Casualties from the assault were shocking, with 800 killed and 2,900 wounded out of an overall total for the siege of around 1,000 killed and 3,800 wounded. As always with the sieges it was the officers and better soldiers who took more than their fair share of the injuries. Engineer casualties were similarly heavy. Of the twenty-four officers present, four were killed and eight were wounded, three of whom went home.67
Wellington had taken Badajoz in twenty-one days. His estimate before the start was twenty-four days, not taking into account the bad weather that surely delayed progress. Mulcaster, one of the engineers, had estimated twenty-seven days for the siege.68 In 1811 the French took forty-five days to get the fortress to surrender and in reality it should have held out for much longer. The cost of this rapid success was once again measured in casualties. In this case they were all from the very experienced British divisions, troops Wellington could not afford to lose. Although there were criticisms at the time of the decision to postpone the assault for another day to make the third breach, it is probable that this decision tipped the balance by spreading the defenders thinner which meant they were not able to resist the secondary assaults. Once order had been re-established in the town, work started immediately to repair the defences. As a sign of the importance that Wellington placed on its speedy and effective repair, Fletcher was left to oversee the work and did not rejoin Wellington at headquarters until September 1812.
Analysis of the siege
As in the previous year, time was of the essence and taking the fortress on 6 April 1812 required brute force, inflicting enormous casualties on Wellington’s best divisions. The huge casualties at the siege of Badajoz finally pushed Wellington into writing a strongly-worded private letter to Liverpool demanding that something be done about the lack of trained men available to undertake siege work. His criticism overflowed into a more general complaint about the skills of the engineers. An analysis of his complaints will be detailed below, but first the other components of the siege that were not within the control of the engineers will be evaluated.
Wellington’s strategy of keeping the French guessing about his plans by staying north worked well. Soult made arrangements for Marmont to come to his aid if Wellington attacked Badajoz, but he then appears to have become distracted and, even though warnings had started filtering through, he was at Cadiz until 20 March. Soult then rushed back to Seville and spent the next ten days putting together a relief force which did not exceed 25,000 men, believing that Marmont would be doing the same. Marmont, in the meantime, had received direct orders from Napoleon not to support Badajoz, this being Soult’s responsibility. He was ordered to threaten Ciudad Rodrigo instead, which Napoleon believed would force Wellington to break off the siege of Badajoz and race north to protect it.69 Soult did not discover until around 6 April that Marmont was sending no supporting force. By that time it was too late for the French to relieve the fortress.
The habitual problem of transport once again caused the siege train to be much less powerful than Wellington would have liked. At Ciudad Rodrigo the siege train was made up of thirty-eight new English iron guns, thirty-four of which were 24-pounders. Since these could not be transported to Badajoz, reliance had to be placed on a combination of sixteen new English 24-pounders and twenty old Russian 18-pounders in poor condition. There were an additional sixteen 24-pounder carronades but these were of no use for breaching work and appear to have been used for enfilade fire. Jones commented that the 24-pounder iron howitzer (carronade) ‘should never be admitted into a battering train … [as] it only served to waste ammunition’.70 General Colville commented ‘we have for the third time undertaken the siege … deficient of means … half the guns are 18-pounders. We have not a single mortar’.71 This siege train was a little better than the one used at the second siege of Badajoz, primarily due to the guns being made of iron, but it was much less powerful than that used at Ciudad Rodrigo, which was a much weaker fortress, so the time taken to make a significant impact on the breaches was extended. The lack of heavy howitzers limited the besiegers’ ability to undertake counter-battery fire and this led to heavier casualties in the trenches and during the assault.
The weather also had a material effect on the early stages of the siege. It rained continuously until about 25 March, and this slowed down work in the trenches and certainly stopped any attempt to put guns into the batteries until the ground had dried out. Of more concern to Wellington was the loss of the pontoon bridge and the difficulties with the flying bridge as the river rose. At this time, around 22 March, Wellington did not have a clear picture of the movements of Soult and Marmont. The loss of his only bridge was a serious matter. If the French had forced him to lift the siege and retire, his army would have been able to do this, but the siege train would probably have been lost. The wet weather also ensured that the inundation around the walls of Badajoz caused by the damming of the Rivellas stream was higher than normal and was impossible to cross. This was what made the attack on the San Roque outwork important. If heavy howitzers had been available to suppress the French guns, it might have been possible to take the San Roque lunette, which would have enabled the destruction of the dam and the draining of the area in front of the breaches. Wellington could not reasonably blame the bad weather for unexpectedly hampering his plans. He understood what the weather would be like at this time of year and used the poor weather as an argument to explain his timing of the siege, as it would hamper the movements of the French. Of course there was also a chance that it would hamper his own plans and in the event it did.
The French governor, Phillipon, showed the same energy and determination that he had in 1811. The garrison was made up of seasoned troops and the experienced chief engineer, Lamarre, had been at the fortress for some time and knew it well. The defenders’ energy, particularly in clearing the debris from in front of the breaches and in blocking them up, made the assaults much more difficult. As described above, the assaults on the breaches all failed with heavy casualties and it was only due to the secondary attacks that the fortress was taken. With another thousand men, Phillipon would have probably repulsed the assault. It is doubtful that the British troops would have had the energy to make a further serious assault as Wellington planned on the morning of 6 April.
One question that needs further consideration is why did Wellington decide to make the assault on 6 April? Wellington was clearly concerned that the French would try to relieve the fortress, but there does not appear to be the urgency that he felt. He was aware of the movements of Soult and he had a reasonable idea of the size of his force. Wellington also must have been reasonably certain that Marmont was not marching to the aid of Soult, having had a report on 4 April that Marmont had been in front of Almeida the previous day, which suggested he was not making any immediate plans to move south.72 He was also clearly concerned that the breaches were only just practicable. His decisions to order and then postpone the attack on the night of 5 April show a level of indecision that was very unusual for him. He had made preliminary plans to suspend the siege and move to face Soult who he believed had up to 35,000 men. When he realised that he had around 25,000 men, he would have known that Soult could not possibly interfere with the siege without the support of Marmont. Marmont did not receive permission from Napoleon to directly support Soult until 27 March, and would have needed ten to fourteen days to concentrate sufficient troops. A week later he had not moved south and Wellington knew that, so the earliest he could have arrived would have been the end of the second week in April.
There are two areas where the lack of trained artificers appeared to have made a difference to the planning. The first was in selection of the point of attack. As mentioned above, Wellington’s preference was to attack the south front, as it appeared to be the weakest. This was the point that the French attacked, but the French, realising the same, had significantly strengthened it by reinforcing the Pardaleras outwork and also by placing mines in the approaches to the walls. The approaches to
the southern wall that Wellington last saw in June 1811 were significantly stronger in March 1812. The second was in the attempt to take the San Roque lunette and allow the destruction of the dam behind it. This was abandoned due to the heavy casualties and poor progress made by the partially-trained sappers from the army. If trained sappers had been available, better progress would have been made and casualties should have been lower. But the major difficulties were caused by the heavy fire from the defenders and without some attempt to reduce this, the results might not have been any different. The siege train at Badajoz did not contain weapons that were ideal for counter-battery and breach clearing activities. The 24-pounder carronades were the only ‘high-angle’ weapon available and as they were equivalent to the smallest 5½in howitzer, they did not have the punch that was required.
It could be argued that Wellington moved too quickly to the assault, when he could have waited a few more days and continued battering the defences. This would have reduced his casualties although it is unlikely that Phillipon would have considered surrender. Wellington’s complaint about the lack of trained sappers and miners causing the additional casualties was justified, but even with the trained artificers he would still have needed to give them time to work and it is unlikely that the siege would have progressed any faster. As in all the previous sieges in 1811 and 1812, Wellington was pushed into attacking early because of the need to take the fortress before the relieving force could intervene. Badajoz was no different and trained artificers would not have made a significant difference.
On 7 April Wellington wrote his dispatch informing the government of the success at Badajoz. With it was sent a private letter to Liverpool in which he complained about the lack of trained engineers and artificers and blamed the heavy losses at Badajoz on the lack of such troops:
It is quite impossible to expect to carry fortified places … unless the army should be provided with a regular trained corps of sappers and miners … The consequences … are – first, that our engineers although well educated and brave, have never turned their minds to the mode of conducting a regular siege, as it is useless to think of that which it is impossible in our service to perform. They think that they have done their duty when they construct a battery, with a secure communication to it, which can make a breach in the wall of a place; and, secondly, these breaches are to be carried by vive force by an infinite sacrifice of officers and soldiers … I earnestly recommend to your lordship to have a corps of sappers and miners formed without loss of time.73
His frustration at his losses extended his complaints from the reasonable towards what many engineers saw as an unreasonable attack on the whole engineering profession. His complaints about the lack of sappers and miners were fully supported by the engineer officers themselves. One example was Squire, who used almost the same words as Wellington in his letter after the assault: ‘This siege has served to confirm … that constituted as our Corps is, we are decidedly not equal to the attack of a place; whose scarp is covered by a good counterscarp and glacis … Sappers and Miners are as necessary to engineers during a siege, as soldiers to the General’.74
Wellington’s critical comments in his letter of 7 April 1812 were lost until 1889, but a subsequent letter on the same subject to Major-General Murray was published in the dispatches.
I trust … that future armies will be equipped for sieges, with the people necessary to carry them on as they ought to be; and that our engineers will learn how to put their batteries on the crest of the glacis and to blow in the counterscarp, instead of placing wherever the wall can be seen, leaving the poor officers and men to get into and across the ditch as best they can.75
This was responded to in Jones’ Journal: ‘the officers … were fully equal to the difficult duty of crowning the crest of the glacis had they been assisted by a proper trained body of men’.76 Wellington’s complaint about the casualties during the assault on the Picurina fort is particularly unreasonable, since the fort was stormed on his orders the same day the batteries opened when it was clear that no material damage had yet been inflicted. Wellington rushed the assault to make up time lost due to the bad weather. There is no doubt, based on the available evidence, that Wellington’s criticism of the engineer officers was unfair. The four sieges of 1811 and 1812 had all been arranged with limited resources and limited time. This led to compromises that affected the chance of success and the level of casualties. There was not sufficient time at any of these sieges for formal approaches to be prepared. Complaining about the lack of troops to deliver formal approaches is not reasonable when such troops would not have had the time to make the approaches anyway.
In the archives at the British Library, there is a scrap of paper written by John Squire on 8 April 1812. You can feel the shock and exhaustion he was feeling as he wrote his brief note on the successful assault and the loss of more friends. He finishes it with ‘I am a little fatigued, so you will excuse me breaking off so abruptly’. A month later, he was dead, collapsing and dying whilst travelling with General Hill.77
Fletcher was left at Badajoz to carry out repairs and Burgoyne accompanied Wellington with the army as it set out on the Salamanca campaign. This was an unusual arrangement, as typically the senior engineer would travel with Wellington. Whilst there has been some question about whether this was evidence of a lack of trust in Fletcher, there is no evidence to support this view. Wellington’s decision was probably based on two points that would have been foremost in his mind. Firstly, that losing Badajoz again was unthinkable, so every effort had to be made to protect it. Secondly, Wellington had handed over responsibility for Ciudad Rodrigo to the Spanish only four weeks before and he had already received communications to show that little progress had been made to complete the repairs; the Spanish were asking for further help and they had already used most of the supplies left for the use of the garrison. Because of this Wellington was forced to remain in a position where he could support Ciudad Rodrigo when one of his options would have been to pursue Soult south.78 Although it was not approved, Wellington had also asked for promotion for Fletcher after Ciudad Rodrigo.79
In summary, Badajoz was attacked with a second-rate siege train; the lack of sappers and miners meant that the preferred choice of attack could not be chosen; the fortress was assaulted too early; and together these factors caused the high casualties. Badajoz was taken due to the secondary attacks succeeding when all the main attacks had failed. Wellington was lucky.
However, Wellington’s complaints reinforced the desire of the Board of Ordnance to progress the development of the School of Military Engineering that had just been formed on 23 April 1812 (see Appendix 5). Liverpool wrote to Wellington on 28 April, informing him that the Board of Ordnance had been working on this issue for some time and that the first troops would be with him before the end of the month.80 Although this was unrealistic, it is true that Charles William Pasley had previously started work on training artificers. The incorrect understanding of the causes of the formation of the Royal Sappers and Miners still appears in most works. Oman81 assumes that Wellington’s letter of 7 April caused an immediate change and the formation of the corps. Fortescue seems even wider from the mark, suggesting that Wellington was ‘beginning himself to train one on the spot’. Myatt does not recognise that the Board of Ordnance had been working throughout 1811 to rectify the situation.82 Similarly, in the most recent books on sieges in the Peninsula, there appears to be a misunderstanding of the role of sappers and miners. They would undertake the specialist tasks, like sapping up to the glacis or mining, but the line infantry would still do the bulk of the ‘spade work’ with the trained artificers providing supervision.83
Whilst this siege is often seen as a breakdown in trust between Wellington and Fletcher, I am not so sure. Fletcher was wounded on 19 March but Wellington insisted on him retaining command even though he was bed-bound, visiting him each morning. Wellington could easily have sent Fletcher away, but chose to retain him even though other engin
eer officers, seen as his ‘favourites’, were present, i.e. John Burgoyne and John Jones. Whilst Jones suggested that Wellington left Fletcher to repair Badajoz as a punishment, I believe he was left there because he was not fit to travel. Fletcher only left his tent for the first time on 4 April, two days before the assault and riding was probably impossible.84 There is plenty of correspondence to confirm Fletcher remained in charge of the engineer department for Wellington’s army whilst he was at Badajoz.
As soon as order was restored, work started of repairing the fortress, Burgoyne noting on 9 April that 300 men from Power’s brigade commenced filling in the trenches.
The following day, Burgoyne was dispatched to Villa Velha to be ready to take up the pontoon bridge as Marmont had started an advance into Portugal to try and distract Wellington from the siege that had just been completed. Wellington was not sure that he could get troops there before Marmont and did not want to lose the bridge or his ability to cross the Tagus. Burgoyne rode post horses to the river and there:
found the Portuguese Captain of Engineers in charge of the bridge in great distress, having been ordered to remove the bridge [only] when the enemy arrived … knowing how impossible this would be … he determined on preparing to burn it as the French had entered Castello Branco yesterday … and were expected down at Villa Velha hourly. Neither General Lecor … nor General Baron Alten … would take upon themselves to give an order for removing the bridge … On my arrival, I had it immediately withdrawn.85
Wellington’s Engineers: Military Engineering on the Peninsular War 1808-1814 Page 19