by David Grier
Army Group North did initially tie down a substantial number of Soviet divisions in Courland. On 22 October, Schörner, at this time commanding approximately thirty-six divisions, briefed Guderian that the Soviets had 117 infantry and thirty-five armored units opposite the army group, with additional enemy forces moving into Courland. By mid-November the army group reported that Soviet strength had increased by twenty to twenty-five rifle divisions and one armored corps, bringing the besieging force to sixteen armies with nearly 200 formations, consisting of 122–132 infantry and from 53 to 57 armored units.6 This represented the peak of the army group’s success in tying down Soviet divisions. At the beginning of December, Gen. Reinhard Gehlen, chief of army intelligence in the East, estimated that 123 Russian rifle divisions and 36 armored brigades remained in Courland. During the Third Courland Battle the army group detected the absence of four Soviet armies, including the powerful Fifth Guards Tank, Third Shock, and Second Guards armies.7 Nevertheless, at the end of the year the army group reported that with about 160 formations opposite Courland, the Soviets still had not given up their intention to destroy the German bridgehead in Latvia. In fact, although the Russians had fewer divisions than in the Second Courland Battle, the actual number of enemy troops had increased, because the Soviets had replenished their units. In early January 1945 German intelligence calculated Soviet strength in Courland at approximately ninety-eight rifle divisions, eight infantry brigades, thirty-one tank brigades, and seventy-two armored regiments, facing about thirty-three German divisions.8
By mid-February 1945 Gehlen estimated that only sixty-three infantry divisions, one armored corps, and thirteen independent armored units remained opposite Courland. Two weeks later, however, Vietinghoff pegged enemy strength at seventy-seven rifle divisions and forty armored formations. These numbers remained essentially unchanged until the beginning of May, when German intelligence assumed the Soviets had transferred units from Prussia to Courland, increasing Soviet forces to nine armies with over eighty-six rifle divisions and up to eighty-five independent armored units.9 Since about twenty German divisions remained in Courland following the evacuations of January through March, the army group was tying down three to four times as many divisions as it possessed, even better odds than Göring claimed Hitler wanted in the first place.
Nonetheless, the Soviets withdrew a considerable number of units by the beginning of 1945. During the first two Courland Battles the Germans identified fourteen to sixteen armies opposite Courland, including three elite Guards armies, four Shock armies, one Guards tank army, and six to eight general-purpose armies. In early December intelligence indicated the withdrawal of the Fifth Guards Tank Army. Schörner acknowledged to Guderian that if the Soviets had withdrawn this army, they had removed a powerful offensive force indeed.10 By April the Soviets withdrew at least seven armies from Courland, including one Guards tank army, one Guards army, two Shock armies, and three to four general-purpose armies. The Russian forces remaining in Courland consisted of two Guards armies, two Shock armies, and four to five general-purpose armies.11
The Soviets also withdrew significant numbers of aircraft from Latvia. The army group reported the presence of three air armies in early November 1944, and at the end of the year it estimated the Russians had approximately 4,750 combat aircraft in the Courland area. The Germans detected the transfer of about 500 aircraft in January 1945, and by early February the Third Air Army and parts of the Fifteenth Air Army had been sent to East Prussia.12
The Soviets withdrew over half their armored corps from Courland. During the first two Courland Battles Schörner’s army group faced five tank corps, one Guards tank corps, and one Guards mechanized corps. Of these units, only two tank corps and one Guards mechanized corps remained in Latvia.13 In mid-April the Soviets still retained a fairly large number of independent armored units in Courland, when the Soviets disposed of an estimated sixteen tank brigades, thirty-five tank regiments, and forty-five assault gun regiments.14
It seems less likely that Hitler ordered Memel’s defense for the purpose of tying down Soviet units. The bridgehead around the city was so small that the Russians could besiege it with relatively little force. Once the initial attacks on Memel failed, the Germans observed the withdrawal of several units. In mid-December the Germans estimated that only five Russian rifle divisions and three armored regiments stood opposite the city, albeit with plentiful reserves available from the Courland front.15 Since the Germans had two infantry divisions and some fortress units in the city, Memel by no means tied down enough Soviet units to serve as an effective breakwater.
East Prussia
HITLER REPEATEDLY ORDERED bridgeheads in eastern Germany defended to hold back enemy forces. In late February 1945 Rendulic acknowledged that his army group’s task was to tie down and inflict losses upon Soviet troops in East Prussia for the benefit of the Oder and Pomeranian fronts. Especially at the end of March and beginning of April, with the Soviet assault on Berlin imminent, on an almost daily basis Hitler instructed German troops in Prussia that their mission was to prevent the enemy from withdrawing forces to attack Berlin.16 Like Memel, the West Prussian and Pomeranian bridgeheads tied down few Soviet divisions. Elbing and Kolberg fell too quickly to be any real hindrance to the Russians, and the Soviets smashed German positions around Danzig and Gdynia in short order, seizing both ports and forcing their defenders back into tiny bridgeheads. It is extremely unlikely that the survivors who fled to the Hela Peninsula tied down many Soviet units, and those at the mouth of the Vistula probably did not bind many more.
East Prussia is another matter. Here, as in Courland, the Germans initially tied down quite a number of Soviet divisions. At the beginning of the January offensive Gehlen estimated that the Soviets had concentrated 145 rifle divisions, 3 cavalry divisions, and 77 armored units opposite Reinhardt’s army group. A few days later the Germans raised this figure to 180 rifle divisions, 5 to 7 tank or mechanized corps, and 1 cavalry corps. In mid-February, following the army group’s isolation, 95 rifle divisions and 72 armored formations faced German forces in East Prussia.17 On 1 March Gehlen estimated the Soviets held approximately 94 rifle divisions and 75 armored units opposite Army Group North. At the same time the Soviets faced Army Group Vistula, defending the Berlin front and Pomerania, with some 123 rifle divisions, 10 cavalry divisions, and 108 armored formations.18 As of 1 March Army Group North commanded approximately thirty divisions, and Army Group Vistula contained over forty divisions. Two weeks later, however, the Russians had cleared German forces from Pomerania east of the Oder River, and Second Army in West Prussia had been attached to Army Group North. Under these conditions the Soviets deployed nearly twice the number of units against Army Group North as they had along the Oder. Army Group North then faced 142 rifle divisions, 3 cavalry divisions, and 111 armored formations. Opposite Army Group Vistula were 76 rifle divisions, 7 cavalry divisions, and 57 armored units. These numbers remained essentially the same to the end of the month.19 German estimates of Soviet strength in early April reveal a powerful concentration of troops against Fourth Army in East Prussia. Some 90 rifle divisions and 62 armored units faced Fourth Army, while 50 rifle divisions, 3 cavalry divisions, and between 30 and 50 armored formations engaged Second Army. A week later Foreign Armies East, now headed by Colonel Gerhard Wessel, concluded that 129 rifle divisions, 3 cavalry divisions, and 92 armored units stood opposite the Army of East Prussia and that 82 rifle divisions, 7 cavalry divisions, and 78 armored units faced Army Group Vistula.20
The Russians assembled a huge air armada against Army Groups Center and A for the January offensive. As stated above, the Russians later increased their air power in East Prussia even more by withdrawing aircraft from Courland and other sectors.21 The Soviets retained a massive concentration of artillery and aircraft in East Prussia into the first week April for the assault on Königsberg. Despite the forthcoming Berlin operation, Bagramian deployed approximately 5,000 pieces of artillery, 300 multiple rocket
launchers, 538 tanks and assault guns, and 2,444 aircraft to storm Königsberg. Two to three entire air armies, parts of two additional air armies, and aircraft from the Baltic Fleet supported the attack. Bagramian also received sixteen engineer brigades, aside from regular corps and divisional sapper units—a considerable number considering the impending assault on Berlin.22
For the Berlin operation, the First and Second Belorussian and First Ukrainian fronts massed more than 190 divisions, 6,100 tanks and assault guns, and 7,500 combat aircraft.23 Of Zhukov’s eight general-purpose armies and two tank armies, one had previously been in East Prussia and two in Courland. Konev’s seven general-purpose armies and two tank armies included one formerly opposite East Prussia and one from Courland. For Rokossovskii’s simultaneous operation along the Oder, one army and a tank corps had come from Courland. In addition, of four air armies supporting the Berlin operation, two had been active in East Prussia in February.24 German units defending coastal sectors succeeded in tying down large numbers of Russian troops, but to no avail.
The entire premise behind the Wellenbrecher reveals an unusual paradox in Hitler’s thinking. In conversations with his closest associates, Hitler often referred to the danger from the East, of the “oriental hordes” that had constantly threatened Germany. A few months prior to his defeat at Stalingrad he claimed that his “greatest service” to humanity had been “saving Europe from the Asiatic onslaught.”25 Yet at the same time that he exaggerated the danger from the East, he consistently underestimated the Soviet Union’s strength. When the Russians launched their offensive at Moscow in December 1941, Hitler refused to believe they had brought up fresh forces. Dismissing OKH’s reports as exaggerated and pessimistic, he declared that the Soviets were attacking with their last reserves from Moscow itself. Following the Soviet winter offensive of 1942–43, despite terrible German casualties, Hitler maintained that the Russians had suffered such high losses in manpower that their collapse was only a matter of time.26 Ignoring all the evidence to the contrary, Hitler insisted to the end the war that the Soviets were running short of manpower and rejected Foreign Armies East’s estimates of Soviet strength as lunacy.27 In the war’s final six months Goebbels, too, frequently commented that the quality of Soviet replacements was poor, that the Soviets were running out of manpower, or that they had thrown just their last reserves into battle.28
Schörner, Gehlen, and Guderian
FROM THE START Schörner had misgivings about the mission assigned to his army group. He requested Guderian’s support for his plan to break through to East Prussia and warned of the problems involved with seaborne supply. Although he acknowledged the army group’s task of tying down enemy forces, Schörner advised that considering the situation in East Prussia and Memel, this represented no long-term solution, and he again pointed out his concern for receiving supplies by sea in winter. The army group initially viewed its task as temporary, that of tying down Soviet armies until the crisis in East Prussia had passed; once the situation stabilized, the army group would launch its breakthrough attack.29 Despite Schörner’s personal reservations, as usual he outwardly displayed total agreement with Hitler’s order to hold Courland.30 By the end of December he had accepted the army group’s isolation and even provided Hitler an additional incentive to continue Courland’s defense. Schörner declared that besides the threat his forces posed to their flank, the Soviets had to capture Courland for political reasons—they had repeatedly boasted of Army Group North’s imminent destruction.31
Gehlen also questioned the purpose of holding Courland, although his doubts surfaced later than Schörner’s. After the First Courland Battle Gehlen predicted that the Soviets would attempt to destroy Army Group North as quickly as possible, so the Baltic fronts could participate in an attack on East Prussia. To accomplish this, he believed, the Russians had postponed operations in other sectors and sent to Courland units originally intended for deployment elsewhere. Gehlen assumed that the Soviets felt compelled to do this because of the threat to their flank in East Prussia.32 By mid-December he had begun to wonder if the Soviets had changed their plans. He suspected they had already withdrawn units from Courland, opting instead to attack Army Groups Center and A before eliminating Schörner’s forces. Gehlen concluded that the Soviets realized they would need these troops for the coming offensives in Poland and East Prussia and that lesser forces would suffice to engage German troops in Courland.33 By the end of the year German intelligence had detected the withdrawal of three armies from Courland. Gehlen suggested that following the Soviets’ failure to dislodge Schörner’s armies in the Third Courland Battle, they would withdraw even more units. The remaining Soviet troops in Latvia would merely conduct holding attacks, to prevent the evacuation of Courland.34
Gehlen called for Courland’s evacuation only after the Soviets launched their winter offensive. As early as 15 January he concluded that OKH could not restore the situation in the East without immediate reinforcements, and two days later German intelligence reexamined Army Group North’s position in relation to the overall situation. In this study Foreign Armies East revised its earlier estimates, finding that Army Group North had faced a smaller Soviet force than originally assumed and surmising that the Russians had withdrawn several armies from Courland. The Soviets, therefore, had given up their intention to destroy the army group. They would merely retain sufficient forces to stop a German breakthrough to East Prussia and conduct holding attacks to prevent the withdrawal of German units there. If the Germans attempted to evacuate the army group by sea, the Russians again would launch a determined offensive with the forces at their disposal.35 Without blatantly urging Courland’s evacuation, Gehlen pointed out that German forces there no longer tied down a disproportionate number of Soviet divisions—if they had ever had done so—and that the Eastern Front urgently required reinforcements.
On 20 January Gehlen warned that the Soviets were on the verge of isolating Army Group Center in East Prussia and that the decision of whether or not to hold East Prussia was closely linked to Courland. To leave the army group in Latvia, he cautioned, would mean its sacrifice in the long run. It would become increasingly difficult, if not impossible, to attack from East Prussia to reestablish land contact with the army group. Gehlen contended that German forces in Courland no longer tied down a disproportionate number of Soviet divisions, so the army group had fulfilled its task. An attack from Courland to reach Army Group Center was the only logical step. Moreover, the combined forces of the two army groups stood a better chance of breaking through to the Vistula. As an additional reason for this solution, Gehlen claimed the navy could not supply armies isolated in both Courland and East Prussia for long.36 Thus, in late January 1945 Gehlen advocated giving up Courland and East Prussia to gain forces to defend Germany’s heartland.
Hitler, however, refused to abandon Courland and insisted upon the defense of East Prussia as well. At the beginning of February Gehlen maintained that although German resistance in both areas would tie down strong Soviet forces for some time, the Russians still had enough troops to attack Berlin. Two weeks later Gehlen characterized the situation in East Prussia as one of crisis. Even if East Prussia’s defense was essential to ensure the link to Courland, it did not justify the destruction of an entire army group in East Prussia. Arguing that the Soviets had withdrawn half their units initially opposite Courland and were at liberty to pull out further forces at any time, he restated his conviction that Army Group Courland had fulfilled its task. The psychological value of holding Courland by no means compensated for the lack of reserves in Germany. He warned that since the evacuation would require quite some time, a decision must be made quickly.37 Gehlen therefore unequivocally called for the evacuation of the Courland divisions.
A week later Gehlen asserted that the Wellenbrecher doctrine had failed, denouncing it as a complete fiasco. Considering the ratio of forces, it worked to Germany’s disadvantage, especially in Courland and East Prussia, because the Soviets had
not displayed inordinate concern for their flanks as had been predicted. The policy of tying down enemy forces on nondecisive fronts had in reality granted the Soviets a free hand with their armies in Courland and East Prussia. In fact, it was Germany’ s forces that were tied down, since they could not be redeployed quickly enough, due to the transport situation at sea.38
Although Gehlen called for the evacuation of Army Group Courland beginning in January 1945, the chief advocate of withdrawing divisions from Courland was Guderian. After the situation in East Prussia stabilized in early November 1944, Guderian directed his attention to Courland and urged Hitler to evacuate the army group. He argued that the number of Soviet units tied down in Courland did not make up for the lack of forces in Germany. This subject caused numerous disagreements with Hitler. One reason Hitler offered in rejecting Guderian’s repeated demands to evacuate Courland was that the withdrawal would also release considerable Russian forces, which would appear at more vulnerable sectors of the front. The repeated Soviet offensives in Courland throughout the autumn of 1944 reinforced Hitler’s conviction.39 On 16 January, after the Russians launched their offensive against Army Groups A and Center, Guderian met with Hitler and again pleaded for Courland’s evacuation. This time he achieved some success, for Hitler agreed to withdraw one armored and two infantry divisions. From this point on, Guderian demanded Courland’s evacuation at practically every conference with Hitler, and on several occasions this led to heated arguments between them. On 28 March, following a bitter dispute concerning an unsuccessful attack by Ninth Army to relieve Küstrin, Hitler ordered Guderian to take six weeks’ medical leave.40 There is little doubt that their constant struggle over Courland was a major factor in Guderian’s dismissal.
Courland was not the first time Hitler had employed the Wellenbrecher doctrine, and he often emphasized the merit of holding positions to tie down enemy forces. This belief played a role, although it was not the determining factor, in two “bridgeheads” on the extreme southern end of the Eastern Front. When Hitler withdrew Army Group A from the Caucasus in January 1943, following Sixth Army’s encirclement at Stalingrad, he ordered Seventeenth Army to defend the Kuban Peninsula. Zeitzler and Heusinger maintained that one reason for this was Hitler’s desire to tie down Soviet forces. In addition, a motive for Hitler’s decision in April 1944 to hold Sevastopol as long as possible was to tie down twenty-five to thirty Soviet divisions.41 Both of these bridgeheads bound numbers of Russian troops greater than that of the Germans involved.