by John W. Dean
Late that afternoon Buzhardt brought Nixon up to date in his EOB office, with several discouraging developments.77 Strachan had requested immunity from the Senate Watergate committee, Buzhardt said, and “they’ve apparently agreed to give it to him.” Buzhardt said that Strachan would “testify that Bob knew about the whole cover-up,” for Strachan had told him about it a week after the break-in. Buzhardt said that that information was already running on the news wires.
Buzhardt, however, had additional unwelcome news, which was still inside information: The memo in which Ehrlichman had approved the operation to obtain Ellsberg’s psychiatric records had surfaced, as had the fact that Ehrlichman had attempted to remove it from the files but David Young had anticipated this and kept a copy. “So John’s got a real problem,” Buzhardt reported. ”In view of Young’s testimony, he’s going to have a rough time.” Buzhardt said Krogh had also been recalled to the grand jury, since he had tried to assume full responsibility, which was now disproved by Ehrlichman’s memorandum. “[Krogh] didn’t know it was there,” Buzhardt explained.
Buzhardt also reported that I had told Dash and Thompson that afternoon that I had mentioned to the president on two occasions that the Democrats’ “civil lawsuit would be taken care of, because one of the attorneys could fix it with the judge, Judge Richey.” Nixon, acting flabbergasted, denied that I had ever discussed the matter with him, protesting, “Richey is a decent man, for crying out loud. He said he told me about the civil suit?” Nixon asked several times. “He told you that the civil suit was being fixed until after the elections,” Buzhardt reported, and reminded Nixon that I had only seen the president once, on September 15, before the election. Nixon asked if Buzhardt had checked with Haldeman; he had, but Haldeman had no notes of the September 15 meeting regarding me. “[Dean] said that the man who said he would fix Richey was Roemer McPhee,” Buzhardt added. Nixon, who knew McPhee from the Eisenhower administration, said he would deny it. When Ziegler joined the conversation, Nixon told him that “Strachan is going to take immunity and dump on Bob. That I just can’t believe. I just can’t believe it. He said that was on the wire.” The president also told Ziegler what he had learned from Haldeman about Magruder’s testimony. All this was discussed at length, but no conclusions were reached.
“The prosecutors never believed Dean had anything on you,” Buzhardt reported, which led to a remarkable exchange. “Really? How do you know that?” Nixon asked. “They [referring to what would have to have been Earl Silbert, Sy Glanzer and Don Campbell] told me so,” Buzhardt replied. “He doesn’t?” the president said hopefully. “I told you, he isn’t going to talk, okay?” Buzhardt said. “He might have to,” Nixon countered. “He won’t,” Buzhardt insisted flatly. “But what did they say?” Nixon asked, wanting specifics. “They said he just has never come up with anything to implicate the president. And they think Dean was really a key figure in the whole operation, and they want to get the key figures and put them behind bars.” If the prosecutors did give Buzhardt this information, they failed to mention that we in fact had never discussed the president; at the time I was dealing with them, I had still not discussed the president with my own attorney. Just as Buzhardt had earlier misinformed the president about the payments to the Watergate defendants ending in January, he was now giving the president a remarkably inaccurate reading of the situation.
This one-hour-and-forty-five-minute conversation rambled along with no resolution, although Nixon did finally have a recommendation: “Incidentally, I think you should start to call Dean a confessed criminal,” to which Buzhardt replied, “You know, that’s what I’m thinking.”
June 15, 1973, the White House
At ten o’clock the president was aboard Air Force One heading, accompanied by the congressional leadership, for a dedication of the Dirksen Congressional Leadership Research Center in Peoria, Illinois, an event honoring the late Republican minority leader Senator Everett Dirksen. On returning to the capital he prepared to leave for Key Biscayne but before departing met with Ziegler in the Oval Office.78 Ziegler reported that a private White House poll showed that the economy was the number-one concern of Americans, outranking Watergate by 4 to 1. Gallup’s latest poll, meanwhile, indicated that 45 percent of the country thought that “Watergate has been overcovered.” Ziegler was also pleased that the columnists Evans and Novak had written another negative piece about me, and Murray Kempton had done a negative radio piece on CBS Spectrum on me as well. Al Haig was the next visitor to the Oval Office, and the president told him he was expecting the worst from me when I appeared for the closed session with the Senate committee later that day.79 As opposed to Magruder’s testimony, Nixon told Haig, “You understand the Dean stuff will be rough, and our boys must not panic. I don’t think they will.” Based on Ziegler’s report, Nixon felt there was “a little sense of the balance back.” Haig reported that the Senate was feeling the pressure of hearing my testimony during the Brezhnev visit, but nothing had been decided.
June 18–19, 1973, the White House
On Saturday, June 16, I had attended an executive session of the Senate Watergate committee. It was after that session I learned that the Senate leadership, both majority leader Mansfield and minority leader Scott, would request that the Watergate hearings be suspended for a week during the visit of Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev, postponing my appearance. While I had written my opening statement, and was prepared to give it to the committee on Sunday, June 17, as originally planned, I learned that the Republicans on the Watergate committee had leaked information I had revealed during the executive session. I told Shaffer that I had no intention of giving them a week to attack my testimony without my having any ability to defend it. While I was breaking the rules of the Senate Watergate committee requiring advanced submission of my testimony, they had broken their rules as well in leaking, so Shaffer notified Sam Dash of my position on Monday, June 18. I would bring my prepared statement with me when I returned to the Senate on Monday, June 25, to testify, but no earlier.
Nixon had returned to the White House late on Sunday night, and the White House was having its own expected problems on Monday morning, when The Washington Post ran a banner headline story: NIXON EXPECTED TO ALTER STANCE, ABANDON AIDES. The opening paragraph of Woodward and Bernstein’s story reported, “President Nixon is expected to defend himself against increasing allegations of his involvement in the Watergate cover-up by saying he was misled by his former principal deputies, H. R. Haldeman and John D. Ehrlichman, according to White House and other government sources.”80 The story claimed the change in strategy was to counter charges I would make about the president and his aides.
Because Brezhnev was arriving on the South Grounds at eleven o’clock, it would be a rushed morning for Nixon. The president and Haig briefly discussed the schedule for the Brezhnev visit and accompanying Soviet summit, the kind of event that Nixon planned down to the smallest detail.81 But Haig, believing it more important to discuss the problem created by the Post story, said, “We had a vicious, unbelievably vicious story in the Post this morning that you were shifting your strategy away from support of Bob and John.” “Rubbish. Unbelievable,” Nixon exclaimed. “It’s just blatant political warfare now. I called Fred and told him to get in touch with Wilson immediately and tell them this was absolutely untrue, and there is just nothing to support it, in any way.” Nixon had seen the story and wanted to know where it originated, noting that “White House sources had said Strachan tied ropes around Haldeman’s neck. Well, I don’t know, I mean, they could have made that up, about a high-ranking White House source. Are we sure Garment isn’t talking to anybody?” Nixon asked. “I called Len personally,” Haig answered, and reported that Garment said he had not seen Woodward or Bernstein in three weeks. As the president pressed, Haig responded, “The only other person it could be, and I’m checking now, is [David] Gergen, who’s close to Woodward. And if it’s Gergen, I’ll just fire his ass.” That was fine with Nixon, who noted of Gerg
en, “He’s not much, anyway.” Haig reported that Buzhardt was outraged by the leak and doing his best to repair the problem with Haldeman and Ehrlichman. Haig came back to Gergen and said he would find out if he had been talking to Woodward, for he did not think a speechwriter had any business talking about Watergate. “I’ll fire his ass. I don’t think he’s worth a damn anyhow,” Haig added.
As they proceeded to revisit many familiar Watergate issues relating to my testimony, Nixon said the only matter that concerned him was the conversation on March 21 about the million dollars to pay the Watergate defendants. “Al, basically what Buzhardt and the other boys have got to realize, when I learned the consequences of the million dollars, I said, that’s when I started my own investigation. I said, get Mitchell’s ass down here with the others. That was what triggered it.” Nixon said. Then the president turned to my appearance on Saturday before the Senate Watergate committee staff (after starting the session, Senator Baker had departed). “Buzhardt says Dean was not particularly effective the first day,” Nixon noted, to which Haig added, “That’s right, he was rambling, and there were absolutely no surprises of any kind.” Haig said, for that reason, Buzhardt felt very confident that he could handle the situation. (In fact, the Watergate committee staff could not know anything about my forthcoming testimony based on my closed-door session with them. As an experienced former congressional aide, this was a game I knew how to play well.)
When Ziegler arrived in the Oval Office, at 10:14 A.M., he reported that former Nixon speechwriter William Safire, who had become an op-ed columnist at the New York Times, had done “the most scathing, cutting, ripping, shredding piece on Dean,” which he had entitled “Gunga Dean.”82 But soon this conversation was drowned out by the U.S. Marine Band playing on the South Grounds to mark the arrival of Brezhnev. Not until later that afternoon did the conversations resume, with Haig present and Nixon inquiring if Ziegler had identified the source of the leak for that morning’s Post story.83 Ziegler had not spoken to Gergen, for his wife had just had a baby and he was not in, but having further analyzed the story, Ziegler did not think it had come from Gergen, because “it was written in lawyer’s language.” (Haig was unaware Gergen had attended law school.) Nor did Haig think Garment was the source. The president expressed concern about Fred Thompson’s cross-examining me, but Haig said Buzhardt was confident: “Fred’s usual explanation is to paint a gloomy picture so it comes out a shade better than he painted. I’ve worked with him, and I know he’s essentially a pessimist, but he’s not at this time. He’s more optimistic than I’d be. I expect this to be a tough period for us.” “But it will be,” the president insisted. Haig clarified that his point had been that Buzhardt would be ready for whatever happened. When Nixon asked if they had the crisp, clean denial statement he had requested, Haig assured him it was ready.
At 4:20 P.M. the president called Haig about the fact that the Watergate hearings had been postponed.84 “Can’t we get these hearings put on again, or what’s the score? What happened there?” Haig had just received this information from Timmons and had not yet spoken with Buzhardt. Nixon wanted the hearings to proceed, notwithstanding the summit meeting, and thought that halting them was stupid, as were minority leader Hugh Scott and “that poor darned fellow from Tennessee, Baker.” Nixon did not like the fact that Baker had been “on my back every minute taking pictures” on the trip the previous day. “He was unbelievable, unbelievable,” Nixon complained. Less than a half hour later, after thinking further about the canceled proceedings, Nixon called Haig.85 First, he wanted someone to get a copy of my statement to the committee. “They’ve got to have it,” Nixon insisted. “The Post has got it, or somebody now. Put Gergen on it, if he can tear himself away from his baby long enough.” As they spoke, Nixon added, “We ought to make something out of this at the committee,” referring to the postponement. “You see, the thing that I’m concerned about is that they’re going to let this God damned thing hang over us, and build it up for a week, in order to poison the summit. That’s what they’re trying to do here, don’t you agree?” “Uh, yes,” Haig answered noncomittally, as Nixon continued: “Well, somebody ought to say that they backed down, and that, God damn it, the White House didn’t ask them to. You know, try to get our little boys together and see if they can think of something, will you?”
Late that afternoon the president met with Buzhardt, who in his campaign to discredit me, had picked up information I had given the Senate Watergate committee: I had used cash in my safe for personal expenses, putting in a personal check to cover the withdrawal.86 Although I had fully reimbursed the fund* and placed it all in a trust account, Buzhardt was going to try to portray me as a thief as well as a liar.87 (Ironically, Senator Edward Gurney—who was later indicted but not convicted for bribery, perjury and conspiracy—attempted to create such an impression as well when cross-examining me during the hearings, actually giving me a chance to explain my action, which was foolish and expedient but certainly not illicit.88) That evening, before heading to his state dinner with Brezhnev, Nixon discussed with Haig and Ziegler in general how to handle my testimony.89 The debate was whether to fully engage me, or as the president felt, “We should just be enigmatic about it.” It came down to the president’s instinct: “So I just think that just the one sentence [a general rebuttal] is the thing to do,” Nixon said to end the discussion.
The unrelenting White House attacks on me were beginning to have an impact. As Ziegler explained during this conversation, “The discrediting of Dean is taking place below the surface at this point, and I oftentimes think that is the best way.” The “kill the son of a bitch” attitude that Nixon and his team fostered, and shared with both friendly and unfriendly reporters, was soon picked up by Nixon supporters, who acted on it. Sam Dash began receiving a steady stream of threats against me, and the first one that appeared serious got his attention: a simple note printed in large block letters, sent anonymously, that read: “JOHN DEAN WILL NEVER BE A WITNESS. HE WILL BE DEAD.”90 Years later Dash told me that this was only the tip of the iceberg, for he received literally hundreds of such threats. After discussing the matter with Senator Ervin, who knew the Capitol Police did not have the capability to protect a witness, he called Cox, who was part of the Justice Department, which had such a program. After Cox conferred with his staff they strongly recommended that I enter the U.S. Marshals’ witness protection program: Two U.S. marshals would be posted at our home; others would keep it under surveillance; and two marshals would accompany me on all travels outside my home. After discussing it with Dash, Shaffer strongly urged me to take part in the program. I discussed the matter with my wife, we accepted the offer, and I would remain in the program for slightly more than a year and a half, as the death threats continued until Nixon departed the White House.
In an aside during a summit discussion on June 19 in the Oval Office, Kissinger told the president that he had known Cox at Harvard, and he warned Nixon that “Cox will come after you, I don’t doubt it.”91 Kissinger described Cox as “a fanatic liberal Democrat, and all his associates are fanatics.” He was critical of Richardson for selecting Cox when he could have found someone who had “a natural interest in us.” Cox was on the mind of everyone in the White House, because the front page of that morning’s Washington Post had reported, “Special prosecutor Archibald Cox said yesterday that he is studying whether President Nixon can be subpoenaed to testify before the Watergate grand jury here.”92 As the president told Haig and Buzhardt in his next Oval Office meeting, “One thing I noted this morning was that fucking, shocking statement by Cox.” Nixon said he was trying to get someone on the Hill to challenge Cox’s statement, and suggested to Buzhardt, “Maybe you can write a brief little rejoinder there.”93
Buzhardt replied (incorrectly, as time would tell) that Cox “knows he can’t subpoena the president. He knows he can’t indict the president. But he is going to play this game quite the opposite.” He also noted that Cox had said “he had ma
de no decision on whether to get into the San Clemente property thing or the gifts,” and added, “I’m going to talk to Elliot Richardson.” “What does ‘the gifts’ mean?” Nixon asked, indicating he had not read the full story of the Cox press conference, in which Cox had said “he has not decided whether he will investigate the federal funding of improvements to President Nixon’s San Clemente, Calif., home, or the more than $200,000 in tax write-offs that Mr. Nixon built up in 1969 with a gift to the government of his pre-presidential papers.” When Buzhardt mentioned Nixon’s papers, the president knew exactly what he was talking about and reacted accordingly: “God Almighty.” While Buzhardt did not think Cox had jurisdiction, Nixon was complaining: “The San Clemente property, what the hell is he getting into that for? What’s Elliot done? What the hell has Elliot done here?” (All these matters would later be investigated by either the special prosecutor or the Congress.)