by David Grier
MAP 6. THE BALTIC ISLES
Soviet plans to capture the Baltic Isles involved one of Russia’s largest amphibious operations of World War II.4 The Soviets initially intended to land on Moon and Worms on 26 September, then to invade Dagö and Ösel the next day. This somewhat ambitious plan was delayed to allow more time to clear mines from Moon Sound and to assemble troops and landing craft. The revised plan called for the seizure of one island after another (Moon, Dagö, and finally Ösel), with the operation to be completed by 5 October at the latest. On the evening of 29 September Soviet forces landed at several sites along Moon’s eastern coast, about three miles from the mainland. Natzmer ordered the Soviets driven from the beaches and requested support from light naval vessels. But later that night the army group instructed the Baltic Isles’ Armed Forces Commander to withdraw his troops from Moon to Ösel if necessary and to prepare for Dagö’s evacuation. The army group also intended, if Ösel’s defense was not required, to pull its forces back to the Sworbe Peninsula, at the southern end of that island, since control of the Irben Straits was vital to safeguard shipping to Riga.5 The Germans withdrew from Moon to Ösel that night, and the Soviets thus gained possession of the island within a day.
OKH refused Schörner’s request to evacuate Dagö. On 30 September Hitler declared possession of Ösel and Dagö to be of decisive importance and ordered reinforcements sent to the islands immediately. Guderian reported that Dönitz had been asked to employ all available naval forces to assist in the islands’ defense and to disrupt the Soviets’ supply to their troops on Moon. Furthermore, OKH commanded Schörner to prepare an operation to recapture Moon.6 It is unlikely the Germans could have regained the island, and in any case subsequent events ruled out this option. Early on the morning of 2 October the Russians landed at four sites on Dagö. The Soviets quickly broke out from their beachheads, and the Germans withdrew from the northern part of the island to form two bridgeheads in the south. By the afternoon of 3 October both bridgeheads had been evacuated, the defenders retiring to Ösel.
On the morning of 5 October the Soviets landed almost simultaneously at five locations on Ösel. The army group pointed out to OKH that in 1941 the Soviets had had seven divisions on Ösel but could not prevent German forces from taking the island. By the end of the day the Germans had written off most of Ösel and merely planned to hold bridgeheads around the port of Arensburg and on the Sworbe Peninsula. Shortly after midnight Natzmer approved a gradual withdrawal to these positions but warned that Arensburg’s defense was not to jeopardize Sworbe, which should be readied for a protracted defense. Natzmer informed OKH and Admiral Eastern Baltic, however, that German units were conducting a fighting withdrawal to a position at the center of the island.7 On the afternoon of 7 October the Soviets captured Arensburg, and German troops on Ösel withdrew to positions at the head of the Sworbe Peninsula.
The next morning Natzmer notified Bonin that he feared the Soviets planned to cross from Ösel to the mainland. The Germans estimated that the Russians had six rifle divisions and two armored units on Ösel. At this time the army group’s main concern was to halt the Soviet advance on Libau and Memel, and Natzmer complained that he could spare only one exhausted division for coastal defense in Courland. Soviet forces on Ösel pressed home their attack, pushing the Germans back to the Ariste Line, at Sworbe’s narrowest point—about three kilometers in width—on 10 October. The German commander on Sworbe pleaded for support from the navy’s Second Task Force, but Schörner refused, claiming that this would tie down all available aircraft and naval escort vessels for two days.8
In an attempt to outflank German positions on Sworbe, the Soviets unsuccessfully attempted landing operations behind the front on 11 and 12 October. After a brief respite the Russians resumed the offensive from 19 to 23 October, pushing the Germans back from the Ariste Line, past a second line of defense to the Leo Line, compelling Schörner to send even more troops to Sworbe.9 Hitler intervened at this point, declaring Sworbe a “fortified site,” to be held to the last man, and he called upon the navy to support the fight for the peninsula with the Second Task Force. The army group welcomed the offer of assistance but warned that it could not provide fighter protection for the warships. Nevertheless, two torpedo boats shelled Soviet positions on Sworbe on 23 October, and Lützow bombarded Russian forces there the following day.10 On 28 October Hitler commanded the army group to recapture the Ariste Line and instructed the Skl to provide as much naval support as possible. When Voss pointed out that fighter protection was a prerequisite for such an operation, Hitler ordered additional fighter aircraft transferred to Army Group North. He wanted the navy to provide as many cruisers, destroyers, and torpedo boats as it could to support the attack.11 The next day Conrady informed the Skl that Guderian had requested support from the Second Task Force to halt the Soviet offensive. Schörner prepared to send more forces to Sworbe, but the onset of a Soviet offensive on the Courland front forced him to call off the attack to regain the Ariste Line and to return the troops assembled for the operation to their former positions on the mainland.12
The front on Sworbe remained calm until 18 November, when the Soviets struck again and on the first day ejected the Germans from the entire length of their main line of defense. Schörner ordered reinforcements to the peninsula to regain the Leo Line, insisting that the Führer order to hold Sworbe must be obeyed. Sixteenth Army protested that the delivery of one or two battalions could not restore the situation and requested permission to evacuate the peninsula. Schörner clung until midday to the idea of regaining the old positions, but during the afternoon he gave up this intention as reports of the disintegration of German units there arrived. That night Schörner informed Hitler that Sworbe’s garrison had been smashed and that he had ordered a withdrawal to bridgeheads on the peninsula’s southern tip. He concluded his message with a plea for support from the Second Task Force and for freedom of action to evacuate Sworbe.13
On 21 November Natzmer confided to Gen. Carl Hilpert, Sixteenth Army’s commander, that Schörner had decided to evacuate the peninsula on his own responsibility if the situation deteriorated further. Two days later Sixteenth Army reported that the destruction of all troops on Sworbe was imminent unless they were withdrawn immediately. Disobeying Hitler’s explicit orders, Schörner commanded Sworbe’s evacuation and notified OKH of his decision. Early the next morning the last German troops had boarded ships to return to Courland. The struggle for the Baltic Isles, which had lasted nearly two months, had come to an end.14
While Soviet and German troops had been battling for control of the islands, the German Army and Navy had clashed over the need for their defense. The army group saw no reason to hold the Baltic Isles for any length of time, especially after Riga’s evacuation. Schörner contended that once his forces had withdrawn to Courland, possession of Sworbe served no purpose. On 10 October Natzmer declared that Sworbe’s garrison could not hold out in the long run and should withdraw to the mainland after the middle of the month, once units arrived in northern Courland for coastal defense. But the next day he noted that although the reason for holding Ösel had been to guarantee the use of Riga’s port, the army group had not yet received permission to evacuate Sworbe, and it seemed likely that it would have to defend the peninsula even after abandoning Riga. Schörner stated that the “higher leadership,” presumably Hitler, wished to retain Sworbe after Riga’s evacuation but that the army group would later request to withdraw from the peninsula.15
Schörner wrote a personal letter to Guderian on 12 October asserting that there was no convincing reason to control the Irben Straits after giving up Riga and requesting permission to evacuate Sworbe. Two days later the army group’s operations officer, Gersdorff, hand-carried Schörner’s letter to Guderian and he also proposed Sworbe’s evacuation. Conrady insisted that the peninsula must be held to prevent Soviet warships from exiting the Gulf of Riga. Gersdorff replied that holding Sworbe did not serve this purpose, because shipping lane
s through the Irben Straits passed along Courland’s coast, within range of coastal batteries. Guderian declared, however, that the army group had to hold on to Sworbe in order to hinder Soviet landings on the coast of Courland. At this point Guderian, reluctant to define exactly what the army group’s future task would be, remarked that possession of northern Courland was important to the navy.16
In fact, for some time the navy had considered retention of the Baltic Isles to be of the utmost consequence. In early August Voss had requested an assessment of the importance of the Baltic Isles. The Skl responded that these islands represented a strategic position with respect to control of the entrances to the Gulf of Finland, as well as for domination of the eastern Baltic, and pointed out that the islands were presently unfortified and weakly manned. If the Soviets captured the Baltic Isles, the Skl warned, the Russians could disrupt convoy traffic to Riga and shipping routes in the Gulfs of Finland and Bothnia, which would jeopardize supply for Army Group North and Twentieth Mountain Army in Finland, as well as deliveries of Swedish iron ore. Of greater importance, Soviet control of the islands would threaten the navy’s U-boat training areas. For these reasons the Skl demanded that the Baltic Isles be held as long as possible.17
On 15 October Schörner asked Admiral Eastern Baltic for his opinion regarding Sworbe, pointing out potential supply complications due to approaching autumn storms. Mindful of his past experiences in the Crimea and Odessa, Schörner wished to protect himself from the navy’s criticism at a later date. Admiral Burchardi replied that possession of Sworbe neither excluded the possibility of Soviet landing operations on Courland’s northern coast nor guaranteed domination of the Irben Straits, explaining that the navy could not effectively mine the straits until German troops evacuated the peninsula. Burchardi complained that efforts to ensure Sworbe’s supply and defense tied up vessels urgently needed for other functions. Finally, he cautioned that the approach of bad weather could result in the isolation of Sworbe’s garrison. Considering the advantages and disadvantages of holding the peninsula, Burchardi favored giving up Sworbe. Schörner seized this unexpected opportunity and sent Burchardi’s report to OKH, along with a request to evacuate the peninsula immediately, before storms isolated the over ten thousand German troops on Sworbe.18
On the same day Burchardi determined that holding Sworbe served no real purpose, the Skl reevaluated Sworbe’s value to naval strategy and reached precisely the opposite conclusion. The Skl contended that possession of Sworbe, as well as Courland’s northern coast, was essential for passage through the Irben Straits in order to support army operations by coastal bombardment with light naval forces, as well as to carry out mining operations and offensive raids to contest the Soviets’ use of newly acquired bases on the Estonian and Latvian coast. The naval staff also claimed that Sworbe’s retention was vital to protect minefields blockading Soviet naval forces. In contrast to Burchardi’s appraisal, the Skl maintained that the navy could not block the Irben Straits if the Soviets possessed Sworbe. The Skl also warned that loss of the peninsula would grant the Russians total freedom of movement in the Gulf of Riga and the use of forward bases from which their surface vessels could endanger German shipping routes and training areas in the eastern Baltic.19
The next day Kummetz reported that he concurred with Burchardi’s opinion—holding Sworbe was no longer necessary. Meisel, however, insisted that the opposite was true, especially if divisions were to be withdrawn from Army Group North. He also cautioned that it was still uncertain whether the army group could hold Libau; if the port fell, the army’s formations in Courland could be evacuated only from the open coast on the Gulf of Riga. Dönitz ordered a report prepared for OKW and OKH that explained Sworbe’s significance and clarified this confusion.20
Schörner regarded the Skl’s declaration of Sworbe’s “new importance” ridiculous and angrily refuted the navy’s arguments for holding the peninsula. He insisted that the Skl’s claim that control of the Irben Straits was essential for a possible evacuation of the army group made no sense. In the first place, the army group could hold its positions in Courland. Moreover, the greatest danger to his troops, one that could force an evacuation, was a large-scale Soviet landing in northern Courland, in which case the evacuation of troops from Courland’s eastern coast would be impossible anyway. Finally, erection of mine barrages along Courland’s northern and eastern coast to protect against enemy landings, as well as mining of the Irben Straits, could not take place until German forces evacuated Sworbe. The Skl informed Army Group North’s naval liaison officer that it had taken note of Schörner’s protests but that in the meantime Hitler had declared Sworbe a “fortified site,” which rendered further discussion on the subject unnecessary.21
During Bonin’s visit to Courland on 19 October, one of Schörner’s foremost demands was to withdraw from Sworbe. OKH wanted the army group to give up several divisions, but Schörner insisted that he could not relinquish any units until he evacuated Sworbe. Schörner wanted to abandon Sworbe in any event, claiming that to continue holding the peninsula would lead to the useless sacrifice of two divisions. He repeated his assertion that artillery on Courland’s northern coast could control the Irben Straits. Two days prior to this meeting, however, Hitler had decreed that Sworbe be held until further notice, and in his command of 20 October for the army group to go over to the defense in Courland instructed Schörner to continue to hold the peninsula.22
General Hilpert, commander of Sixteenth Army, initially understood Sworbe’s defense as merely a temporary measure. He instructed his troops on 12 October that they must hold the peninsula until coastal defense in northern Courland had been established. Natzmer had notified Hilpert earlier that day that he hoped to begin the evacuation of the peninsula on the 15th. When the 15th arrived, however, Hilpert informed his men that for the present, Sworbe’s evacuation was out of the question. On 19 October he briefed the local commander that the U-boat war required the continued defense of Sworbe.23 A few days later Gersdorff, now Sixteenth Army’s Chief of Staff, complained to Natzmer that further requests to evacuate Sworbe seemed hopeless, adding that Dönitz was the main advocate of Sworbe’s defense.24
The navy displayed an extraordinary interest in the Baltic Isles. Meisel later claimed that these islands were the key position in the eastern Baltic.25 Although on 9 July Dönitz had commented to Hitler that possession of the Baltic Isles would be useless if the Soviets reached the coast in Latvia or Lithuania, a few days later he asserted that if Finland collapsed, Dagö and Ösel must be held in order to erect a new mine barrage to continue the blockade of the Soviet fleet. On 22 September Meisel again argued the need to reinforce the islands.26
After the loss of Moon, Bonin phoned the Skl and reported the army’s intention to reinforce the islands, but he warned that this would take time—during which anything could happen. Bonin solicited the navy’s opinion on the army group’s proposal to withdraw from Dagö to concentrate its forces on Ösel. Dönitz replied that the navy wanted all the Baltic Isles held as long as possible and regarded Ösel’s port of Arensburg and the Sworbe Peninsula essential. The Skl requested OKH to examine an operation to regain Moon, since it considered control of the Moon Sound especially important to holding the Baltic Isles.27 Soviet landings on Dagö and Ösel rendered any hopes of recapturing Moon futile. On 3 October OKH suggested the use of the Second Task Force to support the army’s defense of the Baltic Isles. The Skl welcomed this proposal but stipulated that fighter aircraft protection was necessary and placed the warships on alert. Four days later, upon learning that the army planned to evacuate Arensburg, the Skl instructed Voss to try to prevent this, lest the troops on the island be isolated.28 The following morning Dönitz instructed that Voss be informed that Sworbe’s importance concerned more than just the evacuation of the troops from Ösel.29
On 14 October, immediately after Riga’s evacuation and increased demands by Schörner to withdraw from Sworbe, Dönitz impressed upon Hitler the need to
hold the peninsula as long as there was any chance Army Group North would have to be evacuated by sea. Upon learning of the desperate situation on Sworbe when the Soviets launched their final offensive, Dönitz ordered the accelerated dispatch of heavy warships without even a request from the army. Hitler commanded the navy to support the fighting on Sworbe at all times with one or two heavy cruisers. Kummetz reported on 23 November that he believed Sworbe could no longer be held, but Dönitz refused to lend his support to save the troops there, claiming that it was a matter for OKW and OKH to decide. Although unable to prevent the evacuation, after the loss of Sworbe Dönitz pointed out to Hitler the increased danger of Soviet landings on Courland’s coast.30
As the Soviets launched their final attack on Sworbe, Capt. Victor Oehrn, Skl operations officer, remarked that the army would surely claim that Sworbe had been held only at the navy’s behest. He suggested that the navy take advantage of a favorable opportunity to free itself from this task, which tied down so much of its forces. Dönitz angrily replied that the navy was concerned only with Sworbe’s supply and that the matter was an OKW question in which the navy supported holding the peninsula solely in the army’s interest, since it protected Courland’s coast from landings and provided for the army group’s evacuation from the open coast. He repeated this argument the day after Sworbe fell, again insisting that he had only acted in the army’s interest.31 It is unlikely that even Dönitz believed this nonsense, since a month earlier the Skl had concluded that a Soviet breakthrough on the land front, not landings on Courland’s coast, posed the greatest danger to the Army Group North.32