by David Grier
In the south, pressure against Riga mounted. Bauske fell on 16 September, and Schörner ordered Sixteenth Army back to the Mitau–Ost Position, although the Soviets had already captured some sectors of this line. An attack conducted by Army Group Center from 16 to 18 September, intended to expand the corridor linking the army groups, made little head-way but eased the tension at Riga by forcing Bagramian to divert units to stop the German assault. To gain forces to bolster the line near the Latvian capital and to launch an attack against the Soviets near Mitau, Schörner obtained permission to retreat to the Segewold Position on 20 September.11
In the north, Aster proceeded according to a drastically accelerated timetable. Most troops crossed the Estland–West Position from 21 to 23 September, although some units withdrew to bridgeheads around Estonian ports to await evacuation by sea. The last German ship left Reval on 22 September, and Pernau was evacuated the next day.12 Since by this time Schörner had received permission to continue the retreat past the Wenden Position to the Segewold Position, on the night of 26 September the Germans withdrew to this line.13 Army Group North had successfully completed Aster.
In the meantime the situation at Riga had reached crisis proportions. On 22 September the Soviets captured Baldone, scarcely fifteen miles south of the Latvian capital, and also broke through Eighteenth Army’s front near Walk. The SS division “Nordland,” which arrived from the Narva front that day, rushed into action and managed to prevent a Soviet breakthrough south of Riga. To make matters worse, the army group’s shortage of ammunition, troops, and aircraft fuel persisted. Guderian promised Natzmer that all available ammunition was on the way and declared that the army group’s only chance was to continue to retreat—the sooner the better. Schörner commanded Third Panzer and Sixteenth armies to hold their positions while Eighteenth Army fell back to the Segewold Position.14
Hitler summoned Schörner to East Prussia on 28 September to discuss future operations. The Führer still wanted an attack to remove the Schaulen–Mitau salient, but Schörner insisted that he could not assemble sufficient forces for this if he remained in the Segewold Position. Hitler finally agreed to a retreat to the Tuckum Position, west of Riga, but only after the army group carried out an attack to smash Soviet forces near Schaulen. To gain forces for this operation, code-named “Blitz,” Hitler allowed Schörner to withdraw to the Riga–Ost Position. Hitler ordered the army group to continue preparations for the attack and also to reinforce its garrison on the Baltic Isles.15
For the Soviets, the September offensive had produced results exactly the opposite from its intention. Instead of being splintered, Army Group North, weakened but still intact, had withdrawn its northern flank and reduced its front by nearly half. In addition, Schörner had concentrated his strength around Riga, making Soviet attempts to capture the city more difficult than when the offensive began. This required a change in plan, and Stavka decided to shift the direction of the attack westward to the Baltic coast. The new plan called for First Baltic Front to attack Third Panzer Army and thrust to the sea near Memel. At the same time, Second and Third Baltic fronts were to break through the Segewold Position, seize Riga, and clear the Baltic coast up to Libau. In a separate operation, Leningrad Front received orders to capture the Baltic Isles by amphibious assault. To prevent the Germans from sending reserves to the Memel area, Third Belorussian Front would tie down German forces with an attack into East Prussia. Stalin displayed great interest in arrangements for this offensive and discussed preparations with Marshal A. M. Vasilevskii, Stavka’s representative to the Baltic fronts.16
From 30 September through 4 October the front remained relatively calm. The Germans prepared for Riga’s evacuation, readying its factories, bridges, and port installations for demolition. Rear-area services transferred westward into Courland, and Estonian troops, plus Estonians capable of military service, boarded ships for the Reich to re-form their units. At the end of September the army group’s deployment invited an assault against Third Panzer Army. Eighteenth and Sixteenth armies occupied the front from the Segewold Position to the Aa River with their tightly packed formations. Army Detachment Grasser (formerly Army Detachment Narva), on either side of Doblen, defended the junction between Sixteenth and Third Panzer armies. Third Panzer Army, stripped of all but one of its armored divisions, held a long, winding front from east of Moscheiken to the Memel River with only a handful of divisions.17 The army group detected the buildup of Soviet forces opposite Third Panzer Army but assumed that the Russians would require considerable time before they could launch an assault. Schörner ordered the accelerated delivery of reinforcements to this sector, yet he believed that the Russians could not complete regrouping before mid-October.18
MAP 5. THE WITHDRAWAL TO COURLAND (FRONT LINE 10 OCTOBER 1944)
The Soviets, however, unleashed their offensive on 5 October, catching the Germans off guard. The Russians shattered Third Panzer Army’s defenses, ripping a fifty-kilometer gap in the front in the first forty-eight hours. On 10 October spearheads of the Soviet Fifty-first Army reached the Baltic coast at Polangen, a small port twenty miles north of Memel. Army Group North again had been cut off from land contact with the rest of the front—this time for good.
As the Soviets surged toward the Baltic, Army Group North acquired an exposed southern front that grew longer by the hour. To avoid encirclement in the congested area around Riga, the army group had to form a southern front in Courland and protect Libau, the only port capable of handling the army group’s supply. To this end, Schörner flew to Hitler’s headquarters on 11 October and secured permission to retreat to Courland. “Thunder,” the withdrawal to the Riga–Ost Position, had been completed the previous day. It was now to be followed by “Rain,” a retreat to the Aa Position, and “Sunshine,” a final jump to the Tuckum Position.19 The retreat proceeded at an accelerated rate. The army group had canceled preparations for Blitz on 6 October and shifted Eighteenth Army to the area east of Libau to coordinate the establishment of a southern front. German divisions freed in the course of the retreat raced to the west to halt the Soviet drive on Libau. Shortly after noon on 17 October Sixteenth Army occupied the Tuckum Position. The withdrawal to Courland had been completed exactly one month after the order for Aster had been given.20
In the meantime, Schörner prepared an attack Hitler had ordered to regain contact with Army Group Center. This operation envisioned a thrust along the coast to link up with the besieged garrison of Memel, followed by a breakthrough attack to East Prussia. The army group coordinated its plans with the navy, which pledged to support the assault with artillery from heavy warships. Dönitz demonstrated keen interest in this operation, assigning a pocket battleship and a heavy cruiser to it.21 As Schörner assembled his forces, however, the Soviets once more thwarted his intentions by launching an attack of their own, on 16 October, two days before the breakthrough operation was scheduled to begin. The Russians struck Eighteenth Army between Skuodas and Moscheiken and attacked near Doblen, at the junction of Army Detachment Grasser and Sixteenth Army. The Germans managed to prevent a breakthrough, but the divisions assembled for the attack to Memel were drawn into the battle. Schörner could not attempt the attack to the south until he halted the Soviet assault. In addition, the Russians also launched an offensive into East Prussia, compelling Army Group Center to commit its armored reserves.
On 18 October OKH reviewed Army Group North’s status in relation to the overall, continually deteriorating, situation on the Eastern Front. Army planners believed that Schörner’s army group was essential to fending off Soviet attacks on Germany itself. Earlier that month Guderian complained that Germany had suffered over 360,000 unreplaced losses on the Eastern Front in September alone. Bonin concluded that Schörner could not attempt the attack to Memel as long as the army group held its current positions. The Soviet offensive in East Prussia, which particularly worried Bonin, prevented Army Group Center from mounting an operation to relieve Schörner as it had done in August
. Bonin thus devised another solution to extricate Schörner’s forces. First, the entire army group would withdraw into bridgeheads around the ports of Libau and Windau. Troops in the smaller Windau bridgehead would be evacuated by sea, and Schörner’s main force would attack from Libau toward Memel. After the creation of a broad bridgehead around Memel, Army Group North would give up its positions around Libau and mount another operation to regain contact with Third Panzer Army.22
Bonin flew to Courland the next day to meet with Schörner and Natzmer. Schörner complained that his main concern was the shortage of weapons and the weakened state of his divisions. Bonin asked whether the army group, under current conditions, could defend its present front in the long run. Schörner replied in the affirmative, provided that no forces were withdrawn and that OKH guaranteed the army group’s supply. The three officers concurred that the withdrawal of any divisions would jeopardize the army group’s ability to maintain its present front, and they further agreed that an attack along the coast to Memel had little chance of success under prevailing circumstances. They also sketched out a slightly altered version of Bonin’s plan to bring Schörner’s forces back to the Reich. This proposal suggested that the army group withdraw into a bridgehead only around Libau, where Schörner could assemble a powerful assault force to break through to Memel. Once this had been accomplished, Schörner would abandon the Libau bridgehead and attack into East Prussia.23
Hitler rejected this solution and the following day ordered Schörner to go over to the defense along his present front in Courland and to ready several divisions for evacuation by sea. Schörner, however, did not give up his intention to break through to Memel. On 25 October he submitted plans for another attack to the south, assuring Hitler that the offensive had good prospects of success as long as no divisions were withdrawn from Courland.24 Yet the next day OKH reported that Hitler had refused Schörner’s plan, “in view of the overall situation on the Eastern Front.” This final proposal to break through to Memel denied, Army Group North went over to the defense in Courland, with a coastal front of about 320 kilometers and a land front approximately 250 kilometers in length.25 There the army group remained until Germany’s capitulation in May 1945.
As enemy armies approached and finally entered German territory from both east and west, Dönitz grew increasingly desperate. In the West, the navy lost its best Atlantic U-boat bases when the Allies drove the Germans from France. In the East his greatest concern was the Soviet advance upon ports along the Baltic, and on several occasions in September and October he actively intervened in decisions regarding Army Group North’s operations in an attempt to hold the Russians as far as possible from the Baltic Sea. Dönitz traveled to Hitler’s headquarters on 15 September because he had been alerted to a forthcoming decision about Army Group North’s proposed retreat from Estonia. Voss had first warned Dönitz on 12 September, when he reported that Guderian had suggested the withdrawal to Hitler earlier that day. Aware that Army Group North’s retreat was also of decisive importance to the navy, Voss advised Dönitz’s presence at the Wolfsschanze (or Wolf’s Lair, Hitler’s headquarters in East Prussia, present-day Poland) on the 15th if at all possible. Probably seeking a way to prevent the withdrawal, the next day Wagner phoned the Skl from the Wolfsschanze, requesting data on the importance of Estonian oil.26 Later on the 16th Kummetz reported that Army Group North had already issued orders to begin the evacuation of Estonia the next day. This information caught the Skl unawares, and Wagner investigated the matter, only to discover that although OKH had not yet ordered the retreat, the evacuation presumably would take place. Kummetz pointed out the decisive importance of maintaining fighter bases near Libau and Windau should Army Group North withdraw. The Skl notified the Luftwaffe’s operations staff of the need for fighter aircraft to protect supply and evacuation transports as well as U-boat bases.27
At the end of September the Skl issued new instructions for naval warfare in the eastern Baltic. This directive took into account radical changes resulting from Finland’s withdrawal from the war, the evacuation of Estonia, and the loss of Swedish waters for shipping—for on 26 September Sweden had closed its territorial waters in the Baltic to foreign vessels. In addition, for the first time since 1941 the navy seriously had to consider the possibility of the Soviet fleet’s emergence from the Gulf of Finland. The Skl had based its planning on the assumption that Riga and the Baltic Isles would remain in German hands, although the loss of these areas, plus the likelihood of increased tension with Sweden, was not ruled out. Despite these changes the Skl persisted in regarding its primary goal in this theater as continuing to blockade the Soviet fleet inside the Gulf of Finland. To fulfill this task the Skl intended to maintain the mine barrages by sowing new minefields to close any gaps the Soviets cleared. The deployment of U-boats at the exits to the Gulf of Finland to observe the location of Soviet mine-clearing activity thus received increased importance. To support the minefields’ guardians, as well as to engage in a timely manner Soviet vessels attempting to break out, the Skl ordered torpedo boats, motor torpedo boats, and destroyers held in readiness as close as possible to the minefields. Libau and Windau served this purpose well. In addition, the navy decided to hold a powerful cruiser task force ready to intervene at any time.28
Although these precautions consisted of potential engagements in coastal regions, the Skl warned that Soviet aircraft and submarines could now to threaten the entire central Baltic, endangering German shipping and training areas. The main focus of coastal protection was assigned to the Baltic States, since the Skl doubted the Russians would attempt landing operations far from the front lines. Clearly distressed over the loss of the army’s front on the Gulf of Finland, the Skl noted on 2 October that Army Group North had retreated “despite great disadvantages for the war at sea and the situation in general.”29
As German armies withdrew and the Soviets approached the Baltic, several problems arose, or resurfaced, for the navy. The Skl was confronted with decisions regarding the defense of the island of Tütters, the possible evacuation of the Schörner’s entire army group by sea, artillery support in coastal areas, and the supply of isolated army units. On 9 October Conrady had alerted the Skl that the Soviet thrust to the Baltic could require the navy once more to supply Army Group North by sea.30
Courland’s ports of Libau and Windau figured prominently in decisions affecting the army group, especially regarding its supply. The importance of these ports had first arisen in the summer, when they became vulnerable in the wake of Army Group Center’s collapse. Dönitz had immediately ordered naval personnel placed at the army’s disposal, including all naval troops earmarked for Tanne, and instructed naval forces based on land to defend ports to the end. The Skl had declared that the retention of a bridgehead in northern Courland, including Windau, was essential to controlling the Irben Straits.31 The Germans had to dominate these straits if the army group was to receive supplies through Riga. At the beginning of August, shortly after Army Group North’s isolation east of Riga, Model commanded Third Panzer Army to protect Libau and Windau and to prevent a Soviet advance along the coast to the Irben Straits. Army Group Center also ordered Third Panzer Army to regard Libau and Windau as fortresses and to lay in three months’ supplies. Third Panzer Army considered this senseless and protested that if the army had to retreat, it could not detach forces strong enough to hold out on their own for three months. After Third Panzer Army had been attached to Army Group North, its chief of staff mentioned to Natzmer that although both ports had been stocked with supplies, they still officially had not been declared fortified sites. Natzmer replied that it would be best not to draw attention to this matter; Natzmer obviously had no interest in defending Libau or Windau at this point. In October, however, when the Soviets threatened to sever the land link to East Prussia and the army group planned to evacuate Riga, the army and navy agreed upon the importance of the ports, particularly Libau. On 7 October OKH instructed the army group to view both
cities as fortresses.32 After 10 October the army group, now entirely dependent upon supply by sea, realized that these ports collectively represented its sole lifeline to the Reich.
Another source of distress for the navy concerned provisions for the army group’s evacuation if the Soviets again isolated Schörner’s forces east of Riga. On 6 September, the navy’s liaison officer to OKH reported that Guderian had requested information on available transport space and the time required to evacuate Army Group North by sea. Based upon Conrady’s estimate of the army group’s strength at 520,000 men, the Skl’s shipping department concluded that to evacuate the troops, without their horses or equipment, would require approximately five weeks and the use of all suitable naval vessels. If the army group’s horses and artillery were also transported, the evacuation would last eight weeks. Finally, if the army group brought out all of its equipment the operation would take five months. The Skl declared, however, that fuel was available only for the evacuation of the troops.33 Yet the day after Hitler ordered the army group to go over to the defense in Courland, the Skl issued “revised” figures on the navy’s transport capabilities.34
The appearance of Soviet troops along the coast also led to increased demands by the army for warships to bombard coastal sectors, and on several occasions surface vessels supported the land fighting with their heavy guns. Light naval vessels repeatedly assisted the army group, shelling Soviet positions along the Gulf of Riga and south of Libau. Support from the Second Task Force, however, required fighter protection, and Schörner often preferred to have the available aircraft at his disposal for other missions. Dönitz demonstrated his willingness to help the army by ordering a reduction in naval cadet training cycles, so that nearly all of the surface fleet remained operational.35 At the end of October Meisel issued instructions stating that the fleet’s main task lay in the Baltic: to support ground forces by coastal bombardment and to protect the army’s supply routes. The navy cautioned the army, however, not to expect the type of support that Anglo-American warships had provided their invasion force in Normandy, because Germany did not possess air superiority in the area, nor did it have adequate antisubmarine protection.36