James A. Hessler
Page 8
Dan Sickles had originally been assigned to support Sedgwick, but at 1:00 p.m. on April 30, he received orders to report to Hooker at Chancellorsville. Sickles reached the commanding general about 9:00 a.m. on May 1 and was ordered to mass “my forces in the forest, near the junction of the roads leading to Ely’s and the United States Fords.” Captain Francis Donaldson of the 118th Pennsylvania was introduced to Sickles for the first time. The general was “leisurely sauntering” near Hooker’s headquarters. The captain found him “to be an affable, pleasant man, not at all distant or hard to approach, as would have been supposed by reason of his rank.” Sickles apologized, “I am sorry gentlemen that I have nothing with which to extend the hospitalities,” but a nearby officer produced a bottle of Drake’s Plantation Bitters, which the group socially drank (“strangled over the vile stuff” as Donaldson wrote.) Sickles, like most of the army, believed that Hooker’s plan had thus far been “conducted with perfect success…as to be a complete surprise to the enemy.”3
Neither army had an overwhelming desire to become entangled in the Wilderness because the thick undergrowth would restrict troop movements, limit the usefulness of artillery, and (in Hooker’s case) potentially neutralize his advantages in superior numbers and firepower. On Friday, May 1, with roughly 70,000 men under his direct influence, Hooker set out with three columns to push through the Wilderness and continue east toward Fredericksburg. Confederate detachments under Lafayette McLaws and Jackson intercepted the move. The collision that followed seems to have surprised the Federals. Hooker responded by ordering his men to fall back into the Wilderness toward Chancellorsville. Like many other officers, the withdrawal angered and bewildered George Meade, who later wrote,“[J]ust as we reached the enemy we were recalled [emphasis in original].” Not only had Hooker failed to get his army out of the Wilderness, but he had surrendered the initiative to his opponent.
Jackson, meanwhile, continued pressing the Federals, who started digging in for a defensive battle. As the Federal army’s new position coalesced, Hooker expressed concerns that Oliver Howard’s Eleventh Corps, which held the extreme right flank, was not fully secure. Hooker wanted the flank contracted and swung back to a more secure position, but Howard argued that it would demoralize the Eleventh Corps to fall back even farther. Although he agreed to build field fortifications, Howard declined any assistance.4
That evening near dusk, Lee and Jackson met near the intersection of the Orange Plank Road and Catharine Furnace Road, a little more than one mile east of Chancellorsville. After determining that Hooker’s left flank was securely fixed on the Rapidan River and well defended, the pair of Southern generals turned their attention to the Federal right. Neither general knew where Hooker’s right flank was situated, but cavalry intelligence brought in by Fitz Lee’s troopers suggested it was about two miles west of Chancellorsville, and therefore open to the possibility of being turned. Jackson’s chaplain, Beverly Tucker Lacy, knew the area well and confirmed that the local road system would allow the Confederates to swing in an arc south, west, and then north to outflank Hooker’s right. Lee divided his outnumbered army again, cleaving it into three widely separated pieces. His own direct command consisted of about 15,000 infantry and cavalry intended to hold Hooker’s attention in front of Chancellorsville. The force left behind at Fredericksburg under Jubal Early, about 12,400 troops, had orders to prevent John Sedgwick from capturing the heights above the town and opening a direct route into Lee’s rear. Jackson, meanwhile, accompanied by Stuart’s cavalry to screen the flanking operation, would lead a grand total of 33,000 men (infantry, artillery, and cavalry) to find and turn the enemy flank. Jackson’s tradition was to start his marches at first light, but circumstances delayed the column until 7:00 a.m. the following morning.5
Joe Hooker’s line that Saturday, May 2, extended slightly more than six miles in length. The Federal line fronted generally south and ran roughly east to west. Meade’s Fifth Corps held the left (east) side anchored near the Rapidan River. On Meade’s right was a slightly protruding salient near Chancellorsville occupied by two Second Corps divisions under Winfield Hancock and William French. Henry Slocum’s Twelfth Corps was next in line, forming the army’s left center. Sickles threw Brigadier General David Birney’s division on Slocum’s right, holding Hiram Berry’s and Amiel Whipple’s divisions in reserve. On Birney’s right, holding the army’s right (west) flank, was Oliver Howard’s Eleventh Corps. Howard’s outfit was the smallest corps in the army and his right ended along the Orange Turnpike with no natural feature anchoring the line. In military terms, the army’s right flank was “in the air.” Howard’s men, however, were the farthest Federals from the enemy and so seemed the least likely to see substantial action.6
About sunrise, Sickles and engineer Cyrus Comstock accompanied Hooker on an inspection tour of the Federal right flank. Sickles claimed that he accompanied Hooker because his proximity to Howard increased his own interest in the army’s right. According to Sickles, the soldiers demonstrated “irrepressible enthusiasm” for Hooker as they rode along the lines. When the party reached Howard’s sector they noticed several gaps in his front and reached the conclusion that his line was overextended. Engineer Comstock urged Howard to close the gaps, but he remonstrated. How could an enemy in any serious numbers come crashing through the tangled Wilderness from that direction? Some fortifying along his lines had already been done, but Howard had not yet refused his flank to make it more difficult to turn.7
By 8:00 a.m., the head of Jackson’s Confederate column had been underway for about an hour. Near the Catharine Furnace, the Furnace Road crossed a stretch of high open ground. Some three-quarters of a mile north was Hazel Grove, an important elevation occupied by David Birney’s division of Sickle’s Third Corps. Federal observers perched in trees began reporting to Birney that enemy infantry, artillery, and wagons were crossing the open space and moving west in the general direction of the Federal right flank. “About 8 o’clock Saturday morning I first saw the enemy’s column moving continuously across our front towards the right,” Birney later recalled. “It was in plain sight, with trains, ambulances.… ” Birney “immediately” passed these messages up was reported to me by General Birney. I had then returned to headquarters.” During that delay, Jackson’s men covered nearly another three miles.8
Hooker instructed Sickles to personally investigate the report. The Third Corps leader rode to Hazel Grove and “satisfied myself that it was a movement in great force.” When he reported as much to the army commander and suggested he bring up some rifled guns to shell the Confederates, Hooker agreed. Between 10:00 a.m. and 11:00 a.m., Judson Clark’s battery opened on the enemy, who double-quicked across the opening in the woods. The Southerners, boasted Sickles, were “vainly endeavoring to escape our Well-directed and destructive fire.” Jackson detached Colonel Emory Best’s 23rd Georgia Infantry regiment to remain behind and “guard the flank of the column in motion against a surprise.” While the remaining infantry scurried past the gap, orders were also sent for Jackson’s heavy corps train to take a more roundabout route to avoid the artillery fire.9
Hooker, meanwhile, cautioned Howard to prepare for a possible flank attack, since intelligence offered “good reason to suppose that the enemy is moving to our right.” Hooker also ordered Sickles to reconnoiter to the east where Lee had halted on May 1, but not to the south where Jackson’s column was spotted. Two regiments from Berry’s division advanced and drove back enemy pickets until they ran into solid Confederate defensive lines that triggered a sharp skirmish. Sickles later called the movement a “brilliant reconnaissance” that demonstrated for Hooker that the enemy on his left was still in place and ready for a fight.10
Other than warning Howard, Hooker appears to have done little to strengthen his army. Sickles, on the other hand, appeared characteristically aggressive. He reported enemy movements to not only Hooker but to Slocum and Howard, “inviting their cooperation” in case Hooker “should authorize me
to follow up the enemy and attack his columns. At noon I received orders to advance cautiously toward the road followed by the enemy, and harass the movement as much as possible.” Sickles later claimed it was he who proposed to “strengthen” the reconnaissance, with the intention of gaining possession of the Furnace Road on which Jackson was marching and either cut off the enemy if they were retreating, or cut them in half if they were attacking.11
Sickles ordered Birney’s division forward, along with the support of Hiram Berdan’s U.S. Sharpshooters. Berdan’s men, with Birney in the rear, pushed south toward the 23rd Georgia’s skirmishers. It was now about 1:00 p.m., and while it may have appeared to Sickles, Berdan, and Birney that they were about to strike the enemy’s main flank, they didn’t realize that Jackson’s infantry column had already crossed the Furnace clearing. It was now about five hours after Jackon’s march was first detected. Colonel Best’s 23rd Georgia stalled Berdan and Birney long enough for the last of Jackson’s trains to turn off, but the Georgians were eventually overwhelmed and at least 276 were captured. The large cache of prisoners, Sickles later claimed, confirmed they were part of Jackson’s corps. The Southern captives estimated their fighting strength at approximately 40, 000 men. If Sickles indeed gained this intelligence, time was rapidly running out to make good use of it.12
Since Jackson’s column was actually turning south at the Catharine Furnace (before eventually turning north by west toward Howard’s flank), and since only wagons were still visible, Sickles reached a conclusion that would have lasting import on the battle. At 1:30, he reported to Hooker, “I think it is a retreat. Sometimes a regiment then a few wagons.… ” Later, when the error of this conclusion became apparent, he modified his opinion. In his report dated May 20, he wrote that “the movement indicated a retreat on Gordonsville or an attack upon our right flank—perhaps both, for if the attack failed the retreat could be continued.” Still later, he told the Congressional Committee on the Conduct of the War, “The direction which the enemy’s column took…was susceptible of two interpretations. It was, perhaps, a movement in retreat; for they had a large train with them, a great many wagons, and all arms, except cavalry, were in large force.” The other “interpretation,” of course, turned out to be the correct one: a flank attack that rolled up part of the Army of the Potomac.13
Sickles’ report that the Rebels were in retreat probably reached Hooker’s headquarters around 2:00 p.m. The report gained easy acceptance among prominent Federal officers. “I was deceived at the time of Jackson’s attack,” Oliver Howard later admitted, “and did believe, with all the other officers, that he was making for Orange Court House.” Sickles’ report served to reinforce Hooker’s hope that his plans were still proceeding successfully. Another event helped foster the same mistake. General Lee’s chief of staff, Colonel Robert Chilton, had earlier misinterpreted an order that started Confederates under Jubal Early and William Pendleton out of their Fredericksburg defenses. Federal observers passed the erroneous intelligence to Butterfield and Hooker that the enemy was abandoning Sedgwick’s front. The intelligence seemed sound all the way around and convinced Hooker. At 2:30 p.m., he sent his corps commanders a circular ordering them to be ready to move early the next day. At 4:10 p.m., Hooker telegraphed Sedgwick to seize Fredericksburg, and included this mistaken statement: “We know that the enemy is fleeing, trying to save his trains. Two of Sickles’ divisions are among them.”14
Around 3:00 p.m., Captain Alexander Moore of Hooker’s staff appeared at Howard’s Eleventh Corps headquarters with a message from Sickles. “I am advancing a strong line of two brigades to ascertain whether the enemy is retreating,” he wrote. “General Birney reports that he has reached a brigade of the enemy in rifle-pits, posted, as I think, to cover the retreating column. I will attack if the enemy is not stronger than the reports so far represent him, and occupy the road by which he is retreating. Please support my advance.” Howard, however, had received orders from Hooker to keep a strong reserve on hand and so declined Sickles’ request. Perhaps an hour later, Moore returned with a direct order from Hooker for Howard to support Sickles’ move. Reluctantly, Howard detached Francis Barlow’s brigade for the task, and decided to lead the brigadier to the scene himself. Barlow’s departure left the Eleventh Corps with fewer than 11,000 men. Federal artillery, which poured fire on what Sickles still referred to as “the retreating column of the enemy,” helped Birney gain the Furnace Road.15
Sickles had bigger plans than simply advancing Birney. He requested permission to make “a flank attack” on Jackson and asked that three regiments of Alfred Pleasonton’s cavalry, along with horse artillery, be sent to his support in order to launch a vigorous pursuit. As Pleasonton later recalled, “Sickles sent word that the Rebels were retreating towards Gordonsville.…Hooker sent for me, said he wanted an officer experienced in that part of the field.” When Pleasonton arrived near Hazel Grove, “Sickles sent word the enemy were retreating and ordered me to follow.” With infantry from the Eleventh and Twelfth corps, both Birney and Whipple’s divisions, together with Pleasonton’s cavalry, the Federal force gathered near the Catharine Furnace had swelled to nearly 25,000 men. By this time, Hooker was too preoccupied with supporting Sickles’ planned assault to give much thought to Howard’s Eleventh Corps and the army’s exposed right flank.16
With his typical self-confidence, Sickles “found every indication that looked to a complete success as soon as my advance could be supported.” Confederate resistance on his front had momentarily ceased, “and although our scouts reported a considerable force on the right and in front, it was evident that in a few minutes five or six regiments would be cut off and fall into our hands.” Sickles claimed that he was “about to open my attack in full force” when an aide arrived from Howard to warn him that Stuart’s cavalry was in his rear, Stonewall Jackson was nearby, and “our troops were retreating.” No sounds of a major engagement from the right-rear were audible, so an incredulous Sickles “felt very indignant at this communication; I utterly disbelieved it.” A few moments later another aide arrived “begging” Sickles to send a regiment of Pleasonton’s cavalry to Howard, adding “that his corps had given way, and that our right flank had been carried by the enemy, and that Jackson was in my rear.”
Unfortunately for the Federals, the reports were accurate. Jackson had successfully deployed approximately one-half mile opposite the Eleventh Corps’ right flank and attacked in depth across a broad front against Howard’s narrow wing. When Jackson’s infantry came bouncing out of the Wilderness against Howard’s unsuspecting soldiers, the Eleventh Corps broke and fled in wild disorder. Elements stood here and there and did their best to stem the tide, but the weight of the attack was too great to withstand. By the time Sickles learned of the growing debacle, Jackson’s brigades were pushing east using the Orange Turnpike as a guide.17
Sickles’ own attack plan was quickly abandoned. The collapse on the right happened so fast that he had barely sent staff officers to recall Birney and Whipple when hundreds of men from the Eleventh Corps appeared. Jackson’s infantry were quick to follow. “The fugitives of the Eleventh Corps swarmed from the woods and swept frantically across the cleared fields in which my artillery was parked,” Sickles wrote. “The exulting enemy at their heels mingled yells with their volleys, and in the confusion which followed it seemed as if cannon and caissons, dragoons, cannoneers, and infantry could never be disentangled from the mass in which they were suddenly thrown.” Sickles and Pleasonton readied their artillery to stop Jackson’s columns. After Howard’s “panic-struck hordes” had cleared Sickles’ front, Confederates stepped out of the woods and reportedly called out, “We are friends, don’t fire!” Pleasonton was not fooled by the ruse and the Union guns opened on the pursuers. Sickles praised Pleasonton’s actions in his report, and Captain James Huntington of Battery H, 1st Ohio Artillery, recalled that Sickles “warmly expressed his approbation” for the manner in which Huntington’s command held its ground. B
irney’s division retraced its steps in the growing darkness to Sickles and Pleasonton. Birney found both generals deploying artillery and cavalry “with which they had managed to stay Jackson’s corps…and, in my opinion, saved the army from a great disaster.”18
Ignoring his own significant contribution to the presumption that Jackson was in retreat, Sickles later blamed the entire campaign’s failure to the “giving way” of the Eleventh Corps. Birney blamed the Eleventh Corps rout on its “disregard of rules of warfare, had its pickets too close to the main body, and was surprised by the sudden massed attack of the enemy on its right flank and rear.” Although Birney didn’t witness their flight, it was described to him “by officers who saw it, as disgraceful in the extreme.” George Meade also blamed the day’s misfortunes on the “bad behavior” of Howard’s corps. Second Corps staff officer Josiah Favill complained, “Howard’s men had stacked arms and were playing cards and loitering about without any thought of danger, when the enemy sailed right into them, driving them like flocks of sheep…deaf to all entreaties many of them actually ran right across into the arms of the very men they were trying to avoid. It was really ludicrous.”19
Most of Howard’s fugitives ran east down the Turnpike toward Chancellorsville. The sounds of the attack had not yet reached the Chancellor house. About 6:30 p.m., Hooker and two staff officers were on the porch when one noticed a commotion down the road. After studying it for a moment, the aide shouted, “My God, here they come!” Hooker, his staff, and headquarters cavalry vainly tried to halt the flight. Cavalry was usually effective at stopping stampeding infantry, but most of the army’s horsemen had been sent to support Sickles’ planned attack. Hooker’s only nearby infantry reserve was Hiram Berry’s Third Corps division, so he ordered Berry’s men to move to the front. The strongest motivation to stop running may have been Hooker’s order for the Twelfth Corps soldiers to shoot fleeing Federals. Whatever the reason, Howard’s men began to halt. Sickles would later boast that he and Pleasonton had “succeeded in checking Jackson,” but by 8:00 p.m., darkness, disorganization, exhaustion, and scattered Union defensive efforts had done more to slow Jackson’s attack than anything Sickles and Pleasonton had accomplished. Still, Sickles had held his ground when others had fled. In a stunning turn of events, about 9:00 p.m. Jackson was reconnoitering in front of his lines when he was accidentally shot by his own men. The general was carried from the field and died on May 10.20