by David Grier
Dönitz submitted a report to Hitler on 28 February that contained his true assessment of the U-boat war. He reviewed prewar operational thinking and the course of the U-boat war since 1939, and after discussing the reasons for the defeat of Germany’s submarine force in the spring of 1943 as he saw them, Dönitz turned to the possibilities offered by the new models of U-boats. He maintained that a submarine that operated completely underwater would turn the tide of the war at sea and that thus it was vital to send into action as many of these U-boats as possible. The next day he again assured Hitler that the Anglo-Americans had no means of locating and combatting submerged submarines. In the summer of 1945 Dönitz prepared a report for his captors clearly stating that the imminent arrival of Germany’s miracle weapons, especially his new submarines, “completely justified the hope for a reversal in the nick of time” and that his goal in the war’s final months had been to try to hold out long enough for these weapons to become operational.6 These statements hardly indicate that Dönitz no longer regarded the U-boat war as a priority.
Dönitz’s attempt to revive the Battle of the Atlantic conformed to Hitler’s vision of waging war offensively, and in many ways Dönitz’s political views also mirrored those of Hitler. Despite his claims to have had nothing to do with politics prior to his appointment as Hitler’s successor,7 Dönitz was a firm, even unconditional, adherent of National Socialism. Dönitz’s daughter later insisted her father never joined the Nazi Party, but records from the former Berlin Document Center prove that he became a Party member early in 1944.8 In truth, Dönitz enthusiastically embraced Nazism. Several leading naval officers maintain that Dönitz was “clearly under Hitler’s influence” and “closely tied to Nazi ideology and Hitler.”9 Raeder wrote that after an “inappropriate” speech to the Hitler Youth, he acquired the nickname “the Hitler-Boy Dönitz.”10 Speer attempted in February 1945 to enlist Dönitz’s support in circumventing Hitler’s scorched-earth policy, but Dönitz replied, “I am here only to represent the navy. The rest is none of my business.”11 At about the same time, Dönitz issued an order warning that any naval officer, regardless of rank, who impaired the troops’ spirit of resistance would be placed at the army’s disposal. He could not use such officers.12
There is ample evidence in his public and private statements of Dönitz’s anti-Semitism. When the Swedes closed their waters to German shipping, for example, Dönitz blamed their action on “fear and dependence on international Jewish capital.”13 In a speech of March 1944 he referred to “degraded Jewish enslavement” and declared, “What would have become of our country today if the Führer had not united us under National Socialism? Split parties, beset with the spreading poison of Jewry, and vulnerable to it because we lacked the defense of our present uncompromising ideology, we would long since have succumbed under the burden of this war.”14
When prosecutors at the Nuremberg Trials asked exactly what he meant by this statement, Dönitz replied, “It means that it might have had a disintegrating effect on the people’s power of endurance. . . . I was of the opinion that the endurance, the power to endure, of the people, as it was composed, could be better preserved than if there were Jewish elements in the nation.”15 Dönitz thereby voiced his approval of the expulsion of the Jews from Germany—at his trial.16 In August 1944 Dönitz proclaimed to his commanders, “I would rather eat dirt than see my grandchildren grow up in the filthy, poisonous atmosphere of Jewry.”17 He told interrogators in the summer of 1945 that “the whole nation of course agreed that such a thing as the control of all business life and economic power, up to 80 or 90 percent, by Jews, was intolerable. That situation had to be corrected and some check imposed on them.”18 Such comments require no further elaboration.
Dönitz would claim to have known nothing about the murder of the Jews, but the extent of his knowledge of the Holocaust is uncertain. He attended the infamous Gauleiter (regional Party leader) conference in Posen in October 1943, but it is not clear whether he was present for Himmler’s speech acknowledging the extermination of the Jews. He could not rid himself of his anti-Semitism in Spandau, still envisioning the supposedly pernicious power of the Jews. In 1953 he told Speer that if it were up to the Americans, Speer would be released before he was, because “the American Jews would make sure of it.”19 Dönitz apparently embraced Nazi racial ideology in its entirety, including the drive to eliminate “inferior elements” from the gene pool. Although there is no direct evidence of Dönitz’s support for the forced sterilization or euthanasia programs, in 1943 he declared that a soldier’s asthma “endangered the national community [Volksgemeinschaft].”20
When Dönitz became the navy’s commander in chief, he brought many changes to the service. Unlike Raeder, who rarely visited Hitler’s headquarters and remained as briefly as possible, Dönitz came frequently and for extended periods. He saw Hitler on 119 days between February 1943 and April 1945.21 Hitler soon developed a genuine admiration of and fondness for Dönitz. Hitler’s satisfaction with the navy in general, and Dönitz in particular, grew especially in the final months of the war. As Michael Salewski has stated, in Dönitz Hitler saw the ideal soldier of the Third Reich.22 Hitler praised the navy’s loyalty and fighting spirit on a number of occasions and was keenly aware that very few naval personnel had been implicated in the Resistance following the assassination attempt of 20 July 1944. In the autumn of 1944 Hitler remarked that in contrast to 1918, wherever the navy fought it now displayed exemplary behavior and unparalleled aggressiveness. Once when Admiral Fuchs dined with Hitler, a high-ranking Nazi Party official commented that Hitler was so interested in the navy that he would have become a naval officer if he had had the chance!23 Hitler also displayed great confidence in the naval units fighting on land in the war’s final months, declaring that the navy was an example for the other branches of Germany’s armed forces. Several times he commented on naval units’ steadfastness and insisted they receive the best equipment available, exclaiming that “first-class soldiers must receive first-class weapons.”24 In March 1945 Hitler considered appointing naval officers to command “fortresses” in the West. He declared that many fortresses, but as yet no ships, had been lost without fighting to the last man.25 Not only Hitler but also army generals like Guderian and Raus praised the courage of naval troops fighting as infantry.26
There are also many examples of Hitler’s personal fondness for Dönitz. During air raids, Hitler sometimes phoned Dönitz to make sure he had gone to his shelter, and on several occasions when Dönitz visited Führer Headquarters Hitler invited the grand admiral to dine with him.27 In the fall of 1943, in response to Dönitz’s request, Jodl issued instructions that in the future Dönitz should receive a copy of all proposals submitted to OKW that affected naval interests.28 This gave Dönitz advance warning of threats to what he perceived as the navy’s interests. With this knowledge he could arrive at Hitler’s headquarters with well-prepared arguments to contest unpalatable proposals.
Several members of Hitler’s entourage attested to Dönitz’s popularity with Hitler. Speer later asserted that Dönitz was one of the few Nazis given an SS escort squad and an armored Mercedes, and Hitler’s valet, Heinz Linge, was to recall that the Führer often claimed Dönitz was the only one who had not deceived him. Puttkamer declared that Dönitz won Hitler’s respect by speaking bluntly but honestly, adding that Dönitz had immense authority even with the Party. Hitler’s air force adjutant asserted that in the war’s final weeks Hitler displayed great confidence in Dönitz, but not in Göring or Himmler. Goebbels’s diary contains several passages praising Dönitz for his ideological attitude and determination to continue the struggle. On Hitler’s last birthday, ten days prior to his suicide, he invited only Dönitz, Keitel, Jodl, and Göring individually into his private quarters to receive their best wishes. Everyone else had to settle for a handshake from Hitler in a crowded conference room. Finally, in his political testament Hitler stated, “May it become a point of honor to future German Army officers, a
s already is the case with our navy, that the surrender of a district or city is out of the question.”29 To reward Dönitz for his loyalty, Hitler granted him a monthly “salary supplement” of four thousand marks.30 On the tenth anniversary of the Nazi seizure of power Hitler appointed Dönitz naval commander in chief, and exactly one year later he awarded Dönitz the Golden Party Badge. Hitler was keenly aware of dates and the significance of timing, and it is very unlikely that the choice of 30 January to give Dönitz these two great honors was happenstance.31
Dönitz returned Hitler’s admiration. After a meeting in August 1943 Dönitz added to the summary of the conference: “The immense power the Führer radiated, his unswerving confidence, the farsighted evaluation of the situation in Italy these past days has made it very clear that in comparison to the Führer, we are all very wretched pip-squeaks. . . . Anyone who believes he could do better than the Führer is stupid.”32 When British aircraft sank the battleship Tirpitz in November 1944, Hitler did not reproach Dönitz but rather consoled him. Dönitz claimed that on this occasion he realized not only Hitler’s historic greatness but also his humanity.33 In July 1945 Dönitz told interrogators that “Hitler was a person with an abundance of good heart; his mistake was perhaps, that he was too noble.”34 Immediately prior to the Nuremberg Trials, Dönitz said of Hitler, “I have always found him very courteous, very polite, and very hearty to me. I can’t say any other thing. I made his acquaintance as a man of the best heart, of the most noble heart.”35 In the summer of 1946 he pointed out that people in 1850 regarded Napoleon as despicable and a criminal but that forty years later judgment had changed, indicating his belief that Hitler’s reputation would be restored. At the same time he stated, “All in all, I believe that there was very much decent in the Third Reich.”36 Even after the Nuremberg trials, when he could no longer even feign ignorance of the enormity of Nazi crimes, Dönitz did not revise his opinion of Hitler. He still considered criticism of Hitler treasonous and was probably the only person on the planet to regard himself as Germany’s sole legal head of state because Hitler had appointed him thus. He bitterly resented being a prisoner and, prior to his trial at Nuremberg, tried to convince the Anglo-Americans that he alone could prevent German naval officers from going over to the Russians.37
Some of Dönitz’s actions in the final weeks of the war, including his brief tenure as head of state, require closer scrutiny. On 22 April Dönitz left Berlin first for Plön, and ten days later for Flensburg, to command the “northern zone,” consisting of northern Germany, Denmark, and Norway. On the morning of the 25th he held a meeting with two Gauleiters of northern Germany, Friedrich Hildebrandt and Hinrich Lohse. Dönitz briefed the two Party officials on what he considered to be the most urgent tasks facing the northern region, explaining that his foremost goal was to obtain more combat soldiers by combing out men from rear-area units in all branches of service. Another “urgent task,” ranked eighth, was to establish flying drumhead courts-martial. In view of the situation facing millions of German soldiers and civilians, one can only wonder at Dönitz’s belief that roving courts-martial were a priority. Furthermore, naval police had a reputation among some Germans as being even more savage than the SS; naval executions for desertion continued until the end of the war and beyond. Incredibly, on 4 May 1945 Dönitz approved a sailor’s death sentence for making critical remarks about Hitler, and on 9 May—after the war had ended—the Naval High Command checked to make sure the execution had been carried out. Three additional sailors who deserted on 5 May were executed on the 10th, again after the war was over.38
Dönitz became Reich president on 1 May and held this post until the 23rd, when the Allies arrested him. In that time he did virtually nothing to break with Hitler’s policies. He did reject the services of criminals like Himmler but allowed several Nazis to remain in their cabinet posts, and he ordered no changes whatsoever in OKW. He made no attempt to ban or dissolve the Nazi Party, and pictures of Hitler remained on the walls of government buildings even after Germany’s surrender.39
There are several versions of how Hitler selected Dönitz as his successor. After the war Dönitz insisted that the appointment had taken him “completely by surprise.” He also falsely claimed that since 20 July 1944 he “had not spoken to Hitler at all except at some large gathering.”40 Dönitz would maintain that in prison Speer confided that he had suggested Dönitz to Hitler as a possible successor. Speer, however, asserted this was not the case and that he had assured Dönitz of this shortly before the latter’s release from Spandau.41 At Nuremberg Dönitz testified that he had no idea why Hitler had chosen him, that he assumed it was merely because after Göring’s fall from favor he was the senior service chief.42 Yet Admiral Meisel attested that Dönitz had engaged in a power struggle with Göring, due to Dönitz’s “unbridled ambition” to become “the second man in the state.”43 Hitler’s naval adjutant related a story that one evening in the winter of 1944–45 Hitler asked who his successor should be. One person proposed Göring, another Himmler, and so forth, but Hitler rejected them all. Then someone suggested Dönitz, and Hitler remained silent.44
Some view Hitler’s choice of Dönitz as his successor simply as a matter of convenience, but this is not the case. Hitler seriously considered two army men, Model and Schörner, both experts at defensive warfare and fanatical National Socialists, and coincidentally both former commanders of Army Group North.45 It was surely wounded pride and jealousy that led Göring to exclaim, “Who was Dönitz? A little admiral who could negotiate a peace.”46 Göring was not alone in suggesting that the selection of Dönitz reflected Hitler’s realization that the war was lost, that he needed to appoint someone suitable to make peace. This appears to be a logical course of action in hindsight, but it does not make sense when viewed from Hitler’s perspective when he made this decision. In his last days Hitler repeatedly looked to Dönitz to relieve Berlin, not to surrender it.47 Furthermore, Hitler expelled Göring and Himmler from the Party and stripped them of their titles for negotiating with the Allies. Hitler’s anguish and sense of betrayal at their attempts to negotiate is well documented. Furious, Hitler shouted, “A traitor must never succeed me as Führer.”48 Why would he have appointed Dönitz as his successor to make peace when he had just disgraced the two most likely candidates for that very reason?
Hitler need not have feared defection by Dönitz. Dönitz had long been an ardent supporter of Hitler’s strategy of holding out to the end. For example, in an address in December 1943 Dönitz proclaimed several ideas he would later insist he had never espoused: “I am a strong supporter of the idea of ideological indoctrination. . . . It is nonsense to say that soldiers or officers must be non-political. . . . I am an adherent of not giving up anything in the East that is not absolutely necessary. I have vigorously advised holding the Crimea. I have exerted my influence as much as I could for that purpose.”49
Two months later Dönitz delivered a similar talk, again emphasizing the importance of defending every foot of ground in the East, including the Crimea. He also insisted it was vital to keep the enemy out of the Baltic because of the current buildup of the new U-boat force. In a speech later that year Dönitz maintained that the navy’s “fanatically pursued and unshakable goal” was to revive the U-boat war. He insisted that the Allies had not yet built enough vessels to compensate for the tonnage they had lost and that their demands for shipping space were greater than ever. In December 1944 Dönitz addressed high-ranking naval officers in Weimar, and a major theme of this talk emphasized the need to hold Courland.50 In a radio speech of 20 February 1945 Dönitz announced to Germany’s youth, Even after the war had ended, while still head of state, Dönitz declared that “the basis for the further existence of the German people is the national community created by National Socialism.”52
You have been so very fortunate as to be placed by destiny in the greatest era of our people. . . . You must be attached body and soul and with all the forces of your heart and character to the Führ
er. You must regard yourselves as his children, whom nothing on earth could ever make waver in their unconditional loyalty. This is the greatest and finest thing in a man’s life—unconditional and loyal devotion to the great man who is his leader.51
Dönitz certainly had done nothing to indicate to Hitler that he would conclude peace. In March 1945 he urged Germans to follow the example of the Japanese at Iwo Jima, where American troops killed 14,000 Japanese soldiers but captured only 180. In a decree of 11 April 1945 he warned that slavery awaited Germans in the Soviet zone of occupation, while in the Anglo-Saxon zones National Socialism would be ruthlessly eliminated, resulting in chaos for the German people. In addition, he cautioned that the “intellectual weaklings” who considered surrender would be the first to perish under such conditions. Finally, Dönitz pointed out that continuing to fight offered Germany the only hope to improve its situation. He commanded all naval personnel on land to fight to the end defending their naval bases, and those at sea to go down with their ships rather than surrender. At the meeting with the Gauleiters on 25 April 1945 the subject arose of ending the war to save lives. Dönitz angrily replied that this was a matter for Hitler alone to decide and that no one had the right to diverge from the course determined by him. “The Führer’s actions,” he insisted, “are determined exclusively by concern for the German people. In any event, since capitulation must mean the destruction of the German people’s substance, from this viewpoint it is only right to fight on.”53