by David Grier
HITLER|DÖNITZ
AND THE BALTIC SEA
HITLER|DÖNITZ
AND THE BALTIC SEA
THE THIRD REICH’S LAST HOPE, 1944–1945
HOWARD D. GRIER
Naval Institute Press
Annapolis, Maryland
The latest edition of this work has been brought to publication with the generous assistance of Marguerite and Gerry Lenfest.
Naval Institute Press
291 Wood Road
Annapolis, MD 21402
© 2007 by Howard D. Grier
All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying and recording, or by any information storage and retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publisher.
ISBN 978-1-61251-413-0 (eBook)
The Library of Congress has cataloged the hardcover edition as follows:
Grier, Howard D., 1955–
Hitler, Dönitz, and the Baltic Sea : the Third Reich’s last hope, 1944–1945/by Howard D. Grier.
p. cm.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
1. World War, 1939–1945—Campaigns—Baltic Sea Region. 2. World War,
1939–1945—Germany. I. Title.
D764.7.B3G73 2007
940.54’21479—dc22
2007000557
Print editions meet the requirements of ANSI/NISO z39.48-1992 (Permanence of Paper).
141312111009080798765432
First printing
For Sandy and Anna Mei
Table of Contents
List of Maps
Acknowledgments
Dramatis Personae
Introduction
CHAPTER 1The Retreat: From Leningrad to Narva
CHAPTER 2The German Collapse in the Summer of 1944
CHAPTER 3The Retreat to Courland
CHAPTER 4The Struggle for the Baltic Isles
CHAPTER 5Army Group Courland, October 1944–May 1945
CHAPTER 6Memel, Prussia, and Pomerania
CHAPTER 7Courland, East Prussia, and West Prussia: Bastions or Bridgeheads?
CHAPTER 8The Swedish Question
CHAPTER 9The U-boat War, the Baltic Sea, and Norway
CHAPTER 10Hitler and Dönitz
Conclusions
Notes
Bibliography
Index
Maps
Map 1: The Retreat from Leningrad
Map 2: The Gulf of Finland
Map 3: The Soviet 1944 Summer Offensive
Map 4: The Retreat from Estonia
Map 5: The Withdrawal to Courland (Front Line 10 October 1944)
Map 6: The Baltic Isles
Map 7: Courland
Map 8: East and West Prussia
Note on geographic terms: In general, German terms for cities and geographic locations are used throughout the text. The maps provide current names with the German term in parentheses.
Acknowledgments
IN THE PREPARATION of this work I have benefited from the kind assistance of many people. I am particularly indebted to the staff of several archival institutions: the Bundesarchiv/Militärarchiv in Freiburg-im-Breisgau, particularly Herr Moritz and Dr. Maierhöfer; the Bundesarchiv in Berlin-Lichterfelde; Manuela Vack at the Bundesarchiv Koblenz; Karin Popp of Munich’s Institut für Zeitgeschichte; Harry Riley at the National Archives; the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum; Kathy Lloyd and Ken Johnson at the Washington Navy Yard’s Naval Operational Archives; and Dr. Erik Norberg of the Kungl. Krigsarchiv in Stockholm, who went far beyond the call of duty. Herr Dipl. Ing. Peter Schörner kindly granted the author permission to examine his father’s papers. I am grateful to Erskine College’s Faculty Development Committee for granting funds for archival research and the preparation of maps. The interlibrary borrowing departments of McCain Library at Erskine, particularly Sara Morrison, and of Davis Library at UNC-Chapel Hill provided invaluable assistance in obtaining books and microfilm used in this study.
Professor Gerhard L. Weinberg has been extremely helpful in providing guidance on this project from its inception as an M.A. thesis. His vast knowledge of the Nazi period and its sources prevented the author from making innumerable blunders, and his gentle but persistent prodding to publish the manuscript is greatly appreciated. Professors Willis Brooks, David Griffiths, Donald Reid, and Russel van Wyk offered helpful comments and suggestions on the dissertation that forms the basis of this study. Also of great value were observations from fellow graduate students David Yelton, Norm Goda, Doris Bergen, and Sandra Chaney. Professor Charles Thomas kindly read portions of the revised manuscript and offered helpful suggestions. Dr. Hans Engler deciphered some of Admiral Meisel’s handwriting and improved the author’s translation of a speech by Admiral Dönitz. Thanks are also due to my departmental colleagues at Erskine College: Sandra Chaney, Nancy Erickson, Gary Freeze, Jim Gettys, the late Bill Kuykendall, and Don Weatherman. I am also grateful to my students at Erskine, whose questions and comments have helped me to strive to be more clear and concise. I appreciate the assistance of Mark Gatlin of the Naval Institute Press for patiently guiding me through the process of publication, and that of Chris Robinson for creating the maps. I am also deeply grateful to Mr. Edward S. Miller for his generous contribution to help defray the cost of publication.
Richard, Erika, Vera, Ingrid, and Harald Müller of Eskilstuna, Sweden, provided friendship and sustenance, as well as tutoring in the Swedish language, with the greatest possible hospitality. I especially appreciate the support of my parents, Dr. John M. and the late Marjorie D. Grier, for their support. Finally, I am most of all indebted to my wife Sandy, who read much of the manuscript and offered valuable suggestions, and to my daughter Anna Mei, who has taught me that there are many things more important than history. All errors, of course, are mine, and any benefit derived from this work is due in great part to those listed above.
Dramatis Personae
Assmann, Capt. Heinz: naval operations officer on Armed Forces High Command operations staff, August 1943–May 1945
Blanc, Cdr. Adalbert von: commander of Ninth Escort Division, October 1944–May 1945
Boheman, Erik: secretary-general at the Swedish Foreign Ministry
Bonin, Col. Bogislaw von: head of OKH’s operations section, September 1944–January 1945
Burchardi, Adm. Theodor: Admiral Ostland, November 1941–June 1944; Commanding Admiral Eastern Baltic, June 1944–April 1945
Conrady, Capt. Heinz-Dietrich von: naval liaison officer to Army General Staff, August 1944–May 1945
Dönitz, Grand Adm. Karl: commander in chief of the German navy, January 1943–April 1945; Reich president, May 1945
Engelhardt, Rear Adm. Konrad: head of the Navy’s Shipping Department; sea transport chief of the Wehrmacht, January 1944–May 1945
Foertsch, Gen. Friedrich: Chief of Staff, Eighteenth Army, December 1943–January 1945; Chief of Staff, Army Group Courland, January–May 1945
Forshell, Anders: Swedish naval attaché to Berlin
Friedeburg, Adm. Hans-Georg von: commanding admiral for U-boats, February 1943–April 1945; commander in chief of the German navy, May 1945
Friessner, Gen. Hans: Commander, Army Detachment Narva, May–July 1944; Commander, Army Group North, July 1944
Fuchs, Adm. Werner: chief of the Main Office for Warship Construction, 1939–November 1944
Gehlen, Gen. Reinhard: chief of Army Eastern Military Intelligence (Foreign Armies East), April 1942–March 1945
Gersdorff, Gen. Curt-Ulrich von: Army Group North operations officer, July 1943–October 1944; Chief of Staff, Sixteenth Army, October 194
4–May 1945
Godt, Rear Adm. Eberhard: chief of Operations Department, U-boat Command, March 1943–May 1945
Göring, Reich Marshal Hermann: Commander in Chief, German Air Force
Gollnick, Gen. Hans: commander of XXVIII Army Corps in Memel, October 1944–January 1945; commander of Army Detachment Samland, February–March 1945
Grasser, Gen. Anton: commander of Army Detachment Narva/Grasser, July–October 1944
Guderian, Gen. Heinz: chief of Army General Staff, July 1944–March 1945
Halder, Gen. Franz: chief of Army General Staff, 1938–September 1942
Heidkämper, Gen. Otto: Chief of Staff, Army Group Center/North, September 1944–January 1945
Heinrici, Gen. Gotthard: commander of Army Group Vistula, March–April 1945
Hessler, Cdr. Günter: staff officer (Operations) to Flag Officer Commanding U-boats, 1941–1945; Dönitz’s son-in-law
Heusinger, Gen. Adolf: chief of Army General Staff’s Operations Department, October 1940–July 1944
Hilpert, Gen. Carl: commander of Army Group Courland, April–May 1945
Hossbach, Gen. Friedrich: commander of Fourth Army, January 1945
Jodl, Gen. Alfred: chief of Armed Forces operations staff, 1939–1945
Juhlin-Dannfelt, Curt: Swedish military attaché to Berlin, 1933–1945
Keitel, Field Marshal Wilhelm: chief of Armed Forces High Command, 1938–1945
Kinzel, Gen. Eberhard: Army Group North chief of staff, December 1942–July 1944
Küchler, Field Marshal Georg von: commander of Army Group North, January 1942–January 1944
Kummetz, Adm. Oskar: commander of Naval High Command, Baltic, March 1944–May 1945
Leeb, Field Marshal Wilhelm Ritter von: commander of Army Group North, June 1941–January 1942
Lindemann, Gen. Georg: commander of Eighteenth Army, January 1942–March 1944; commander of Army Group North, March–July 1944
Mannerheim, Marshal Carl Gustav: Finnish commander in chief, 1939–1946; Finnish president, August 1944–1946
Manteuffel, Gen. Hasso von: commander of Third Panzer Army, March–May 1945
Meisel, Adm. Wilhelm: Skl chief of staff, February 1943–April 1944; chief of Skl, May 1944–May 1945
Merker, General Director Otto: head of Central Board for Ship Construction, 1943–1945
Model, Field Marshal Walter: commander of Army Group North, January–March 1944
Müller, Gen. Friedrich-Wilhelm: commander of Fourth Army, January–April 1945
Natzmer, Gen. Oldwig von: Chief of Staff, Army Group North/Courland, July 1944–January 1945; Chief of Staff, Army Group Center/North, January–February 1945
Oehrn, Cdr. Victor: Skl operations officer, October 1944–May 1945
Oelfken, Naval Construction Director Heinrich: head of Glückauf Construction Office, July 1943–September 1944; head of U-boat department in Office for Warship Construction, September 1944–May 1945
Puttkamer, Rear Adm. Karl-Jesko von: Hitler’s naval adjutant, October 1939–April 1945
Raus, Gen. Erhard: commander of Third Panzer Army, August 1944–March 1945
Raeder, Grand Adm. Erich: commander in chief of the German navy, October 1928–January 1943
Reinhardt, Gen. Hans: commander of Third Panzer Army, October 1941–August 1944; commander of Army Group Center/North, August 1944–January 1945
Rendulic, Gen. Lothar: commander of Army Group North/Courland, January 1945 and March–April 1945; commander of Army Group Center/North January–March 1945
Ruge, Vice Adm. Friedrich: chief of the Navy’s Warship Construction Office, November 1944–May 1945
Saucken, Gen. Dietrich von: commander of Second Army/Army of East Prussia, March–May 1945
Schmundt, Adm. Hubert: commander of Naval High Command, Baltic, March 1943–February 1944
Schörner, Field Marshal Ferdinand: commander of Army Group North, July 1944–January 1945
Sköld, Per Edvin: Swedish defense minister
Speer, Albert: Minister for Armaments and War Production, 1942–1945
Thiele, Vice Adm. August: commander, Second Task Force, July 1944–April 1945, Commanding Admiral Eastern Baltic, April–May 1945
Thörnell, Gen. Olof: supreme commander of Sweden’s armed forces to the end of March 1944
Uthmann, Gen. Bruno von: German military attaché in Stockholm, 1938–1945
Vietinghoff, Gen. Heinrich-Gottfried von: commander of Army Group Courland, January–March 1945
Voss, Vice Adm. Hans-Erich: permanent naval representative to Hitler (Admiral Führer Headquarters), March 1943–April 1945
Wagner, Rear Adm. Gerhard: head of Skl’s Operations Department, June 1941–June 1944; Admiral on Special Duty, June 1944–May 1945
Walter, Professor Dr. Hellmuth: German submarine designer
Wangenheim, Adm. Hubert: Skl operations officer, 1941–October 1944
Warlimont, Gen. Walter: deputy chief of Armed Forces operations staff, 1939–September 1944
Weiss, Gen. Walter: commander of Second Army, February 1943–March 1945; commander of Army Group Center/North, March–April 1945
Wenck, Gen. Walter: head of OKH’s Operations Department, July–September 1944; head of OKH’s Command Group, September 1944–February 1945
Weygold, Capt. Konrad: naval liaison officer to Army General Staff, November 1941–April 1944
Zeitzler, Gen. Kurt: chief of the German Army General Staff, September 1942–July 1944
Introduction
TO ANY SUBMARINER, it was the dream of a lifetime. Adalbert Schnee, commanding the German submarine U-2511, peered through his periscope and saw the heavy cruiser Norfolk, a British warship of approximately ten thousand tons with a crew of 650. The U-boat slipped undetected within the cruiser’s screen of destroyers and reached a range of only five hundred yards. Yet Schnee did not issue the order to fire his torpedoes. The date was 4 May 1945, and earlier that day he had received orders to halt attacks on Allied vessels. Schnee’s U-boat, a sleek Type XXI on its first patrol, stealthily slipped away from the British task force and returned to its base in Norway. The Norfolk proceeded on its course, completely unaware that it had avoided possible destruction by a matter of only a few hours.
* * *
Not all strategies succeed; some fail completely. Although this appears obvious, some historians dismiss the notion that Hitler even had a strategy in 1944 and 1945. The popular conception of Hitler in the final years of the war is that of a deranged Führer who stubbornly demanded the defense of every foot of ground on all fronts and ordered hopeless attacks with nonexistent divisions. To imply that Hitler had a rational plan to win the war flies in the face of accepted interpretation. Yet the fact that a plan does not succeed does not mean that none existed. In fact, refusal to accept the possibility that Hitler had a strategy in the final years of the war is more striking than to assume the reverse. Most scholars agree that Hitler possessed a strategy in 1939, 1940, 1941, 1942, and possibly even 1943. Why would he suddenly discard plans to win the war in 1944 and 1945? The British had a strategy in the dark days of 1940 and 1941, and the United States developed plans to defeat Japan even as Japanese forces overran Allied positions in the Pacific in 1941 and 1942. Was Germany alone in neglecting to devise a strategy when its enemies held the initiative?
It is more reasonable to assume that Hitler still hoped to win the war and that he had some idea how to achieve this. Although we now know it proved unsuccessful in the end, piecing together such a strategy helps to answer lingering questions about German actions in the Third Reich’s final months. Some of the key evidence often used to demonstrate that Hitler had no strategy can be used to support an opposing interpretation. For example, between October 1944 and March 1945, over a million German soldiers were cut off from land contact with the rest of the front in coastal regions of Latvia, Lithuania, and eastern Germany. An additional 350,000 troops sat idle in Norway until Germany’s capitulation in May 1945. Could Hitler no
t have better used these men to defend Germany’s heartland? The standard interpretation for the emergence of the Courland pocket in Latvia, as well as those in East and West Prussia, and elsewhere, is simply that Hitler never permitted retreats. His insistence on holding the line everywhere meant that he could hold it nowhere, which represented no strategy at all. Many historians maintain that these examples in particular provide some of the best evidence that any strategy of Hitler’s actually best served the goals of the Allies.
Some historians who concede that Hitler had a strategy in the final years of the war assert that he fought on primarily in hopes of winning the war by unleashing Germany’s “miracle weapons.” Technological studies of the war tend to focus on rockets and jet aircraft as the most decisive of these weapons. Yet neither of these was a strategic offensive weapon. The Nazis launched the V-1 and V-2 rockets to strike terror into the hearts of their enemies and to exact vengeance for the destruction of German cities, but these weapons were not accurate enough to hit individual strategic targets. The main task of the jet aircraft, for their part, was defensive, to drive Allied bombers from the skies over Germany.
Hitler also had a third, often overlooked, miracle weapon in his arsenal. This was a new, technologically advanced submarine, the Type XXI, with which Admiral Karl Dönitz planned to regain the initiative in the Battle of the Atlantic. An offensive weapon with war-winning potential, the Type XXI was a true submarine rather than a submersible, and its speed and ability to remain underwater indefinitely rendered contemporary Allied antisubmarine tactics ineffective. With a fleet of these new U-boats Dönitz intended to starve Britain into submission and halt the shipment of American troops and supplies to Europe. But before these new submarines could be brought into action, they had to undergo trials and their crews had to be trained, which for geographic reasons was possible only in the eastern Baltic. If Dönitz was to revive the war at sea and turn the tide yet again in Germany’s favor, the Nazis had to control the Baltic and maintain possession of its ports. Norway’s retention was also essential, because it remained the only suitable location from which to launch the new U-boat war following the loss of Germany’s submarine bases in France in the summer of 1944.