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by Meghan L. O'Sullivan


  The volume of exports nearly doubled: Ibid.

  Unless politicians take steps: International Energy Agency, Energy Policies Beyond IEA Countries—Mexico 2017, 2017, 119, https://www.eia.org/publications/freepublications/publication/EnergyPoliciesBeyondIEACountriesMexico2017.pdf.

  this will help Mexico: “New U.S. border-crossing pipelines bring shale gas to more regions in Mexico,” U.S. Energy Information Administration, December 1, 2016, https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=28972.

  In 2014, Mexican industries paid: See “The Power and the Glory,” Economist, July 5, 2014, http://www.economist.com/news/americas/21606269-foreigners-enthuse-over-enrique-pe-nietos-reforms-mexicans-are-warier-power-and. Since this time, electricity prices in Mexico have abated somewhat.

  As a result, high-energy-intensive industries: Ibid.

  These scholars envision that: Jorge Alvarez and Fabian Valencia, “Made in Mexico: Energy Reform and Manufacturing Growth,” WP/15/45, International Monetary Fund, Western Hemisphere Department, February 2015, 12, https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2015/wp1545.pdf.

  This gathering, boisterous as it was: “Millions Join Anti-war Protests Worldwide,” BBC News, February 17, 2003, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/2765215.stm.

  The Rome protest reportedly involved: “Largest Anti-War Rally,” Guinness World Records, archived from the original on September 4, 2004, http://web.archive.org/web/20040904214302/http:/www.guinnessworldrecords.com/content_pages/record.asp?recordid=54365.

  Speaking to London’s largest: “Millions Join Anti-war Protests Worldwide,” BBC News, February 17, 2003, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/2765215.stm.

  Academics writing about the date: Stefaan Walgrave and Dieter Rucht, “Introduction,” in The World Says No to War: Demonstrations Against the War in Iraq, ed. Stefaan Walgrave and Dieter Rucht (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2010), xiii.

  To understand why, it is important: See Meghan L. O’Sullivan, “The Entanglement of Energy, Grand Strategy, and International Security,” in The Handbook of Global Energy Policy, ed. Andreas Goldthau (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 2013).

  Hilter’s generals once presented him: James Marriott and Mika Minio-Paluello, The Oil Road: Journeys from the Caspian Sea to the City of London (London: Verso, 2013), 129.

  Foreign investment in the development: The ownership of Kuwaiti natural resources by foreign companies is prohibited under the Kuwaiti constitution. This has been interpreted to prevent common product-sharing agreements that international oil firms prefer when making major investments. Jareer Elass, “Domestic Politics Slow Kuwait’s Oil Production Expansion Plans,” Arab Weekly, June 19, 2016, www.thearabweekly.com/Economy/5512/Domestic-politics-slow-Kuwait%E2%80%99s-oil-production-expansion-plans.

  A large part of the rationale: Iraq and Kuwait comprised one-fifth (19.7 percent) of the world’s proved crude oil reserves at the time. “Crude Oil Proved Reserves 2014,” U.S. Energy Information Administration, 2014, www.eia.gov/cfapps/ipdbproject/iedindex3.cfm?tid=5&pid=57&aid=6&cid=regions&syid=1991&eyid=1991&unit=BB.

  If it had, such an invasion: The reserve of Iraq, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia were 45.7 percent of global reserves at the time. Derived from ibid.

  In 2015, U.S. tight oil: “Crude Oil and Natural Gas Proved Reserves, Year-end 2015,” U.S. Energy Information Administration, December 14, 2016, https://www.eia.gov/naturalgas/crudeoilreserves/#4; “International Energy statistics,” U.S. Energy Administration, https://www.eia.gov/beta/international.

  In 2016, U.S. crude production: “International Liquids: Crude Oil Prices: Brent,” Annual Energy Outlook 2017, U.S. Energy Information Administration, https://www.eia.gov/outlooks/aeo/data/browser/#/?id=19-AEO2017®ion=0-0&cases=ref2017&start=2015&end=2017&f=A&linechart=ref2017-d120816a.4-19-AEO2017&sourcekey=0; “Oil and Gas: Crude Oil: Lower 48 Average Wellhead Price,” Annual Energy Outlook 2017, U.S. Energy Information Administration, https://www.eia.gov/outlooks/aeo/data/browser/#/?id=14-AEO2017&cases=ref2017&sourcekey=0.

  More immediately, the new energy abundance: “U.S. Forces Afghanistan Memorandum from General David Petraeus: Supporting the Mission with Operational Energy,” Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics,” June 7, 2011, http://www.acq.osd.mil/eie/Downloads/OE/U.S.%20Forces%20Afghanistan%20Memo%20Gen%20David%20Petraeus_06-07-11.pdf.

  The Pentagon is the largest: Jeremy Scahill, “Fueling War: Pentagon Still Buying Most of Its Oil and Gas from BP,” Nation, June 9, 2010, www.thenation.com/article/fueling-war-pentagon-still-buying-most-its-oil-and-gas-bp; Gregory J. Lengyel, Colonel, USAF, “Department of Defense Energy Strategy: Teaching an Old Dog New Tricks” (21st Century Defense Initiative, Foreign Policy Studies, The Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C., August 2007), 7, https://web.archive.org/web/20140529175335/http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2007/8/defense%20lengyel/lengyel20070815.pdf.

  as of 2013: “International Energy Statistics,” U.S. Energy Information Administration; Defense Logistics Agency Energy, Fiscal Year 2015 Fact Book (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2015), 25–26.

  The Pentagon’s oil intake: Paul Dimotakis et al., “Reducing DoD Fossil-Fuel Dependence” (McLean, VA: The MITRE Corporation, September 2006), 13, https://fas.org/irp/agency/dod/jason/fossil.pdf.

  In 2007, when American forces: “Factbox—US Military Fuel Spending,” Reuters, March 20, 2008, www.reuters.com/article/2008/03/20/idUSN20416568.

  In 2013, the Pentagon consumed virtually: “International Energy Statistics,” U.S. Energy Information Administration. In 2014, the Nigerian economy overtook the South African one as the continent’s largest economy.

  For instance, the Arleigh Burke: Peter Hoy, “The World’s Biggest Fuel Consumer,” Forbes, June 5, 2008, https://www.forbes.com/2008/06/05/mileage-military-vehicles-tech-logistics08-cz_ph_0605fuel.html; Daniel Engber, “FYI: What Kind of Gas Mileage Can You Get From a Naval Warship?” Popular Science, October 17, 2012, www.popsci.com/technology/article/2012-09/fyi-what-kind-of-mileage-can-you-get-naval-warship.

  During World War II: “U.S. military in Iraq fuels the gouge of fuel costs,” NBC News, April 2, 2008, www.nbcnews.com/id/23922063/ns/world_news_mideast_n_africa/t/us-military-iraq-fuels-gouge-fuel-costs/.

  In Iraq, where heavy equipment: Ibid.

  In the late 2000s, the Pentagon changed: “Seven Step FBCF Methodology and the JLTV,” The DoD Energy Blog: Rethinking Military Power, July 9, 2009, www.dodenergy.blogspot.com/2009/07/seven-step-fbcf-methodology-and-jltv.html.

  In some of the most remote: Defense Science Board, Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on DoD Energy Strategy: ‘More Fight—Less Fuel’ (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, February 2008), 30, http://www.acq.osd.mil/dsb/reports/2000s/ADA477619.pdf.

  In the fiscal year of 2013: Defense Logistics Agency Energy, Fiscal Year 2015 Fact Book (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, 2015), 25–26, http://www.dla.mil/Portals/104/Documents/Energy/Publications/E_Fiscal2015FactBookLowResolution_160707.pdf?ver=2016-07-08-124636-630.

  Two years later, the costs: Ibid.

  The $6 billion saved: “Military Expenditure by Country, in Constant (2015) US$ m., 1988–1996,” Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 2017, https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/Milex-constant-2015-USD.pdf.

  As former Deputy Secretary: Bill Lynn, “Energy for the War Fighter: The Department of Defense Operational Energy Strategy,” The White House Barack Obama, June 14, 2011, https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/blog/2011/06/14/energy-war-fighter-department-defense-operational-energy-strategy.

  As Senator Jack Reed: Martin Matishak, “DOD Eyes Savings in Sinking Oil Prices,” The Hill, January 8, 2015, http://thehill.com/policy/defense/228849-dod-eyes-savings-in-sinking-oil-prices.

  2011, General David Petraeus: “U.S. Forces Afghanistan Memorandum from General David Petraeus: Supporting the Mission with Operational Energy,” Off
ice of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics,” June 7, 2011, http://www.acq.osd.mil/eie/Downloads/OE/U.S.%20Forces%20Afghanistan%20Memo%20Gen%20David%20Petraeus_06-07-11.pdf.

  In calling on his commanders: Ibid.

  With nearly half of all convoys: Gordon Feller, “Casualty Costs of Fuel and Water Resupply Convoys in Afghanistan and Iraq,” February 26, 2010, Army Technology.com, www.army-technology.com/features/feature77200.

  One study by the army: David S. Eady, Steven B. Siegel, R. Steven Bell, and Scott H. Dicke, “Sustain the Mission Project: Casualty Factors for Fuel and Water Resupply Convoys: Final Technical Report,” Army Environmental Policy Institute, September 2009, www.aepi.army.mil/docs/whatsnew/SMP_Casualty_Cost_Factors_Final1-09.pdf.

  Numbers in the same report: Gordon Feller, “Casualty Costs of Fuel and Water Resupply Convoys in Afghanistan and Iraq.”

  A second study concluded: Paul Skalny, director of the Army’s National Automotive Center, from William Matthews, “A Different Kind of Hybrid,” Defense News, November 2, 2009; Schuyler Null, “Defense Sustainability: Energy Efficiency and the Battlefield,” Global Green USA, February 2010, 13, https://static1.squarespace.com/static/5548ed90e4b0b0a763d0e704/t/55548eb1e4b0df117522923c/1431604913196/publication-112-1.pdf.

  Such statistics put in context: Chief Warrant Officer 2 Kenneth Hudak, “Lengthening the Tether of Fuel in Afghanistan,” U.S. Army, March 6, 2013, https://www.army.mil/article/97879/Lengthening_the_Tether_of_Fuel_in_Afghanistan/.

  Early one morning in January: The source of this anecdote and a fuller examination of Levey’s efforts can be found at: Robin Wright, “Stuart Levey’s War,” New York Times Magazine, October 31, 2008, www.nytimes.com/2008/11/02/magazine/02IRAN-t.html?pagewanted=all.

  “That could spark the right”: Ibid.

  With the backing of the highest echelons: Ibid.

  Iran’s oil exports fell 60 percent: Kenneth Katzman, Iran Sanctions (CRS Report No. 7-5700) (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2016), 55, https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RS20871.pdf.

  Tehran’s financial difficulties were compounded: In December 2011, as part of a defense authorization act, Congress passed a provision that essentially forced banks to make a choice between doing business with Iran’s central bank, or maintaining or opening accounts in the United States. This provision was critical, as oil importers used the central bank to pay Iran hard currency for its oil exports. In March 2012, Iranian banks were disconnected from the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication (SWIFT), further frustrating efforts to conduct transactions in hard currency. Ibid., 20, 41, 50.

  The rial, Iran’s currency: Facts from ibid., 56.

  Before sanctions proved so critical: Dick Kirschten, “Chicken Soup Diplomacy,” National Journal, January 4, 1997, 13–17, http://archives.usaengage.org/archives/news/970104nj.html.

  Efforts to corral others: These secondary sanctions were devised by Congress, not the executive branch. Europe threatened to bring any imposition of such sanctions to the World Trade Organization. See “EU Regrets Extension of US Sanctions Law Against Iran and Libya: Statement by Commissioner for External Relations, Chris Patten,” European Commission Press Release Database, July 31, 2001, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-01-1162_en.htm.

  Efforts to marginalize Iran: International Energy Agency, Key World Energy Statistics 2007 (Paris: OECD Publishing, 2007), 11, 23, www.coprocem.com/documents/key_stats_2007.pdf.

  Some analysts even suggested: “Broad economic sanctions, comparable to the isolation of Iraq in the 1990s, are no longer feasible. Unlike the cheap oil of the 1990s, oil prices today are at or near record levels. Given tight global supplies, Iran has greater leverage to counter sanction [sic] major oil consuming nations by cutting back its oil exports. Few producing nations have the spare capacity to increase shipments to offset potential Iranian cutbacks, so prices would likely rise sharply. Iran would sell less . . . and earn more.” Statement by Jeffrey J. Schott, “Economic Sanctions, Oil, and Iran,” Hearing on “Energy and the Iranian Economy” before the Joint Economic Committee, 109th Cong. (July 25, 2006), www.iranwatch.org/sites/default/files/us-congress-jec-schott-iran-energy-072506.pdf. Also see Thijs Van de Graaf, “The ‘Oil Weapon’ Reversed? Sanctions Against Iran and U.S.-EU Structural Power,” The Middle East Policy Council 20, no. 3 (Fall 2013), www.mepc.org/oil-weapon-reversed-sanctions-against-iran-and-us-eu-structural-power?print.

  As the perception of the threat: UN Resolutions 1737, 1747, and 1803 imposed sanctions on Iran’s nuclear program and weapons of mass destruction infrastructure.

  As Tom Donilon, former national: See “A Review of the ‘Asia Rebalance’ and a Preview of the President’s Trip to the Region: A Conversation with Thomas E. Donilon,” March 6, 2014, transcript, The Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C., https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2014/02/20140306_donilon_asia_transcript.pdf.

  The late 2009 exposure of Fordo: Julian Borger and Patrick Wintour, “Why Iran Confessed to Secret Nuclear Site Built Inside Mountain,” Guardian, September 25, 2009, www.theguardian.com/world/2009/sep/25/iran-nuclear-uranium-enrichment-intelligence; William J. Broad, “Nuclear Plant in Iranian Desert Emerges as Flash Point in Talks,” New York Times, April 3, 2015, www.nytimes.com/2015/04/04/world/middleeast/nuclear-plant-in-iranian-desert-emerges-as-flash-point-in-talks.html?_r=0; Karen DeYoung and Michael D. Shear, “US, Allies Say Iran Has Secret Nuclear Facility,” Washington Post, September 26, 2009, www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/09/25/AR2009092500289_2.html?sid=ST2009092601752.

  To make matters worse: “Growth of the Real Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in the European Union and the Euro Area from 2010 to 2020 (Compared to the Previous Year),” Statista, www.statista.com/statistics/267898/gross-domestic-product-gdp-growth-in-eu-and-euro-area/.

  While Donilon and his national: Donilon recounted this tension in a public event at the Brookings Institution on March 6, 2014, “A Review of the ‘Asia Rebalance’ and a Preview of the President’s Trip to the Region: A Conversation with Thomas E. Donilon.”

  Burgeoning U.S. tight oil production: See Daniel Yergin, “America’s Unconventional Revolution, Energy Security and Innovation,” Manufacturing Engineering, July 10, 2013, www.sme.org/MEMagazine/Article.aspx?id=74235&taxid=1476#sthash.mFCVB2ql.dpuf.

  In Beijing, New Delhi, and Tokyo: See, for example, “Saudi Arabia Issues Oil-Supply Assurance,” Daily Star Lebanon, January 31, 2012, www.dailystar.com.lb/Business/Middle-East/2012/Jan-31/161641-saudi-arabia-issues-oil-supply-assurance.ashx; CNN Wire Staff, “Oil Minister: Saudi Arabia Can Make Up for Iranian Crude,” CNN, January 17, 2012, www.cnn.com/2012/01/16/world/meast/saudi-oil-production/; Ayesha Daya, “Saudi Arabia Can Raise Output 25% if Needed, Naimi Says,” Bloomberg, March 20, 2012, www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2012-03-20/saudi-arabia-can-increase-oil-output-25-if-needed-naimi-says.

  U.S. officials were also armed: See James Hamilton, “US Tight Oil Production Surging,” Econbrowser, December 22, 2013, http://econbrowser.com/archives/2013/12/us_tight_oil_pr.

  A provision in U.S. legislation: See National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-81, 125 Stat. 1298 (2011), https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/Programs/Documents/ndaa_publaw.pdf.

  Europe instituted its own ban: Justyna Pawlak and Parisa Hafezi, “Exclusive: EU Agrees to Embargo on Iranian Crude,” Reuters, January 4, 2012, www.reuters.com/article/2012/01/04/us-iran-idUSTRE8031DI20120104. The ban came into effect on July 1, 2012.

  Tokyo was initially unenthusiastic: See Irina Mironova, “Japan Weighs the Pros and Cons of Imposing Sanctions on Russia,” Russia Direct, September 19, 2014, www.russia-direct.org/analysis/japan-weighs-pros-and-cons-imposing-sanctions-russia; Aaron Sheldrick, “Japan Is Worried That Western Sanctions on Russia Would Hurt Tokyo,” Business Insider, March 5, 2014, www.businessinsider.com/r-japans-embrace-of-russia-under-threat-with-ukraine-crisis-2014-05.

  At the tim
e, Russia was the fourth: Alexander Martin, “Japan Announces Fresh Russia Sanctions,” Wall Street Journal, September 24, 2014, www.wsj.com/articles/japan-announces-new-russia-sanctions-1411553420.

  The amount of natural gas: Japan increased its LNG imports from Russia by 40 percent, from 6.0 million tons in 2010 to 8.4 million tons in 2014.

  The two had met five times: Michael Lipin, “Why is Japan’s Abe Seeking Better Ties with Russia’s Putin?” VOA News, February 12, 2014, http://www.voanews.com/a/why-is-abe-seeking-better-ties-with-russia-putin/1850393.html.

  Nevertheless, despite Tokyo’s wariness: Alexander Martin, “Japan Announces Fresh Russia Sanctions,” Wall Street Journal, September 24,2014, www.wsj.com/articles/japan-announces-new-russia-sanctions-1411553420; “Japan Steps Up Sanctions as Tensions Rise with Russia,” BBC News, September 24, 2014, www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-29345451.

  In their book, Economic Sanctions Reconsidered: Gary Clyde Hufbauer, Jeffrey J. Schott, Kimberly Ann Elliott, and Barbara Oegg, Economic Sanctions Reconsidered, 2nd rev. ed., 2 vols. (Washington, DC: Peterson Institute for International Economics, 1990).

  University of Chicago professor Robert Pape: Robert A. Pape, “Why Economic Sanctions Do Not Work,” International Security 22, no. 2 (Fall 1997): 90–136, https://www.jstor.org/stable/2539368?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents; Robert A. Pape, “Why Economic Sanctions Still Do Not Work,” International Security 23, no. 1 (Summer 1998): 66–77, https://www.jstor.org/stable/2539263?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents.

  While its rejuvenated use may pertain: See Meghan L. O’Sullivan, Shrewd Sanctions: Statecraft and State Sponsors of Terrorism (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 2003).

  Six: Soft Powering Up

  Writing in 1990, Joe Nye: Joseph S. Nye, Jr., “Soft Power and American Foreign Policy,” Political Science Quarterly 119, no. 2 (Summer 2004): 255–70.

 

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