Harry Potter and Philosophy: If Aristotle Ran Hogwarts

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by David Baggett


  113

  Roger Highfield, The Science of Harry Potter (New York: Penguin, 2002).

  114

  John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding (1689) (Oxford: Clarendon, 1975), Book II, Chapter 27, §9.

  115

  Locke, Essay, Book II, Chapter 27, §9.

  116

  Locke, Essay, Book II, Chapter 27, §23.

  117

  David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature (1739) (Oxford: Clarendon, 1978), Book I, Part 4, Section vi.

  118

  Hume, Treatise, Book I, Part 4, Section vi.

  119

  Ibid.

  120

  G.W. Leibniz, Discourse on Metaphysics (1686), in Philosophical Papers and Letters, second edition (Dordrecht: Reidel, 1969), §9.

  121

  Derek Parfit, Reasons and Persons (Oxford: Clarendon, 1984), pp. 254-55.

  122

  Parfit, Reasons and Persons, p. 261.

  123

  For various views of the relationship between consciousness and brain function, see Richard Swinburne, Evolution of the Soul, revised edition (Oxford: Clarendon, 1997); William Hasker, The Emergent Self (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1999); David J. Chalmers, The Conscious Mind (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996); and Daniel C. Dennett, Consciousness Explained (Boston: Back Bay Books, 1991). Views represented here are substance dualism, emergent dualism, property dualism, and reductionism, respectively.

  124

  I am most grateful to Kevin Decker for supplying me with many helpful references to the Harry Potter books and to the editors of this volume, Bill Irwin, and Greg Bassham for their insightful comments and suggestions.

  125

  Quoted in Theodore Schick, Jr. and Lewis Vaughn, Doing Philosophy: An Introduction through Thought Experiments (Mountain View: Mayfield, 1999), p. 140.

  126

  Not to be confused with libertarians in the political sense—believers in small government and the right to do whatever lamebrained thing you want, so long as you don’t violate the liberties or property rights of others.

  127

  There are, of course, more sophisticated versions of soft determinism than the version I have critiqued. See, for example, Daniel Dennett, Elbow Room: The Varieties of Free Will Worth Wanting (Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1984). For a powerful argument that none of these sophisticated versions have succeeded, or ever could, see Peter van Inwagen, Free Will (Oxford: Clarendon, 1983).

  128

  See Martin Luther, “Bondage of the Will,” in Martin Luther: Selections from His Writings (Garden City: Anchor Books, 1961), p. 181; John Calvin, Institutes of the Christian Religion, Volume 2, translated by Lewis Ford Battles (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1960), Book 2, Chapter 2. For a good contemporary defense of this view, see John Feinberg, “God Ordains All Things,” in Predestination and Free Will: Four Views on Divine Sovereignty and Human Freedom, edited by David Basinger and Randall Basinger (Downers Grove: InterVarsity Press, 1986), pp. 19-43.

  129

  For a similar formulation, see Alvin Plantinga, “On Ockham’s Way Out,” in John Martin Fischer, ed., God, Foreknowledge, and Freedom (Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 1989), pp. 179-180.

  130

  Homework for American readers: After consulting at least three dictionaries of British slang, explain the difference between a “a load of old tosh” and a “a load of old bosh.”

  131

  See Josh McDowell, The New Evidence that Demands a Verdict (Nashville: Thomas Nelson, 1999), pp. 164-202. This argument, of course, only has force for those who take Scripture and such prophetic passages seriously.

  132

  For a balanced discussion of the relevant issues, see Thomas V. Morris, Our Idea of God: An Introduction to Philosophical Theology (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1991), pp. 119-138.

  133

  Plantinga, “On Ockam’s Way Out,” p. 183; Scott A. Davison, “Divine Providence and Human Freedom,” in Michael J. Murray, ed., Reason for the Hope Within (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1999), p. 231.

  134

  Assuming that genuine knowing is involved and not merely intelligent guesswork.

  135

  Some claim that divine foreknowledge raises greater challenges than prophetic foreknowledge, owing to God’s being essentially all-knowing. See, for example, John Martin Fischer’s “Introduction: God and Freedom,” in Fischer, God, Foreknowledge, and Freedom. 12 Cf. ibid., p. 180.

  136

  God’s knowing that I will reread Sorcerer’s Stone tomorrow doesn’t mean I will reread it in this and all possible worlds. But of course that doesn’t entirely answer how God could know such a proposition’s truth value in advance—a point even more obvious when the future actions in question are more realistic possibilities than Irwin’s revealing ditty in Trafalgar Square tomorrow. Divine omniscience extending comprehensively to every future contingency remains a big mystery to solve.

  137

  Some kinds of foreknowledge may be possible only if causal determinism is true. Astrology, for example, seems to assume that human destiny and personality is causally influenced or determined by the position of the stars, planets, and Moon at the moment of one’s birth. But foreknowledge need not presuppose causal determinism. God, for example, in virtue of His essential omniscience, may be able to foreknow all human choices even if those choices are not determined. And if God can foreknow them, He can reveal them to others. Hence the possibility of prophetic foreknowledge.

  138

  Thanks to Dave Baggett for coaching me on proper gnome-tossing technique, and to Bill Irwin for teaching me the Icelandic National Anthem.

  Volume 9 in the series, Popular Culture and Philosophy™

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  Copyright © 2004 by Carus Publishing Company

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  Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

  Harry Potter and philosophy : if Aristotle ran Hogwarts / edited by David Baggett and Shawn E. Klein.

  p. cm.—(Popular culture and philosophy ; v. 9)

  Includes bibliographical references and index.

  eISBN : 978-0-812-69697-4

  1. Rowling, J. K.—Philosophy. 2. Children’s stories, English—History and criticism. 3. Fantasy fiction, English—History and criticism. 4. Rowling, J. K.—Characters—Harry Potter. 5. Potter, Harry (Fictitious character) 6. Philosophy in literature. I. Baggett, David. II. Klein, Shawn E. III. Series.

  PR6068.O93Z69 2004

  823’.914—dc22

  2004015133

  Table of Contents

  Popular Culture and Philosophy Series Editor: George A. Reisch

  Title Page

  Dedication

  A Few Start-of-Term Notices

  Abbreviations

  The Magic of Philosophy

  Gryffindor - The Characters of Harry’s World

  Chapter 1 - The Courageous Harry Potter

  Magic and Virtue

  The Virtues at Hogwarts

  Feelings of Fear

  Harry’s Recipe for Courage

  Harry’s Big Step of Faith

  Chapter 2 - Dursley Duplicity: The Morality and Psychology of Self-Deception

  The Arguments for Self-Deception
<
br />   The Self-Deceptions of the Dursleys

  The Lessons of Dursley Deceit

  A Fourth Lesson

  Making Sense of Positive Illusions

  An Honest Life

  Chapter 3 - Voldemort’s Agents, Malfoy’s Cronies, and Hagrid’s Chums: …

  Voldemort’s Agents

  Malfoy’s Cronies: Crabbe and Goyle

  Hagrid’s Chums: Harry, Ron, and Hermione

  Aristotle’s Friends

  Useful Friends and Pleasant Friends

  Friendship in the Fullest Sense

  “What’s Comin’ Will Come, an’ We’ll Meet It When It Does” (GF, p. 719)

  Chapter 4 - Feminism and Equal Opportunity: Hermione and the Women of Hogwarts

  In the Image of Her Creator

  Not Just One of the Guys

  Strength of Mind and Moral Virtue

  Co-education at Hogwarts

  Equal Opportunity Beyond Hogwarts

  Hufflepuff - Morality in Rowling’s Universe

  Chapter 5 - Heaven, Hell, and Harry Potter

  Are We Truly Happy?

  Is Death Really a Good Thing?

  So Why Not Take the Money and Run?

  Magical Moral Obligations

  Some Damned Good Reasons

  Chapter 6 - Magic, Science, and the Ethics of Technology

  Magic, Science, and Harry Potter

  Interlude: Fantasy and Moral Epistemology

  Rowling’s Ethics of Magic

  Back to Reality

  Chapter 7 - The Mirror of Erised: Why We Should Heed Dumbledore’s Warning

  The Mirror of Erised

  Dumbledore’s Warning

  Knowledge and Truth

  Descartes’s Dreams

  The Experience Machine

  To Plug In …

  … Or Not to Plug In

  Doing Certain Things

  Being a Certain Way

  Back to the Mirror

  Heeding Dumbledore’s Warning

  Chapter 8 - Kreacher’s Lament: S.P.E.W. as a Parable on Discrimination, …

  Discrimination and Prejudice

  What Is Wrong with Prejudice?

  Why S.P.E.W. Doesn’t Work

  Indifference, Security, and Social Justice

  Slytherin - Knockturn Alley and the Dark Arts

  Chapter 9 - Is Ambition a Virtue? Why Slytherin Belongs at Hogwarts

  Aristotle and the Sorting Hat

  The Virtue of Slytherin House

  Ambition as a Virtue

  What We Can Learn from Slytherin House

  Chapter 10 - A Skewed Reflection: The Nature of Evil

  Evil Doesn’t Exist

  Evil Protects Itself and Grows through Deception

  Evil Is a Result of Free Choice

  Seeing Clearly, Acting Bravely

  Chapter 11 - Voldemort, Boethius, and the Destructive Effects of Evil

  Boethius and the Destructive Effects of Evil

  Voldemort and the Destructive Effects of Evil

  Voldemort and Moral Education

  Chapter 12 - Magic, Muggles, and Moral Imagination

  The Devil Made Harry Do It

  What’s Wrong with Harry?

  Answering the Moral Charge

  Is Hogwarts a Wiccan Academy?

  Imagination and Morality

  Imagination and Faith

  Ravenclaw - Many-Flavored Topics in Metaphysics

  Chapter 13 - Finding Platform 9 : The Idea of a Different Reality

  The Oz Stories

  The Ship of Theseus

  The Narnia Chronicles

  Hogwarts

  Hogwarts and Narnia

  Hogwarts and Oz

  Hogwarts and Our World

  Seeing but Not Noticing

  Science and Alchemy

  Chapter 14 - Space, Time, and Magic

  Where and When: The Harry Potter Universe and Our Own World

  Magical and Non-Magical Places

  How: Travel by Magical Means

  Time Travel: The Tensed versus the Tenseless View of Time

  Time Travel in the Harry Potter Universe

  What We’ve Learned About Harry Potter’s World

  Chapter 15 - Why Voldemort Won’t Just Die Already: What Wizards Can Teach Us …

  Disembodied Survival and the Nature of Persons

  Teletransportation and Personal Identity

  Chapter 16 - The Prophecy-Driven Life: Fate and Freedom at Hogwarts

  The Scientific Challenge to Freedom

  The Religious Challenge to Freedom

  The Paranormal Challenge to Free Will

  Reconciling Freedom and Foreknowledge

  Hogwarts Emeritus Faculty

  Current Hogwarts Faculty

  A Wizard’s Index

  Copyright Page

 

 

 


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