Although the tone of the letter was very strong, his views were obviously supported by some of the Ordnance hierarchy as his proposals for setting up a school were well received and being seriously considered. Events in early 1812 were moving fast.
As General Mann is very desirous that the instruction of the R.M. Artificers in the construction of field works, should be put in train … he wishes to see you upon the subject as soon as convenient … General Mann wishes you would turn in your mind some outline … for him to lay before the Master-General, as to the best means of carrying the system into effect, with some idea if possible of the expense which would attend it upon any given scale.41
Pasley’s ideas were also being aired by his peers who were serving in the Peninsula. Richard Fletcher wrote to the Inspector-General of Fortifications after the siege of Ciudad Rodrigo in January 1812 that ‘the sappers we lately employed were taken from the Third Division, and had received such instruction as time and means afforded, under Captain Burgoyne. They were certainly useful, but far from expert.’42
Fletcher also submitted a proposal for the creation of a corps of sappers and miners which was different from Pasley’s proposals. They were similar in a number of ways, but clearly developed independently. This leads to the question of whether Fletcher knew of Pasley’s proposal, and also if there was any communication between Fletcher and Pasley, as it seems unusual that Fletcher would have submitted a separate proposal at this time if he knew of and agreed with Pasley’s. Fletcher’s main subordinates, Burgoyne, Squire and Jones, certainly all knew of Pasley’s plans and it is inconceivable that Fletcher did not. It appears that Fletcher was proposing a quick-fix solution for immediate implementation by cherry-picking the best soldiers from the Royal Military Artificers and using junior Royal Engineer officers to command them.
Pasley’s continued correspondence with the Master-General eventually led to him submitting a proposal to set up the School of Military Engineering. The Inspector-General approved the recommendation and Pasley was asked to take command of the new School of Military Engineering. On 23 April 1812 the Royal Warrant was issued by the Prince Regent authorising the establishment of the school at Chatham under Pasley.43 The Warrant was signed on the same day that Wellington’s dispatch of 7 April was received in London.44
The first soldiers from Pasley’s school were in the Peninsula before the end of 1812. Though there were still complaints about their skills, they were a major improvement on the performance of the RMA. Apart from training more suited to operational activities, they now came with their own subaltern officers, which removed the problem of the RMA having no constant and consistent leadership. Another consequence of the formation of the school, which appears to have been overlooked by all writers on the subject, was that from 1812, all newly-commissioned Royal Engineer officers were sent to the school to instruct and be instructed on practical field works. The Corps monthly returns state clearly that officers were being sent to Chatham for this purpose.45 Writing to his sister in May 1812, Pasley’s view is clearly explained ‘you know I have long had a plan in view of training the young officers and all the N.C. Officers and soldiers to their field duties’.46 He had used almost identical words in a letter to John Burgoyne in March 1812.47 Also, in a minute from the meeting of the Board of Ordnance dated 11 May 1812, reference is made to ‘the System of Instruction in the Field Duties intended for the junior officers of engineers and the Corps of Military Artificers Sappers and Miners’.48 Pasley’s memoir on the formation of the Royal Sappers and Miners stated that the key role of the engineer officers was the instruction of the soldiers, but went on to say:
When the officers of engineers are not occupied in military or field duties, they have a course of study laid down for them, calculated to improve them in the science of attack, upon which the art of fortification is founded. They are required to present memoirs relative to the various operations of a siege, stating the number of men, materials and tools, and the distribution of them.49
The junior officers typically spent a further four to six months gaining experience of the practical aspects of their profession and also gained valuable insight into the command of the first sappers and miners who were to be sent to the Peninsula. In many cases, these junior officers would travel to the Peninsula in command of the soldiers they had trained with. Pasley also used any other officers who were available to come and teach the new recruits. A testament to the newly-formed establishment was given by Lieutenant Colonel Samuel Dickens, who wrote to Pasley requesting permission to spend a couple of months at the school, ‘to take a little instruction’ before going out to the Peninsula.50
Pasley was keen to eliminate the previous problem of poor discipline by attaching engineer officers permanently to each company of the Royal Sappers and Miners. Whilst he acknowledged that many engineer officers were averse to any form of regimental duties, which they saw as ‘drudgery’, he saw the introduction of the newly-commissioned junior engineers immediately into the regimental role at Chatham as a way of reducing this view. Pasley also put forward the notion that there should be one title, ‘Royal Engineers’, for both the officers and the soldiers. He saw the two separate titles as causing a lack of concern in the engineer officers about the actions of the artificers as they took no pride or responsibility for their actions and reputation.51
The Engineers’ View of their Training
The common view in the army of artillery and engineer officers was that they were studious, stuffy and pedantic. The term ‘Scientific Soldier’ was a term that was used at this time and the training and education of Ordnance officers differed significantly from the training and education of junior officers in the army. But was this perception based on fact? Were the Ordnance officers better trained? Were they competent to undertake the tasks they would be asked to perform? Did the Ordnance even understand what the requirements were for modern warfare in Europe?
In the eighteenth century, their experience was almost non-existent. Early eighteenth-century campaigns made extensive use of officers from other European nations to provide the specialist engineering services in British armies. More recent operations were focussed on colonial campaigns in India or America, or limited attacks on coastal fortresses often carried out by, or with, the Royal Navy. There was very limited experience of siege warfare in Europe. Wellington was one of the few British generals who had experience of siege warfare, but ‘Sepoy’ experience counted for little at home.
The engineer officers who were involved in operations in the early years of the nineteenth century were not happy with the training they had received and felt that changes were required. There was resistance from several senior Ordnance officers to the reforms which were being proposed by the younger breed of engineer officer like Pasley, Squire, Lefebure and Burgoyne. Bearing in mind the remarks made above on the Royal Military Academy and the quality of training the cadets received, it is important to note that many of the officers who played prominent roles in the Napoleonic Wars passed through the Royal Military Academy during the period when examination requirements were being lowered to meet the demand for officers.
In most (if not all) cases, the officers themselves complained bitterly about their training and their experiences. One only has to look at the campaigns in which they fought in the period from 1793 to 1810 to realise that they had almost all had nothing but bad experiences at Alexandria, Buenos Ayres, Copenhagen and Walcheren. There was a constant theme of the lack of training engineer officers had received in the practical aspects of their work. Pasley, writing around 1811, set out his views.
I should have suggested several improvements that appeared to me from my own experience and reflection to be essential … I considered the British Army … to be incapable of succeeding in a siege, … without either having recourse to the barbarous measure in incendiary bombardment, or without an enormous sacrifice of the lives … in sanguinary assaults … which might be rendered unnecessary by a more efficient organiza
tion of the Royal Engineer department, and especially by forming a well-instructed and well-disciplined body of engineer soldiers … The better instruction of the junior officers of the Royal Engineers appeared no less essential, for at that time they were not even taught the theory of the attack of fortresses … and the examinations for commissions were merely a matter of form, and no genuine test for proficiency. As for practical instruction, they had none, for they were sent on service without ever having seen a fascine or gabion, without the smallest knowledge of the military passage of rivers, of military mining, or any other operation of a siege, excepting what they may pick up from French writers, of which a striking proof occurred in Sir John Moore’s retreat, when all attempts to blow up stone bridges … made by officers of the Corps, myself amongst others, failed … with the exception of only one, which Lieutenant Davy, a very promising young officer, succeeded in completely destroying, but at the expense of his own life, which he lost from not understanding the very simple precautions necessary to insure the safety of the person who fires the train of the mine. For my part, I should not have even known how to make a battery in the attack on Copenhagen, the first siege in which I was employed, but from the information I derived from a French book on the subject.52
Jones made a similar point in the preface of his book on the sieges during the Peninsular War, ‘In the English language there exists not a single original treatise on sieges; all our knowledge of them is obtained from foreign writers’.53
Analysis of the movements of officers on these campaigns shows that there was a small number who repeatedly took part in operations and these officers came to know each other very well and trusted the judgement and discretion of their peers. Their letters over the period on occasions display an almost incandescent rage at the bad planning and organisation of engineering activities. The early years of the nineteenth century saw these officers talking amongst themselves about what needed to be changed. There was recognition that change at home was going to be very slow and they began to discuss how they could make progress themselves. Pasley described how this small group of officers responded to the challenge. The instigator appeared to be Charles Lefebure, who proposed forming a group to foster ideas and knowledge. When Lefebure was killed in April 1810, Burgoyne seems to have taken up the challenge. This was no easy task, as many of the officers were in different locations and planning was over an extended period by letter. In 1810 the ‘Society for Procuring Useful Military Information’ was formed with an initial membership of six, made up of John Burgoyne, Sebastian Dickenson, George Ross, Edmund Mulcaster, John Jones and John Squire.54 Its aim was the ‘encouragement of military study and engineering’.55 Membership was by invitation only and restricted to officers ‘as are inclined to be of the same way of thinking with ourselves’.56 One unexpected omission from the initial group was Charles Pasley. He was a logical choice for membership, even if it was for the sole reason of having a UK-based supporter who could collate, disseminate and promote information on the Society’s behalf. The probable reason why Pasley was not amongst the founder members was because he was recovering from the injuries he received at Walcheren. Also omitted from the group were the senior engineers in the Peninsula during the period, Richard Fletcher and Howard Elphinstone. Elphinstone was, by this time, back in England, but Fletcher’s omission is more surprising. Very little correspondence has survived on the activities of this group. What is clear, however, is the recognition of the need to share experiences and to improve effectiveness in the Corps. That no senior officers were invited to join indicates that the membership did not feel they shared its views.
What is clear is that the skills of the engineers and artificers at the end of the Napoleonic Wars were far greater than they were at the start. The British had a trained and experienced mobile force that was able to meet the demands of the army in 1815 and the years beyond. The demobilisation after the wars slowly eroded this position and the forces that headed for the Crimea thirty-five years later appeared to have forgotten most of what was learnt.
Notes
Abbreviations Used in the Notes
BL = British Library
NA = National Archives
REM = Royal Engineers’ Museum
WD = Wellington’s Dispatches
WSD = Wellington’s Supplementary Dispatches
Acknowledgements
1. Page, Intelligence Officer in the Peninsula: Letters & Diaries of Major the Hon. Edward Charles Cocks 1786-1812.
2. Pen & Sword, 2006.
Introduction
1. NA WO55/977, Letter from Captain Howard Elphinstone, dated 31 July 1808.
2. This is the establishment number, not the actual number of officers serving.
3. Forbes, History of the Army Ordnance Services, Vol. 1, p. 173.
4. Ward, The School of Military Engineering 1812-1909, Chatham, 1909, p. 4.
5. Pasley, Course of instruction originally composed for the use of the Royal Engineer Department, Vol. 2, p. iv.
Chapter 1
1. REM 4201-274, Elphinstone to his wife, 27 July 1808.
2. REM 4201-274, Elphinstone to his wife, 6 August 1808.
3. Landmann, Recollections of Military Life, Vol. 2, pp. 93–5.
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid, p. 126.
6. Ibid, p. 127.
7. Ibid, p. 300.
8. REM 4201-274, Elphinstone to his wife, 21 August 1808.
9. NA WO55/977, Landmann to Morse, 17 August 1808 (should be 18 August).
10. NA WO55/977, Landmann to Morse, Vimeiro, 21 August 1808.
11. Landmann, Recollections of Military Life, Vol. 2, pp. 310–12.
12. NA WO55/977, Fletcher to Morse, 7 September 1808. A British Pound (£) was made up of 20 Shillings (s).
13. Burnham & McGuigan, The British Army against Napoleon, p. 146. Also, Haldane, Official Letters, p. 125.
14. NA WO55/977, Fletcher to Morse, Amity Transport, 27 July 1808.
15. NA WO55/977, Fletcher to Morse, Oeyras, 7 September 1808.
16. Most references to Fletcher’s children mention five, not six. I have used six on the basis that Fletcher himself mentions six in a letter dated 27 July 1808. Two of the children died young and this may account for the discrepancy.
17. NA WO55/977, Fletcher to Morse, 8 October 1808.
18. NA WO55/1561, Fletcher to Morse, 22 October 1808.
19. NA WO55/1561/4.
20. NA WO55/1561, Fletcher to Morse, 22 October 1808.
21. NA WO55/1561/9 Burgoyne’s report en route from Alhandra to Almeida.
22. NA WO55/958 Fletcher to Mann, Abrantes, 1 November 1808.
23. NA WO55/977, Fletcher to Morse, 26 November 1808.
24. NA WO55/958, Burgoyne to Fletcher, 23 November 1808.
25. BL Add63106, ff. 9-10, Squire to Bunbury, 10 September 1810.
26. Castlereagh, Correspondence, Vol. 6, pp. 371–2, 381. The original order from Castlereagh to Dyer, Roche and Patrick dated 19 June 1808. Doyle ordered out 2 July 1808 to accompany released Spanish prisoners.
27. These details taken from Fortescue, British Army, Vol. 6, pp. 256–60. These officers included Colonel Sir Thomas Dyer, Major Roche, Captain Patrick, Colonel Charles Doyle, Captain Whittingham and Major Cox.
28. Castlereagh, Correspondence, Vol. 6, pp. 416–18.
29. Castlereagh, Correspondence, Vol. 6, p. 413.
30. Leith-Hay, Narrative of the Peninsular War, 2nd edition, London, 1834.
31. Ibid, Vol. 1, pp. 16–17.
32. BL Add MS41961, f. 92, Pasley to Yorke, 30 August 1808, Castlereagh’s letter was dated 26 August 1808. NA WO55/977 Pasley to Morse (probably), 1 September 1808. NA WO55/977 C.W. Pasley to Morse (probably), 1 September 1808.
33. BL Add MS41962, f. 184, Pasley to his brother, 10 February 1809.
34. Leith-Hay, Narrative of the Peninsular War, Vol. 1, p. 19.
35. Ibid, p. 22.
36. Ibid, pp. 28–32.
37. NAM 7004-16 f. 4, Pasley to
Baird, 1? October 1808.
38. Fortescue, British Army, Vol. 6, p. 270.
39. NA WO55/977, Lefebure to Morse, Santander, 7 September 1808.
40. Leith-Hay, Narrative of the Peninsular War, Vol. 1, p. 33
41. NA WO55/977, Pasley to Handfield, 21 October 1808.
42. Fortescue, British Army, Vol. 6, p. 277.
43. Ibid, pp. 300–3.
44. NA WO30-35-1, Carmichael-Smyth to Baird, 24 November 1808.
45. NA WO55/977, Pasley to Handfield, 21 October 1808.
46. NA WO55/977, Jones to Handfield, 6 November 1808.
47. BL ADD41962, f. 98, Pasley Papers.
48. NAM 7004-16 f. 2, Birch to unknown correspondent, 3 November 1808.
49. NA WO55/977, Jones to Handfield, 6 November 1808.
50. NA WO55/977, Pasley to Lefebure, 4 November 1808.
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