Hooker patched together a line fronting north and west to block any further attempts by Jackson’s troops to drive up the Turnpike and Plank Road. The road was now straddled by both armies, with Jackson’s men to the west and Hooker’s soldiers to the east. Hazel Grove was still under Third Corps control and anchored by thirty-four guns, but was now a salient sticking out from Hooker’s main line. Perhaps still agitated by his lost opportunity at the Catharine Furnace, Sickles obtained permission for one of the boldest and most questionable of Civil War tactics: a nighttime attack. Theodore Dodge wrote that the objective was to recapture some guns, caissons, and portions of Whipple’s ammunition trains that had been left in the woods in front of Sickles, and to join his right with Slocum’s new line. The tactical aspects of the plan were rather simple: Birney’s and Whipple’s divisions would advance straight from Hazel Grove to the Orange Plank Road. “The plan was to charge into the woods with the bayonet,” wrote Regis de Trobriand, “striking down the enemy where we found him.” According to Birney, he received orders from Sickles about midnight “to attack Jackson’s corps with my division, driving them from the plank road and the small earthworks.”21
When the order came to move out, Birney’s nervous men fixed bayonets and stepped off. The Confederates were on their left and front. Once in the darkened woods, the Federal formations began to break up. Sporadic firing broke out, but no one was sure who was firing at what. Nerves added to the tension felt in every trigger finger, and before long the firing was wildly out of control, with some of it penetrating the backs of those walking in the front rank. Somehow, Sickles forgot to notify General Henry Slocum of his attack, so when he heard the shooting, the Twelfth Corps commander ordered Federal artillery at Fairview to fire into the moving masses. Some of Birney’s men shifted to the right and collided with Alpheus Williams’ divisional line (Twelfth Corps), a mistake that triggered the exchange of more friendly fire. So confused was the affair that the 3rd Michigan boldly captured a Twelfth Corps battery, and two regiments from Thomas Ruger’s Twelfth Corps brigade fired into one another. According to Abner Doubleday, a division commander in John Reynolds’ First Corps, some of Sickles’ men thought themselves surrounded and surrendered to Hiram Berry’s division. Private John Haley of the 17th Maine recalled that some of the officers were “so frightened that they couldn’t have told their names.” A rumor spread that Brigadier General J. H. Hobart Ward had been taken prisoner, but had instead ridden down two of his own men while fleeing for the rear.22
The attack fiasco came to a fitful end when Sickles’ two disorganized divisions made their way back to where they started. It was about 1:00 a.m. when Birney reported to Sickles that “we held the road and works, and had recaptured the artillery and caissons taken from us during the stampede of the 11th corps.” Sickles pronounced the exercise a success, but Theodore Dodge wrote that, despite a gallant attack, Sickles “overstated” the benefits, having recovered only part of Whipple’s trains and “one or two guns.” According to Charles Mattocks of the 17th Maine, “This midnight affair was a bad thing as we fought both Rebs and Federals.” In the end, the midnight offensive became just a footnote in a long and bloody day filled with deadly blunders. The attack was a fitting example of Sickles’ aggressive temperament overruling sound military judgment.23
Hooker decided to contract his lines on Sunday, May 3. Birney, Whipple, and more than thirty artillery pieces were still in the Hazel Grove salient. Although the bulge divided Lee’s forces into two separate wings (and so offered the Federals a small glimmer of hope of defeating Lee in detail), Fighting Joe was now thinking defensively. He may have feared that Sickles could be caught in a crossfire delivered by Lee to his rear (south), and Jackson’s corps to the front and left. A withdrawal, however, would mean giving up Hazel Grove, an open grassy ridge several hundred yards long. Confederate artillerist E. Porter Alexander described it as “a beautiful position for artillery.” If Confederate batteries occupied it, they could strike the Federal lines all the way to the Plank Road as well as the Federal artillery massed at Fairview, a high and open clearing just southwest of Chancellorsville. Almost certainly unaware of the significance of that key terrain feature, before daylight Hooker ordered Sickles to abandon Hazel Grove and march his two divisions and batteries to Fairview. Since Howard’s corps had been effectively wrecked as an organized fighting body, Sickles’ two divisions could be used to reinforce the main battle line. The decision to abandon Hazel Grove, many historians have argued, would have a profound influence on Sickles and his controversial actions at Gettysburg just two months later.24
Charles Graham’s Pennsylvania brigade (the same regiments that would occupy the Peach Orchard salient on July 2 at Gettysburg) comprised the rearguard with James Huntington’s Ohio battery. During the Federal withdrawal, James Archer’s Confederate brigade of A. P. Hill’s division attacked near daylight. The Southern infantry climbed over the undefended breastworks and quickly flanked Graham. Three of Huntington’s six guns were captured, prompting him to complain about the lack of infantry support. By 6:45 a.m., the Rebels occupied Hazel Grove. Jeb Stuart, who had replaced the wounded Jackson in temporary command of the Second Corps, recognized the terrain for what it was—an outstanding artillery platform—and immediately ordered Alexander to fill it with guns. Within a short time seven Southern batteries comprising twenty-eight pieces were unlimbered. Most of the Federal line, including Hooker’s headquarters at the Chancellor house, was within distant view. Alexander added fourteen guns along the Plank Road so that the Fairview position could be hit with converging artillery fire.25
When Stuart attacked, his infantry advanced from the west. Most of the assault struck the front of the Third and Twelfth corps. “Then began a desperate battle,” Regis de Trobriand remembered, “the brunt of which the Third Corps had still to bear.” Sickles thought that the “vigor and tenacity of the enemy’s attack seemed to concentrate more and more upon my lines near the Plank road and on my left flank.” Four of A.P. Hill’s brigades, now under Stuart’s command, smashed into Hooker’s line near the Plank Road, striking Hiram Berry’s division. A bullet struck General Berry while he was delivering orders. “I am dying,” he exclaimed to his staff. “Carry me to the rear.” The mortally wounded commander was taken to the Chancellor house, where he later died.26
After Berry’s fall, the Third Corps position experienced a near-crisis when Edward Thomas’ Georgians threatened to take Fairview in the flank and rear. At the height of the assault, Brigadier General Joseph J. Revere “shamefully” (in Sickles’ words) marched the Excelsior Brigade and a portion of two others off of the field to the rear. Revere claimed that his command was “broken” and “was almost without ammunition and quite out of rations,” and that he only intended to move “them down the road for the purpose of reorganizing and bringing them back to the field comparatively fresh.” Thomas fought his way within 800 yards of the Chancellor house before being driven back by a successful counterattack from William French’s Second Corps division. Sickles reformed the Excelsiors “under my own supervision” behind Fairview and relieved Revere, who was eventually court-martialed. In his report, Sickles emphasized that Revere had subjected “these proud soldiers for the first time to the humiliation of being marched to the rear while their comrades were under fire.”27
The attack continued. “The bullets ricocheted in our ranks,” Regis de Trobriand recalled, “shells burst around us, and the balls which passed over the first line found a mark in the second.” By midmorning, Williams’ Twelfth Corps brigades south of the Plank Road were out of ammunition and suffering heavy casualties. As Williams led his men to the rear, the Third Corps was ordered to replace them. When a colonel asked Sickles where they should go, Sickles shouted,“Fall in here with no reference to regiments, brigades, or divisions. You are all my men! We must hold this line if every man of us should fall!” Charles Graham’s brigade moved into the Twelfth Corps breastworks just in time to bear the brunt o
f an attack by Robert Rodes’ Confederate division. After intense combat, Stephen Ramseur’s brigade broke Graham’s line and threatened Fairview. Federal artillery in the sector began limbering up and hauling out.28
When Confederate gunner E. P. Alexander learned from Union prisoners that the Chancellor house was Hooker’s headquarters, he began raining artillery fire against the postion. “A converging fire of the enemy’s guns from front, right, and left swept the ground” near the Chancellor house wrote Josiah Favill, “round shot and shell filled the air about us, and confusion reigned supreme.” Colonel Henry Madill of the 141st Pennsylvania had his horse killed from under him and counted seven bullet holes in his coat. A lieutenant in the 3rd Maine was cut in two by a shell, his legs thrown to one side and his trunk to the other. Regis de Trobriand saw a caisson explode and an artilleryman burned “black as a negro. He runs shrieking toward the ambulances.” Amidst the chaos strolled Sickles, remembered de Trobriand, who “goes by in his turn at a walk, with a smiling air, smoking a cigar. ‘Everything is going well,’ said he, in a loud voice, intended to be heard.” Sickles lowered his voice and promised de Trobriand that he would receive a star for the May 2 midnight fight.29
Under attack by “heavy columns,”and having thrown in his final reserves, Sickles sent Major Henry Tremain to Hooker for reinforcements. Tremain arrived at the Chancellor house to find Hooker on the porch. Seconds later, a Confederate solid shot struck a nearby pillar. A portion of it smashed into Hooker, who dropped to the floor and, in Henry Tremain’s words, was “picked up for dead.”Hooker was still very much alive, albeit “senseless.”Tremain would eventually return to Sickles without instructions or support. Hooker was carried to a tent in the rear to recuperate. He was slowly regaining his senses when George Meade arrived and proposed an attack by his Fifth Corps on the Confederate left flank. Hooker refused.30
Sickles later boasted that with another corps in support, he could have not only counter-attacked but would have “carried the day.”He ultimately blamed the Federal debacle on Hooker’s wound and his being unable to send support. Sickles was careful not to publicly blame Hooker for forcing him to abandon Hazel Grove. Without support or communication from the commanding general, the enemy pressure forced Sickles to fall back toward the Chancellor house, which was now on fire. The fighting ex-congressman set up an initial line behind the smoking structure until Second Corps commander Darius Couch took temporary command and ordered Sickles to fall back another three-quarters of a mile with the rest of the army. Couch supervised the Federal retreat from Chancellorsville and formed a new ‘U’shaped line north of Chancellorsville, enclosing the U.S. Ford crossing of the Rappahannock. The Confederates captured Chancellorsville around 10:00 a.m., bringing the two converging Southern wings of the widely separated army together. To add final insult to injury, Lee countermarched several brigades east toward Fredericksburg and beat back an attempt by Sedgwick to penetrate his rear. The repulse of Sedgwick ended the disastrous Sunday for the Federals, backed against the Rappahannock and beaten on two fronts while their commanding general recovered from his stupor.31
Hooker remained committed to a defensive posture on May 4. Sickles lost his second division commander in two days when Amiel Whipple was mortally wounded by a Confederate bullet during a skirmish near Chancellorsville. He was taken to Washington, where he died three days later. Of Sickles’ original three division leaders, only David Birney survived. Sickles praised all three in his report for their performance during the disastrous battle: “The gallantry of Whipple was gracefully acknowledged by his promotion before his wound proved to be mortal. The dashing leadership of Birney has already received a like recognition. The chivalrous Berry proved but too soon how well he had deserved the highest rank in our service.… ”32
That night, Hooker assembled his commanders in his tent. Generals Sickles, Meade, Howard, Reynolds, Couch, Butterfield, and Warren were present. (Henry Slocum arrived as the meeting was ending.) The council was unusual because this was the first time Hooker had invited his subordinates to participate in the decision-making process. “Hooker” Darius Couch recalled, “stated that his instructions compelled him to cover Washington, not to jeopardize the army, etc.” Hooker essentially proposed two options to the group: a forward movement the next day or a retreat across the Rappahannock and an end to the campaign. “It was seen by the most casual observer that he had made up his mind to retreat,”concluded Couch.33
Hooker and Butterfield departed to allow the corps commanders the opportunity to discuss the options. According to Couch, “We were left by ourselves to consult, upon which Sickles made an elaborate argument, sustaining the views of the commanding general.” According to Warren’s recollections, Sickles professed that since he was not a professional soldier his view might carry less weight, but (ever the politician) he considered the matter more political than military. Sickles argued that the uncertainties were “against us,”a victory was “doubtful,”and that another battlefield defeat could endanger Washington. In the end, Dan did not think that a withdrawal “would be fatal.”34
Meade, Howard, and Reynolds were in favor of advancing. Meade expressed doubts that “we could get off our guns”in a retreat, and that the protection of Washington was a clichéd excuse and should not be considered. Couch voted with Sickles against an advance. That placed the corps commanders at three votes in favor of advancing and two votes for retreating. When Hooker returned and polled each general, Sickles raised an additional concern about the army’s supply and communication lines should an advance take place. Meade argued that the risk of withdrawing in the face of an aggressive enemy was actually greater than the risk of attacking. Hooker rejected Meade’s concerns on the grounds that Lee would be “only too glad to have us go back.”Hooker and his allies later claimed that in meeting Meade’s objections, Hooker could now count Meade in favor of a retreat. Hooker ended by informing the council that he would “take upon himself the responsibility of retiring the army to the other side of the river.”35
As the generals left the tent, John Reynolds blurted out, “What was the use of calling us together at this time of night when he intended to retreat anyhow?” On the morning of May 5, Hooker issued orders for the army to prepare to re-cross the Rappahannock. Ironically (given the criticism that would be directed against him after Gettysburg) it was George Meade who concluded that “Lee committed a terrible blunder in allowing us to come back; he might have destroyed us by a vigorous attack while we were retreating.”
“No strategic advantage of any importance was gained on either side,” was what Sickles later concluded of Chancellorsville. His hindsight was essentially correct. Both armies essentially returned to their former positions along the Rappahannock. Lee had once again befuddled another Union commander, but the victory at Chancellorsville was a costly one for Southern arms. Stonewall Jackson would not survive his wounds, and thousands of irreplaceable casualties had been knocked out of the ranks. Southern losses totaled about 13, 000 men from all causes.36
Total Federal casualties topped 17,000, marking Chancellorsville as the army’s costliest battle up until that time. Despite the huge losses, Sickles correctly noted later that the army“still remained competent to win at Gettysburg, as it did win it.” While the corps under Reynolds and Meade had seen little action and suffered few casualties, Sickles’ Third Corps lost 4,124 men, second only to Sedgwick’s larger Sixth Corps, which suffered higher losses in six days of fitful fighting around Fredericksburg. The Excelsior regiments reported 250 casualties. Although there were some charges that Graham’s brigade had abandoned artillery on Sunday, and both Birney and Graham ridiculed Charles Collis of the 114th Pennsylvania for hiding behind a tree and then falsifying his report, in general the corps had fought well. The men knew that they, along with Slocum’s Twelfth Corps, had borne the brunt of stopping the Confederate attacks, and unlike Howard’s Eleventh Corps, had held their ground. “The quality of the fighting, with the exception of the
11th Corps, was better than ever before,” thought Chaplain Twichell. “Our corps fought well,”General Birney wrote, “my division as usual suffered terribly.…I am proud of them.” For as long as the Third Corps veterans lived they were proud of the role they had performed at Chancellorsville.37
Some historians have credited Sickles with a solid performance at Chancellorsville. Whatever success he enjoyed was really more of a reflection of the Third Corps’ fighting abilities than on Sickles’ first true test as a corps commander. His own specific performance was a harbinger of what would follow at Gettysburg. He fought aggressively, but demonstrated questionable military judgment. His misreading of Jackson’s “retreat” on May 2 contributed to a general lack of preparedness for Jackson’s flank attack (although Sickles’ conclusion that Jackson was retreating does not excuse Howard’s lack of readiness.) On the other hand, Sickles has been criticized for failing to organize a more “determined” assault against Jackson’s flanking column. The Third Corps leader was acting under instructions from Hooker to remain cautious. By the time he organized a potentially large scale assault, which would have included nearby infantry and cavalry, Jackson was already striking Howard.38
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