by David Grier
72.TBJG, 14: 318–19, 452; “An Interview with Alfred Jodl,” 15–16; “An Interview with Hermann Goering,” 10–12; Below, Als Hitlers Adjutant, 386; Speer, Inside the Third Reich, 527–28.
73.Kreipe Diary, 16 Sept. 1944, IfZ, F 29, 21.
74.Jung, Die Ardennen-Offensive, 105–109.
75.Oven, Mit Goebbels bis zum Ende, 2: 130, 169; Speer, Inside the Third Reich, 527–28.
76.Jung, Die Ardennen-Offensive, 104; Weinberg, World at Arms, 765.
77.Tippelskirch, Geschichte des Zweiten Weltkrieg, 563–64; Görlitz, Zweite Weltkrieg, 2: 462.
78.Guderian, Erinnerungen, 373; Guderian, “Interrelationship between the Eastern and Western Fronts,” 51.
79.OKH, “Besprechungspunkte für den Führervortrag am 20.12.1944,” T-78/338/6294884; OKH, “Nr. 450012/45,” 16 Jan. 1945, T-78/339/6295412; OKH, “Nr. 1357/45,” 31 Jan. 1945, RH 2/331a, 4.
80.Ziemke, Stalingrad to Berlin, 81–85.
81.OKH, “Nr. 430586/43,” 4 Sept. 1943, OKW KTB, 6: 1455–56; Ziemke, Stalingrad to Berlin, 164–65, 171; Pickert, Kuban-Brückenkopf bis Sewastopol, 55.
82.Zeitzler, “Das Ringen um die grossen Entscheidungen im zweiten Weltkrieg,” vol. 2, N 63/80, 31; Weinberg, World at Arms, 456–57; “Fragen Fest,” BA/K, N 1340/17; Speer to Fest, 13 Sept. 1969, BA/K, N 1340/17.
83.Heusinger, Befehl im Widerstreit, 266.
84.Manstein, Lost Victories, 392; Ziemke, Stalingrad to Berlin, 59, 181.
85.Zydowitz, 58. Infanterie-Division, 130–31.
86.Speer to Fest, 13 Sept. 1969, BA/K, N 1340/17; Speer, Spandau, 15; Hitlers Lagebesprechungen, 720, 739, 742.
87.Heidkämper, “Die Schlacht um Ostpreussen,” N 245/15, 54–55.
88.TBJG, 15: 53–56, 218, 231, 275.
89.Speer to Hitler, 5 Sept. 1944, BA/K, N 1340/214; “Protokoll 8: Bedarf der Wehrmacht, Progeammgestalting, Lieferungen vom Ausland, einschliesslich besetzte Gebiete (8 August 1945),” in Speer: Die Kransberg-Protokolle 1945, 384–87; Speer, Inside the Third Reich, 480–81.
Chapter 8: The Swedish Question
1.Hitler Book, 179–80; HGr Nord, KTB, 5 and 7 Sept. 1944, RH 19 III/318, 50, 67; Guderian, Erinnerungen, 336; Boldt, Hitler, 74–75, 77.
2.Das Deutsche Reich und der Zweite Weltkrieg, 4: 405; Boheman, På Vakt, 2: 97, 103–104; Behrendtz, “Tysklands hållning till svensk intervention i vinterkriget,” 225–27; Uthmann, “German Military Policy in Scandinavia,” WWII German Military Studies, 5: 11–13.
3.Juhlin-Dannfelt, “Hågkomster,” Kungl. Krigsarkivet, Stockholm [hereafter KrA], Curt Juhlin-Dannfelts arkiv, 2: 204.
4.On 9 Apr. the Swedes had one company of troops and one artillery battery in southern Sweden; Ehrensvärd, I rikets tjänst, 155; Lange, “Vapenhjälpen till Finland,” Sveriges beredskap, 136.
5.Gemzell, Raeder, Hitler und Skandinavien, 277, 287; OKW KTB, 2: 963.
6.Salmon, “British Plans for Economic Warfare against Germany,” in Laqueur, Second World War, 31–32, 37, 43–46; Churchill, Gathering Storm, 531–36, 543–47.
7.Cruickshank, SOE in Scandinavia, 33–42.
8.Wittmann, “Deutsch-schwedische Wirtschaftsbeziehungen im Zweiten Weltkrieg,” in Forstmeier and Volkmann, Kriegswirtschaft und Rüstung, 201.
9.Churchill, Gathering Storm, 608.
10.Uthmann, “German Military Policy in Scandinavia,” 13–15.
11.Fst, Marinoperationsavd., “VPM rörande det sjöstrategiska läget i Östersjön vid krig mellan Sovjetunionen och Tyskland,” 21 Mar. 1941, KrA, Beredskapverket 9, vol. 2; TBJG, 3: - 205.
12.Juhlin-Dannfelt, “Hågkomster,” KrA, Curt Juhlin-Dannfelts arkiv, vol. 2, 230; Hökv FSt, “Nr. H 12:1/1941,” 13 Mar. 1941, KrA, Beredskapverket 7, vol. 1.
13.Salewski, Seekriegsleitung, 3: 154–59.
14.OKW KTB, 1: 299, 2: 393.
15.Ibid., 2: 401, 409.
16.Boheman, På Vakt, 2: 182–87; Calgren, Swedish Foreign Policy, 84; Uthmann, “German Military Policy in Scandinavia,” 20; Wangel, “Neutralitetsrätt—regeler och tillämpning,” Sveriges beredskap, 60–66.
17.Calgren, Swedish Foreign Policy, 85, 104; Boheman, På Vakt, 2: 124–26, 159; TBJG, 2: 462, 3: 205–06, 8: 143–44, 167, 9: 389, 393, 546.
18.Denham, Inside the Nazi Ring, 27, 45, 48, 53, 140–42, 150–52; Cruickshank, SOE in Scandinavia, 206.
19.Björkman, “Svensk beredskap hösten 1940 till Juni 1941,” Sveriges beredskap, 206; Juhlin-Dannfelt, “Hågkomster,” KrA, Curt Juhlin-Dannfelts arkiv, vol. 2, 334; Ehrensvärd, I rikets tjänst, 193, 216; Denham, Inside the Nazi Ring, 54.
20.Ehrensvärd, I rikets tjänst, 207; Hägglöf, Samtida Vittne, 206; Boheman, På Vakt, 2: 267–71, 295–96.
21.Lagevorträge, 336, 347–48; “Aufzeichnung des Generalmajors Schmundt über die Besprechung Hitlers mit Mussolini und dem Chef des italienischen Wehrmachtgene-ralstabes, Generaloberst Graf Cavallero am 30. Apr. 1942,” MGM, 117.
22.OKW KTB, 4: 968–70, 6: 905.
23.Chef WFSt, “Entspricht die Verteilung der Gesamtkräfte auf den einzelnen Kriegsschauplätzen der strategischen Lage?” 8 Sept. 1943, RM 7/260, 322–23.
24.In 1942 the Swedes broke 2,100 kilometers of telegram text; Thörnell, “Sammanfattande historik rörande försvarets signal- och kryptotjäntst,” KrA, Beredskapverket 1, vol. 3, Bihang 7, 37–38; Thorén, “Försvarsväsendets radioanstalts (FRA) tillkomst, utveckling och arbete till sommaren 1945,” 8 Mar. 1946, ibid., vol. 43, 5–9.
25.Calgren, Svensk underrättelsetjänst, 66–69.
26.Ibid., 98; Thörnell, “Sammanfattande historik rörande försvarets signal- och kryptotjäntst,” 1 Dec. 1947, KrA, Beredskapverket 1, vol. 3, Bihang 7, 38; Mueller-Hillebrand, Germany and Its Allies, 175–76.
27.Gemzell, Organization, Conflict and Innovation, 372–74.
28.OKW KTB, 5: 18, 39, 199–200, 207, 217.
29.Ziemke, German NTO, 258–60.
30.OKW KTB, 6: 983; Gemzell, 221.
31.Thörnell “Den operativa planläggning under beredskaptiden,” KrA, Beredskapverket 1, vol. 5, Bihang 2, 1–14.
32.“Militära synpunkter på Sverige läget i händelse av krig mellan Tyskland och Sovjetunionen,” 5 Apr. 1941, KrA, Beredskapverket 7, vol. 1; Fst, Sektion I, “PM för Över-befälhavarens föredragning i statsrådsberedning 17/10 1942 rörande krigsfall Tyskland-Sverige,” ibid.
33.Thörnell “Den operativa planläggning under beredskaptiden,” KrA, Beredskapverket 1, vol. 5, Bihang 2, 41; Fst, Sektion I, “Memorial angående viss krigsfallsplanläggning,” 25 Jan. 1944, KrA, Beredskapverket 7, vol. 1.
34.In Oct. 1941 the Swedish Navy consisted of seven coastal defense ships, three cruisers, seventeen destroyers, eighteen submarines, and thirty-two minesweepers. By the end of the war the Swedes had added one cruiser, seven destroyers, eight submarines, ten minesweepers, and twenty motor torpedo boats; Wangel, “Flottans utbyggnad,” Sveriges beredskap, 322–25; Chefen för Marinen, “Instruktion för Krigsfall I/IMK:I/,” [Mar.] 1941, KrA, Marinstaben, Expeditionen, vol. 5, F XVI.
35.Chefen för Marinen, “Särskild instruktion för CKF vid Krigsfall I,” 21 Apr. 1942, KrA, Marinstaben, Expeditionen, vol. 5, F XVI.
36.Calgren, Svensk underrättelsetjänst, 64.
37.Denham, Inside the Nazi Ring, 63–65; Wangel, “Neutralitetsförsvaret till sjöss,” Sveriges beredskap, 556–58.
38.OKW KTB, 6: 1418.
39.MOK Ost, KTB, 16 and 22 July, 22 Aug. 1943, RM 31/M 522.
40.MOK Ostsee, “Betrifft: Tonnage-Krieg,” Anlage 4 zum KTB des MOK Ost v. 16.–31.8.1943, ibid.
41.“B.Nr.1/Skl 23966/43,” 27 Aug. 1943, RM 7/160, 118–19; Beredskapverket 1, KrA, vol. 3, 68. Skl KTB, 6 Sept. 1943, 109.
42.MOK Ost, KTB, 15 and 26 May 1944, RM 31/M 523.
43.Ibid., 1 July 1944; Adm.östl. Ostsee, “Betr.: Auftreten schwed. Einheiten Höhe Irben-strasse,” 14 July 1944, ibid.
44.MOK Ost, KTB, 16, 18 and 24 July 1944, ibid.
45.Marinstaben, Krigsdagbok, 28–29 July, and 5–6 Aug. 1943, Kr
A, D II, vol. 2 [hereafter Mst, KDB].
46.Goebbels’s diary contains complaints about Sweden’s attitude throughout the year, often with threats of retaliation; TBJG, 11: 120, 374, 481, 13: 508.
47.Mst, KDB, 14–16 and 23 May 1944, KrA, D II, vol. 2; Fst, Sektion I, “PM för Överbe-fälhavarens föredragning i statsrådsberedning 17/10 1942 rörande krigsfall Tyskland-Sverige,” KrA, Beredskapverket 7, vol. 1.
48.MOK Ostsee, “Nr. 648/44,” T-1022/1825/PG 32519.
49.Fst, avd M, KDB, 31 Mar. 1944, KrA, F III:1.
50.Ibid., 1 Apr. 1944; MSt, KDB, 23 Mar.–14 Apr. 1944, KrA, D II, vol. 2.
51.MSt, KDB, 19–20 June, 15–16 Sept. 1944, KrA, D II, vol. 2.
52.OKW, “Deutschland-Schweden,” 19 Nov. 1944, RW 4/v.653; OKH, “Kurzgefasste Übersicht Schweden,” 10 Jan. 1945, T-78/502/6490840; Fritz, “Question of Practical Politics,” 109; WO Schweden, “Erzverschiffung über Lulea in den Kriegsjahre 1939–1944,” T-77/694/1904386–87.
53.“Weisung für die Seekriegsführung in der östlichen Ostsee,” 29 Sept. 1944, RM 7/162, 109.
54.ObdM, “Kurzlage ObdM Nr. 4,” 6 Oct. 1944, RM 7/100, 352.
55.“Vortrag des Chefs der Skl bei der Besprechung der Oberbefehlshaber in ‘Koralle’ am 24./25.8.44,” ibid., 162; Skl KTB, 25 and 29 Sept. 1944, 697, 787; “Einsatz der Flottenstreitkräfte zur Abwehr von Landungen im Skagerrak-Raum,” 25 Oct. 1944, RM 7/163, 329; Skl, “Besprechung Chef Skl mit Chef Genstb.d.H.,” 15 Dec. 1944, RM 7/261, 117.
56.OKW, “Deutsche Haltung gegenüber Schweden,” 3 Oct. 1944, RW 4/v.653; OKW, “Verhalten gegenüber Schweden,” 15 Oct. 1944, ibid.
57.Skl KTB, 23 Oct. 1944, 561.
58.MOK Ost, “Op 6644 FI,” 24 Oct. 1944, RM 7/163, 340; Skl KTB, 28 Oct. 1944, 668; Skl KTB, 14 Nov. 1944, 298; Skl KTB, 8–9 Feb. 1945, 72, 75–76.
59.OKW, “Betr.: Schweden,” 5 Jan. 1945, RW 4/v.654; Adm.FHQu, “Lageunterrichtung,” 10 Jan. 1945, RM 7/101, 120.
60.OKW KTB, 8: 1098; Lagevorträge, 671. In 1943 the government permitted training for Norwegians and Danes who had fled to Sweden. By May 1945 the “police units” contained 15,000 Norwegians and 5,000 Danes; Beredskapverket 1, KrA 3: 483–85; 35: 70–71.
61.Gemzell, “Tysk militär planläggning under det andra världskriget: fall Sverige,” 201–204.
62.1/Skl, “Kurze Betrachtung zum Kriegsfall mit Schweden” [May 1943], RM 7/160, 172–84.
63.Salewski, Seekriegsleitung, 2: 403.
64.1/Skl, “Betr.: Schweden,” 20 Oct. 1943, RM 7/163, 384; Skl KTB, 23 Oct. 1943, 463–64; MOK Ostsee, “Nr. 196/43,” 10 Dec. 1943, RM 7/163, 372–80; MOK Norwegen, “Betrifft: Studie Schweden,” 6 Mar. 1944, RM 7/163, 363.
65.Skl KTB, 19 Oct. 1944, 460; 1/Skl, “Studie Schweden,” 19 Oct. 1944, RM 7/163, 355–59.
66.1/Skl, “Lagebetrachtung für den Fall eines Kriegseintrittes Schwedens auf der Seite unserer Gegner,” 29 Oct. 1944, RM 7/163, 267–93.
67.Skl KTB, 1 Dec. 1944, 10; 1/Skl “Betr.: Vorbereitungen für einen möglichen Kriegseintritt Schwedens,” 12 Feb. 1945, T-1022/3913/PG 31757.
68.Fst, avd M, “VPM ang marinpolitiska läget,” 9 Sept. 1944, KrA, F IV, vol. 3; Mst, KDB, 28 Oct., 3 and 11 Nov. 1944, KrA, D II, vol. 2.
69.Fst, avd M, “VPM angående det militär-politiska läget hösten-vintern 1943/44 samt de åtgärder, som böra vidtagas därest en ökning av den marina beredskapen måsta genomföras,” 29 Dec. 1943, KrA, F IV, vol. 3.
70.Churchill, Gathering Storm, 462.
Chapter 9: The U-boat War, the Baltic Sea, and Norway
1.Salewski, Seekriegsleitung, 2: 497.
2.Germany and the Second World War, 6: 348.
3.1/Skl “Abschlussbetrachtung zum Geleitzug Nr. 19,” 24 May 1943, RM 7/847; 2/Skl “Geleitoperation Nr. 3,” 28 May 1943, ibid. Actual Allied losses in Mar. 1943 in the Atlantic were 504,675 tons. Key works on the U-boat war include Rahn’s excellent summary in Germany and the Second World War, 6: 342–405; Rohwer, Critical Convoy Battles of March 1943; Gannon, Operation Drumbeat; Roskill, War at Sea; and despite questionable interpretation, Blair, Hitler’s U-boat War.
4.Lagevorträge, 475–77; Iu, “Kurze Betrachtung zum U-Bootskrieg,” [7] June 1943, RM 7/847.
5.Lagevorträge, 505, 507–10; OKW KTB, 8: 1577.
6.Ruge, In vier Marinen, 264; Ing. J. Elenz, “Festigkeitstechnische Untersuchung an einem U-Boot vom Typ XXI beim Tieftauchen am 23.3.45,” Nachlass Oelfken, N 518/2a; Niestlé, “German Technical and Electronic Development,” Howarth and Law, Battle of the Atlantic, 435–36; Rahn, “Die Entstehung neuer deutscher U-Boot-Typen,” 15; Weinberg, World at Arms, 374.
7.2/Skl, “Überlegungen zum Einsatz des Typ XXI,” 10 July 1944, N 236/19, 7–18; N.I.D. “Report: Summary of German U-Boat Designs,” 17 Oct. 1945, NavOpArch, GNR, box T 77, 17; Sieche, “Type XXI Submarine,” 3–7; Rössler, U-boat, 208–209, 340.
8.Rössler, U-boat, 209–10, 341; N.I.D. “Report: Summary of German U-Boat Designs,” 17 Oct. 1945, NavOpArch, GNR, box T 77, 20.
9.Lagevorträge, 517–21; Schulze-Wegener, Kriegsmarine-Rüstung, 130–33.
10.Speer, “Nr. M 1362/45” 27 Jan. 1945, T-77/864/5611342–43.
11.Rössler, U-boat, 214–17; USSBS Interview 49, Otto Merker, 20 June 1945, National Archives, Record Group 243 [hereafter NA, RG 243], entry 6, box 723.
12.Hauptamt Kriegsschiffbau, “K Stb. 2812/43,” 13 Oct. 1943, RM 7/98, 198. In fact, sectional construction reduced slip time from twenty-six weeks for a Type IX-D, a U-boat of similar size, to about six weeks for Type XXI submarines; Oelfken and Arendt, “Die Baumethoden der deutschen U-Boote 1935–1945,” N 518/5.
13.Oelfken and Arendt, “Baumethoden der deutschen U-Boote,” N 518/5; USSBS “Overall Report (European War),” 30 Sept. 1945, NA, RG 243, box 47, 69; Schulze-Wegener, Kriegsmarine-Rüstung, 132–35; Dönitz, “Die deutsche Seekriegführung,” 6 Aug. 1945, RM 6/374, 57.
14.U.S. Naval Technical Mission in Europe, “Organization of German Submarine Construction,” Sept. 1945, NavOpArch, NAVTECHMISSEUR, series IV, box 42, 25.
15.USSBS, “Report on Ingenieurburo Glueckauf,” NA, RG 243, entry 6, box 724; “Organization of German Submarine Construction,” NavOpArch, NAVTECHMISSEUR, series IV, box 42, 33–36; Rössler, U-boat, 231–34.
16.Lagevorträge, 79; Rössler, U-boat, 168–75.
17.Lagevorträge, 416–19, 420–24; Rössler, U-boat, 178–82; Oelfken, “Deutsche U-Bootsprojekte 1943–45,” N 518/2a.
18.Lagevorträge, 435–36; Hessler, U-boat War, 1: 110.
19.BdU KTB, 1 Dec. 1943, RM 87/9, 99–100.
20.Ibid., 24 May and 22 June 1943, RM 87/8, 259, 306; Lagevorträge, 505, 507–10.
21.Walter to Dönitz, 19 May 1943, RM 6/106, 7–8; Oelfken, “Der Schnorchel,” N 518/3; Fuchs, “Stellungnahme zu den Angaben des Buches von Grossadmiral Dönitz ‘Zehn Jahre und Zwanzig Tage,’” 6 Feb. 1959, Nachlass Fuchs, N 548/v.43. On snorkels making life on U-boats less comfortable, Tarrant, Last Year of the Kriegsmarine, 30–31.
22.Major works on breaking German naval codes include Beesly, Very Special Intelligence; Hinsley, British Intelligence; Kahn, Seizing the Enigma.
23.Germany and the Second World War, 6: 396–405; Rohwer, “Doenitz and the Battle of the Atlantic,” in Dönitz, Ten Years and Twenty Days, 494–96, 506–507 Schulze-Wegener, Kriegsmarine-Rüstung, 119–21.
24.Lagevorträge, 529; Skl KTB, 13 Aug. 1943, 234; Skl KTB, 8 Sept. 1943, 164. Rahn puts the losses at thirty-seven and twenty-five, respectively; Germany and the Second World War, 6: 348.
25.Skl KTB, 6 Jan. 1944, 91; Lagevorträge, 565; “Ubootslage,” RM 87/10, 35–37.
26.OKW KTB, 8: 1577–80; Skl KTB, 31 Jan. 1944, 567; Lagevorträge, 575.
27.Lagevorträge, 583–85; 1/Skl, “U-Bootslage Mittelmeer,” 1 May 1944, RM 7/848, 63–64.
28.OKW, “Lageunterrichtung 14.6,” RM 7/99, 122; “Ubootslage 1.6.1944,” RM 87/40, 13, 19; Skl KTB, 7 June 1944, 140–41.
29.Skl KTB, 11 Sept. 1944, 282; ibid., 5 Nov. 1944, 111;
ibid., 6 Jan. 1945, 104; BdU KTB, 3 Dec. 1944, RM 87/46, 14; “Zusammengefasste Ubootslage Atlantik Monat November–Dezember,” RM 87/46, 107–11; Lagevorträge, 621, 630, 635, 638, 653, 655, 675.
30.Sternhell and Thorndike, “Antisubmarine Warfare in World War II,” Strategic Planning in the U.S. Navy, reel 10, 70, 73–74; Glennon, “The Weapon That Came Too Late,” 88.
31.USSBS, “Interview No. 53, Karl-Otto Saur,” 22 June 1945, NA, RG 243, entry 6, box 1000; Rössler, U-boat, 241, 246; Ruge, In vier Marinen, 256.
32.Skl KTB, 7 Aug. 1944, 160–61; ibid., 6 Sept. 1944, 160; 2/Skl “Stand der U-Boote am 1. November 1944,” RM 87/45, 6–7.
33.Lagevorträge, 604; Oven, Mit Goebbels bis zum Ende, 2: 169; Skl KTB, 5 Oct. 1944, 119.
34.OKM, “XIX. Rü-Besprechung Kriegsmarine am 6.9.44: Besprechungsergebnisse und Entscheidungen,” RM 7/100, 260–61; 2/Skl, “Stand der U-Boote am 1. Januar 1945,” RM 87/46, 94.
35.2/Skl, “Wirkungsgrad der U-Boote,” 13 Jan. 1945, RM 87/46, 175–77; TBJG, 15: 58; Lagevorträge, 653.
36.Lagevorträge, 673, 680; “Typ XXIII Boote,” N 379/v.101; Hessler, U-boat War, 3: 98–99; Sieche, “Type XXIII German Submarine,” 160–61.
37.“German Submarine Design 1935–1945,” July 1945, NavOpArch, NAVTECHMISSEUR, series IV, box 32, 13; Schulze-Wegener, Kriegsmarine-Rüstung, 140.
38.Skl KTB, 17 Mar. 1945, 244; OKW KTB, 8: 1208; Hinsley, British Intelligence, 3: part 2, 631; Hessler, U-boat War, 3: 98; Cremer, U-boat Commander, 201–202.
39.Hinsley, British Intelligence, 3: part 1, 47–50, 244–45, 284–85, 519–23; part 2, 483, 627–29.
40.Beesly, Very Special Intelligence, 246, 249; Hinsley, British Intelligence, 3: part 2, 627.
41.On several occasions British estimates came to only half the actual number of new U-boats; Hinsley, British Intelligence, 3: part 2, 471–74, 482, 486, 630, 633. Beesly, Very Special Intelligence, 248; Knowles, “Ultra and the Battle of the Atlantic: The American View,” 447; Erickson, Road to Berlin, 481–82.
42.Lagevorträge, 518; Oelfken, “Deutsche U-Bootsprojekte,” 23 Feb. 1947, N 518/2a; Ruge, In vier Marinen, 259–60.
43.USSBS “Overall Report (European War),” 30 Sept. 1945, NA, RG 243, box 47, 69–70.