aviators for their effective work against so much [sic] superior air forces, and it indicates the power of the air attack even when the forces may appear insignificant, and the enemy greatly superior.”12 CinCUS Robert E. Coontz, Chief Umpire for the problems, noted the need for more aircraft and urged the swift completion of Lexington and Saratoga.13
FP V (February–March 1925) required Black (Japan) to capture an advanced base on Guadalupe Island (about 250 miles south of San Diego) and then attack the Panama Canal, opposed by a small Blue (U.S.) force trying to buy time for reinforcements to arrive from the Atlantic. Black was superior in air power, with some eighty real and constructive aircraft, about half assigned to Langley and two surrogate carriers, plus battleship and cruiser spotter aircraft as well as patrol bombers and their tender; Blue had only about thirty floatplanes, roughly half notional. Black advanced behind a cruiser screen supplemented by Langley aircraft, often as many as ten planes simultaneously, on missions lasting as long as two hours. “Capturing” Guadalupe, Black advanced toward Panama. Surprisingly, despite energetic scouting, the two fleets never actually encountered each other before the problem ended. Nevertheless, CinCUS Coontz complimented Langley’s aircraft, again urged the swift completion of Saratoga and Lexington, and noted the need for more capable aircraft and better aircraft handling facilities on battleships and cruisers.14
A few weeks later, the fleet took part in GJE No. 3 (14–27 April), testing the defenses of Hawaii and the fleet’s ability to conduct expeditionary operations. Blue, tasked with “recapturing” Hawaii from Black, included Langley (notionally eighty-four aircraft) as a surrogate for Lexington, while Black had about sixty Army and thirty Navy airplanes but lacked unified air command. Blue achieved complete surprise, “capturing” Molokai Island in a swift amphibious landing on 25 April. Black aircraft intervened, but Army-Navy squabbling caused the attacks to be conducted in a piecemeal fashion, and they were ruled largely ineffective, though Army umpires declared Langley out of action by air attack even before she could launch any aircraft, which the Navy protested. While this ended carrier operations, spotter aircraft did an excellent job supporting the “bombardment” of beaches during subsequent landings on Oahu. The joint critique revealed a deep rift between Army and the naval Services over air power. The issues included “jurisdictional disputes” over whether the Navy could operate land-based aircraft and how far over the sea the Army could operate aircraft. In addition, Army airmen were more optimistic about their ability to hit maneuvering vessels than were Navy airmen, who actually had experience in the matter. Both sides agreed that joint operations required unified air command, but naturally disagreed as to which service should be in charge.
Over the next three years, aircraft, including those on Langley, continued to participate in Fleet Problems and other maneuvers. The fleet experimented with ways to incorporate the carrier into cruising formations, while carrier aircraft clearly proved easier to operate than battleship and cruiser floatplanes. Moreover, as aviation missions continued to be explored and expanded, to include reconnaissance, fleet air defense, spotting, supporting amphibious operations, anti-submarine patrol, and land attack, the need to balance demands on aviation assets soon arose. In a Joint Army-Navy maneuver in March 1927, a series of air strikes by flying boats and Langley aircraft against the Pacific end of the Panama Canal reduced fighter protection for observation planes supporting the battleships bombarding the coast defenses, causing many to be “lost” to enemy fighters, reducing the effectiveness of the bombardment, an indication of the extent to which battleships had come to rely on aerial spotting.15 A few days later, on 13 March, during FP VII a similar situation arose when Blue fighters were sent to attack an enemy destroyer squadron, and while so engaged the Blue fleet was hit by two dozen Black Army bombers with marked success, due largely to the absence of fighter opposition.16
Meanwhile, progressive thinkers such as Commander Aircraft Squadrons (ComAirRons) Joseph M. Reeves urged more aggressive use of aviation. By mid-1927 Reeves proposed having aircraft carriers conduct “scouting and offensive operations at a distance from the battle line,” arguing that there should be “complete freedom of action in employing carrier aircraft,” a position with which CinCUS Charles F. Hughes concurred.17 During FP VIII (April 1928) poor weather limited Langley to only four days of operations, but on those days her aircraft reconnoitered as far as seventy-five miles from the fleet.
A few weeks later, Langley gave a spectacular demonstration of what an autonomously operated aircraft carrier could do, during a joint Army-Navy exercise testing the defenses of Hawaii against a surprise air-sea attack. The fleet, organized into a small task force built around Langley, commanded by Rear Admiral Reeves, and two battleship task forces, approached Oahu from the south on the night of 16–17 May. By 0430 on the 17th Langley was ten miles south of Diamond Head, with the battleship task forces some distance to her east and west. While coast defense searchlights probed the sea and sky, Langley launched thirty-five aircraft. At dawn, what the press described as “swarms” of planes achieved complete surprise in simulated raids on various installations. Langley fighters then kept Army aircraft away from the battleships as they engaged coast defense installations.18
Shortly after this impressive performance, the fleet’s new aircraft carriers, Lexington (CV-2) and Saratoga (CV-3), arrived in Hawaiian waters. ComAirRons Reeves transferred his flag to Lexington, and over the next few weeks the two big carriers engaged in daily training in the conduct of flight operations and in a series of exercises testing how carriers could operate together, becoming the first operational carrier division in the fleet.19
EMERGENCE OF THE FAST CARRIER TASK FORCE: FLEET PROBLEMS IX-XV, 1929–1934
The Fleet Problems of 1929–1934 were the most critical in the development of the autonomous Carrier Task Force.20 Of t
hese, FP IX (1929), the first in which Lexington and Saratoga took part, was certainly the most important.21
Held in January, the scenario was familiar: the defense of the Panama Canal by a smaller force against a major attack from the Pacific side. Admiral William V. Pratt, commanding Black (Japan), had originally intended to proceed to the Galapagos and approach Panama from the southwest, but financial considerations led to the plan being changed to a direct approach from the northwest. Based on a suggestion by ComAirRons Joseph M. Reeves, as the forces were still taking up their initial positions, Pratt dispatched Saratoga at high speed to the Galapagos, to approach the canal from the southwest, while the main body approached more directly.
Escorted by one light cruiser, Saratoga proceeded to the Galapagos, and then turned northward for a fast approach to Panama. At 0548 on 26 January, when about 140 miles south of the canal, she began launching seventy aircraft: seventeen bombers, forty-nine fighters, three scouts, and a “communications relay” plane.22 Blue was aware of a possible carrier strike from the southwest, but the raid nevertheless achieved complete surprise. Beginning about 0700 Saratoga’s planes “destroyed” the Miraflores and Pedro Miguel Locks, before hitting military installations. Army fighters attempted to intercept, but the attackers escaped without loss. Saratoga followed this strike with two more, at one point maintaining eighty-three aircraft in the air simultaneously. Compounding this success, aircraft tender Aroostook (CM-3), standing in for Langley, with the Black main body, launched a single amphibian representing a notional twenty-four aircraft, which “destroyed” the Gatun Locks, on the Atlantic side of the canal. Unfortunately, shortly after this, Saratoga, operating in foggy weather, was located by Blue battlewagons making a sweep of the Gulf of Panama and ruled “sunk.”
One Hundred Years of U.S. Navy Air Power Page 15