Three years later, when Fort William Henry surrendered to the French, the marquis de Montcalm’s Indian allies fell on the departing garrison and perpetrated the massacre made infamous by James Fenimore Cooper’s The Last of the Mohicans. With the exception of some routine plundering, no such atrocities occurred at Fort Necessity. As Washington and what was left of his army filed out of what was left of the fort on the morning of July 4, they saw “many of our Friend Indians” with the French, some of whom they recognized by name. Several came and spoke to the soldiers, “told them they were their Brothers, and asked them how they did.” Yet, said Washington, “we had not one Indian to assist when the Action commenced or ended.”57 He saw their presence as open-faced betrayal, but he had consistently misread the motives and actions of the Ohio Indians who wanted to maintain a balance of power in the region and hesitated to take part in Tanaghrisson’s war, on either side. Dinwiddie was perhaps closer to the mark, although he echoed the view of Indian unreliability: “Mr. Washington had many of the Indians with him, but I observe these People remain inactive till they see how Affairs go, and, generally speaking, side with the Conquerors,” he wrote; “in my private Opinion, little dependence is to be put to them.”58 In accordance with the French terms for surrender, Washington provided two hostages, Van Braam and Captain Robert Stobo, who were taken to Fort Duquesne. Stobo managed to smuggle out information and a plan of the fort via two Delaware visitors; they passed it on to George Croghan, who took it to Philadelphia. The Delawares were Shingas and Delaware George. “Neither had lifted a finger to help Washington,” the historian Francis Jennings noted, but the English “were wrong about them being pro-French. They were pro-Delaware.”59
With Fort Necessity burning behind them, Washington and his demoralized troops withdrew to Fort Cumberland at Wills Creek. En route, the Virginia Regiment began to disintegrate: men deserted, and Washington was helpless to stop them. In Edward Lengel’s assessment, “his command had completely fallen apart. His humiliation was complete.”60 From Wills Creek, Washington traveled by canoe about 170 miles down the Potomac River to Great Falls (about 14 miles above present-day Georgetown). He was exploring the possibility of using the Potomac as a supply route to the Ohio country. For the next forty-five years, he would promote developing the Potomac into a navigable waterway that would boost western expansion and link western settlement to eastern markets.61
Once safely back in Virginia, Washington explained his failure to attract more Indian allies (never more than thirty, he said) by blaming Montour and Croghan for boasting that they had far more influence over the Indians than was actually the case and by complaining that he had not been adequately supplied. The only reason the Indians supported the French was that the French had more goods to give them; Washington had so few goods and provisions that the Indians asked, “when they were to join us, if we meant to starve them to death as well as ourselves.”62 Washington’s understanding of Indian motivations and the significance attached to gifts, like his understanding of Indian character, remained one-dimensional. Indians who had been ambivalent before now had few doubts about where their best interests lay.
After Washington’s defeat, Tanaghrisson abandoned Logstown. He and Scarouady went east with their followers to Aughwick, on the Juanita River near present-day Shirleysburg, where Croghan ran a trading post, and where they were supported by funds from the government of Pennsylvania. Shawnees and Delawares who arrived in August asked if the English were making any preparations to fight the French, which they thought would not be difficult to do in the fall but would be very difficult to do if deferred to the spring. Tanaghrisson sent runners to bring Shingas and the Delawares and Shawnees for a council. The Delawares and Shawnees were unimpressed by Britain’s response to the French invasion and feared that if the English did nothing in the autumn, the Ohio country would fall to the French.63 Deputy Governor Hamilton of Pennsylvania dispatched the interpreter Conrad Weiser to work with Croghan at the upcoming conference. Since the Pennsylvania Assembly continued to insist on frugality and Hamilton was waiting to be replaced in office by Robert Hunter Morris, Croghan and Weiser were instructed to spend no more than was necessary and to have the Indians sit tight for the moment—at the same time, they were to assure them the English had every intention of striking back at the French. It was a difficult task to provision more than two hundred Indians and stay within Hamilton’s budget; it was a tougher job to convince the Indians that the parsimonious and dilatory English had the power and determination to oppose and repel the French. Weiser confided to Tanaghrisson and Scarouady before the council that it would be “better not to mention any thing about the Virginians striking the French this Fall.”64
Things had not worked out as Tanaghrisson had planned. He had encouraged Washington to fight the French and had encouraged the Shawnees and Delawares to assist him. The capitulation at Fort Necessity was a blow to Tanaghrisson’s standing and to Iroquois authority over the Ohio Indians.65 Like Washington, Tanaghrisson was quick to place the blame elsewhere. On his way to the council with Weiser and Montour, the old chief “complained very much of the Behavior of Col. Washington to him (tho’ in a very moderate way, saying the Col. was a good-natured man but had no Experience).” Washington tried to command Indians as he did his slaves, had them out scouting every day, and would never take advice from them. He made no fortifications except “that little thing upon the Meadow,” and expected the French to attack across open ground. Had he listened to Tanaghrisson and made the kind of defenses he advised, Washington would have been able to repulse the French, who had fought like cowards while the English fought like fools. Like the other Indians, Tanaghrisson left before the battle began “because Col. Washington would never listen to them, but was always driving them on to fight by his Directions.”66 At the same council, Delaware and Shawnee chiefs assured Tanaghrisson and the British they had not gone over to the French and had not fought at Fort Necessity. Tamaqua told Tanaghrisson they had done their best not to interfere in war, but their stance was increasingly difficult to maintain; “now Things seem to take another turn, and a high Wind is rising,” he warned.67
The Ohio Iroquois who gave the account of the Jumonville fight also blamed Washington for the Indians’ ambivalence and hesitation in coming forward. After the Indians had guided him on his mission to the French fort in 1753, Washington “never thought it worth his while” to inform them what happened in his talks with the French, as he had promised to do. After the ambush on Jumonville, he never consulted with them or took their advice, and he did not believe them when they warned him of French numbers prior to the fight at Fort Necessity. The Indians never knew what transpired when Washington surrendered and could not understand why he totally abandoned the country afterward. Washington’s conduct in war and diplomacy lent weight to French warnings that the British were untrustworthy allies, concluded the Iroquois.68
Relations between the British and the Indians were at a crisis point. The Mohawk chief, Theyanoguin or Hendrick, declared the Covenant Chain broken. The British and Iroquois met at Albany in June and July 1754 to mend their fences and repair the chain. In addition, the colonial delegates at the Albany Congress discussed joint defensive measures against the French, although Pennsylvania’s delegate, Benjamin Franklin, went further and tried to advance a plan of colonial union. Franklin saw the Albany Plan as a blueprint for western expansion with a central government that would have control over Indian affairs, including the power to make war and peace, make treaties, regulate trade, purchase land that was not within the boundaries of any one colony, grant land, and make laws for new settlements. Many of the provisions would reappear in the US Constitution, but in 1754 colonial assemblies rejected the plan. Dinwiddie did not attend the Albany Congress. He maintained that he was too busy trying to build support among the southern tribes. Hendrick suspected he was too busy coveting Indian land. The governors of Virginia and Canada were “both quarrelling about lands which belong to us, and
such a quarrel as this may end in our destruction,” he told the Albany delegates. Hendrick himself was involved in selling Indian lands. Two days after Washington surrendered Fort Necessity, Hendrick and twenty-two other Iroquois signed a deed conveying to Pennsylvania lands west of the Susquehanna River. Before the Albany Congress was over, the unscrupulous trader Henry Lydius had also acquired a dubious deed to the Wyoming Valley and part of northwestern Pennsylvania. Once again, the sales were based on the notion that the Six Nations could sell lands they claimed by right of conquest. The Delawares and Shawnees who lived on those lands would soon be fighting to defend them.69
Rumors and reports from Indian country persisted throughout the summer of 1754: the French were stepping up preparations, and their troops were on the move; Indian anxieties were growing, and people were relocating out of harm’s way. Daniel Claus, a British agent among the Mohawks, reported that about one hundred Iroquois had gone to Canada. People thought it was out of fear of the French; “they say there never was the like seen how quick the said Nations turned after Col. Washington’s defeat.” Some Ohio Indians joined the French.70 Tanaghrisson remained steadfast, however, declaring he would “live and die with the English.” He did the latter. On October 1 Scarouady and some other Six Nations chiefs arrived at the house of the trader John Harris, bringing Tanaghrisson and his family with them. Tanaghrisson was “in a very low Condition” and died a few days later, probably of pneumonia. Croghan said all the Indians mourned his passing. The Virginia Gazette gave it front-page notice. Dinwiddie said Britain had lost a brave and steady friend. Croghan gave a condolence speech and presents to cover Tanaghrisson’s grave, as the Indians could “not see the Road nor hear what the Governor of Virginia had to say to them till that Ceremony had been done.”71 Some of Tanaghrisson’s followers attributed his death to witchcraft. Scarouady, who took over his duties, said, “The French joked with Us on the Death of the Half King, and laughed, but we shall make them cry before We have done with them.”72
Scarouady remained firm in his allegiance to the English and continued to try to fan the flames of the conflict he and Tanghrisson had engineered. Richard Peters, a member of the Pennsylvania governor’s council and a delegate to the Albany Congress in 1754, believed he had “an aversion to the French, and wants without any good Reason to strike them.” Scarouady agreed to carry a message from the governor of Virginia to Onondaga, inviting the Six Nations to come to Winchester in the spring. Maryland and Pennsylvania added their own belt to reinforce the invitation. On Christmas Day 1754, Scarouady set out from Philadelphia. Such an errand trod on the toes of William Johnson, who jealously guarded his role as the liaison between the British and the Six Nations, and Peters warned him that, whatever the public face of the errand, Scarouady might have his own agenda and secretly try to incite the Six Nations to war. Scarouady carried a large black belt of fourteen rows, which was inappropriate for a peaceful invitation, and Peters feared the Six Nations would interpret it as a message of war. He did not buy Scarouady’s explanation that its color had no significance, as there was no hatchet on it, and that he would not use it to talk of war. The governor asked Peters to forewarn Johnson and Hendrick so “that all Mistakes may be prevented and no bad Consequences ensue.”73 Meanwhile, the government of Pennsylvania fed the Indians who remained at Aughwick throughout the winter. Queen Aliquippa died there in December 1754.74
The House of Burgesses conveyed its formal thanks to Washington and his officers for their conduct at Fort Necessity, which gave Washington great “satisfaction.”75 Dinwiddie, however, described Washington’s conduct as wrong in many respects. If he had followed Dinwiddie’s orders, he would not have engaged the enemy before reinforcements arrived.76 Dinwiddie broke the Virginia Regiment into several companies, with no officer holding a rank higher than captain. “This was too degrading for G. W. to submit to,” Washington wrote years later, referring to himself in the third person. Rather than accept a reduction in rank, he resigned and returned to private life.77
For a crucial moment, Tanaghrisson had dominated Washington’s relations with the Indians and the French in the Ohio country. Like Macbeth’s poor player, he had strutted and fretted his hour upon the stage, and at times he had been full of sound and fury that did not signify very much. Now he had left the stage, but he had set it for the first truly global conflict. As Robert Hunter Morris, the new deputy governor, told the Pennsylvania Assembly, “the Eyes of Europe” were now turned “to this Quarter of the World.”78 Tanaghrisson did not live to see the storm he had unleashed, but it caught Washington in its path and changed the course of American history.
Chapter 5
Braddock and the Limits of Empire
In march 1755, after fifty-six days crossing the stormy Atlantic, the largest British army that had been sent to America landed in Virginia. Its commander in chief, General Edward Braddock, had arrived on February 20. The army consisted of two regiments dispatched from garrison duty in Ireland—the 44th, commanded by Colonel Sir Peter Halkett, and the 48th, commanded by Colonel Thomas Dunbar. Other officers included Lieutenant Colonel Thomas Gage (who twenty years later commanded the British forces at Lexington and Concord) and Lieutenant Colonel Horatio Gates (who twenty-two years later defeated a British army at Saratoga). Braddock was to raise two more regiments of volunteers in the colonies. His goal was to take the French forts at the Forks of the Ohio and Niagara, while other expeditions took the forts at Crown Point on the southwestern shore of Lake Champlain and Beauséjour in Nova Scotia.1 Lieutenant Governor Dinwiddie assured Braddock in June, “I have no doubt the Fr. Will surrender on Sight of y’r Forces.” Like his superiors in London, Dinwiddie misjudged the realities of power in the Ohio country, where Indian power and indigenous foreign policies trumped imperial ambitions. Six months later, he was struggling to comprehend what happened to Braddock’s grand army, which, he wrote, “appears to me as a dream.”2
In order to launch his campaign, Braddock had to deal with colonial assemblies that were supposed to provide money and manpower, and with Indians who were to provide the scouts and allies he needed to operate effectively in Indian country. Braddock’s strategy and route had been decided for him in London, based on political rather than logistical or tactical considerations. Instead of attacking Fort Niagara first, which would have allowed him to transport troops and supplies across the Great Lakes and cut off Fort Duquesne from its supply line, the Duke of Cumberland ordered Braddock to assault Fort Duquesne from Virginia and then head north to take Niagara. Virginia was not the best place to supply or provide transportation for an army. Dinwiddie threw his support behind Braddock, but in a pattern that was to be repeated throughout the Seven Years’ War, colonial noncooperation, parsimony and profiteering, inadequate and insufficient recruits, and a lack of horses and wagons frustrated and infuriated the general, who in turn alienated colonial assemblies and citizens with his high-handed and disdainful attitude. His argumentative and overbearing quartermaster, Sir John St. Clair, made matters worse.3
Pennsylvania boasted the largest city in British North America, better roads, and more horses and wagons, but Braddock fared little better there than in Virginia. “I cannot help expressing the greatest Surprise to find such pusillanimous and improper Behaviour in your Assembly,” he told Deputy Governor Robert Hunter Morris, “and an absolute Refusal to supply either Men, Money, or Provision for their own Defense.”4 Dinwiddie voiced similar complaints about Pennsylvania. Morris blamed the failure to supply funds on the Quaker Assembly, when in fact Morris himself was vetoing grants in accordance with instructions from Thomas Penn, the proprietor of the colony, who was out to discredit the Assembly. It took sterling efforts by Benjamin Franklin to come up with the wagons Braddock needed to get his campaign on the road.5
Washington had resigned his command in a huff.6 But Braddock’s expedition offered an opportunity to restore his reputation after the disaster at Fort Necessity and revived his interest in a military career.7 Washin
gton wanted a place in Braddock’s expedition and made inquiries through friends and contacts. A regular commission in the British army, usually purchased by members of the aristocracy, was beyond his reach, and he had done nothing so far to earn advancement on the basis of his military merit. He could volunteer as an aide and hope to obtain a commission that way. “Conceiving, I suppose, that the small knowledge I have had an opportunity of acquiring of the Country, Indians, &c was worthy of his notice; and might be useful to him in the progress of this Expedition,” Washington approached Braddock through his aide Robert Orme, importuning to join the campaign as a member of the general’s staff or military family. Orme replied that Braddock understood Washington’s concerns about issues of command and would “be very glad of your company in his family by which all inconveniences of that kind will be obviated.”8
Technically violating the terms of his surrender at Fort Necessity, when he pledged not to return to the Ohio country for a year, Washington set off to join Braddock. He did so, he told William Byrd III of Westover, with no other goal than “serving my country without fee or reward.”9 Leaving management of Mount Vernon to his younger brother Jack, and over his mother’s objections, he joined the army at Frederick in early May. He was appointed to the general’s family as an aide-de-camp, which meant, he told Jack, he was “freed from all command but his, and give his Orders to all.” He recognized he had an opportunity to make “an acquaintance, which may be serviceable hereafter, if I can find it worth while pushing my Fortune in the Military way,” and he was not going to waste it. He expected to advance his career and his fortune by participating in an easy victory: “As to any danger from the Enemy,” he reassured his brother, “I look upon it as trifling, for I believe they will be oblig’d to exert their utmost Force to repel the attacks to the Northward.”10 Braddock may not have shared his confidence, at least in private—he confided to a former mistress before he left England that his army was being “sent like sacrifices to the altar.”11
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