You have risen to every challenge and fulfilled every charge your country has asked of you and more. As you lay down one heavy mantle of service and responsibility, only to pick up another as you assume my one-time post as Director, Central Intelligence Agency, it has been a privilege and a pleasure to work with you these past 4 ½ years.
I wish you and your family the very best for the future.
Sincerely,
Robert M. Gates
The handwritten note, dated June 29, on a secretary of Defense notepad, read:
Dear Dave,
As I leave this position, I want to tell you how much I have enjoyed working with you over the last 4 ½ years. We have had a unique partnership spanning two wars. I would be hard pressed to identify a secretary and a field commander who worked more closely—and beneficially—together. I suspect we will write about these times, and I, for one, would be gratified to have Dr. Petraeus review my draft.
I wish you all the best at CIA and thank you from the bottom of my heart for your brilliant and courageous service.
All the best,
Bob Gates
Petraeus responded in a note that “Dr. Petraeus” would be honored to help, adding, “Allow me, also, to thank you again for your determined, principled, and visionary leadership over the past 4½ years—and, again, for ‘having my back’ and ‘having our troopers’ backs’ throughout that time!” He followed up with a formal letter of his own, on July 12:
Dear Mr. Secretary:
Thank you for your letter of June 27, 2011.
I cannot tell you how much I appreciate your kind words. I remain deeply grateful for your support, counsel and mentorship over the past 4 ½ years. As I noted when you were here in June, you “had my back” throughout that time. More importantly, you had our troopers’—and our families’—backs throughout that time, too. You were masterful in ensuring they received the support and resources they needed, even when there was institutional resistance. As you well know, we never would have gotten MRAPs, more UAVs, M-ATVs, much of the Counter-IED systems, and a host of other vital enablers, were it not for your determined leadership. Please accept my sincere appreciation for that leadership and for your steadfast commitment during your time as our Secretary.
Best wishes to you and the Gates tribe as you begin the next chapter of your life. And thanks again for all that you have done for our Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, Marines and Coast Guardsmen and their families.
Very respectfully,
David H. Petraeus
General, United States Army Commander
LATER THAT MORNING, Ahmed Wali Karzai, the president’s half brother and the most powerful man in Kandahar, was killed at his home by one of his security force commanders, his trusted aide, Sardar Muhammad. Muhammad was immediately shot and killed by Karzai’s bodyguards. Ahmed Wali Karzai and Muhammad were so close that the killing was at first seen as a personal vendetta. But in the days following the assassination, Afghan officials and members of the Karzai family began to express their suspicions that the Taliban had somehow turned Muhammad. It was ultimately determined, however, that Muhammad had become a heavy narcotics user and that he had learned that Ahmed Wali Karzai was going to fire him. Muhammad confronted Karzai, and the argument escalated into Muhammad shooting and killing Karzai. Even so, the mere suspicion of Taliban involvement sowed fear and made those Afghans closest to the United States realize that if someone as powerful and well guarded as the president’s half brother could be assassinated, no one was really safe. Indeed, two days later, a suicide bomber with an explosive hidden in a turban attacked a memorial service for the slain Karzai at a mosque in Kandahar, killing himself and three others.
The attack came on the same day that the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan released its midyear report, Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict. Its stark conclusion: “In the first six months of 2011, the armed conflict in Afghanistan brought increasingly grim impacts and a bleak outlook for Afghan civilians.” Civilian deaths totaled 1,462, a 15 percent increase over the same period a year earlier. The UN attributed 80 percent to the Taliban and other insurgents, and it noted that the overall number killed by the Taliban had increased by 28 percent. Fourteen percent of the deaths were attributed to ISAF and Afghan forces, and the number killed had decreased by 9 percent from the previous year. The deaths occurred during an overall escalation of violence.
“The mounting toll of civilian casualties in the first six months of 2011 represents a deepening entrenchment of violence in the everyday lives of Afghans,” the UN concluded. Behind the grim statistics, there were a number of alarming developments. The UN documented the first two confirmed cases of attacks on hospitals. The recruitment and use of children as suicide bombers was also noted. The UN found that the increasing use of “night raids” by U.S. and Afghan special forces—three hundred a month, on average—had resulted in fewer civilian deaths: thirty fewer than were seen in the first six months of 2010. Still, the UN said that night raids “remain one of the most despised tactics in the eyes of the Afghan population.” While night raids produced fewer civilian casualties, ISAF air strikes produced more, despite all of Petraeus’s efforts. Air strikes were the leading cause of civilian deaths, claiming seventy-nine lives in the first half of 2011, a 14 percent increase.
Petraeus noted that there had been more than 1,600 strikes involving improvised explosive devices in June, the highest number recorded for any month during ten years of war. U.S. military officials knew that the Taliban’s deadly reliance on IEDs was the direct result of Pakistan’s inability or unwillingness to stop large quantities of ammonium nitrate fertilizer from being smuggled into Afghanistan. Petraeus had become increasingly concerned about the insurgent sanctuaries in Pakistan and other Pakistani support for the Taliban from the moment he’d arrived in Afghanistan a year earlier; in fact, he had been seized with it as the Central Command commander as well. He had less influence while in command in Afghanistan, but it didn’t stop him from engaging when he could.
Even as U.S.-Pakistani relations had deteriorated in the wake of the bin Laden raid in Islamabad and the Obama administration had suspended $800 million in military aid, Petraeus tried to remain relatively optimistic—publicly, at least—about his ability to work with the Pakistanis. As the UN released its midyear report, Petraeus and Allen flew to Pakistan to meet with General Ashfaq Kayani, the head of the Pakistani military. As bad as the relationship was, the situation could only get worse in Afghanistan if that relationship fell apart completely. As Petraeus noted in a video teleconference he gave that week to Princeton alumni, “We’ve seen that movie before.” He was referring to the American withdrawal of support for Pakistan and lack of interest in Afghanistan after the end of the so-called Charlie Wilson’s War—the support through Pakistan of the mujahideen fighters who forced the Soviets to withdraw from Afghanistan in 1989, after nearly ten years of war.
THAT SATURDAY, July 16, Petraeus attended his final senior security shura at the Ministry of Defense, attended by Defense minister Wardak and the deputy minister from the Ministry of the Interior, among others. Listening to the discussion topics that day, Petraeus knew the future in Afghanistan was tenuous but far from hopeless. There had been setbacks, chief among them the recent infiltrations of the Afghan armed forces by insurgents and the worrisome Taliban assassination campaign. When Petraeus had the chance to speak at the end of the two-hour session in the crowded room, he wanted to assuage concerns, which had spread like wildfire, about the U.S. drawdown. He reminded the senior Afghan leaders in the room that the Afghan armed forces would be increasing by 70,000 by the time the last of the surge forces left the country next fall. “The U.S. drawdown is made possible by our combined progress,” he said. “We’ll draw down 10,000 by the end of 2011, and 20,000 more by September 2012. This will allow us to fulfill our original surge timeline and allow Afghans to assume inc
reasing responsibility for security.” He also wanted to assure them that there was no run to the exits. “The U.S. drawdown is not a reflection of a changing strategy or overall campaign plan. It does not undermine the 2014 commitment and post-2014 commitment,” he said. “We will not abandon our partners before you are capable, nor will we withdraw precipitously.”
PETRAEUS WAITED UNTIL the last possible day, his second-to-last in command, to preside over his first-ever battlefield promotion. He had a special place in his heart for Sergeant Landon Nordby, a member of his personal security detail in Iraq and then in Afghanistan, a highly professional NCO and one of the greatest all-around athletes Petraeus had encountered in the Army. Petraeus had fought to bring back battlefield promotions in 2008, during the latter part of the surge in Iraq. The practice had been discontinued after the Vietnam War, with the advent of the Army’s centralized promotion system. But Petraeus pushed the idea when he was commanding the effort in Iraq, based on his belief that promoting soldiers at war purely on the basis of “extraordinary performance of duties while serving in combat or under combat conditions”—with no promotion boards or time-in-grade requirements necessary—would be hugely motivational. “Today,” he said, “I am enormously proud, as is Command Sergeant Major Hill,” who had helped him gain approval of the battlefield promotions in Iraq, “to promote Sergeant Landon Nordby to staff sergeant, in recognition of his performance and proven ability to carry a few more rocks in his rucksack of responsibility.” It was a special moment for Petraeus and his inner circle, many of whom had uprooted their lives to follow Petraeus to Afghanistan—a number after having followed him to Central Command from Iraq.
PETRAEUS ALSO released his farewell message to the troops that day:
As I prepare to depart Afghanistan, I want you to know what an honor it has been to be your commander for the past year. During that time, you and our Afghan counterparts have achieved important progress in a hugely complex, enormously important mission. In the face of resilient enemies and innumerable other challenges, you and our partners have halted the momentum of the insurgents in much of the country and reversed it in a number of key areas. While much hard work clearly lies ahead, the achievements of the past year have enabled gains in security, governance, and development and have helped bring new hope to the Afghan people in a number of villages, districts, and provinces.
He ended with a reference to his impending retirement, the event he dreaded as much as relinquishing command.
When I take off the uniform for the last time on 31 August 2011, I will recall with deep respect and enormous gratitude the extraordinary troopers with whom I have been privileged to serve in my 37 years in uniform. That is particularly true for those with whom I have served on deployments in the past decade in tough, important coalition missions. Among those in the front rank of such troopers will be each of you with whom I have had the honor of soldiering during the surge here in the Shadow of the Hindu Kush.
But the Taliban were determined to keep Kabul on edge as Petraeus prepared to depart. On the eve of his change of command, two gunmen broke into the Kabul home of Jan Mohammed Khan and killed the former governor of Uruzgan Province. Khan was a close adviser and political ally of President Karzai. The gunmen also killed Mohammed Hasham Watanwal, a member of Parliament from Uruzgan. A Taliban spokesman called Khan a “stooge of American invaders.” As Petraeus occasionally observed, it is the rare day in command that does not have bad news. His final day in command was no exception.
THE NIGHT BEFORE his change of command, Petraeus was scheduled to attend a ramp ceremony on the military tarmac of the Kabul International Airport to honor soldiers who had been killed in action. Petraeus continued to work in his office until he was summoned to the memorial. This ramp ceremony was for seven fallen French soldiers killed in three separate incidents that week in Kapisa Province. Five of them had died in a suicide attack earlier in the week that also killed an Afghan civilian. It was the worst loss of life for French forces since August 2008, when ten soldiers were killed in a Taliban ambush east of Kabul. Seventy French soldiers had died in Afghanistan since the war began in 2001. Around four thousand French troops were serving in Afghanistan, most in Kapisa, and Petraeus was impressed with their counterinsurgency efforts and grateful for their contributions. He had met French president Nicolas Sarkozy earlier in the week and expressed his gratitude, especially given the ambivalence of French citizens over the war. He had strived to keep the coalition together, and paying his last respects to these French soldiers was, in his mind, a commander’s responsibility in support of coalition cohesion.
Finally, as midnight approached, Hickman signaled that it was time to head to the ceremony. Petraeus walked with his team and Lieutenant General Allen to the ISAF compound soccer field to catch his helicopter to the airport. They lifted off to the whup-whup-whup of the rotors into the Kabul night. Petraeus sat looking out the window in silence as they flew.
There were more than two hundred French troopers in blue berets lined up to form a single-file man-made tunnel from the open-ended French cargo plane that would carry the fallen soldiers home. The night was dark, but rampside stadium lights and headlights from parked military vehicles shone on the entourage. Somber music began to play. Senior French officers then slowly marched from the aircraft down the long line of steely-faced troops, saluting slowly on every fifth step. French troops hoisted the French blue-white-and-red-draped coffins to their shoulders. They walked slowly, in a quiet cadence, with the bodies of their comrades on their shoulders, down the two-hundred-yard tunnel of soldiers and dignitaries and up the yawning rear ramp into the belly of the plane. A moderator gave remarks in French as the troops paid their respects. Many of the soldiers standing at attention on that dark, quiet night didn’t know who the fallen troopers were or how they had died. Neither did Petraeus. Ramp ceremonies in Afghanistan were held anytime a soldier gave the ultimate sacrifice. An attempt was made to send the remains of the fallen home within twenty-four hours of their deaths. It was optional for troops to attend, but there was always a substantial turnout, even after midnight.
Petraeus, Allen, UN special representative Staffan de Mistura and the other leaders stood at attention as still as statues, close to the French cargo jet. Petraeus had attended too many of these in his years in the military; these young men were the same age as his son, Stephen, he thought to himself. The melancholy songs reminded him of his first real exposure to significant casualties after seventeen of his men from the 101st Airborne died in a tragic helicopter crash in Iraq. The emotion triggered had been so strong at times over the years that he would occasionally put his head down on his desk, but only when he thought his staff was not watching. Petraeus never let anyone see this side of him. He had learned to hide the heavy burdens of command during his first tour in Iraq in 2003. But on the night before his final day in command, at a 1:00 A.M. ceremony for more of the war’s dead, the mask felt heavy.
“At the end of the day, there is only one commander, and he is the one who feels the ultimate responsibility for committing these troops who made the ultimate sacrifice. We are all changed by this,” he later relayed to a friend. “You carry a sense of responsibility for those who never go home or whose lives are changed forever from catastrophic injuries. And there is an added feeling of guilt from departing the theater earlier than planned as well, of leaving your guys, your team while they are still in combat. A commander feels, understandably, this extraordinary weight of responsibility. It is impossible to understand it without having lived it. You cannot explain it to others. It doesn’t get easier and you don’t get hardened to it.”
THE DAY OF HIS change of command, Petraeus awoke at 5:00 A.M. He hadn’t returned to his room after the ramp ceremony until 1:30 A.M., and he hadn’t slept well. Petraeus had his personal security detachment meet him at 6:00 A.M. for a final morning run. Three soldiers arrived to accompany the general on what would be his final laps around the
ISAF and U.S. Embassy compound. Normally inquisitive and humorous when he ran, he was now serious and contemplative; despite the early hour, he wore sunglasses. He barely spoke. His focus, he later confessed, was basic: Get to the other end of the day.
After the run, Petraeus donned his camouflage battle fatigues and was driven to the palace, where he would receive an award from President Karzai. It was the highest Afghan award, the Medal of Ghazi Wazir Mohammad Akbar Khan. Karzai made the presentation in front of Afghanistan’s National Security Team. Petraeus thanked Karzai, expressed his gratitude and said he had always thought of himself serving President Obama, the secretary general of NATO and Karzai, the head of the Afghan state. “I’ve always regarded myself as your soldier and your commander,” he said, pledging continued support once he became director of the Central Intelligence Agency. He departed as swiftly as he had come, heading back to ISAF headquarters. He attended the ceremony for the promotion of his successor, Lieutenant General Allen, to the rank of general and paused for a moment at a short reception in Destille Gardens, across from the headquarters, as the crowd of guests arrived. Then it was time for the change of command.
As the ceremony began, the sun poured down on the peach-colored building that had been first a military installation and then a military sports club but now served as the ISAF headquarters. With the building as the backdrop, Petraeus stood ramrod straight and saluted as the 1st Cavalry Division Band and the Afghan Army National Band played the national anthems of both Afghanistan and the United States. Spectators sat under blue tents. Ambassador Eikenberry began the ceremony, recalling Petraeus’s comments to him from the previous year’s Fourth of July celebration at the embassy: “Civil-military cooperation is not optional.” Then he presented the State Department’s Secretary’s Distinguished Service Award to Petraeus on behalf of Secretary of State Hillary Clinton. The ambassador was followed on the podium by Admiral Mullen, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Wolf Langheld, Petraeus’s NATO boss, and the Afghan minister of Defense, all of whom praised Petraeus for his effort and his sacrifice. Petraeus then formally handed the colors of command of ISAF and U.S. Forces–Afghanistan to his close friend and colleague General Allen, a fourth star now on Allen’s collars. Petraeus delivered his address at a wooden podium, his battle fatigues decorated with two additional medals he had just been awarded, the Defense Distinguished Service Medal and the NATO Meritorious Service Medal.
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