by David Grier
As the situation at the front grew more critical, Assmann’s anxiety increased. On 19 July he reported that Hitler had refused permission for Army Group North’s retreat, for a variety of reasons: fear of Finland’s collapse, which would deprive Germany of its nickel supply and its position on the Gulfs of Finland and Bothnia; loss of unrestricted control of the Baltic, and thus the forfeiture of Swedish ore imports; loss of Estonian shale oil, which was unacceptable to the navy; and the elimination of Germany’s fleet and U-boat training bases in the Baltic. Assmann also confided that Heusinger did not believe Germany could hold East Prussia without Army Group North’s forces. If this were true, Assmann asserted, Army Group North’s withdrawal represented the lesser evil. Although abandoning the Gulf of Finland would offer the Soviets operational possibilities in the Baltic, it did not pose as great a threat as loss of the Bay of Danzig, which would almost wholly cripple training in the German Navy, particularly for its submarines. Moreover, if the Soviets severed Army Group North’s land contact with the Reich, Assmann doubted it could be supplied by sea in the long run.
Assmann also questioned whether the effects of Army Group North’s withdrawal would be as serious as Hitler feared. In view of Finland’s success in halting the Soviet offensive, he believed that the Finns would continue to fight if Germany explained the reasons for its withdrawal. To soothe their fears, he suggested the transfer of German divisions from the Narva front to reinforce Finland. Assmann also evaluated the threat the Soviet fleet posed as having been exaggerated and expressed confidence that German naval forces could maintain convoys to Sweden. In addition, he claimed that as long as Germany held East Prussia, it could control the Baltic for the navy’s vital requirements. To ensure this, he proposed that destroyers based in Norway, and possibly even the battleship Tirpitz, return to the Baltic. Assmann also contended that retention of the Bay of Danzig was more decisive for submarine training than was the coast of the Baltic States. In any event, he again warned that if the Soviets captured the Bay of Danzig, the navy’s maintenance of Army Group North’s supply by sea was unlikely. Assmann concluded with the recommendation that Adm. Gerhard Wagner (liaison between Dönitz and the Skl whenever Dönitz was absent) contact Heusinger, Model, and Friessner before Dönitz tried to convince Hitler that the army group should retreat, with the warning that time was of the essence.44 The next day, upon receiving Assmann’s evaluation, Dönitz declared that the critical issue was whether Army Group North’s withdrawal was necessary to protect Courland and East Prussia, and whether the retreat was still possible.45 Events in the next few hours, however, saw Dönitz shake off his despair and regain his former confidence.
The unsuccessful assassination attempt of 20 July brought Dönitz back to his former devotion to Hitler’s Durchhalt policy, the strategy of holding out. He was summoned to Hitler’s headquarters scarcely thirty minutes after the bomb’s detonation. As a member of Hitler’s inner circle, his presence was clearly required. Dönitz embraced Goebbels’s notion that the failure of the assassination attempt confirmed that “divine providence” favored Hitler. Dönitz issued an order to the navy: “We see in the salvation of our Führer renewed confirmation of the righteousness of our struggle. We will rally even closer around the Führer, we will fight even harder until victory is ours.”46 Dönitz was not alone in this belief. Goebbels also had experienced a crisis of confidence in the preceding weeks, but Hitler’s seemingly miraculous survival of the assassination attempt brought the propaganda minister back to his former trust in his Führer. Goebbels later referred to 20 July as “not only the deepest point of our crisis but also the key date of our rebirth.”47 Armaments Minister Albert Speer similarly described the failure of the plot as “the turning point in the struggle for survival, the turn toward victory, a victory that could only be won under the Führer.”48 Hitler too was reinvigorated by having escaped the blast relatively unharmed, convinced now that destiny would not prevent him from fulfilling his task of leading the German people to victory.49
One of Goebbels’s colleagues charged that during the summer crises, “traitors” had sent desperately needed fuel and weapons to the wrong sectors and that masses of troops had been held back in Germany despite shortages of men at the front. Himmler was correcting these matters, and now that the traitors had been exposed, it would not happen again. Other leaders in the Nazi Party believed also that this was the cause of Germany’s defeats.50 In other words, treacherous generals had been responsible for the summer’s catastrophes, not the enemy’s superiority or Hitler’s mistakes.
Guderian’s energy and optimism upon his appointment as chief of the Army General Staff immediately following 20 July impressed Dönitz. On several occasions Dönitz confidently predicted that Guderian would master the situation. In this connection, on 25 July he reversed his earlier order, commanding that Rotdorn and Weissdorn be viewed merely as precautionary measures and declaring that the navy had no thoughts of retreat.51 Dönitz was prepared to assist Guderian as much as possible in his efforts to restore the situation. Upon Admiral Eastern Baltic’s protest that Schörner had demanded two thousand naval troops for the land fighting, Dönitz replied that he had conferred with Guderian on this subject and that the navy would comply with Schörner’s orders. Dönitz insisted that it was of decisive importance to close the “Baltic Gap” whatever the cost, for the stabilization of the front in this sector was essential for the continuation of the war at sea. He added but one reservation—he would seek Hitler’s intervention in the event of interference with the interests of the U-boat war.52
Back to form, Dönitz once more embraced the policy of holding out at all costs. At the end of July, as Soviet forces practically roamed at will in the gap between Army Groups North and Center, Sea Commandant Latvia appealed for surface vessels to shell Russian units approaching Libau and pleaded for transports for an evacuation. The report of Soviet troops near Libau was incorrect; notwithstanding, Dönitz responded that he was to hold his post to the end. He repeated this order from Hitler’s headquarters, commanding that all naval units based on land were to defend ports to the last man unless they received explicit orders for evacuation.53 On 27 August Kummetz relayed a message from Admiral Eastern Baltic warning that Schörner had presumably attempted to convince Hitler to evacuate Estonia and suggesting that the navy exert all its influence to retain the Estonian coast. Dönitz wondered whether insisting that Estonia be held might increase the danger of losing Courland. He concluded that he did not need to discuss the matter again with Hitler, proclaiming, “The Führer is in complete control of the question of the Estonian coast’s importance for the conduct of the naval war in the Baltic in all its consequences.”54
At the end of August Meisel informed assembled naval commanders that the navy’s foremost mission on the Eastern Front was to support Army Group North in the Baltic States by shipping supplies, protecting against Soviet landings, and providing artillery support with the fleet’s heavy guns. In a very optimistic tone, he pointed out that the demonstration of German sea power in the Baltic had exerted a powerful political effect on Sweden and Finland, and he expressed confidence that the Finns would continue to fight. Echoing Hitler’s belief that the British were war weary, Meisel insisted that the navy’s primary task overall was to revive the tonnage war against England. Denying the Soviets access to the Baltic was a vital precondition for the war at sea and thus decisive to the entire conduct of the war.55 Meisel apparently had been influenced by Dönitz’s regained optimism, for scarcely a month earlier he had suggested implementing Weissdorn and Rotdorn.
Assmann’s prediction that Army Group North’s seaborne supply would be troublesome proved correct. Jodl warned the Skl on 25 July to make immediate preparations to supply Schörner’s forces temporarily by sea. The Skl’s shipping department estimated that the army group required a daily supply of 5,200 tons. Since Riga, Reval, Pernau, and Baltischport had a maximum capacity of 7,900 tons per day, if these ports remained in German hands supp
ly was certainly possible in that respect.56 Prior to Dönitz’s “reconversion” the Skl had reported that due to limitations of port facilities in the Reich, it could not deliver 5,000 tons daily by sea alone. A few days later, however, the Skl issued “corrected” figures claiming that German ports of embarkation could handle 8,500 tons per day.57
At the end of the month, when Army Group North lost its last rail link to East Prussia, the navy took over its supply. Kummetz ordered Adm. Kurt Böhmer, commander of the Ninth Escort Division, to provide protection for supply convoys and insisted that there be no delays. Despite this, Army Group North’s naval liaison officer complained that the ammunition delivered covered only about half the army group’s requirement.58 Obviously Guderian also protested that not enough supplies were getting through, because on 3 August Dönitz explained to him that planning for the army group’s supply had begun only on 26 July and argued that the navy had carried out this task well. Also on 3 August, Admiral Eastern Baltic instructed Böhmer that as long as no troops were on board, supply ships under no circumstances were to remain in port due to lack of escorts but should sail at once.59 From 1 to 13 August the navy shipped an average of 4,184 tons of supplies per day to Army Group North. After Third Panzer Army’s attack broke through to Army Group North on 20 August, supplies could again, at least in part, arrive by land. Up to 23 August, the navy delivered an average of 3,922 tons daily—well below the amount required.60
Hitler’s reaction to the situation in the Baltic States, certainly not nearly as serious as the crisis at Army Group Center, reveals his assessment of Estonia’s importance to Germany’s war effort. To stem the Soviet advance against Eighteenth Army in mid-August Schörner requested the assistance of Maj. Hans Rudel, a Stuka pilot famous for destroying enemy tanks. In less than an hour, Guderian reported that Rudel’s squadron was on the way.61 Moreover, in view of Germany’s crippling shortage of aircraft fuel, the use of transport planes to airlift troops to Schörner on at least two occasions (once an entire division!) accentuates the Baltic States’ importance to Hitler.62
Hitler continued to display interest in the Narva sector. On 24 June Heusinger reported that Hitler feared a Soviet assault there, and the Führer had ordered an evaluation of German countermeasures in the event of an attack in this area. In view of the situation on the army group’s southern flank at this time, this command perplexed Lindemann’s staff.63 Zeitzler, however, did not share Hitler’s concern. At the end of the month he worried that unless Army Group North retreated, Germany faced a disaster equal to Stalingrad. Viewing the extrication of Lindemann’s forces as his foremost task, he met privately with Hitler and urged a withdrawal to the Düna in order to protect East Prussia. Hitler, however, refused, and for familiar reasons—shale oil for the navy and the importance of the Narva sector to Finland.64 In response to Lindemann’s request to evacuate the fortified sites of Polozk and Narva, Zeitzler stated that Hitler might agree to give up Polozk but that withdrawing from Narva was out of the question. Zeitzler later confided to Friessner that he and Heusinger had advocated the evacuation of Estonia but that Hitler had brusquely rejected the retreat.65
Hitler affirmed the importance of the Narva sector as never before at a situation conference with Friessner and Model on 18 July. In an uncharacteristic display of candor, Göring bluntly stated that the only way to gain reserves to close the Baltic Gap was to retreat to a line along the Düna River. Hitler agreed this was the easiest solution but maintained that it would result in disaster. Hitler explained that the consequences of the evacuation of Estonia would include Finland’s surrender, the opening of the Baltic to the Soviets, and an end to U-boat training. Such a measure, Hitler declared, could mean the loss of the war. Interestingly citing the example of the Crimea, which the Soviets had recaptured in May, he explained that the loss of strategic areas affected the attitude of neutral and allied countries. Hitler claimed that giving up the Baltic States would mean the loss of Finland as the sole source of nickel, the forfeiture of nine million tons of Swedish iron ore annually, and the loss of the shale oil for the navy. For these reasons, he insisted that Army Group North’s front be held at all costs.66 Hitler’s comments at this conference are extremely important, revealing the interrelationship of military, diplomatic, and economic factors in his strategy.
Hitler rejected Friessner’s first request to withdraw to a shorter line along the isthmus of Narva both for military and political reasons. He claimed that the army’s forward positions were better and that the Finnish front was beginning to stabilize.67 But the crisis on the southern flank required additional forces, and the army group had to withdraw yet another division from Narva. Hitler then permitted the retreat, but only after securing Finnish consent. Voss (Admiral Führer Headquarters) hastened to assure Dönitz that Hitler intended to hold Army Group North’s current positions in consideration of political repercussions on Finland and other allies, the economic situation regarding nickel and oil, and the importance of the Baltic for submarine training and imports. Schörner, who frequently was in contact with Hitler, informed Eighteenth Army’s commander on 6 August that he must defend the present front, because possession of the Baltic States was crucial for the war’s outcome.68
Following a situation conference at OKH in mid-August, Natzmer reported that Hitler had insisted the army group not weaken the Narva front too seriously, because Finland would continue to fight only if the Narva front held and if the army group halted the Soviet attack on Dorpat.69 Once Third Panzer Army had reestablished contact with Schörner’s forces, Army Group Center urged OKH to withdraw Army Group North to gain forces for its overextended front. Col. Bogislaw von Bonin (head of OKH’s operations section from 31 August) replied that Guderian had already made this request but that Hitler had immediately refused, claiming that political considerations and the naval situation ruled out any prospect of this solution.70 Hitler’s frequent references to the importance of the Narva front to Finland were no invention, for on several occasions the Finns expressed concern about the course of events in Estonia. Nevertheless, at the beginning of September Hitler ordered Army Group North to hold its present front even if Finland capitulated.71 Hitler also reaffirmed the importance of the Estonian shale oil in the Narva sector. In July Warlimont had relayed Hitler’s order forbidding any preparations to evacuate the shale oil area, because Germany’s desperate shortage of fuel required shipments of oil from Estonia until the last possible moment. Once Schörner took command of the army group, Hitler personally charged him to ensure that no preparations for evacuation occurred without his express approval.72
When the news of Finland’s decision to make peace with the Soviets reached Hitler, he was furious but not unprepared. Both Hitler and Dönitz were determined to keep Finland, or at least parts thereof, in the war—one way or another. Hitler had considered the possibility of Finland’s defection for some time and in September 1943 had issued instructions for a possible withdrawal of Twentieth Mountain Army from Finland. These orders did not envision the complete evacuation of the country but provided for the retention of the northernmost region containing nickel deposits.73 The nickel mines were not the only parts of Finland of interest to Hitler. When he heard rumors of Finnish peace feelers in February 1944 as Army Group North retreated to the Panther Position, Hitler ordered plans prepared to seize strategically located Finnish islands. These operations received the code names “Tanne East” and “Tanne West.”74 Tanne East called for the capture of the island of Hogland in the Gulf of Finland, and Tanne West aimed for the occupation of the Åland Islands at the entrance to the Gulf of Bothnia. Possession of Hogland was considered essential to maintaining the blockade of the Soviet fleet within the Gulf of Finland, because artillery on this island and the German-held island of Tütters protected the Seeigel mine barrage from Soviet minesweepers. Control of the Åland Islands was vital to securing the delivery of Swedish iron ore and to safeguarding Twentieth Mountain Army’s supply. The notion of occupying Hogland a
nd the Åland islands was not new but had been considered by the German Navy since the 1930s.75 OKW’s operations staff received responsibility for planning the seizure of the Åland Islands, and the Army General Staff for the Hogland operation. The army took charge of Hogland’s capture because of the island’s importance for protecting Army Group North’s northern flank, although its position as anchor for the mine barrages in the Gulf of Finland was of greater importance to the navy.76 On several occasions throughout the spring of 1944, OKW and OKH alerted the army group and the Skl that the operations could be ordered at any time.77
On 21 June Assmann reported that Hitler was worried about the Åland Islands and had ordered preparations for Tanne. But as a result of Army Group Center’s collapse, all the army forces that had been specially trained for Tanne East had to be sent to the front. In the first week of July, therefore, Hitler entrusted the navy with this operation.78 As in the spring, Hitler issued preparatory orders for Tanne on several occasions throughout the summer.79
In the meantime, other plans were afoot. Germany intended to retain not only Finland’s nickel mines and Hogland but additional parts of the country as well, including Helsinki. On 24 June, shortly after the fall of Vyborg, Assmann reported that the occupation of the port of Hangö was under consideration. Earlier that day Dönitz had remarked that he had spoken with Hitler about the importance of southern Finland and that Hitler doubted the Finns would hold out.80