The Final Move Beyond Iraq: The Final Solution While the World Sleeps

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The Final Move Beyond Iraq: The Final Solution While the World Sleeps Page 11

by mike Evans


  Faced with a growing certainty that it would be next in America’s sights, Syria pled with Saudi Arabia to intercede. Backed by Saudi promises to persuade al-Assad to relinquish Iraqi henchmen that had fled to Syria, the leaders in Riyadh successfully averted a Syrian invasion that would have been on the coattails of the Iraqi one.

  “ALLIES” AND ALLIANCES

  Although some participated in the 1990–1991 Gulf War, many of America’s so-called allies sat on the sidelines during the Iraq invasion of 2003. However, once the coalition troops marched into Baghdad and began pulling down the idol-like images of Saddam Hussein, the Europeans began to line up for a piece of the postwar building program. They were eager to share in the bounty that was sure to result from the pillaging of Saddam’s palaces and storehouses. France and Germany began to try to ingratiate themselves with the United States to secure a role in future Iraq projects. They, along with other United Nations members, wanted a central role in the process. Even as France’s smooth-talking then foreign minister Dominique de Villepin was encouraging the Bush administration to let bygones be bygones, a French delegation was winging its way to Tehran to meet with leaders from Iran and from the Iraqi resistance.

  Meanwhile in Iraq, Iranian-supported factions were spreading the jihad much like Typhoid Mary spread her murderous disease across New York in the early 1900s. Moqtada al-Sadr and his cronies spread “Shiite-controlled Iraq” propaganda, while other clerics encouraged their followers to defy American troops in open hostility. The southern Iraqi city of Kut rapidly became a stronghold for Iranian-backed forces determined to spread Grand Ayatollah Khomeini’s Islamic revolution to Iraq, and Tehran infused Sadr’s Mahdi army with new blood, raising their numbers to five thousand men. (As of the end of 2006, estimates of the Mahdi army’s size have grown to around sixty thousand.) These death squads assumed the duties of the local police while emulating the Iranian style of dress and driving vehicles supplied by Iran.

  One of the ways the Iraqi Shiites made their presence known following the collapse of Hussein’s government was to celebrate Ashura, a holy day set aside to display the might of the Shiites. A part of the ritual surrounding Ashura Day is the use of chains for self-flagellation. It was during Ashura that the Iranian-backed forces made their presence known near Karbala and al Najaf, two of the holiest Shiite cities in Iraq. It is estimated that some two million people began the march toward the two cities, rapidly joined by millions from nearby cities, all “protected” by forces loyal to Iran. Intelligence services surmise that the march to and from Karbala and al Najaf was a means to transport weapons, explosives, munitions, and money throughout Iraq, as well as a means to transport and embed Iranian agents.

  By the end of April 2004, coalition forces were already beginning to sit up and take notice of all the activity sponsored by neighboring Iran. In one of my meetings with Lt. Gen. Moshe Ya’alon, he stated that more than 85 percent of the improvised explosive devices used in Iraq were furnished by Iran.

  The coalition troops were becoming more and more vulnerable to suicide attacks carried out by terrorists crossing the border from Iran. To compound the problem, Hezbollah forces remaining in Iraq after Saddam’s fall were joined by more forces slipping across the border from Syria. It was estimated that some twenty-five thousand to thirty thousand Iranian forces were actively fighting coalition forces in Iraq. This was a surprising turn of events for the Bush administration. The Washington Post reported they had “underestimated the Shiites’ organizational strength…[and were] concerned that those sentiments could coalesce into a fundamentalist government [in Iraq].”9

  True to Israeli concerns expressed before the war, it appeared that the administration had a clear entry strategy but were unprepared for the task of stabilizing Iraq and dealing with the various factions in the country. Like the Energizer Bunny, France was too eager to jump on the bandwagon to encourage the United States to seek Iran’s assistance in the region. The French foreign minister de Villepin was one of the first to openly endorse asking Iran to join in providing assistance in the rebuilding of Iraq. What neither France nor the United States could know was that Iran was preparing to unchain the terrorist forces of Islamic radicals in Iraq. This, apparently, was in response to Iran’s fear that, given the opportunity, the United States would stop the Shiite majority in Iraq from controlling that country.

  Equally staunch in making Iraq a case study for dealing with terrorist states, President Bush, in his speech aboard the USS Abraham Lincoln on May 1, 2003, had issued this warning:

  Any person involved in committing or planning terrorist attacks against the American people becomes an enemy of this country, and a target of American justice.

  Any person, organization, or government that supports, protects, or harbors terrorists is complicit in the murder of the innocent, and equally guilty of terrorist crimes.

  Any outlaw regime that has ties to terrorist groups and seeks or possesses weapons of mass destruction is a grave danger to the civilized world—and will be confronted.10

  To add to the Islamic radical frenzy, Osama bin Laden reared his head via an audiotape from Pakistan and challenged the terrorists racing toward Iraq not only to attack American troops but to turn their hatred on moderate Arab countries that dared support the United States, such as Pakistan, Afghanistan, Bahrain, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia. On the tape, unveiled in a CBS news report, bin Laden called for every segment of Islamic society to support suicide bombers. With repeated calls for martyrdom, bin Laden expressed his support for “those martyrs who sacrificed their lives for the sake of Islam.”11

  IRAN RISES

  With Tehran’s encouragement, resistance from the Shiites in Iraq was growing daily. U.S. and British patrols in principally Shiite cities were greeted with chants and barrages of rocks thrown from rooftops.

  Initially, the Shiites in Iraq assumed the role of peacemaker. They seemed to be willing to support the United States during the invasion, certain that when the dust settled, the United States would back a Shiite-majority government. As sure as the Iraqis were that this would happen, Tehran was equally sure that an American-friendly, democratic Iraq would not be in their best interest. Ayatollah Baqir al-Hakim, the leader of the Iranian-sponsored Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI), intensified his call for a Baghdad regime much like that in Iran. Al-Hakim was certain that the future of Iraq lay in an Islamic theocracy, not a Western-style democracy. In early May 2004, al-Hakim took his well-practiced, middle-of-the-road, democracy-for-Iraq rhetoric to al Najaf. Of course he knew, as did Iran, that a democratic election in a Shiite-majority Iraq meant control of the government for that faction. He preached security for Iraq with the inference that it could only be achieved by the groups that were armed and funded by Iran.

  Unbeknownst to many, this also included Al Qaeda radicals ready and willing to enter the terrorist-driven battle against the United States. Just how far was Iran willing to go to achieve its aims in Iraq? Tehran was willing to provide a safe haven for Osama bin Laden and his cronies. In fact, it was widely reported that Al Qaeda personnel, including bin Laden (who is a Sunni Muslim), were entertained by Iranian government officials. Cooperation between the Sunnis and Shiites, as well as a base in Iran, would provide bin Laden with a launching pad for future attacks against other U.S.-friendly Arab regimes such as his own home country, Saudi Arabia. And it would allow Iran to more rapidly take on the role of “Terror Central.” This was not surprising, since Iran had been instrumental in providing safe and undocumented passage for the hijackers responsible for the 9/11 attacks.

  The knots in the noose of terror encircling Iraq were being formed with residual Al Qaeda operatives in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iran as well as Syrian Hezbollah with ties to Al Qaeda in Syria and Lebanon. How long would it be before the various factions began to pull on the rope, strangling coalition troops and forcing the United States to abandon its commitment to stay the course in Iraq?

  Iran, leery as it wa
s of a Western influence, was equally wary of one of Iraq’s most respected ayatollahs, Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani. They feared that his more lax form of Islam practiced around al Najaf would not look favorably on Iran’s overtures. Iran began to accelerate the only plan that it knew with any certainty might work—terror attacks against American troops. Tehran was certain that a sustained flood of terror would demoralize the U.S. military and the American people and therefore influence the Bush administration to bow to pressure from Congress to withdraw the troops as quickly as possible.

  The go-ahead to launch terror attacks on U.S. troops in Iraq further emboldened Osama bin Laden to call his troops together to plan new attacks, not only against the government in Riyadh but against the British, Israelis, tourists, and politicians. In fact, anyone who was pro-West would become an open target for bin Laden’s troops. At the top of his list were the same nations that topped Tehran’s list of Islamic traitors—Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, and other Arab states with Western leanings.

  Bin Laden’s first targets were compounds that housed Western interests in Riyadh. In the early morning hours of May 12, 2003, five vehicles eased their way through the city. Three of the vehicles were packed with explosives; the other two carried assault teams. As the sun peeked over the edge of the city, massive blasts rocked three Western compounds, killing twenty-six people, nine of them Americans, and wounding more than one hundred sixty people. These explosions were followed days later with similar blasts in Casablanca that claimed the lives of thirty-three civilians and injured more than a hundred. According to a Washington Post report, Iran was complicit at least in the Riyadh bombings:

  Saad bin Laden [Osama bin Laden’s son] and other senior Al Qaeda operatives were in contact with an Al Qaeda cell in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, in the days immediately prior to the May 12 suicide bombing there that left 35 people dead [this number also counts the nine suicide bombers],…European and U.S. intelligence sources say. The sources would not divulge the nature or contents of the communications, but the contacts have led them to conclude that the Riyadh attacks were planned in Iran and ordered from there.12

  Prominent Al Qaeda member Ayman al-Zawahiri joined the call for vicious, worldwide attacks against Americans and Jews. In a harangue delivered in May 2003, he ranted:

  The crusaders and the Jews do not understand but the language of killing and blood. They do not become convinced unless they see coffins returning to them, their interests being destroyed, their towers being torched, and their economy collapsing. O Muslims, take matters firmly against the embassies of America, England, Australia, and Norway and their interests, companies, and employees. Burn the ground under their feet, as they should not enjoy your protection, safety, or security. Expel those criminals out of your countries…. Learn from your 19 brothers who attacked America in its planes in New York and Washington and caused it a tribulation that it never witnessed before.13

  The powers-that-be in Iran were convinced that America had a twofold plan for the Middle East: regime change where necessary and democratization of other Arab states. Tehran had learned by studying American involvement in other regions that the Americans were good at quick response but had a very poor track record when it came to defending prolonged occupations; perfect examples could be found in Vietnam and in Lebanon. Given these two options, and fearing American incursion, the Iranians came up with a third plan: rather than be dominated by the United States, Iran would dominate. How would they achieve their plan? As the world would soon see, it would pick up the pace on Iran’s nuclear program and succeed through nuclear blackmail.

  Tehran believed that Iran—not Iraq—had always been the ultimate goal of an American invasion. A foothold in that country would place American troops in two countries surrounding Iran’s borders: Iraq and Afghanistan. An invasion of Iran seemed to be the next logical step in what was seen as a U.S. bid for regional domination. U.S. efforts, or so Tehran believed, were focused only on preserving the Zionists that had usurped land from the Palestinians, and in order to do that, Iranian influence had to be curbed. Therefore, in the minds of the mullahs in control, the only answer was a U.S. invasion of Iran and an end to Khomeini’s Islamic revolution. In June 2003, a power play designed to showcase Iran’s presence in the Persian Gulf unfolded. The Iranian Coast Guard stopped two boats carrying four U.S. soldiers and five civilians. The occupants of the two boats were blindfolded and interrogated by the Iranians before being released, according to U.S. Central Command.14

  Just a few days before the incident in the Persian Gulf, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld had subtly warned Iraq’s neighbors against interference in that nation’s liberation. Said Rumsfeld in a Wall Street Journal article: “Assistance from Iraq’s neighbors will be welcomed. Conversely, interference in Iraq by its neighbors or their proxies—including those whose objective is to remake Iraq in Iran’s image—will not be accepted or permitted.” Rumsfeld went on to say that the transition to democracy would “take time” and that the “ultimate political outcome must be decided by the Iraqi people.” The end result in Iraq should not be made to “replicate any other system [of governance].”15 All the political pundits had to figure out now was how to keep the Shiite majority from controlling Iraq and linking arms with Iran.

  OPEN-ENDED OCCUPATION

  America was now firmly entrenched in Iraq, but the unanswered question was, “For how long, and toward what end result?” Protests, not only from factions in Iraq but also from the entire Muslim world, were increasing. Terrorist organizations seemed capable of humiliating and/or killing American troops at will. Rather than reinforcing the Bush administration’s war on terror, the terrorists in Iraq were sucking the life and the will to win out of Operation Iraqi Freedom. Coalition troops were faced with an increasingly bold guerrilla war fought by jihadists.

  The Iraqi resistance movement was compared to the Palestinian resistance against the Israelis. It was also heralded as an infusion of new life into the Lebanese and Palestinian intifada against the Jews. With all eyes on Iraq, both Iran and Syria could take advantage of the opportunity to build forces in Lebanon and in Gaza, Israel’s closest neighbors.

  However, just as the Madrid Peace Conference following the first Gulf War ran through Jerusalem, so a resolution to this war would as well. The first entity to benefit from the defeat of Saddam Hussein was the Palestinian Authority. In fact, the two coalition leaders, George W. Bush and Tony Blair, agreed even before the outbreak of hostilities on the link between the war on Iraq and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Indeed, the entire European political establishment tied the defeat of Saddam Hussein to a renewed peace process between Israel and the Palestinians.

  In an address to Parliament before the war began, Blair started the campaign to link the Palestinian question to the war in Iraq. He reassured his listeners that peace between the Jews and the Palestinians was of paramount importance. It was the beginning of a push for what was to become known as the Road Map for Peace that would be unveiled in June 2003.

  Following a meeting at Camp David between the president and Mr. Blair, President Bush stated:

  History requires more of our coalition than a defeat of a terrible danger. I see an opportunity, as does Prime Minister Blair, to bring renewed hope and progress to the entire Middle East. Last June 24th, I outlined a vision of two states, Israel and Palestine living side-by-side in peace and security. Soon, we’ll release the road map that is designed to help turn that vision into reality. And both America and Great Britain are strongly committed to implementing that road map.16

  Blair responded by noting a date for the public debut of the Road Map:

  We both share a complete determination to move this forward. It is, indeed, often overlooked that President Bush is the first U.S. President publicly to commit himself to a two-state solution, an Israel confident of its security and a viable Palestinian state. And I welcome the decision announced recently to publish the road map as soon as the confirmation of
the new Palestinian Prime Minister is properly administered.17

  The Road Map plan included sponsorship by the UN, the EU, and Russia—none of which supported the war with Iraq. According to sources in Jerusalem, Israel accepted the Road Map in principle but had a number of reservations. This could well have been a sign that Israel learned a valuable lesson post-Madrid. It learned that it cannot afford to make unilateral concessions. Israel recognized that a new Middle East could not evolve in response to a UN Security Council resolution or to a well-executed public relations campaign by the EU, even if Arafat and the various factions could be successfully lured to the bargaining table.

  For the moment, at least, Israel was satisfied with being relegated to the background, comfortable with helping Washington without public recognition. It must have created quite a shock wave in the Knesset when their staunch political ally, George W. Bush, announced the Road Map with its steps to a two-state solution. The entities resident in the Palestinian Authority met the news with their usual response: a suicide bomber detonated a backpack of explosives inside an Israeli pub, killing three and wounding twenty. And still, Israel was pressured to turn a blind eye on the daily threats of terrorism by Hamas, Fatah, Hezbollah, and a plethora of terror organizations in deference to the new peace process, the Road Map. Knesset member Uzi Landau wrote:

  If the Quartet’s road map is accepted, Yasser Arafat will win the greatest victory of his life. Despite the blatant violation of all his commitments in the Oslo agreements and his responsibility for the murder of more than 1,000 Israelis—nearly 800 of them during the last two years of terror—he has not been punished. On the contrary, he…will get…the establishment of a state…without negotiation.18

 

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