Nightmare at Scapa Flow: The Truth About the Sinking of HMS Royal Oak

by H J Weaver

  Next came Engineer Commander John Renshaw.

  ‘What was the condition of the oil fuel tanks when the ship was torpedoed?’ – ‘. . . The ship was 90 per cent full of oil fuel except for the inner tanks in A boiler-room, which were in use, but they were nearly full.’

  ‘Can you say if there were any internal explosions?’ – ‘I cannot say.’

  ‘Do you know of any evidence that columns of water were seen to rise on the starboard side of the ship or to have fallen on the ship?’ – ‘I understand other witnesses saw this, but I did not.’

  A statement by Lt.-Cdr. Richard Gregoy, Royal Oak’s navigator, was then read into the evidence: ‘When the first explosion occurred I was undressing in my cabin [in the bridge structure]. Time, 0104. I went to the flag deck and was informed the explosion was right under the bows. A large column of water had been shot up above the forecastle level and the cable had run out . . . [After the next explosions] I went over the side where I sat and undressed. Very shortly afterwards the ship turned turtle but I managed to keep pace with her and fetched up on the ship’s bottom. Subsequently three other men and myself climbed back again onto the bilge keel where we remained for some seven to 10 minutes [arrived on keel at 0133]. During this time the ship remained steady, settling very slowly. I walked some way forward but the hull appeared intact. I took to the water about 0140 by which time there was about eight feet of the blister (apart from the bilge keel) still above water.’

  ‘From whom did you get the information about the column of water thrown up by the first explosion?’ – ‘From the signalman of the watch.’

  ‘Please repeat all he told you’ – ‘He stated that a large column of water had been thrown up in the bows, and, on being questioned, he said he thought it was much bigger than could have been caused by the port anchor falling.’

  ‘Did all the explosions seem to you equally violent?’ – ‘Allowing for the fact that I was further from the last than I was from the second and third, I think they were all about the same.’

  ‘Was it a very dark night?’ – ‘When one’s eyes grew accustomed to it, it was comparatively light. Men swimming could be seen for about 70 yards.’

  Sub-Lt. Anthony Pearman, the next witness, was questioned about a written statement he had made describing how the second and third explosions had caused a shower of water to drench the after part of the compass platform, and a sheet of orange flame, thought to be the cordite flame venting around the funnel case. He was then replaced by Surgeon-Commander George Ritchie.

  ‘How many persons have you seen who are definitely suffering effects of poisonous or other gases?’ – ‘One, sir, the Pay Commander.’

  ‘To what extent has he been affected?’ – ‘Moderately badly.’

  ‘Can you identify the nature of the gas?’ – ‘I think it was cordite fumes.’

  ‘The effect produced might have been caused by cordite or the fumes of some other explosive?’ – ‘Yes, sir.’

  ‘Was there any evidence of carbon monoxide?’ – ‘He was not affected by carbon monoxide.’

  Captain Benn was recalled again.

  ‘What SOS signals were made from the ship?’ – ‘The commander ordered a signal to be made to Pegasus. When I got to Pegasus some time later and I had consulted with one or two officers, I felt very strongly of the opinion that the ship must have been torpedoed. I had an immediate signal made to ACOS to inform him of my opinion so that counter action could be taken at once. This was followed by an amplifying signal and a further signal.’

  ‘Please give us your remarks on rescue work, mentioning speed, efficiency and any point of special interest’ – ‘A great deal of rescue work was carried out by the drifter Daisy II who was alongside the port side of the ship and got clear after the fourth explosion. The remainder was carried out so far as I know by boats from Pegasus, assisted, I believe, by a drifter sent over by the King’s Harbour Master, Lyness. I believe also that some drifters which were alongside Scapa Pier, about one and a half miles away, when Royal Oak went down also carried out rescue work . . . The skipper of the Daisy II and his crew did everything possible to get men aboard and into warm positions. The action of Pegasus appears to me to be very prompt and commendable. They appear to have sent boats away at once. Not only did they do this, but they sent blankets away in boats and they appear to have made every possible arrangement, giving up everything in the ship to the care and attention to men rescued. They were simply magnificent. When in the water I saw a searchlight burning which I imagine came from Pegasus.’

  ‘Were any other searchlights used?’ – ‘Not as far as I know. No other ship was near.’

  ‘Have you the impression that a large proportion of the men in the water were subsequently saved?’ – ‘I have an impression that very many of the men who went over the side were saved.’

  ‘Please tell us how you left the ship.’ – ‘After the fourth explosion . . . I moved over to the port guardrails with some difficulty. I sat on them for a moment or two and had a good look at the ship and started to walk up the ship’s side: the ship must by then have heeled over to more than 90 degrees. I think I only went a very few feet when the ship appeared to capsize very quickly. A large number of men came falling down the ship’s side past me, and I slipped down until I fetched up on something in the water, which I now imagine must have been the guardrails. My next impression was that the keel of the ship was well over my head and falling on top of me. At that moment, some force threw me straight up the side of the ship and eventually a few yards away when I started to swim.’

  Commander Nicholls was now recalled to be questioned on the subject of signals.

  ‘Please tell us what you know of any SOS signals from Royal Oak.’ – ‘As soon as I got onto B gun deck after the fourth explosion, I hailed the flag deck and told them to make a general signal on their projector to send all boats. The reply I got back was that all power had failed.’

  ‘Had you a rocket on the bridge, ready for firing, or Very lights?’ – ‘I cannot say, and, unfortunately, it did not occur to me to order their use.’

  ‘Can you say what visual signal from ships in the harbour would have been regarded as an urgent distress signal?’ – ‘There would have been nothing more than the normal international signals for a ship in distress.’

  ‘Were any such signals made from Pegasus?’ – ‘I saw none, but I know she made a general signal to send all boats to Royal Oak.’

  ‘Did Pegasus promptly switch on a searchlight and was it helpful?’ – ‘I saw her burning a searchlight soon after I was in the water, but it was of no assistance as far as I know.’

  The next testimony was provided by Commander Oswald Frewen, who explained that he had been ‘appointed in March as Senior Naval Officer and King’s Harbour Master, Scapa, with a view to the development of the base’.

  ‘Which entrances to Scapa Flow are you responsible for the closing, or defence, of?’ – ‘I am not personally responsible for any of them, only to point out to the Rear-Admiral and Commanding Officer, Coast of Scotland (COCOS), and later to ACOS, which gaps in my opinion are dangerous.’

  ‘Have you made any written reports on the subject?’ – ‘No, sir. The matter was already in hand when I was appointed.’

  ‘What verbal representations have you made on the subject since you got here?’ – ‘When I got here the Soriano had already been laid in Kirk Sound . . . and the Naja had been laid in Water Sound. I understood that three or four more blocksbips were to be laid by Metal Industries, who had laid the other two and were going to purchase the ships privately and lay them. Later there was some question of reversing the whole arrangement and laying no more. HMS Scott came up and carried out a survey as a result of which the Rear-Admiral and Commanding Officer, Coast of Scotland, recommended that four more blockships be put down. I then heard no more blockships were going to be put down as Their Lordships were satisfied the Sounds were . . . too dangerous for navigation. When Admiral French
came up, about June, I think, I took him out and in again through both Skerry and Kirk Sounds in a boom defence picket boat, and, in view of Mr Mackenzie of Metal Industries offering to bring in a reasonably sized tramp through either of these Sounds, I understand that Admiral French reported to the Admiralty and obtained sanction for two more block-ships.’

  ‘Would you consider two more sufficient or would you prefer four?’ – ‘Since the Soriano we have placed the Cape Ortegal, which, in my opinion, makes Skerry Sound absolutely safe. We are today [note: October 21] laying the Lake Neuchatel, which, if it is successful, will make Kirk Sound absolutely safe. I am not prepared to say that East Weddel or Water Sounds are 100 per cent safe.’

  ‘Do you mean you cannot guarantee that the Royal Oak episode might not be repeated by a German submarine entering one of these passages?’ – ‘I think it would be very, very difficult, but I think it is possible.’

  ‘If the Lake Neuchatel completely blocks the south gap in Kirk Sound, are you satisfied that a small submarine with modern wirecutters could not get through to the northward of Soriano?’ – ‘I think it is a possibility.’

  ‘Would it then be wise to have a blockship in this position?’ – ‘I think the passage north of the Soriano would scarcely require a blockship if a ship’s cable rather than the present five and a half inch ship’s wire were used between the bows of the Soriano and low-water mark.’

  ‘Do you know if before October 13 there were any coast watchers to watch the gaps between the blockships and the shore?’ – ‘I think there was no continuous watch, and I understand that when a ship grounded on one of the northern islands a Metal Industries tug proceeded straight through Kirk Sound during the night on the way out there and returning, and she was not reported by anyone. She drew about 13ft.6in.’

  ‘What was the state of the tide when the tug passed through?’ – ‘She passed out near low water.’

  ‘Do you know if it was a dark night?’ – ‘Not very dark, sir.’

  ‘If it be assumed that a small German submarine drawing about 12½ft. entered Scapa on the surface on the night of October 13, please state all the different places at which you think she might have entered.’ – ‘In view of the open space south of the (blockship) Thames in Kirk Sound, I would not have thought that any submarine would have bothered with any of the other entrances . . .’

  ‘We have heard it stated that a small vessel could point herself at a narrow passage, stop her engines and be swept through by the tide without risk of hitting either side. Have you heard this stated?’ – ‘I have heard it with reference to the Pentland Firth, but not with regard to the eastern Sounds.’

  ‘We have heard it stated that, in recent years, German trawlers have passed constantly in and out of Scapa through Hoy and Kirk Sounds. If German submarine officers had come in these vessels, would you say that this would make it much easier for them to bring a submarine in under war conditions?’ – ‘Yes, sir, definitely.’

  In addition to the gaps between the blockship Soriano and the northern shore of Kirk Sound, and the blockship Thames and the southern shore of Kirk Sound, there was a gap between the blockships themselves. Commander Frewen was asked: ‘What is the distance between Thames and Soriano and the approximate depth at high water?’

  He replied: ‘There is a gap of 145 feet with five and a half fathoms (33ft.) at high water,’ and went on to explain that the gap between the blockships was protected by ‘a taut 12in. hemp for moral effect’ and an arrangement of seven-inch and six-inch wires attached to seven-and-a-half-ton anchors.

  The last witness but one was Commander John Heath, Staff Officer (Operations) to ACOS, who was questioned about his duties. He told the Board: ‘I have all dealings with ships wishing to enter, or go from, the Scapa anchorage. I therefore have control over the opening and closing of the gates.’

  ‘We take it that you are generally concerned with all the defences at the entrances?’ – ‘Only in an indirect way, sir, the direct responsibility being with the XDO [Extended Defence Officer].’

  ‘Can you tell us of any officer besides the Admiral who is directly concerned with the general security of the base and the defence of its seven entrances?’ – ‘There is no one but the Admiral and the XDO and his staff. He has assistant people, I believe, at various entrances.’

  ‘How long has the Chief of Staff been here?’ – ‘The present Chief of Staff arrived here the day before Royal Oak sank. Previous to that, Captain Fellowes performed that duty. The details of the defence were compiled by Captain Fellowes and the Flag Captain. The Flag Captain controlled the drifters and organised the drifter patrols for all the entrances.’

  ‘How long was Captain Fellowes here?’ – ‘He was here from approximately, I am not certain, August 6 to October 11.’

  ‘What date did the Admiral get here?’ – ‘Approximately August 26 [note: a handwritten insertion in the evidence file says ‘actually Sunday, August 27].’

  ‘There are seven entrances here, most of which have gaps through which a small submarine could certainly pass in daylight at slack water. Is there any comprehensive defence plan recorded on paper which has been passed on by successive officers to the officers now in charge here?’ – ‘Yes, the Scapa General Defence Scheme, circulated as soon as we arrived. It is typed.’

  ‘Will you please have us provided with a copy?’ – ‘Yes, sir.’

  ‘Would that contain such information as a list of the gaps where a submarine might enter and details recording the watch on those gaps?’ – ‘As far as I recollect, no, only full details of the entrances which have boom defences. It was a long screed. I cannot remember exactly.’

  ‘Have you ever seen a statement regarding the width and depth of these gaps at high water spring?’ – ‘No, sir, but I have made it my business to find out as much as I could of the matter from various sources.’

  ‘From your experience and knowledge, at how many of these gaps would you think it possible for a small submarine to have entered on the night of October 13?’ – ‘Two, sir, Hoxa Sound and Kirk Sound.’

  After further questions about the defences and the currents in various Sounds, Commander Heath was asked: ‘Would it not be your duty to advise the Admiral on these matters or at least to assist him in perfecting the defences of these places?’ – ‘It has never been brought to my notice that I should take particular action with regard to these matters. I will only amplify this by saying we had a small staff to start with and the day-to-day requirements were so multifarious it was not possible to devote attention to matters which were not immediately before one.’

  ‘Have you been called upon to consider your main defence plan?’ – ‘No, sir.’

  The Board then turned to the question of coast watchers and armed guards for the Scapa entrances, and Commander Heath explained: ‘The general organisation is under the control of the District Officer of Coastguards, Captain Buchanan, at Wick, the details of which I am not acquainted with.’

  ‘Presumably his watchers cover the whole of the Orkneys?’ – ‘Yes, sir.’

  ‘Have you ever heard of any coast watchers whose special duty was to observe night and day the five, six or seven passages through which a small submarine might enter?’ – ‘I know of no such detailed organisation.’

  ‘Do you know if any lookouts are placed on shore at any of these seven entrances that have been mentioned?’ – ‘Not permanently, sir, that I know of. That was not the case until after October 13.’

  ‘Can you say how the first news of the Royal Oak attack reached Iron Duke or ACOS?’ – ‘A signal was received through the PWSS. Flotta, at 0135, I think, on October 14 from Pegasus: “General. Send all boats.” ’

  ‘Would that have been a flashing or wireless signal?’ – ‘That was a visual, sir. A further signal was received some half-hour later from Pegasus: ‘Royal Oak is sinking after several internal explosions.’ That is my recollection, sir. The PWSS to Iron Duke was telephoned, but from Pegasus to PWSS was
made by visual.’

  ‘Then the first intimation of enemy attack and sinking of Royal Oak was by means of a visual morse signal to PWSS?’ – ‘Yes, sir.’

  ‘Would this have been much slower than if rockets or Very lights had been fired?’ – ‘Possibly, sir, but more information was conveyed.’

  ‘When and how was it first made clear to the Admiral that an enemy attack had been made on Royal Oak?’ – ‘The first suggestion that enemy action had been taken was a message from Captain Benn which reached the Admiral within one and a half hours of Royal Oak sinking.’

  ‘What action was taken on receipt of the Pegasus signal?’ – ‘Rescue work. All available boats were sent to the scene of the occurrence as soon as possible. The movement of destroyers I cannot give you with any degree of accuracy without further reference. This matter was dealt with by the Chief of Staff.’

  Admiral French was now recalled for the last time.

  ‘What date did you arrive here, please?’ – ‘I was here for five days in June and then I took on my duties on the Sunday before the declaration of war. That is, August 27.’

  ‘Were you given by anyone here a defence plan giving comprehensive details of how the base was defended?’ – ‘Yes, there was an interim defence plan prepared by Rosyth which was given to me.’

  ‘Was anyone here generally responsible for the defence of the base before you arrived?’ – ‘The Senior Naval Officer was Commander Frewen and the person who was directly responsible was the Commander-in-Chief, Rosyth.’

  ‘What exactly is the responsibility of the XDO at the present time?’ – ‘The XDO is responsible for the passage of vessels in and out of the Hoxa and Switha booms, and, in conjunction with the shore batteries, to prevent the passage of enemy vessels. He is not actually responsible for the maintenance of the booms in any way or for the manner in which they have been laid down.’