Wellington’s Engineers: Military Engineering on the Peninsular War 1808-1814

by Mark S. Thomson

  In summary, the siege of Ciudad Rodrigo was a great operational success that materially strengthened Wellington’s position and put the French firmly on the defensive. The success was due to three main factors: the weakness of the fortress, the strength of the Allied battering train and the lack of energy of the French governor. Overall, the engineers had performed their duties well, but as Fortescue wrote ‘the engineers themselves … were by no means faultless in their plans’.43 As mentioned above, the first signs of criticism within the engineers were also appearing. This situation was not helped when, due to an oversight, Burgoyne’s name was omitted from Wellington’s dispatch and only Jones and Captain George MacLeod RE were mentioned. Both received brevet promotions and only a subsequent appeal got the same recognition for Burgoyne. The promotion of Macleod in particular would have caused annoyance as he was mentioned in connection with the troops from the 3rd Division who had been trained as sappers. Burgoyne was responsible for their training but received no thanks for his work training these troops or for his performance as siege director. It appears that Wellington also asked for a brevet promotion to colonel for Fletcher. This was, however, refused with the following explanation:

  HRH is most fully impressed with a high opinion of the merits and services of Lieutenant Colonel Fletcher, and would gladly attend to your recommendation in his favour, if it were not for the difficulty which would attend the establishment of such a precedent, particularly in the case of the lieutenant colonels who have eminently distinguished themselves at the head of their regiments and who would naturally look for similar indulgence.44

  The frustration around the lack of trained sappers and miners was more apparent during the siege. Writing home to Liverpool after the siege, Wellington said:

  I would beg to suggest to your Lordship the expediency of adding to the Engineer establishment a corps of Sappers and Miners. It is inconceivable with what disadvantage we undertake anything like a siege for want of assistance of this description … we are obliged to depend … upon the regiments of the line; and although the men are brave and willing, they want the knowledge and training which are necessary.45

  Fletcher had written a similar note to the Board of Ordnance about two weeks earlier. Wellington had no-one other than Fletcher at hand to take his frustrations out on. One wonders if this was becoming a source of friction between them. Jones in his autobiography said he also wrote to the Board of Ordnance and was suitably chastised for the suggesting the inactivity of the Board of Ordnance was the equivalent of Nero fiddling whilst Rome burned.46

  Casualties among the nineteen engineer officers were two killed and five wounded. Two of the wounded sailed to England and did not return to the Peninsula.47 Three of the four fortresses covering the main routes in Portugal were now in Allied hands. It was not difficult to see what was coming next.

  The Third Siege of Badajoz

  As soon as Wellington had the repairs for Ciudad Rodrigo under way, he turned his attention to the next challenge, the retaking of Badajoz. On 25 January 1812, Dickson arranged for all the 24-pounder roundshot and shells along with 900 barrels of powder to be moved to Oporto for onward transmission to Elvas.48 The following day Wellington ordered sixteen 24-pounder carronades (howitzers) and a number of gun carriages to be moved by land to Elvas from Almeida.49 On the 28th, Wellington met Borthwick (the senior artillery officer in the Peninsula), Dickson and Fletcher to discuss moving the 24-pounder guns from Almeida to Elvas, but Dickson argued that the state of the bullocks and the availability of forage made it impossible.50 This meant another cobbled-together siege train using guns from Lisbon and Elvas. Wellington revised his plan to use sixteen 24-pounder guns that were on transports in Lisbon, supplemented by twenty 24-pounder guns which Wellington hoped could be supplied by Admiral Berkeley from the fleet. Wellington also sent orders to Lisbon for the engineering stores to be collected and dispatched to Elvas, which would allow the garrison to start work on gabions and fascines. Captain George MacLeod RE was ordered to Elvas to superintend the preparations. Wellington had previously made arrangements for a pontoon train to be assembled, ready for use to cross the river Guadiana which would be in full flow at that time of year.51

  All this preparation looks a little odd. Wellington had been planning the siege of Ciudad Rodrigo since May 1811. He knew that Badajoz was likely to be his next target but there seemed to be a distinct lack of planning for this eventuality. All the discussions of the previous days appear to be trying to work out how to get hundreds of tons of siege equipment across central Spain. When this was seen to be impossible, the Allies were then trying to find other, less-suitable guns that could be used instead. Was Wellington’s original plan to besiege Badajoz later in the year, or did he have some other plan and then changed his mind to go after Badajoz? If he had known that he was going to besiege Badajoz after taking Ciudad Rodrigo, why was there not another siege train prepared for that purpose? The plan to attack Badajoz feels like a last-minute decision as he hoped to get guns from Berkeley that the Admiral did not have or was unwilling to release. Wellington clearly did not know this.

  Timeline for the Third Siege of Badajoz

  28 January 1812

  Wellington agreed there was insufficient transport to move main siege guns from Ciudad Rodrigo to Badajoz. Arrangements made for alternative supply from Lisbon

  5 March 1812

  Wellington hands Ciudad Rodrigo over to Spanish governor and sets out for Badajoz

  8 March 1812

  Last guns of siege train arrive at Elvas

  11 March 1812

  Wellington arrives at Elvas to direct the siege

  16 March 1812

  Fortress invested

  17 March 1812

  Trenches opened night of 17/18 Mar

  19 March 1812

  French launched sortie from Picurina fort. Colonel Fletcher wounded

  22 March 1812

  Pontoon bridge washed away

  25 March 1812

  Batteries opened fire on fortress

  25 March 1812

  Picurina fort stormed night of 25/26 Mar

  5 April 1812

  Fortress stormed night of 5/6 Apr

  Dickson found out on 10 February that Admiral Berkeley was planning to provide twenty Russian 18-pounders instead of the hoped-for English 24-pounders.52 This caused Wellington and Dickson great concern as 18-pounders were significantly less effective in siege work. The guns were also in poor condition, which meant that both their accuracy and power were further reduced. Wellington complained to Berkeley, but at the time Berkeley would not offer an alternative. Berkeley did eventually provide ten new English 18-pounders but Dickson argued that he did not want to mix 18-pounders (Russian and English) or to delay the siege to bring them up. Myatt notes that he was unsure if they were used in the siege, but Jones’ journal clearly stated that they were not used.53

  Wellington remained in Ciudad Rodrigo while all the preparations were being made. The main reason for this was to keep the French guessing. Although the siege of Badajoz was an obvious next step, there were other possibilities and until Wellington signified his intention by going to Badajoz, the French had to keep their options open. He wrote to his brother:

  You are aware of the great operation, which I have in hand. If I should succeed, which I certainly shall, unless those admirably useful institutions, the English newspapers, should have given Bonaparte the alarm, and should have induced him to order his Marshals to assemble their troops to oppose me, Spain will have another chance of being saved.54

  Jones’ diary described a meeting to discuss the plan of attack on Badajoz. There had been much criticism of the point of attack the year before and a decision had to be made on whether to follow the same plan as last year, the previous French plan, or some other alternative. At the meeting were Wellington, General Castaños, the Spanish Chief Engineer and Fletcher. Jones recorded that Wellington and the Spanish engineer wanted to attack the southern front as the F
rench had done in early 1811, while Fletcher wanted to attack the south-western corner from the Picurina redoubt. Fletcher was initially reluctant to admit openly that his recommendation was due to the lack of skilled sappers and miners to deal with the mines that the French were known to have placed on the southern face. Wellington, on being reminded of the situation, reluctantly agreed saying ‘he regretted extremely our deficiencies and it obliged him to undertake an attack he did not approve, but that knowing the means he believed it to be the only attack in our power to get through’. Jones added ‘though adopted through necessity, … it was never for one moment approved by any one employed in drawing it up, or in the execution of it’.55 Jones summed up his thoughts with the comment, ‘what a reflection on those who have governed the engineering service for the last nineteen years of war’.56 Jones added further comments in his published Journal to the effect that the attack on the southern side would have required a further thirty guns and significantly more engineering stores and that this was beyond the available resources and transport.57

  The Siege

  Like the year before, the attack on Badajoz started with the engineers placing a pontoon bridge across the river Guadiana. And, like the year before, keeping it in place proved a real challenge. The south side of the fortress was invested on 16 March. Fletcher had twenty-three engineers including Squire and Burgoyne, who acted as siege directors, and Jones as Brigade Major. At least one and possibly four of this number did not arrive until the very end of the siege.58 For the first time in the war there was a significant number of men from the Royal Military Artificers present, 115 in total. A further thirty had been ordered up from Cadiz, but they did not arrive before the end of the siege. Fletcher also had at his disposal the remainder of the men from the 3rd Division who had been previously trained in sapping, now reduced to around 120 from their original strength of around 200. Finally, there were also ten assistant engineers from the line regiments.59

  Fletcher marked out the first trenches on 17 March, and these were commenced that night. The weather over the first few days was poor with constant rain and this made work in the trenches very difficult. The French launched a sortie at noon on the 19th, and once again caught the Allies unprepared. A small body of French cavalry made it to the engineers’ depot where they attacked the unarmed soldiers and captured two officers before they were driven off. Little damage was done to the works, but many tools were carried off as the French troops had been promised a reward for every one they collected. Allied casualties were around 150 men including the Chief Engineer, Fletcher, whose wound confined him to bed until 5 April but he retained command. The routine for the remainder of the siege was for Wellington to meet with Fletcher and Jones each morning to discuss progress and agree the tasks for the next twenty-four hours.

  The wet weather led to the river Guadiana rising until it swept away the pontoon bridge on 22 March. This was a major concern to Wellington as the bridge was both the source of his siege supplies and also his line of retreat. A complete loss of communication across the river would require Wellington to raise the siege, the nearest alternative bridge being at Merida, twenty miles away. Lieutenant Piper RE was sent to investigate the damage to the pontoon bridge and reported that twelve of the twenty-four pontoons had sunk. Two were subsequently recovered from the river, but the rest were lost. Wellington, with his normal attention to detail, wrote further instructions:

  1. Lieutenant Piper to be desired to supply six pontoons as row boats near the flying bridge, to carry over principally powder and shot.

  2. Care must be taken that they are not overloaded; not more than forty 24-Pound shot to be put in each, or an equal quantity or weight of powder.

  3. Plank must be placed in the bottom, and the lower part of the sides should have a plank in order to prevent the shot from rolling against them and making holes.

  4. The pontoons must not be used as passage boats.

  5. Lieutenant Piper to be requested to mention in his report whether he has bullocks in sufficient numbers, and in good order, to move the bridge.60

  For the remainder of the siege the pontoons were used exclusively as rowing boats for the transport of powder and shot across the river.61 The poor weather had probably delayed completion of the batteries by two or three days but they finally opened on the fortress on the morning of 25 March and started to batter the fortress and also the Picurina and San Roque outworks. No significant damage had been inflicted on the Picurina fort when Wellington ordered it to be stormed that night, Oman suggesting that this was to make up lost time.62 Due to the delay between the siege guns ceasing fire and the attack, the French had time to make repairs and although the attack was successful, fifty-four were killed and 265 wounded out of 500 attackers. Once the fort had been taken, the second parallel and associated batteries could be started.

  From 27 March, the trenches were extended towards the San Roque lunette with the intention of taking it and destroying the dam that kept the ground in front of the fortress flooded. Wellington’s intention was to launch the assault across this ground but until the water was drained this was not possible. Progress by the partially-trained sappers was not fast enough and casualties were high. An attempt was made on 2 April to mine the dam near the San Roque lunette. Lieutenant Stanway RE led a party forward and placed 450 pounds of gunpowder on the dam, but the explosion did not have the desired effect. The attack on San Roque was now abandoned and Wellington accepted that the attack would have to work round the flooded area. The danger involved in trenching is well described in a letter from Lieutenant Vetch RE:

  I was employed … in advancing the approaches; we were three or four officers, at least half an hour laying out the work not 80yds from the French parapet. The sap was marked out with a white cord, and the men put down as near as they could work along the line. They squat down and worked away as hard as they were able, in order to cover themselves … the moment we were perceived they opened a very sharp fire of musketry, and killed seven men in the first half hour, after which our men got too much cover to be hit.63

  As the days moved on into early April, Wellington once again found himself balancing the time needed to batter the fortress against the advance of the French to relieve it. He was aware that Soult was collecting troops and was moving north towards Badajoz, so he needed to decide between rapidly concluding the siege, or putting it on hold and advancing to meet Soult, leaving a force to guard the trenches, or raising the siege. Marmont was also demonstrating in the north against Almeida and Ciudad Rodrigo, but Wellington cannot have been seriously concerned about their safety at this time.

  By 5 April, the breaches looked ready and Wellington issued orders for an assault that night. Later in the day the assault was postponed for twenty-four hours to allow a third breach to be battered in the curtain wall. It would appear that Wellington asked Fletcher to look at the breaches and give his opinion.64 Following his inspection, Fletcher advised that the defences the French had constructed behind the breaches were strong and that a third breach should be made where they would have little time to prepare new defences. The original plan was to make a third breach at the last moment. The concentrated effort of the siege guns on 6 April quickly battered the wall and the third breach was ready in the afternoon. The three breaches would be attacked by the 4th and Light Divisions. Separate attacks would also be made on the castle by the 3rd Division and on the San Vincente bastion by the 5th Division. Sunset was just after 7 p.m.65 The siege guns stopped firing at about 7.30 p.m. but the assault did not get underway until around 10 p.m., leaving the defenders with plenty of time to prepare for the assault that they knew was coming. The main attacks through the breaches all failed, with huge casualties, due to the obstacles put across them and the heavy fire from the garrison. When it became clear to Wellington that they had failed, he ordered the troops to be withdrawn and planned to make another assault just before daybreak, but about this time, he was informed that Picton’s 3rd Division had managed to
scale the walls of the castle and that the 5th Division had also entered the town. He ordered the 4th and Light Divisions forward again, using these footholds to break out and finally take the fortress. As at Ciudad Rodrigo, there followed an uncontrollable sack by the troops and it took two days before order could be restored.

  Lieutenant James Vetch RE who had just arrived from Cadiz with a detachment of thirty miners from the Royal Military Artificers described the events:

  When we got intelligence of the siege of Badajoz, and as I knew we were wanted there I pushed on the party as fast as possible … I got to Badajoz on the morning of the fifth. I did duty in the trenches and lost, of my small working party, seven men the first half hour … The enemy had been very active in throwing every obstacle they could think of in the way … I was posted between the castle and breaches, at the ravelin of San Roque, which was to be escaladed by 200 men. About 10 p.m. a brisk firing began from the castle and they threw some light balls which gave them great advantage. When the castle had been attacked for half an hour, the parties in the breaches commenced. That moment produced such a scene as no man can conceive. The night was dark; the castle on high and all the lower points of attack involved in one sheet of fire, a well pitched light ball now and then bringing out the scenes more fully to view; at the breaches the springing of mines, bursting of large shells, which they rolled into the ditch, with the fire from the whole of the batteries made a sight which I believe never was seen in so small a space. My party of 200 men, which attacked the ravelin, carried it immediately and marched their prisoners through the breaches. General Picton carried the castle about 10 p.m. The parties at the breaches were completely repulsed; those escalading on the left succeeded about 2 a.m. with great slaughter. At 3 a.m. we had pretty good light and we discovered the enemy had left a gate open near the ravelin, which three of our companies took possession of. I was in the town at 3 a.m. and it was completely in our possession by 4 a.m. I had been sent out to give notice of the gate being in our possession, and got in again about 5 a.m. in good daylight to behold the most shocking scenes of dead and wounded, and the soldiers pillaging the houses. Not many of the inhabitants were killed, but all were left without a rag to cover them or a morsel to eat. Broken chairs and tables only were left. The pillage [had] lasted two days when two gallows were erected to show the pillage was over. When looking about for quarters, I was implored by a lady to take my abode under her roof for her protection, and I remained there two days. I found my hostess was a Marchioness; Lord Wellington called twice at my billet, and the poor lady had scarce a gown to cover her back.66