There is no doubt that the guns available from Elvas were not up to the task of performing siege work. There is no doubt that the lack of trained sappers and miners had an effect in that there were no experienced troops who could take the sap forward. There is also no doubt that the transport problems meant that not all the materials were there when they were required. But the single inescapable reason why these sieges failed was time. None of the other factors would have prevented the sieges’ success had Wellington not been working against deadlines. Wellington had known for days that he could not continue the siege past 10 June.107 In a letter to Charles Stuart, he wrote, ‘Badajoz may fall; but the business will be very near run on both sides … I have never seen walls bear so much battering, nor ordnance, nor artillery so bad as those belonging to Elvas’.108 He also knew that Badajoz only had supplies for two weeks.109
Added to the above, there were some other factors. San Christobal proved to be stronger than Wellington, the artillery and the engineer officers expected. It must also not be forgotten that the governor proved his skill many times during the three sieges of Badajoz. With a less energetic governor, the fortress would probably have fallen in June 1811. Overall there were too many factors working against the sieges succeeding, but they had to be tried because of the strategic importance of Badajoz.
What is surprising in looking closely at the writing of Oman, Fortescue and many modern authors is that the sieges have been skipped over and not really understood by them. Examples of this include Oman’s criticism that Wellington could have ordered up better guns in early May 1811 for the second siege of Badajoz.110 Wellington had ordered additional guns for the first siege of Badajoz around 10 April, a full month earlier than that. The lack of transport made moving them very difficult. These guns finally arrived near the end of the second siege of Badajoz on 8 June, two months after they were ordered. Fortescue gets similarly confused over the guns. First he suggests that time constraints meant that Wellington would not wait for the ‘English’ siege train.111 Later he writes that they sent for some British iron guns from Elvas.112 The iron guns from Lisbon were actually Portuguese naval 24-pounders. They were also old and worn, but much better than the old brass 24-pounders that were being used prior to their arrival.
In summary, the first two sieges of Badajoz were attempted with insufficient time and material available. The choice of point of attack was not the preferred option for any officer but circumstances led them to believe that this was the only option that might succeed. The engineer officers felt that they were not allowed to follow the plan that had been agreed. There is no strong evidence to support the view that another point of attack under the same circumstances would have been successful. The French, realising that the Allies were once again intending to besiege Badajoz, in a rare show of cooperation combined their forces into a joint operation. Marmont, who had replaced Masséna, came south with around 30,000 troops and Soult came north from Seville with a similar number.
Once Wellington had made the decision to abandon the siege, the artillery was quickly removed and on its way back to Elvas the following day. By the end of 12 June, all the stores had been removed. Over the next few days Wellington closely monitored the movements of the French, waiting until 16 June before deciding to raise the blockade. The next morning the Allied army crossed the Guadiana, primarily by the fords around Jerumenha. Soult and Marmont met at Merida on 18 June and not knowing that Wellington had already retired, made plans to advance to Badajoz on the 19th. It quickly became clear that there were no Allied troops in the vicinity, the two Marshals triumphantly entering the fortress the next morning, which fortuitously was also the last day for which Phillipon had provisions for the garrison.
Following their withdrawal, Wellington placed his forces in defensive positions to wait the advance of Soult and Marmont. His lines stretched from the village of Oguella on the river Gebora on his left, through Campo Mayor, to the bridge over the Caya on his right. The engineers were employed building field defences to strengthen Wellington’s positions, Burgoyne noting he was employed in this activity near Campo Mayor and Captain MacLeod and Rice Jones were working between there and the castle at Oguella.113 This activity is interesting since the Royal Staff Corps were officially responsible for field works. This is a good example of the blurring of responsibilities between the engineering services and Wellington’s pragmatic use of whatever resources was available. As there is no mention of the Staff Corps during either siege, it is certain that the bulk of the Staff Corps were with Wellington’s army in the north where they played their part at the Battle of Fuentes del Oñoro (see below).
Having found no sign of the Allies on the south side of the Guadiana, the French pushed out a large-scale reconnaissance on the morning of 22 June, finding the Allies in strength at Jerumenha and Campo Mayor. No further action was undertaken before the 24th, when Soult expressed concerns to Marmont on receiving the information that the Spanish General Blake was not, as believed, with Wellington, but was in fact moving south into Andalusia. Soult argued that the protection of Badajoz was probably of more importance to Marmont than it was to himself and consequently he should take responsibility for its safety. However, Marmont did not agree and believed that Soult was trying to pass the responsibility for Badajoz on to him as some of the other French generals had said he would. He then insisted that unless the whole of V Corps and Latour-Maubourg‘s cavalry were left with him, he too would abandon Badajoz and move off towards Truxillo. The honeymoon period of good relations between the French commanders had lasted less than a week and Soult, realising he had no option, consented.
The first indications of Soult’s return to Seville came to Wellington on 27 June, when he heard that the defences at Olivenza had been destroyed. On the 28th, Soult set off for Seville. Wellington held his position to protect Elvas and the Portuguese countryside from French attention. This standoff continued until mid-July when Marmont had managed to collect six months’ supplies for Badajoz. Marmont retired north towards the Tagus and D’Erlon, re-established links with Soult. Wellington, as soon as he was certain that the French had dispersed, took the opportunity to do likewise. The countryside around the Guadiana and the Caya was known to be unhealthy due to the marshy terrain, and plans were in hand to move the Allied troops away as soon as practicable. As early as 30 June, Cocks clearly knew what was intended:
We have been quietly encamped here between Elvas and Campo Mayor and scarcely see anything of the enemy; indeed, I believe the greater part of his force has already been drawn off from our front and that the remainder will go as soon as Badajoz is revictualled. In this case it is said we shall go into cantonments during the unhealthy season.114
Between 18 and 24 July, the bulk of the Allied troops moved away to their summer quarters, with Wellington‘s headquarters moving back to Portalegre. Squire had recovered from his earlier despondency and was able to reflect on the events of the last few months:
Every branch of the service has had an opportunity to profit by the extraordinary events, which have occurred. They will give rise to reflections, perhaps not very agreeable to our feelings, but highly important to us; who are now contending against the first military nation in the world. Those who command will see the necessity of proportioning their means to the end they have in view: – they will feel, that first to think deeply and combine with precision – then to execute with promptitude and secrecy is the surest road to success. When the passage of rivers is the object, they will, it is to be hoped, look forward and be provided with the means of passing them: they will not for the future despise difficulties, but be prepared to meet them: – when they intend the attack of fortified places, they will be previously provided with ample means for such an operation. The moment of execution is not the time to deliberate yet have I observed this to occur in more than one instance during our late campaign…. The Engineer Department (I speak without partiality, for you know I am a lover of truth) is capable of being made one of the
best Departments in the Army: – but, as it is without means or organisation, it is one of the most inefficient from my own observation and experience I have no hesitation in saying, that there is more zeal, spirit and intelligence in that Corps, than in any other Department of the Army. Its best executions are however checked and though we may try (as I think we always shall) to deserve a reputation, it is almost impossible to obtain it.115
The army spent the remainder of 1811 quietly, but typically there were many things for the engineers to do. Before I describe these activities, I need to pick up the activities of the Royal Staff Corps at the Battle of Fuentes del Oñoro in May 1811. On the second day of the battle, to safeguard his retreat in the case the battle went against him, Wellington ordered the two companies of the Staff Corps under Captain Todd to construct a temporary bridge over the river Coa. Several large trees that were found two miles from the selected location were floated down the river. Two separate bridges were then constructed, each by placing the tree part-way across the river and artificers then crossing the remaining distance to the far side to complete the construction. The bridges were not required, due to Wellington’s victory but would have been vital if he had suffered a reverse.116
Having failed to relieve Almeida, Masséna now ordered it to be abandoned, the garrison escaping on the night on 10 May due to failures in the Allied blockade. Fletcher ordered Captain MacLeod and Lieutenant Trench to work on the repairs at Almeida. It had been extensively damaged during the French siege and further damage was done when the French abandoned it. One of the engineer officers assigned to this task at Almeida was tragically killed whilst trying to clear the ditches, Fletcher reporting ‘it is with infinite regret I have to report to you that Lieutenant Trench died on the 10th instant [June] of several wounds he had received … by the explosion of several barrels of powder and some shells’.117 Progress in repairing Almeida was reported in a letter from Burgoyne:
Lascelles [Lieutenant Lascelles RE] writes from Almeida that they have begun its repair (the Portuguese engineers) for which a regiment of Militia has been assigned, which from various causes can only produce a daily working party of 3 masons and 80 labourers – this is not a rapid way of building up more than three entire fronts of escarp – this scarp work is to be of 12 to 14 feet only the rest of earth. No measures were taken to provision this unfortunate regiment of Militia, many have deserted, many sick and the remainder are starving.118
The Portuguese engineer commanding the repairs at Almeida was probably Lieutenant Colonel Carlos Frederico Bernardo de Caula.
Recognising the impact in the previous two sieges of the lack of trained artificers, engineer officers were ordered to start training line infantry in the basics of sapping and mining to support future sieges. Burgoyne and George Ross worked with the 3rd and 1st Divisions respectively through the late summer. Burgoyne noting in his diary ‘An order arrived from headquarters that I am to instruct 200 men of the 3rd Division in the art of carrying on the sap etc’. Burgoyne made his opinions clear in a later letter:
My principal business now is training 200 men of different regiments to the duties required in a siege, which, to our disgrace and misfortune, we have no regular establishment equal to, notwithstanding the repeated experience of the absolute necessity of such a corps to act under the Engineers in a campaign. For want of such an establishment we are frequently led to the loss of valuable officers, and very undeserved discredit.119
These troops, whilst not perfect, formed a skills base that would be used in the forthcoming sieges. Similar training had been started in England under the control of Charles Pasley. His developments will be discussed later.
In September, Wellington moved forces near to Ciudad Rodrigo to prevent the French getting supplies and reinforcements into the town. Burgoyne wrote that Wellington had been told the fortress was short of supplies and was hoping that a short blockade might force the place to surrender. Several engineers were present preparing for the planned attack on Ciudad Rodrigo but also assisting in resisting any French advance to relieve the place. Burgoyne noted:
Three or four different positions have been sketched by order of our Colonel who has marked on the plans numerous batteries and slight field works; these positions are in front of Guinaldo and between that and Rodrigo having their right on the bold ravine of the Agueda and their left on the steep fall of the range of heights which is about 4 miles in a parallel direction with that river. The object of a position in the situation I cannot conceive as the enemy by attacking have much to lose by defeat and little to gain by success.120
When the French advance came, Wellington found himself facing superior forces. Burgoyne was present at the action at El Bolden on 25 September and was ordered by Wellington to stay with the 21st Portuguese Regiment which was under great pressure from the French. Anthony Emmett RE, who was also present, described what happened:
On this day Marmont advanced in great force towards … El Boden and after a little manoeuvring opened his artillery on the position near El Boden held by two Portuguese guns supported by the 21st Portuguese Line … After a smart cannonade the French cavalry cut through the Portuguese guns, which made the 21st Regiment in some trouble and Lord Wellington passed by the regiment and posted himself on the right to see what passed, telling Burgoyne in passing to keep by the regiment and see if he could keep it together.121
Surprisingly, Burgoyne does not mention this incident in his diary or when he wrote to Squire a few days later. Eighteen months later he wrote in detail about the event:
In talking over the general arrangements of the Corps for the ensuing campaign, his Lordship agreed it would be advisable to attach officers of Engineers to the different divisions of the army, and said they might be useful in a thousand instances. ‘There was Burgoyne,’ said he ‘in the 3rd Division, always took the command of the Portuguese. After the business at El Boden, Marmont told my Aide-de-Camp, who went in with a flag of truce, that he observed we were forced to attach a British officer to encourage the Portuguese regiment on that day and keep it to its duty, and that was Burgoyne’ … This business of El Boden was on 25th September 1811, and Lord Wellington himself was present; our small force retired for six miles across a plain, in presence of a much superior body of the enemy, particularly cavalry. There being some difficulty in moving the 21st Portuguese regiment, I volunteered, to interpret to them all orders, and regulate their movements, and ultimately, the Portuguese Colonel being an inactive old fool, I took complete command of the regiment through the day. They were frequently threatened but never absolutely charged, though it would appear by Marmont’s observation, that he particularly watched for an opportunity against them, as the party on which he was most likely to make an impression. Lord Wellington appeared most pleased at the time, but I imagined it was all forgotten. This remark, of Marmont’s, however, appears to have fixed it in his memory as a point in my favour.122
The flexibility of Fletcher’s officers was demonstrated in a number of ways over this period. Captain Ross and Lieutenant Emmett spent several weeks working on improving the navigation of the river Douro for the next major operation that would occur in early 1812.123 Lieutenant Reid was serving on the staff of the Spanish army under General Carlos D’España at the specific request of the general and with the agreement of Wellington.124 Squire, who was still with General Hill in the south, was present at the action at Arroyo dos Molinos on 28 October where Hill surprised a French force under General Girard and destroyed it. Writing to his friend Bunbury a few days later in great excitement, he said:
Never was a surprise more complete than that which took place at Arroyo del Molino [sic] on the 28th October … The Colonel of the 40th French infantry told me that the first notice he had of the attack was the appearance of two British officers galloping through the streets of the village … All the French officers (our prisoners) say that Girard ought to be shot and that General Hill deserves the highest praise for his conduct.125
Squ
ire concluded his account with:
During our late excursion General Hill has treated me with the most unbounded confidence, since our return he has expressed himself to me in the most kind and flattering language. He has written to Lord Wellington recommending me very strongly for promotion; should any communication on the subject pass through your office I trust you will exert yourself in my favour; for as I only aim at distinction, military rank is my chief object, and I am conscious of this, that (small as my exertions are) I always do my utmost to deserve it.
Promotion was never far from an officer’s thoughts. As Squire was promoted to brevet Major in December 1811 it looks like the recommendation from Hill was successful.
The year ended with Wellington poised in the north of Portugal waiting for an opportunity that would come sooner than many expected.
Chapter 6
1812 – Taking the Frontier
Whilst the end of 1811 was quiet, 1812 started with a bang, literally, with Wellington besieging and taking Ciudad Rodrigo, almost before the French knew it was happening. It had taken several months to plan and to move the new battering train into position. Bizarrely, whilst Ciudad Rodrigo is seen as being the best-organised and most successful of Wellington’s sieges, the engineers had many misgivings. Captain George Ross commented:
I am now on the eve of being very differently employed…. Lord Wellington is anxious to break ground tomorrow night for which he has not afforded the means … I expect his lordship will have another lesson in the school of sieges … as far as a loss of men goes … he expects to take the same places from the French in a few days which cost them [the French] 30 or 40 to take from the Spaniards. Can anything but chance prevent his being disappointed?1
Two days later Ross was dead, hit by a cannon ball whilst directing troops in the trenches.
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