Wellington’s headquarters was at Pero Negro, in the rear of Monte Agraça, which was close to the centre of the Lines. Hill commanded two divisions at Alhandra, with four further divisions concentrated to the rear and left of Monte Agraça. This gave Wellington great flexibility to quickly move the bulk of his strength to any threatened point.
When the Lines were initially occupied, they were formed into six districts with a general officer in command and an engineer appointed his staff as regulating officer.18
Later, when the area on the first line between Sobral and Torres Vedras was strengthened, a seventh district was formed to cover this area.
The French first arrived in front of the Lines at both Alhandra and Sobral on 11 October. Reconnaissance quickly showed that there was a strong line of defensive forts on the hills in front of them. On 12th, the French attacked the town of Sobral and dislodged the British outpost. A strong cavalry reconnaissance down the Alhandra road achieved nothing but the loss of General Sainte Croix to a shot from one of the Royal Navy gunboats. The following day the French probed west of Sobral and again in front of Alhandra, and on the 14th and 15th, Masséna personally reconnoitred around Sobral and towards Alhandra. There was a difference of views amongst the French on what to do next. Junot wanted to launch an attack from Sobral. Marbot was of the opinion that it should be possible to break through somewhere by using feint attacks to tie down the defenders. But the majority of opinion, including Masséna, Ney and Reynier was that without reinforcements, they would not be able to breach the lines. John Jones noted in his diary on 19 October: ‘A Mameluke who deserted yesterday reports that Marshal Masséna and Ney after spending five days in making a complete reconnaissance of our line had declared it to be “trop forte” and that it was intended to wait for reinforcements.’19 Masséna felt his decision needed to be explained carefully to Napoleon and General Foy was dispatched to Paris, not arriving until 22 November. In the meantime, the French army dispersed to forage. Masséna ordered work to start on preparing bridging material at Santarem, which would give the French access into the Alentejo.
The daily routine for the Allied troops after entering the Lines was for them to assemble two hours before dawn and stand ready until an hour after dawn. Wellington rode up from his headquarters at Pero Negro each morning to the great redoubt above Sobral. When it had been confirmed that there were no changes in the French dispositions, the troops were allowed to return to their bivouacs to prepare food. Initially, for many of the troops these were very rudimentary, built with whatever wood and cloth that could be found making makeshift shelters against the cold and wet weather. Wellington quickly ordered tents to be provided to give some protection to the troops.
The impasse in front of the Lines continued until 14 November when Masséna withdrew to Santarem. Due to a foggy start to the day, this was not immediately detected and the Allies followed cautiously until the intentions of the French were clear and Wellington realised they were staying. On 24th, Masséna withdrew to Cartaxo and these positions remained static for the next four months with the Allied advanced guard facing the French across the bridge at Santarem.
Conditions for the Allied troops improved once the French retreated, with many being housed in the villages in front of the Lines. The situation also settled, with little or no skirmishing between the armies. In fact Kincaid, who spent most of this period living in some farmhouses at the end of the bridge at Santarem, reported that ‘we lay four months in this situation, divided only by a rivulet, without once exchanging shots’.20
Despite this period of relative stability, there was no slowdown in the work on the Lines, Fletcher writing home:
The most vulnerable part of our present front is on the left of Torres Vedras – We have already established six guard redoubts upon this ground, and are now throwing up seven for forty eight pieces of artillery … as his Lordship seems inclined to do all I have proposed to render us secure, we shall have to employ seven thousand workmen at different points at the same moment.21
In this same letter Fletcher reported that Wellington had asked for another 100 Artificers to be sent out to Portugal but Fletcher had reduced this to fifty ‘lest it should appear unreasonable’. Wellington was already planning for next year. On 29 October, Captain Wedekind of the King’s German Legion Engineers received orders directly from Wellington to start preparing material for three bridges across the Tagus to be used when the French retired.22 He was clearly planning for the worst, as several days later he told Admiral Berkeley that boats at Villa Velha had been burnt, the bridge at Punhete had been dismantled and moved to Abrantes and the bridge at Abrantes was still intact. He had given orders that the boat bridge at Abrantes was to be destroyed if there was any possibility that it would fall into French hands.23
The bridge over the Tagus at Abrantes, by Leith-Hay.
In December, Captain Henry Goldfinch was ordered to begin building defences to the south of the Tagus. This was to counter the threat that if the French took the southern bank, shipping at Lisbon would be endangered. A number of engineer officers were employed on this task through the winter including Captain Wedekind and Lieutenants Rice Jones, Meineke and Hulme.
Wellington’s greatest concern during this period was that the French would force a passage across the Tagus and be enabled to forage in the fertile Alentejo region. On reports reaching Wellington that the French were collecting and building boats around Santarem, he first dispatched troops to defend the southern bank and then the engineer John Squire on 19 October to carry out a reconnaissance. Squire reported back that ‘the story of the 40 boats is a mere tale – five bullock carts with their standing poles on the sides were mistaken for 40 boats!!! At Santarem there are two large boats not yet launched.’24 However, Masséna’s ADC Pelet tells a different story, suggesting that many boats were built. We will come back to this. In the coming months, Squire would come to the attention of the commander of the forces a number of times, but not in a good way.
John Squire was one of the most experienced engineer officers in the Corps. He was educated at Charterhouse school before attending the Royal Military Academy, where he was commissioned in 1797. He served in the Helder campaign in 1799 where he served under Sir Ralph Abercromby. He served again under the same commander in Egypt in 1800–1. On the conclusion of the Egyptian campaign, Squire obtained leave of absence, and made a tour through Syria and Greece. Not to be outdone by his colleague Stanway who damaged Trajan’s bridge at Alcantara in 1809, Squire can claim to have been part of one of the biggest heists in antiquity. He left Greece for Malta in the brig HMS Mentor, in Lord Elgin’s party. The ship was laden with the Elgin marbles taken from the Acropolis. The ship was wrecked on the island of Cerigo on 17 September 1802, and he narrowly escaped death. The marbles were later recovered from the wreck.25 He was Commanding Royal Engineer under General Whitelocke in the disastrous South American campaign of 1806 and was called as a witness during his court-martial. He was with Sir John Moore in Sweden in 1808 before serving in the Walcheren campaign in early 1809, which he published a book about the next year.26
The first situation where Squire came to Wellington’s notice arose on 10 November 1810 when he got into an argument with General Craufurd after refusing an order to change the design of one of the forts. Squire thought the change unnecessary and argued that such an order had to come from Wellington or Fletcher. He then appears to have been subjected to one of Craufurd’s ‘foul-mouthed’ tirades and felt so strongly about it that he wrote to Fletcher asking for him to raise the matter with Wellington and seek clarification on whether he was within his rights to refuse. Whether it was related is not clear, but a few days later, Squire was ordered to join General Hill on the south of the Tagus and remained there for the remainder of the winter. Squire felt so strongly about the incident that he wrote again to Fletcher on 25 December asking for clear direction on the relative authority of engineer officers and general officers in the army. Fletcher responded that �
��the custom of the service with reference to officers of engineers seems to be well understood [i.e. engineer officers take orders from their superiors]; but I am not aware of any positive regulation on the subject, and shall therefore transmit your letters of the 24th ult and of the 10th November last to the Inspector-General of Fortifications, that you may have the decision of a superior authority.’27 Fletcher wrote home the next day explaining the situation and asking for guidance:
I have the honour to submit to your consideration, two letters from Captain Squire of the Royal Engineers – the first relative to a discussion which took place between Brigadier-General Robert Craufurd and himself on the 10th of November last – the other dated the 24th ult on the subject of the control and authority possessed by officers of the corps, in the construction of the works entrusted to their charge. The former of these letters I referred (by desire of Captain Squire) to Lord Wellington, who answered me verbally nearly as follows: That ‘he thought it would be injurious to Captain Squire to bring this matter publicly forward. That I might have observed his (Lord W’s) wish to lean towards the engineers whenever it was possible; That he hoped and believed they experienced very little interference but that he would not set-off a Captain of Engineers against a General officer in the force of the army.’ His Lordship concluded by saying that however if I wished it, he would order a public investigation of the matter to be made; but which, on the whole, I did not think advisable. The second letter which I enclose, requesting my instructions as to the control of officer on works, and expressing the opinions of Captain Squire on that subject, seems to embrace so much, that I can only refer it to you.28
Clearly, the Board of Ordnance thought Squire had exceeded his authority and an order arrived in early February for him to be recalled to England. Fletcher reported the order to Wellington, who was clearly trying to play down the whole incident:
I have to acknowledge receipt of your letters of the 4th and 5th instant relative to Captain Squire and containing an order for that officer’s return to England. In conformity with your directions I submitted these letters to Lord Wellington’s perusal. His Lordship expressed his regret that the affair should have been carried so far and a hope that Captain Squire whose conduct had left an unfavourable impression on his mind, might yet be allowed to remain in this country – He desired me to address you confidentially, and to say that if at the time he thought Captain Squire somewhat unreasonable, he did not consider General Craufurd as by any means free from blame. He observed that perhaps at the moment there was something faulty on both sides; but that his wish was to conciliate, and he had hoped and believed the occurrences would have been heard of no more – Lord Wellington desired I would not give Captain Squire the order to return to England until I could receive an answer to this letter – His Lordship added that if Captain Squire wanted for another duty the case would be very different; but that on the mere grounds of having written the two letters in question, he should be very sorry to lose the services of so intelligent an officer.
A few days later, Fletcher wrote home again:
I continue to hope the wish expressed by Lord Wellington that Captain Squire should be allowed to remain in this country will not be disappointing to you – I feel confident that the steps already taken will operate as a salutary warning to that officer; and I trust they will prevent the [repeat?] of anything of the same nature for the time to come – It is extremely gratifying to observe the disposition of Lord Wellington, to uphold the consequences of the Corps of Engineers on every occasion.29
Jones noted in his diary that Fletcher went to see Squire on 3 March 1811. It is likely that this was to explain how close he was to being sent home.
Squire’s argument was not an isolated incident. Captain John Williams wrote to Fletcher on 8 November 1810, explaining that he had an argument with Brigadier-General Pack over the building of a stable for his horses. He also said that he had done several things for Pack that were not strictly his responsibility (e.g. tracing out kitchens) but was concerned that Pack would raise the incident at a later date.30 One wonders if everyone was getting bored and tempers were becoming short?
Soon after Squire’s argument with Craufurd in November, Squire was ordered south to serve with General Hill’s corps on the south of the Tagus where he remained throughout the winter. When Hill became ill at the end of the year, Beresford took command. Initially, he concentrated on the possibility of Masséna attempting to cross the Tagus where it was joined by the Zezere river. On 1 January 1811, Beresford viewed the French positions around Punhete and ordered the construction of three batteries opposite the mouth of the Zezere. The building of these batteries occupied his attention for the next few days until word started arriving of Soult‘s movements to the south. Like many other simple events around this period, the purpose and position of these batteries was used by Napier to criticise Beresford.31 Napier found a supporter of his views in John Squire, who claimed that they were built ‘against the advice of the engineers, he [Beresford] placed them at too great a distance from the river’.32 Squire went on to say: ‘Thank God, for my own credit, I protested against these batteries from the first, in my reports which were sent to Lord Wellington, and I now verily believe that the Marshal himself is ashamed of their construction.’33 This claim was strongly denied following the publication of Napier‘s work, and even at the time D’Urban noted that ‘Lord Wellington sent over Colonel Fletcher, the Chief Engineer, who approved of the sites of the batteries fixed upon by the Marshal’.34
The debate seemed to focus on whether the purpose was to command the mouth of the Zezere only, or to attack the French boat yard and bridge, which were half a mile from the mouth of the Zezere. Defending the mouth of the river only would have been solely for the purpose of opposing any French attempt to cross the Tagus and move into the Alentejo. Installing heavier-calibre artillery to directly threaten the bridge and boat yard would have destroyed the ability of the French to launch such an attack, but required finding and installing heavy guns, which would then be susceptible to the opposing French artillery unless it was disposed of first. This would have been a much larger undertaking, and it is debatable if the Allies could have brought sufficient weight of artillery to bear to overwhelm that of the French opposite them. D’Urban seems quite clear of the purpose, stating in his journal that they were to ‘command the entrance of the Zezere’.35 Wellington, however, was not. Writing to Beresford on 5 January 1811, he said:
I think, however, that this is deserving of some further consideration. First; I observe that Capt. Squire’s report on the relative state of things at Punhete is so far defective that he has not stated at what distance from the river the enemy’s ground rises, and becomes superior to ours: I believe close to the bank. Secondly; What is our object in establishing a heavy battery on the ground opposite the Zezere?
He then went on to suggest:
I therefore think that we should confine ourselves to commanding with our cannon the communication between the two rivers; and that if we attempt more, it should be by a more powerful artillery [than 6- and 9-pounders], which should be opened at once upon the bridge of boats, and continued as long as any of them swim or can be seen.36
Wellington’s criticism of Squire probably reflected his unhappiness over his re-igniting the issue of his argument with Craufurd. Squire’s letter to Fletcher of 24 December 1810 would have been brought to Wellington’s attention in the past few days. Pelet, Masséna‘s ADC, writing about the batteries, stated that they ‘were directed against the mouth of the Zezere’,37 but then later said they ‘actually raked the canal and even our workshops’.38 Squire was clearly not convinced that the lighter guns could achieve their objective of commanding the mouth of the Zezere, and reported this to D’Urban on 3 January 1811. The answer became apparent very soon after, when the French 4- and 8-pounders on the opposite side of the Tagus began bombarding the emplacements that were being built. The Allied view during the early part of January was that
Soult, who was moving north from Seville, would be making a dash to support Masséna. They believed the work by the French opposite Punhete signalled the most likely crossing-place, as they were building a large number of boats and bridging equipment at this point. It became clear a few days later that Soult was besieging Olivenza and not making a dash for the Tagus. The boat-building at Punhete was watched with anticipation, D’Urban noting that ‘the enemy is still busy about his boats in the Zezere and has perhaps about 80 completed. I can’t imagine his attempting the river till the Southern army [Soult] can come near.’39 In the end, the French never made an attempt to cross the Tagus, so the preparations came to nothing.
North of the Tagus, work also continued on the Lines, both repairing damage caused by the rains and starting new redoubts. The demand for workmen remained strong and on 21 December 1810, posters were put up in the surrounding villages asking for workmen for the Lines.40 Mulcaster started a new redoubt at Ribaldeira on 18 December 1810, and on 7 January 1811 another for 300 men and four guns between Forts 32 and 111. On 18 January, Lieutenant Meineke started a redoubt for 200 men between Mount Agraça and Sobral. A few days later he started another for six guns at Alcoentre and marked out three further batteries. The rain was particularly bad in early February 1811 and Jones noted ‘breaches have been reported in almost every work but most from Sobral to Alhandra’.41
As well as work on the forts, a number of bridges were mined in case the French made another advance from Santarem. On 20 February, an attempt to raise the river in front of Alcoentre by rolling casks into it failed. Wellington also wanted to improve his communications across the Tagus and on 8 January, Wellington and Fletcher looked at the possibility of putting bridge across the Tagus at Benavente. Fletcher discussed this with Squire on 20 January and the work was completed on the 27th, the bridge being made up of fifteen boats.
Wellington’s Engineers: Military Engineering on the Peninsular War 1808-1814 Page 11