Wellington returned north on 24 April but left three instructions with Beresford. The first outlined the strategy he should follow for the siege and how he should respond if a French relief force was sent. The most important point in this letter was that Wellington authorised Beresford to fight a battle if he felt it was appropriate. It also included clear instructions that if the siege was raised, any stores from Elvas must be returned as the fortress’ resources had been severely depleted to furnish stores for the siege.
The second detailed the siege operations which were to be carried out against Badajoz. As was typical of Wellington, the instructions were very detailed and left nothing to chance. The main points were:
• To establish a flying bridge over the Guadiana below the junction with the Caya.
• To simultaneously lay siege to the outworks of San Christobal, Picurina and Pardaleras.
• Only when these three outworks were taken was Beresford to start operations against Badajoz itself.
• Wellington suggested that the most likely point of attack would be the south face, but left the decision to Beresford.
Most of the responsibility for the failure of the first two sieges against Badajoz must lie with Wellington, as these orders were clearly not practical, as we shall see.
The third memorandum was a letter to three senior Spanish generals in the area, Castaños, Blake and Ballesteros, asking for explicit acceptance of Wellington’s operational plan. Any move against Badajoz was dependent upon their agreement.14 Wellington made his views absolutely clear to Beresford on 6 May, writing ‘If General Blake does not positively agree to everything proposed in my memorandum, and does not promise to carry it strictly into execution, I think that you ought not to be in a hurry with the siege of Badajoz’.15 The following day he informed Liverpool that he had told Beresford to delay the siege until agreement had been received from the Spanish generals.16 It is significant that Beresford did not take any positive steps to start the siege until 8 May, following the Spanish generals’ agreement to the proposals in Wellington’s memorandum. Beresford had been ready to start a few days earlier and the artillery and engineer officers were puzzled by the delay. Overall, the siege was not off to a good start. The lack of siege stores at Elvas, the loss of the temporary bridge at Jerumenha, which provided their primary means of communication across the river Guadiana, and the delays in resolving issues of command meant that eight weeks had passed since the French had taken Badajoz. Beresford heard that Soult was marching to relieve the fortress on 10 May, before the first gun had even opened fire. The day the first gun fired, 11 May, Beresford was already making preparations to raise the siege.
There is some debate about the plan chosen for the siege of Badajoz. According to John Jones, when Wellington arrived at Elvas on 20 April he was
determined to lay immediate siege to Badajoz, if any plan of attack could be offered which should not require more than sixteen days open trenches, as in that period, and the time required to make the necessary preparations for the siege, it was calculated that Marshal Soult would be able to collect a force equal to its relief.17
The preference of most of the officers, including Wellington, was for an attack on the southern front. No plan could be developed that would meet the sixteen-day target, normal calculations for such an attack indicating that twenty-two days would be required. Jones continued that ‘it was of the greatest consequence to the future operations of the army that Badajoz should be retaken’.18 Probably under pressure from Wellington, Fletcher proposed a plan that he felt could be achieved within the sixteen days. The plan was to take the fort of San Christobal which overlooked the castle and once it was taken, to form batteries to batter the old castle walls which would then be stormed when there was a practicable breach. It was also proposed to make simultaneous feint attacks on the other two outworks to mask their real intentions. According to Jones’ diary, these discussions occurred before Wellington’s reconnaissance on 22 April, and Wellington approved this plan after he had examined the fortress.
There is a confusing difference in the accounts at this point. Jones’ published Journal described Fletcher’s plan above. This Journal also printed Wellington’s memorandum of 23 April, but crucially left out his last point, which stated that all three outworks must be taken before the attack on the fortress began. He also made no mention of feint attacks and suggested an attack on the southern front. Wellington’s instructions do not appear to be the same as Fletcher’s plan. Jones’ original diaries, which he kept at the time, do not specifically detail Fletcher’s proposal. He did, however, detail Wellington’s memorandum including the crucial last point, which was not printed in his published Journal. On 8 May, he noted in his diary ‘Fletcher marked out a work against the Picurina redoubt and to conceal from the enemy the real point of attack, it was decided to carry out a false attack against the Pardaleras’.19 Later in the diary entry for that day, he noted troops breaking ground for the feint attack against the Pardaleras fort, but no mention was made of the attack on the Picurina being a feint. In his published Journal, and in his original diary, Jones made continued reference to feint attacks on the Pardaleras.20 Alexander Gordon, who was one of Wellington’s aides-de-camp travelled with him to Badajoz. He commented on 23 April, the day Wellington inspected Badajoz, that he expected the attack would come from the south side, after opening against the three outworks.21 A later letter still talked about taking all three outworks.22
Oman was highly critical of the decision to attack San Christobal and puts the blame firmly on the shoulders of Fletcher, the commanding engineer. He criticised the decision to make it a requirement to capture all three forts before attacking the castle, noting that ‘none of these were to be mere false attacks’.23 In Oman’s work there is no mention of Jones as a source for the first siege although he does use Jones for the subsequent sieges of Badajoz. Although Oman’s text is explicit, the map of Badajoz in his book marks both the Pardaleras and Picurina forts as ‘False attacks’.24 It is possible that Oman did not have, or chose not to use, the comprehensive third edition of Jones’ work when writing about the first siege. The original first edition of Jones’ Journal, published in 1814, had a shortened account of the first siege. This edition described the attack on San Christobal, but did not mention the false attacks on the Picurina or Pardaleras. Fortescue used Jones’ Journal and recognised that the engineers had a preference for taking San Christobal over the other two outworks. He also criticised the decision to attack San Christobal rather than follow the French lead and attack the southern front.
The above analysis leaves two unanswered questions:
• Was the decision to attack San Christobal due to the time constraints reasonable?
• Why did Jones’ published account completely ignore Wellington’s final instruction to take all three outworks before attacking the fortress?
In answer to the first question, it is necessary to acknowledge the experience of the engineers. Their judgement was that twenty-two days would be necessary to attack from the south. This did not meet Wellington’s requirement of sixteen days. The plan proposed by Fletcher was certainly risky, but quickly taking the outwork would have given the army a great chance of meeting the short timescale. Certainly, the strength of San Christobal had been underestimated by everyone, Dickson noting that it ‘might easily be taken’.25 On 26 April, Wellington sent Beresford copies of the French plan of Badajoz and their plan of attack which had been intercepted by Castaños. With this information, there was time to change the Allied plan of attack, but no change was made. In the end it was the limited resources that led to failure against San Christobal, not the decision to attack it.
The answer to the second question is more difficult. The plan followed by the engineers, which is clearly reported in Jones’ Journal, was to attack all three outworks, but only the attack on Pardaleras was meant to be false. The map in Dickson’s Diaries shows the attack on the Cerro del Vinto (Pardaleras) as being a �
��false’ attack.26 Rice Jones similarly talks about only this attack as being false.27 These do not match Fletcher’s original proposal described in Jones’ Journal. Neither does it appear to follow Wellington’s instructions of 23 April. His instruction to take all three outworks, does not appear to be logical when time was critical. It would have taken significantly longer to capture all three outworks, where the possession of two or even one would allow the start of an attack on the fortress. The plan that was actually followed will be discussed below.
The biggest problem Wellington faced with the loss of Badajoz was getting together the resources to try and re-take it. Both Oman and Fortescue criticise Wellington’s preparations but neither are accurate. Fortescue stated that Wellington did not ask about resources at Elvas until 6 April, with deficiencies being made up from the ‘English’ battering train at Lisbon.28 Wellington did not actually write ‘English’ battering train, but ‘our’ battering train, probably just referring to resources at Lisbon. Wellington was reluctant to use the new train, writing that it would ‘cripple’ future siege operations.29 He did subsequently send a number of siege guns from Lisbon, but these were not from the new train. Oman wrote that Wellington did not start preparations for assembling the guns until 18 April, when Dickson was sent to Elvas.30 Dickson, the commander of the artillery, was writing as early as 21 March that the artillery would come from Elvas.31
Wellington’s first letter to Beresford on the subject of the siege was written on 27 March 1811, where he stated: ‘Elvas must supply the means [for the siege of Badajoz], if possible: if it has them not, I must send them there; this will take time, but that cannot be avoided.’32 Writing to Beresford again on 6 April, Wellington explained: ‘In respect to Badajoz, the first thing to do is to blockade it strictly … and I am most anxious to receive the accounts of what Elvas can supply for this purpose that I may order up from our battering train the deficiency’.33 Beresford had sent for Dickson on 2 April and asked him to prepare a return of the ‘ordnance, ammunition etc’ in Elvas for Wellington.34 Clearly the answer he received was that Elvas could not provide the necessary resources,35 because on 9 April Wellington was ordering siege material to be sent up from Lisbon.36 At the same time, he also ordered heavy guns to be sent from Lisbon to replace the guns that were being moved from Elvas.37
Writing to Beresford the next day, Wellington stated:
I was in hopes that the return of ordnance at Elvas would have been accompanied by a return of stores in the garrison, by which I should have seen what the garrison could spare for the siege of Badajoz, and we should have been spared the time, the trouble, and expense of sending up the articles of which I enclose the list. I enclose the list of our ordnance and ammunition at Elvas, which Fletcher thinks ought to be prepared to be taken out for the siege of Badajoz, and a list of stores, which I have ordered from Lisbon to Setuval.38
At this time Fletcher was still in the north with Wellington, in the vicinity of Almeida, and was clearly providing advice. On 12 April, Squire received a comprehensive enquiry from Beresford:
The Marshal requests you to give out an estimate of all that may be requisite to undertake the siege of Badajoz. It is my[?] desire to commence against that place with as little delay as possible. Elvas cannot probably furnish much more than guns, powder and shot of which Major Dickson can probably give you information. He begs you will consider and specify the means which you conceive the country on both banks of the Guadiana can supply in gabions, fascines, timber for platforms etc. which the Marshal imagines can be prepared in the neighbourhood of the place and that the Militia and country people can make them [from] the dimensions or models being given – sand bags it will probably be difficult to obtain in sufficient quantities – Entrenching tools will be my principal want but the Marshal begs your attention to the working tools made use of by the country people, and whether with those from Elvas or now in your possession, it may not be possible to undertake the siege of the place applying to this object the means of every description which Elvas, the army, and the country can provide. Should the country tools be considered applicable, you will be so good as to state the nature and numbers required and the other articles likely to be procured in the country – and which the Marshal will endeavour to obtain. He desires me to remind you although it will not have escaped your attention, that the repaired breach may not be very perfect, and that you may judge it advisable to conduct your approaches by those recently made and since filled up by the enemy and which may render the insufficiency of the tools less a matter of importance than it would otherwise be. He also desires that you will take into consideration the circumstance of the strength of the enemy garrison which he has reason to suppose does not exceed 1,500 men.39
Squire responded the following day:
I enclose a return of stores and according to the Marshal’s wish; the difficulty with respect to our bridge satisfies me that no timber for platforms etc. can be had at or near Elvas. By a requisition made on the country as I before said, I think we may collect a sufficient number of entrenching tools. From what I observed in the works at Elvas, I should have no doubt that gabions and fascines may be made in the neighbourhood. If the enemy intend seriously to defend Badajoz I am of the opinion that to undertake the attack of that place we ought to be provided with the stores specified in the inclosed return and also think that twelve officers of Engineers besides Forster and myself indispensible. It will also be necessary to create a corps of artificers or Sappers and Miners.40
The criticisms of Oman and Fortescue mentioned above appear to be unfounded. Similarly, Fortescue’s comment that Beresford must have told Wellington that Elvas could supply the stores appears equally unfounded.41 Heavy material for a siege took time to get together and Wellington had no warning that this would be required for Badajoz. In comparison, it took from May to October 1811 to transport the siege train by sea and land to be ready for use at Ciudad Rodrigo in January 1812.
There were also problems with the delivery of the requested stores. Wellington was informed that there was insufficient transport to move all the stores he had requested from Lisbon and on 23 April, he reduced the amount of stores to be brought forward. The stores ordered from Lisbon did not arrive at Elvas until 12 May, and the first items did not get to Badajoz until that evening, by which time the siege was effectively over.
There were similar difficulties with the guns. There were no modern siege guns immediately available for this operation. The guns that were used were supplied from Elvas and, as has been widely recorded elsewhere, they were generally old and in poor condition. Through the efforts of Dickson, a siege train of thirty guns was put together.42 Some of these were the guns used at the siege of Olivenza and were still there. Yet again, the most immediate problem was transport. Dickson reported on 22 April, that there were only three carriages at Elvas for transporting guns. To get the guns to Badajoz would require moving the six guns at Olivenza as soon as possible so that their carriages could then be sent to Elvas to move the remainder.
Apart from material, the engineers were concerned about the availability of experienced troops. Although this became more prominent in the later sieges, the concern was there from the very first siege. Squire raised concerns before the siege started about the lack of sappers and miners and the need for men who ‘know how to carry on an approach under fire’.43 He knew that in their siege of Badajoz the French sapped right up to the glacis and this required trained and experienced sappers. Squire’s view was that if the British had to do the same, there would be significant casualties.
Wellington was impatient to get started on the siege. On 30 March, he wrote to Beresford commenting that ‘the breach can be barely more than stockaded’.44 He wrote again on 6 April, stating that Badajoz must be blockaded as soon as possible. Writing to Liverpool three days later, he mentioned that he ‘hoped’ Beresford would have been blockading Badajoz from 3 April. These timescales all appear unrealistic as there had been problems establishin
g a crossing-point over the river Guadiana in early April due to the level of the river rising unexpectedly. Beresford also had to take Olivenza before he could move on Badajoz. At that time he also did not know the exact whereabouts of Soult. Wellington also wrote to Beresford on 21 April, when he heard that Soult was fortifying Seville. He saw this as indicating that he could be planning to relieve Badajoz. He explained that it was even more urgent that not a moment was lost in starting operations against Badajoz.45
Immediately after the siege of Olivenza was concluded, Dickson and Squire were ordered to start preparing for the siege of Badajoz,46 and from 19 April they were preparing the siege train of thirty guns and howitzers. On the 27th, Beresford issued an order for one hundred troops to be permanently assigned to the engineers as artificers. John Squire, who was the engineer in charge of the siege of Olivenza, had requested these on 10 April:
I request you will submit to His Excellency Marshal Beresford the propriety of forming a corps of artificers amounting to 100 men from the British Regiments of the line who would be attached to the Engineers Department during the attack of Badajoz. Viz. Miners – 50; Carpenters – 20; Masons/bricklayers – 24; Smiths – 6. Such men as have been employed in the lines in front of Lisbon will be best calculated for this service.47
Ten days later, Beresford confirmed he could have them.48 The men arrived at Olivenza on 2 May, and some were immediately put to work cutting timber and making siege materials. The remainder were given some basic training in siegecraft along with the small number of Royal Military Artificers who were present, none of whom had any previous training in siege works.49 In addition, eighty-four carpenters and miners from the British divisions and twelve officers were to serve as assistant engineers (these were officer volunteers from the army). Beresford told Wellington in a letter of 3 May that he was waiting for Fletcher to confirm that all the stores were ready and would then order the investment of the north side of the river Guadiana.50 Dickson and Squire certainly thought everything was ready to start the investment of Badajoz before this date.51 The final delays were likely to have been caused by waiting for confirmation that the bridges had been restored at Jerumenha; that the troops allocated to assist were present; and that the additional shovels had arrived from Abrantes. All these events happened on or around 2 May.
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