James A. Hessler
Page 11
While Hooker was dueling with his superiors, Sickles was planning a return to the army. As late as June 17, the New York Times was reporting that Sickles would “not return, for the present” to the army, and the paper was lobbying instead for him to take command of all New York troops. A few days later in Washington, Captain James E. Smith (who was waiting to return to his own command, the 4th New York Independent Battery) ran into Sickles, “who directed me to be on the lookout, as he intended to start for the front when he could reach the army by rail, and that by so doing I could go with him.” On June 27, they departed Washington on a special train bound for the front. Their progress was slow because of a report that “guerillas” were raiding the countryside, but they reached the army at Frederick, Maryland, without incident about 1:00 am on June 28. One of the train’s passengers was Colonel James Hardie of Henry Halleck’s staff, but neither Sickles nor Smith knew the nature of Hardie’s business. “Hardie,” Sickles later complained, “who was the bearer of the order putting Meade in command, sat by my side from Washington to Frederick, chatting all the way, without revealing a word of his mission.”13
“My health was not restored,” Sickles claimed upon his return to his Third Corps, “and under the circumstances I should not have returned to the army for perhaps several weeks.” Sickles also noted that he would have missed the great battle had it not been for Hooker, who “sent me a message summoning me from New York where I was slowly recovering from a contusion received at Chancellorsville. He announced the coming battle, asking me to join my command instantly.” Supposedly against the advice of his doctors, Sickles arrived in Frederick in time to see his friend Hooker “sacrificed, on the eve of battle, by the action of Halleck.”14
At 3:00 a.m. on June 28, Colonel Hardie woke George Meade from his sleep by telling the Fifth Corps leader that “he had come to give [him] trouble.” Never the optimist, Meade’s first thought was that he was being relieved or arrested, but Hardie instead handed him an order from General Halleck placing Meade in command of the Army of the Potomac. Halleck’s orders included the line that, given “the circumstances, no one ever received a more important command.” Meade, assured Halleck, would “not be hampered by any minute instructions” and was “free to act as you may deem proper.” All of this was contingent upon Meade remembering “the important fact that the Army of the Potomac is the covering army of Washington.… You will, therefore, maneuver and fight in such a manner as to cover the capital and also Baltimore, as far as circumstances will admit. Should General Lee move upon either of these places, it is expected that you will either anticipate him or arrive with him so as to give him battle.” Halleck placed Harpers Ferry “under your direct orders” and also authorized him “to remove from command, and to send from your army, any officer or other person you may deem proper, and to appoint to command as you may deem expedient.… ”15
A “confounded” Meade reportedly “became much agitated, protesting against being placed in command of an army that was looking toward Reynolds as the successor.” Meade also expressed the “responsibility so heavily placed on him in presence of the enemy and when he was totally ignorant of the positions and dispositions of the army.” According to Hardie, Meade said “half playfully, ‘Well, I’ve been tried and condemned without a hearing, and I suppose I shall have to go to execution.’” Meade wired his acceptance to Halleck at 7:00 a.m. “[I]n ignorance of the exact condition of the troops and position of the enemy,” Meade determined to “move toward the Susquehanna, keeping Washington and Baltimore well covered, and if the enemy is checked in his attempt to cross the Susquehanna, or if he turns toward Baltimore, to give him battle.”16
At Chancellorsville, Meade had argued that the protection of Washington had become a cliché, an excuse against aggressive action. Now he had direct orders to “cover” both Washington and Baltimore, a directive that limited his ability to operate freely against Lee. Of more immediate concern was his lack of knowledge of the army’s disposition. Hooker had kept Meade “in total ignorance” of his plans. Once Meade accepted, Hardie notified General Hooker—who seems to have “construed favorably the delay in responding to his tender of resignation”—that his bluff had been called. The surprised general “could not wholly mask the revulsion of feeling.” Hardie, Meade, Hooker, and Chief of Staff Butterfield met to discuss the transfer of command. Although it was apparent to Hardie that “much coldness existed” between Meade and Butterfield, Meade asked the chief of staff to remain and brief him on the army’s condition. The information he received “shocked” him: the army was widely scattered. Meade’s stunned amazement prompted Hooker to retort “with feeling.” The meeting was tense throughout, due mainly to what was later described as “Hooker’s chagrin and Meade’s overstrung nerves.”17
Major General Dan Butterfield
Library of Congress
Among the first to offer Meade congratulations was First Corps commander John Reynolds. Outside of his own corps or circle of friends, Meade was not as well known as some of the other corps commanders. Frank Haskell, who served on the staff of another Meade friend, John Gibbon, observed that those officers who knew him “all thought highly of him, a man of great modesty, with none of those qualities, which are noisy and assuming, and hankering for cheap newspaper fame—not at all of the ‘gallant’ Sickles stamp.” Conversely, Captain Francis Donaldson of the 118th Pennsylvania wrote, “‘Old Four Eye’… appears to be a man universally despised in the Fifth Corps. He certainly cares very little for the rank and file.… ”18
When Sickles reported to Hooker sometime that morning, the latter “informed me that he had been relieved from command.” Sickles later claimed that the change in command “was no sooner announced” than he began to hear from friends “earnest remonstrances against my serving under Meade. They knew he was hostile, dating from several incidents in the Chancellorsville campaign.” Sickles wrote that he consulted with Hooker, who advised that “you cannot ask to be relieved on the eve of battle; wait at least until after the engagement.” (If the story is true, one wonders why Hooker did not heed his own advice.) After reporting to Meade, Sickles returned to his Third Corps as it was passing through Frederick.19
Unaware of the developments then in progress, General Birney had marched the Third Corps from Middletown, Maryland, to Frederick. Birney commanded the corps in Sickles’ absence, to the satisfaction of many officers including Regis de Trobriand. “We cannot desire anything better than to have him [Birney] as our chief in the next battle, probably within two or thee days.” However, Sickles’ return relieved Birney of corps command and returned him to command of the First Division.20
After meeting with Hooker, Meade had to decide upon a chief of staff. Dan Butterfield had made few friends in the position. Colonel Charles Wainwright, commander of the First Corps Artillery Brigade, called Butterfield a “little Napoleon” and thought he was “most thoroughly hated by all officers at headquarters as a meddling, over-conceited fellow.” Provost Marshal Marsena Patrick claimed Butterfield “thinks himself very smart, but is in reality nearly a fool about some things—I am utterly disgusted with him.” Sickles, on the other hand, considered his friend more than competent. “Meade’s [Gettysburg] campaign was shaped by Hooker’s movements and executed by General Butterfield.”21
There is little doubt that Meade wanted someone else in the job. He approached Andrew Humphreys, Gouverneur K. Warren, and Seth Williams about accepting the post, but each declined. Humphreys spent several hours mulling the offer, “which I desired not to do until after the coming battle, and circumstances admitted of my postponing a decision until then.” Humphreys, in his words, “declined or deferred” the offer. Humphreys’ response was somewhat disingenuous, for it gave Meade the impression that he was only “deferring” the decision. Humphreys wanted to command troops in the field and was hoping to one day lead a corps. He eventually accepted the offer after the battle, but only with the understanding that it was a temporary assig
nment.22
Rebuffed by his preferred candidates, Meade asked Butterfield to stay on as chief of staff; Butterfield accepted. Some have suggested that Butterfield was selected to retain continuity, but it appears more likely that Meade had few viable options. With hindsight, we know the retention of Butterfield helped guarantee Gettysburg’s post-battle controversies between Meade and the Hooker-Sickles-Butterfield axis. Butterfield would claim credit for nearly every significant decision made at headquarters, including the allegation that he obtained Hooker’s complete plans, which were in turn adopted wholesale by Meade. Whether or not there was any truth to the claims, months later Congress believed such stories enough to give Joe Hooker primary thanks for the Gettysburg victory.23
Meade’s first objective as commander was to get the army moving. From the immediate available information, he estimated that Lee’s Army of Northern Virginia was more than 100,000 strong. According to his reports, the army had crossed the Potomac and was moving up the Cumberland Valley. Meade decided to march north on a main line from Frederick to Harrisburg with his left and right wings spread as far as possible, keeping Baltimore and Washington covered, halt Lee’s advance toward Harrisburg, and bring on a battle “at some point.” Further developments would depend on what he could learn of Lee’s movements, but by June 29, the army’s seven infantry corps were moving north toward Pennsylvania. The weather was hot, some roads were dusty, and rounding up numerous drunken stragglers in Frederick was anything but easy.24
The Southern army was also advancing. Richard Ewell’s Second Corps led the Confederate advance into Pennsylvania, and by June 28 was preparing to move on the state capital at Harrisburg. General Lee, however, had lost contact with his main cavalry body under Jeb Stuart during the march north, and without reconnaissance reports from his reliable cavalier, Lee found it “impossible to ascertain [Hooker’s] intentions.” From a spy, Lee and Longstreet learned that the Federal army had crossed the Potomac and was advancing northward. The Federals threatened to reach Lee’s communication lines west of South Mountain. Although Lee was initially skeptical of the report, he decided to deter Hooker “from advancing farther west, and intercepting our communication with Virginia” by concentrating his scattered army “east of the mountains.” As a result, Lee ordered Ewell to fall back from Harrisburg and “either move directly on Gettysburg or turn down to Cashtown,” a small village about ten miles west of Gettysburg and slightly east of a key gap in the mountain range. If all went according to plan, Lee’s army would concentrate before waging a major engagement.25
By June 29, George Meade was at Middleburg, where he was pressuring the army for more rapid movement. Sickles and the Third Corps were to march to Taneytown. With the exception of Reynolds’ First Corps, the other corps were not moving rapidly enough to suit Meade. Hancock’s Second Corps was delayed leaving Monocacy Junction. The new Second Corps commander, always unsparing in his criticism, blamed the delay on “an irresponsible person at these headquarters, a clerk, who failed to deliver” orders. Meade suggested that the offending party be “brought to punishment” but did not rebuke his friend Hancock for the delay. That evening, Henry Slocum complained that someone else’s trains would prevent his Twelfth Corps from reaching the day’s objectives.26
The men of the Third Corps gave Sickles what Joe Twichell called “a most complimentary welcome” back on June 29. “Great cheers swelled along the lines as he rode by and all hands feel relieved at his return.” Still, the day’s frustrations spilled over at headquarters where Seth Williams, the army’s adjutant general, issued Sickles a dispatch at 7:00 p.m. “I am directed by the commanding general to inform you that the train of your corps is at a stand-still at Middleburg, and delaying, of course, all movements in the rear. He wishes you to give your immediate and personal attention to keeping your train in motion.” No reply from Sickles has been found. In contrast, Winfield Hancock at least attempted to explain his own Second Corps delay and sent Meade follow-up assurances that he would make up for lost time.27 If Sickles did not send similar assurances to his new commander, it may explain why Meade had Seth Williams dispatch a more prickly follow-up on June 30:
Commanding Officer Third Corps:
The commanding general noticed with regret the very slow movement of your corps yesterday. It is presumed you marched at an early hour, and up to 6 p.m. the rear of your column had not passed Middleburg, distant from your camp of the night before some 12 miles only. This, considering the good condition of the road and the favorable state of the weather, was far from meeting the expectation of the commanding general, and delayed to a very late hour the arrival of troops and trains in your rear. The Second Corps in the same space of time made a march nearly double your own. Situated as this army now is, the commanding general looks for rapid movements of the troops.28
The relationship between Meade and Sickles continued to deteriorate. Sickles had enjoyed a close relationship with Hooker’s army headquarters. Under Hooker, he could compensate for his relative inexperience through open communications that kept him in tune with the commanding general’s objectives. Now he was entering into Pennsylvania on the outside of headquarters, and as the campaign progressed his anxiety and indecision increased. While these dispatches from Meade probably demonstrate some level of personal animosity toward Sickles, a full reading of the June 30 headquarters correspondence reveals a new army commander increasingly cognizant of his mounting responsibilities and the likelihood of a major collision with Lee’s army in the very near future. (Meade even authorized the “instant death of any soldier who fails to do his duty at this hour.”) Sickles was not in a position to do anything but keep his corps moving. Events were transpiring rapidly on June 30, and Meade had more to worry about than just Dan Sickles.29
Lee’s scattered army, meanwhile, continued marching toward a concentration near South Mountain. That same morning Henry Heth, who commanded a division in A.P. Hill’s Corps, ordered Johnston Pettigrew’s brigade to “procure supplies at Gettysburg.” General John Buford’s Federal cavalry division had also been ordered to scout around Gettysburg. Buford entered the town from the south around 11:00 a.m., just as Pettigrew’s infantry was marching leisurely from Cashtown toward Gettysburg from the west. “Found everybody in a terrible state of excitement on account of the enemy’s advance upon this place,” Buford reported. Without any orders to engage the enemy, Pettigrew withdrew his brigade and retraced his steps to Cashtown. Buford now knew that a Confederate infantry force of unknown size was west of town. That evening, Heth reported the encounter to A.P. Hill. Unsure of the nature of the Union forces Pettigrew reported at Gettysburg, Hill sent word to Lee that “I intended to advance the next morning and discover what [is] in my front.”30
On June 30, Meade moved his headquarters to Taneytown. He assigned John Reynolds to “assume command of the three corps forming the left wing,” a move that gave him oversight of Sickles’ Third Corps, Oliver Howard’s Eleventh, and his own First Corps. By 9:45 a.m., Reynolds decided to move his corps “to Marsh Creek, about half way to Gettysburg. The enemy are reported moving on Gettysburg from Fairfield and Cashtown.” Eventually setting up his headquarters at Moritz Tavern, Reynolds directed Howard to be ready to move in on his left, in case Lee should make an advance from that direction.31
As the morning progressed, Meade became convinced that “the enemy are advancing, probably in strong force, on Gettysburg” and believed that he “has relieved Harrisburg and Philadelphia, and now desires to look to his own army, and assume position for offensive or defensive, as occasion requires, or rest to the troops.” Meade thought that Buford’s presence at Gettysburg should give Reynolds plenty of warning if the Confederates moved either in his direction or on Howard at Emmitsburg. If that happened, Meade promised Reynolds reinforcements from “the corps nearest to you, which are Sickles’, at Taneytown, and Slocum’s, at Littlestown.… If, after occupying your present position, it is your judgment that you would be in better position at E
mmitsburg than where you are, you can fall back without waiting for the enemy or further orders. Your present position was given more with a view to an advance on Gettysburg, than a defensive point.”32
Believing reports from Reynolds that “the enemy has appeared at Fairfield, on the road between Chambersburg and Emmitsburg,” Meade decided to bolster his left (Reynolds and Howard) by sending Sickles to Emmitsburg and Hancock to Taneytown. Sedgwick’s Sixth Corps was also directed to move to Manchester on the army’s right. Meade had done well thus far by placing his army’s infantry (with the exception of Sedgwick’s Sixth Corps) and artillery all within ten miles of Taneytown and supporting distance of one another. “It is of the utmost importance that you should move with your infantry and artillery to Emmitsburg with all possible dispatch,”33 Seth Williams wrote Sickles. Meade sent Sickles another order at 12:45 p.m.:
The major-general commanding directs that you move your corps up to Emmitsburg. You will take three days’ rations in haversacks, 60 rounds of ammunition, and your ambulances. Your trains will remain parked here until further orders. General Reynolds’ First Corps, and General Howard’s Eleventh Corps, are between Emmitsburg and Gettysburg. General Reynolds will command the left wing, consisting of the First, Eleventh, and Third Corps. The enemy are reported to be in force in Gettysburg. You will move without delay. You will report to General Reynolds, and throw out strong pickets on the roads from Emmitsburg to Greencastle and Chambersburg. Mechanicstown, on your left, is occupied by a brigade of cavalry, with whom you will communicate.34