by John W. Dean
Nixon explained that he had not listened to March 21, “because I figured you ought to be the witness on that.” He suggested that he had listened to March 22, but had made no notes on it, “figuring that you, Ehrlichman and I were there, you know, and you would make notes on that. Nixon noted as they spoke that “the stuff in the EOB doesn’t come through.” “Oh, really,” Haldeman said, indicating he had not listened to any of the EOB tapes. They continued to discuss the conversations Nixon had listened to and the reason they could never be released, because of matters like his opinions of the members of the Supreme Court. After eight hours of listening to our conversations, Nixon now had a slightly revised view of me: “Some way or other I think his lawyer is the one that’s moving out here. I don’t think Dean, strangely enough, is—” “I think you’re right,” Haldeman interrupted. “I think his lawyer is out really [slandering],” Nixon began. “I mean, making flamboyant charges and so forth, and they won’t stand up. But let’s let him get out on a little limb, a little bit more.” Nixon asked Haldeman to call Ziegler to tell him the good news, and had no sooner hung up than he had a further thought, and called Haldeman back: “Sorry to bother you again, but the one thing, which, of course, is a sticky point is with, regarding to the twenty-first, and if you’d give some thought with regard to how you would preempt that sometime, I think it would be very good.” Haldeman agreed to do so, and said he had a couple of ideas, but did not have his notes at the moment.
June 5, 1973, the White House
When speaking with Fred Buzhardt in his EOB office in the late afternoon, the president said that John Connally had advised him to stop talking about Watergate, and he planned to do so.42 Buzhardt reported that in order to protect White House–related materials from subpoenas, Colson, Haldeman and Ehrlichman had returned them to him. The Colson material dealt with his dealings with the plumbers (for which he would have been indicted had he not made a deal with the Watergate special prosecutor). The Haldeman and Ehrlichman material consisted of “tapes of conversations with various people,” but Buzhardt assured the president that none of them were with him.
June 6, 1973, the White House
Still concerned about his conversation with Tom Pappas about raising money for the Watergate defendants, the president spoke with Rose Woods about the matter early on the morning of June 6.43 She told him she had not yet been able to speak with Pappas, as he was in Greece, but she had left word with “his girl.” Nixon explained the situation again, in language almost identical to that which he had used when first raising this problem, and then more pointedly told her, “I don’t want to have anything indicating that I was thanking him for raising money for the Watergate defendants. I think he’s smart enough to know that, but you know, you just never know.”
Haig told the president that morning how delighted he was that former Republican congressman, and Nixon’s first secretary of defense, Melvin Laird, was joining the White House staff, an appointment Haig had been instrumental in bringing about.44 Former senior congressional relations aide Bryce Harlow was also rejoining the Nixon White House. Laird was taking charge of domestic policy, Ehrlichman’s operation, and Harlow was merely formalizing an informal relationship. Nixon also met with the new addition to his legal staff, Charles Alan Wright, whose consultancy was announced with the Laird and Harlow appointments that morning.45
During a discussion of Watergate with Haig, Buzhardt and Charles Wright about their assessments of where matters stood, Nixon did acknowledge that Haldeman and Ehrlichman had “collected money in the beginning for the defense attorney,” although their “motives were proper, right?” When no one responded Nixon conceded: “I think what you might say, in fairness, maybe they were trying to see that nothing blew the election. That makes sense. But I don’t think that it was obstruction of justice.” Surely Wright understood what Nixon could not grasp: Obstruction is obstruction, regardless of motive. Buzhardt also reminded the group that Archibald Cox’s charter, given to him by Attorney General Richardson, stated “that he’ll have jurisdiction over all allegations against the president.” To Buzhardt that was “about as stupid a thing as could be,” for he told Nixon the courts did not have jurisdiction over him. Charles Wright had no comment.
When talking with Buzhardt that afternoon, Nixon learned that Buzhardt and Wright were going to visit with Cox and offered these instructions: “I want you to say, quite candidly, ‘Mr. Cox, it’s all over town that you’re out to get the president. Now if that is the case, we want you to know we’re ready to fight.”46 He told Buzhardt to “play a tough game.” Late that afternoon of June 6, Buzhardt met with the president in his EOB office to report on his meeting with Cox.47 It had not gone well, although Buzhardt characterized it as “civil.” Buzhardt said that Cox had made it clear at the outset that “he would like to have access to all the documents” that might be relevant. Buzhardt said he told Cox, “He would not have access to the [president’s] files.” This matter was left unresolved, but Cox said he wanted a copy of the one-page memo prepared by Henry Petersen, which he believed “was a summary of the evidence that they had at that time against Haldeman and Ehrlichman.” Nixon did not seem to have a problem with this information.
Buzhardt reported that Petersen had told Cox that Nixon had offered to let him listen to “a tape of a conversation with Dean that you had on the evening of Sunday, April the fifteenth” and added, “We did not comment on that.” “I haven’t got a tape,” Nixon protested twice. “So it was a misunderstanding on his part?” Buzhardt asked. “I have—in fact, I haven’t any notes on that,” Nixon conceded, avoiding the question. He then falsely claimed that there was nothing in that conversation other than my telling Nixon that “Henry had given him grand jury reports. Now Henry vigorously denies, of course. I don’t think it makes any difference.” Buzhardt continued, saying that Cox wanted Haldeman and Ehrlichman’s Dictabelts relating to these matters, but Nixon said there were none.* When Buzhardt reminded him that Ehrlichman had turned over his, Nixon said that since they had nothing to do with him, “I don’t care about that.” Cox also wanted a listing of all the president’s meetings with me, Ehrlichman, Haldeman and Mitchell from June 17, 1972, on, which, Buzhardt said, would take a lot of time to prepare. Cox asked for a list of the president’s meetings from the present back to March 15, 1973. Nixon incorrectly stated that he had not met with Ehrlichman since April 30, and had had approximately ten to fifteen meetings with Haldeman, adding, “But all on transition” and none of them relating to Watergate. When Cox asked for an inventory of Nixon’s files, Buzhardt told him he did not think Cox had any jurisdiction to investigate the president. Buzhardt warned Nixon that he fully expected a head-on confrontation with Cox, who would serve them with a subpoena, but that Cox was assembling his research before sending it.
June 7, 1973, the White House
When meeting with Haig in the morning, the president was still thinking about Cox, and he mentioned that they should start considering that “it may be in our interest to get him out of there” and let the Justice Department “go ahead.”48 Nixon had a lengthy late-afternoon conversation with Buzhardt, who said he was meeting with Henry Petersen the following day, news that prompted Nixon to say he thought he remembered telling Petersen he had “taped” his conversation with me on April 15, but he had misspoken: He had used a Dictabelt, which is what he must have meant when he mentioned it at the time.49 Throughout this conversation Buzhardt asked a number of questions, but Nixon at best gave vague or inaccurate responses, sometimes clearly intentionally and at others because he apparently did not have the answer. Buzhardt, meanwhile, made a number of absurd statements, at one point claiming that Charlie Shaffer had told Jack Miller, the attorney who represented Dick Moore (and after he left office, Richard Nixon), and who Shaffer and I both spoke with, that I was “most worried about Richard Moore,” despite the fact that I knew that Moore had a truly terrible memory. Even Nixon dismissed this notion, explaining, “The problem with
Dick Moore, if I know him, I don’t think he ever made any notes, and I don’t know how good his memory is.” Nonetheless, Buzhardt kept pushing this notion.*
As this conversation proceeded, Nixon brought up the Pappas situation, telling Buzhardt that, based on the March 21 conversation, he knew that I was aware that Pappas had raised money. After revealing that Pappas had raised that money for Mitchell but none of the actual facts explaining the situation, he asked: “Now that wouldn’t make him guilty of anything, would it?” “No,” Buzhardt said flatly. “Are you sure?” “Not unless he knew the money was to be used for political purposes, and he was part of the conspiracy,” Buzhardt replied, which he felt would depend primarily on Mitchell’s statement. “I will check on the Pappas thing and see what I can find out on that,” Buzhardt said. He added that he thought “Silbert is probably going to wind up under investigation,” regarding his handling of the case, along with Henry Petersen. Buzhardt believed that the special prosecutors were “methodically building a case that Silbert did not really investigate the case as thoroughly as other pending cases.” Buzhardt had little confidence that they could make the case but said, “They’ll probably smear him pretty bad.”*
June 11, 1973, the White House
During a morning meeting with Haig, the president said he had read in his news summary that “Richardson had given Cox a broader reign. What in the world is that?”50 “Oh, the ITT merger,” Haig answered, and added, “Well, why the hell he did that, I don’t know.” Nixon, sounding beside himself at the prospect of digging up that old scandal, mused aloud, slowly enunciating each word: “What in the name of heaven made him do that?” He complained that Richardson had not cleared it with the White House. It was another potential scandal.51
Haig, ordered to find out what Richardson was up to and why, reported back a few hours later: “I had a good talk with Richardson, and he said that the charter that he gave Cox on the Hill included the mandate to clean up unresolved investigations.” Haig continued, “Then he said, you know, ‘I feel I can serve the president best by keeping a distance between the president and myself.’ And I said, ‘Elliot,’ I said, ‘not right now,’” and told him he could not show any lack of confidence in the president. “He’s one fast-stepping smoothie,” Haig observed, “and I’ll be God damned if we have to put up with that crap.” Nixon, still angry, agreed, and Haig reported that he and Richardson had had “a helluva shouting match.”52 The president’s morning ended with Kissinger’s complaining that Colson was continuing to drag him into the plumbers operation.53 “Fuck it, he doesn’t know,” Nixon responded and then advised Kissinger, “They don’t pay much attention to Colson, though, Henry.”
In early afternoon Fred Buzhardt arrived at the EOB office for a Watergate update.54 After reviewing the status of the Senate hearings and the order of witnesses—Stans, Magruder, Colson, Dean, Haldeman and Ehrlichman—Buzhardt explained how he was preparing for cross-examining me. Nixon surely understood, but said nothing, about the fact that Buzhardt was looking in all the wrong places: news summaries; my former deputy, Fred Fielding; documents to which I had access; and Dick Moore’s information. Nixon noted that Soviet premier Leonid Brezhnev was arriving for the summit with Russia at precisely the likely time of my testimony. The Senate Watergate committee was already concerned about having my appearance conflict with the summit, Buzhardt said, and was waiting for the White House to request a delay. Nixon said he wanted Congress to make that decision. As this conversation was ending, Nixon, being facetious, said, “Don’t worry me with anything I’m not suppose to worry about.” “Absolutely,” Buzhardt assured him. “I think the fellow’s shooting blanks with regard to his insinuation that he had any tapes,” Nixon said about my testimony. (In his memoir, which he wrote without transcriptions of all his tapes, Nixon wrote that he did not understand why this had concerned him.*) “Well,” Buzhardt responded, a bit disconcerted by the situation, “I just don’t think he has any tapes, at all.” “We can live with them,” Nixon noted. “But it’s harder, isn’t it?” “Yes, it is,” Buzhardt conceded. “You get down to the point,” the president said, “if it’s his word against the president’s, we’ll kill him, right?” “I hope it never comes to that,” Buzhardt answered. “No, it’d be a terrible thing,” Nixon admitted.
Between a visit to his doctor’s office and attending a meeting on price controls, the president told Haig in the Oval Office, “If [Richardson’s] got any doubt about the president or whatever, then he should resign.”55 “That’s a great idea,” Haig said. “I mean, I can’t have an attorney general who doesn’t trust his boss,” Nixon said, still smarting at Richardson’s reopening of the ITT matter. While the president spent the afternoon in meetings, Haig talked to Elliot Richardson’s top aide, since he and Richardson were now at the point of shouting at each other. Haig later reported on that conversation to Nixon, saying that they understand “that Elliot just made a hell of a mistake.”56 Haig did not think there would be future problems, for they had clearly gotten the message: “I said, ‘For God’s sake, this is the last time I’m going to be surprised.’” The president invited Haig to join him for dinner on the Sequoia, but Haig regretted that he couldn’t, for he had invited Joe Alsop, a conservative columnist, to dinner and he explained that having postponed the meal twice, he dared not do so a third time: “[Alsop’s] writing awfully good stuff, and I’d like to keep it that way.”
Following his evening on the Potomac, which he spent with Ziegler, the president did some telephoning, speaking wih Buzhardt shortly after nine o’clock.57 Buzhardt reported that he had spent the afternoon with Fred Thompson, who was “most cooperative” and “perfectly prepared to assist in really doing a cross-examination” of me when I testified before the Senate Watergate committee. Buzhardt also informed Nixon that Henry Petersen was “extremely upset about Cox coming in there and having such wide jurisdiction.” He added, “His animosity with Cox, that’s showing very firmly.” Petersen had told Buzhardt that “I had never given him a hard time,” but Ehrlichman had, “about subpoenaing Stans [before the grand jury] last summer.” “I didn’t know about that,” Nixon falsely claimed, adding “But that’s alright.” Buzhardt added with a chuckle, “Oh, there’s very perceptible animosity toward John Ehrlichman among the prosecutors and Cox. Comes through loud and clear. And I’d say, if they were focusing on one man, it would be John Ehrlichman. Much more so than Bob Haldeman. Or even Dean.” “Good God!” Nixon replied. “Even Dean?” “They all believe that he was doing it at Ehrlichman’s instruction,” Buzhardt explained—and with time the overwhelming evidence would establish this fact beyond any reasonable doubt. But the president still believed it was a problem Ehrlichman could handle.
June 12, 1973, the White House
After checking with Rose Woods on Pappas, whom she had still not been able to reach, the president dictated to her seven questions he wanted me asked during cross-examination.58 Six of them concerned my relationship with Henry Petersen after the arrests at the Watergate and one related to Pat Gray.59 The president then asked about the cash funds Woods had in her safe, which he had last checked on following our March 21 conversation. “I have to find a way to get that to the campaign committee,” Nixon said, but confessed, “I don’t know how it could be done.” “You’d have to report it,” Woods reminded him. Nixon did not care how she did so, but he just wanted her to get the money out of the White House.
It was a mixed morning of Watergate reports. Haig reported that the Senate was concerned about holding the Watergate hearings during the Brezhnev visit, which was encouraging, and based on his dinner the night before with Joe Alsop, Haig seemed encouraged he would continue “slicing [me] up reglarly.” Haig assured the president, “And he’s really done a hell of a job.”60 It was left to Ziegler to report the bad news: “Sirica has granted Dean immunity from prosecution, and I just talked with Buzhardt about this, and he feels Dean could possibly go on next week”—during the Brezhnev visit.61 Fortunatel
y, though, conservative columnist Jack Kilpatrick and others were “attacking Dean’s credibility and his immunity.” Nixon asked where they were getting material for their columns, and Ziegler said that was being done by Buzhardt. After listening to Ziegler’s summary of the coverage in the news media, Nixon complained, “I just can’t believe that the country is going to go with John Dean over the president of the United States.” “No, they won’t,” Ziegler assured him.
The president called Buzhardt at 11:44 A.M. for a confirmation of Sirica’s decision.62 Buzhardt did not know whether Cox would appeal the judge’s ruling and seek a stay, although Buzhardt explained that the judge really had no discretion in the matter, for when the Senate requested immunity, it was automatic. They discussed matters related to the publicity from the Senate hearings, and Buzhardt said they were debating readying Fred Thompson for my closed-door session with the Senate Watergate committee, which would precede my public testimony. Nixon agreed with Buzhardt that they best not prepare Thompson lest I get any indication in the closed session how they planned to impeach my testimony. Nixon told Buzhardt that he would be available on Thursday morning [June 14] to provide him with his recollection of our conversations.