Modern view taken from area north of Little Round Top and looking west toward Houck’s Ridge. The ridge and wood line block the view to the west and the Emmitsburg Road beyond. Author
Hunt accompanied Sickles on the ride toward the Third Corps position. Sickles pointed out the proposed line, which he described as running “from Round Top on the left, perpendicular to the Emmitsburg road, but somewhat en echelon,with the line of battle established on Cemetery ridge.” The new line proposed was actually in frontof Cemetery Ridge, but it did cover the Emmitsburg Road. Hunt knew that Sickles had marched from Emmitsburg without his artillery train on July 1, and he initially inferred that Sickles wanted to maintain control of the road until his train arrived.35
Since Sickles and Hunt were primarily evaluating suitable artillery positions, they must have discussed the portion of Cemetery Ridge that ran between Hancock’s left and Little Round Top. As Sickles told Hunt in 1886, it was “a low, marshy swale and a rocky, wooded belt unfit for artillery & bad front for infantry. Hence my anxiety to get out of the hole where I was & move up to the commanding ground.” While Sickles and partisans would later give several reasons for their advance off Cemetery Ridge, it is this reason—perhaps more than any other—that is frequently cited by historians. Sickles feared that this low ground would prohibit his artillery dispositions while being dominated by enemy guns along the higher Emmitsburg Road. Such an event allegedly brought forth the specter of a repeat of Chancellorsville’s Hazel Grove.36
Hunt later wrote that when they rode “direct to the Peach Orchard,” Sickles “pointed out” the Emmitsburg Road ridge that included Sherfy’s peach orchard “as his proposed line.” This proposed front for the Third Corps, as ultimately deployed later in that afternoon, posed problems in both length and shape. The essentially straight line along Cemetery Ridge, which Meade intended Sickles to occupy, was approximately 1,600 yards long. The Third Corps had roughly 10,675 effectives on the morning of July 2. Sickles later claimed that he lacked sufficient strength to man Meade’s proposed front. The the new position proposed by Sickles, however, was nearly twice as long (roughly 2,700 yards flank to flank). The Emmitsburg Road offered no topographical anchors on Sickles’ left, unlike the anchoring opportunities offered by the Round Tops on Cemetery Ridge. A primary advantage of occupying Little Round Top was that it formed a natural barrier from an attack against the left flank. When he moved forward, Sickles attempted to address this problem by refusing his left (Birney’s division) in a rough line running from the Peach Orchard toward the Round Tops. Sickles’ refused left lacked the manpower to reach the rocky hill, a distance of some one mile. As a result, it ended on Houck’s Ridge (property owned locally by John Houck). The southern end of the ridge is dominated by large boulders and popularly known as “Devil’s Den.” Devil’s Den lies roughly 500 yards west of Little Round Top, and it was here that Sickles was forced to anchor his left flank. By refusing Birney in such a manner, Sickles could effectively prohibit a Confederate attack directly up the Emmitsburg Road, but in doing so he also created an awkward right angle (or salient) at the Peach Orchard. The salient would be dangerously exposed to attack from two directions—the west and the south, simultaneously.37
Hunt noted another problem with Sickles’ proposal. At its farthest point, portions of the new line would be about three-quarters of a mile in advance of the remainder of Meade’s army on Cemetery Ridge. The distance from the Peach Orchard, roughly the center of Sickles’ new line, to Cemetery Ridge was approximately 1,500 yards. This would, in Hunt’s words, “so greatly lengthen our line—which in any case must rest on Round Top, and connect with the left of the Second Corps—as to require a larger force than the Third Corps alone to hold it.” Not only would Sickles need more men to cover a longer line, but the distance between Sickles and Cemetery Ridge would negate the advantages of Meade’s interior lines. Any reinforcements sent to Sickles would have to cover this increased distance.38
Despite these readily apparent disadvantages, Hunt believed that Sickles’ proposal had some merit. The ridges desired by Sickles “commanded all the ground behind, as well as in front of them, and together constituted a favorable position for the enemy[emphasis in original] to hold. This was one good reason for our taking possession of it.” (Significantly, however, a piece of terrain that clearly could not be dominated by the Emmitsburg Road ridge was Little Round Top.) Hunt also thought that the dangers of the dreaded salient angle could, in fact, be minimized. “It would, it is true, in our hands present a salient angle, which generally exposes both its sides to enfilade fires; but here the ridges were so high that each would serve as a “traverse” for the other, and reduce that evil to a minimum.”39
If Hunt’s postwar writing is any indication, he seems to have been most concerned about the gap between Sickles’ proposed right (which petered out along the Emmitsburg Road) and Hancock’s left (which remained anchored on Cemetery Ridge). Because of the northeast-to-southwest direction of the Emmitsburg Road, the distance from Sickles’ right near the Klingle house to Cemetery Ridge was just less than 1, 100 yards. One potential way to close the gap between the two corps would be to order the Second Corps to throw its left forward. Hunt, however, hesitated to endorse the move, partially because the woods west of the Emmitsburg Road and directly in front of the salient were not under Union control. Hunt knew “it would be difficult to occupy and strengthen the angle if the enemy already held the wood in its front.” Hunt told Sickles to reconnoiter the timber before taking any further action.40
About this point in the conversation, Hunt discerned artillery fire on the distant Union right. Believing he had performed his duty in accompanying Sickles, Hunt decided to ride back toward Meade’s headquarters rather than await the results of a reconnaissance of the woods. “As I was leaving, General Sickles asked me if he should move forward his corps. I answered, ‘Not on my authority; I will report to General Meade for his instructions.’” According to Sickles’ version, Hunt added that the position “met with the approval of his [Hunt’s] own judgment…[and] he said that I would undoubtedly receive” Meade’s approval.41
Rather than return directly to the right flank, Hunt decided to take an indirect route via Little Round Top, and so would see Sickles’ entire proposed line. In light of subsequent events, it was unfortunate that Sickles or an aide did not accompany Hunt. Although Hunt had supposedly already inspected the Union left that morning, it is obvious that there were still lingering questions in his mind about the lay of the terrain. “As I rode back a view from that direction showed how much farther Peach Orchard [sic] was to the front of the direct line than it appeared from the orchard itself.” Still more troubling was Sickles’ proposed left flank, which would be tangled amongst the rocks in front of Little Round Top. When viewing the proposed line from the Peach Orchard, Hunt had misjudged the position of Houck’s Ridge and had erroneously thought that it was continuous with Cemetery Ridge. Now examining the ridge more closely, he apparently realized for the first time that Sickles’ desired left anchor would be in front of Little Round Top. To make matters worse, the left flank at Devil’s Den would also be commanded by the “much higher Peach Orchard crests” if the orchard fell to the enemy, “and was therefore not an eligible line to occupy, although it became of importance during the battle.”42
Hunt seems not to have entirely favored Meade’s proposed line, thought the Peach Orchard had both strengths and weaknesses, and decidedly did not endorse Sickles’ proposed left flank anchor point. Which position, then, did Hunt actually prefer? The choice “would depend on circumstances,” explained Hunt. He continued:
The direct short line through the woods [Meade’s Cemetery Ridge position], and including the Round Tops, could be occupied, intrenched [sic], and made impregnable to a front attack. But, like that of Culp’s Hill, it would be a purely defensive one, from which, owing to the nature of the ground and the enemy’s commanding position on the ridges at the angle, an advance in force w
ould be impracticable. The salient line proposed by General Sickles, although much longer, afforded excellent positions for our artillery; its occupation would cramp the movements of the enemy, bring us nearer his lines, and afford us facilities for taking the offensive. It was in my judgment tactically the better line of the two, provided it were strongly occupied, for it was the only one on the field from which we could have passed from the defensive to the offensive with a prospect of decisive results.43
The proposed lines offered a perfect example of the contrasts between Sickles’ aggressive temperament and Meade’s more conservative judgment. Sickles, however, did not command the army. That was Meade’s job. But with the Sixth Corps not yet on the field, Meade did not have the extra men to risk extending into an advanced position. Hunt later wrote that it would take both the Third Corps and the Fifth Corps to defend the proposed line. The latter organization was primarily acting as a reserve on the Union right until the Sixth Corps arrived, and Meade was unlikely to authorize a movement that would leave him with no reserve. The timing of the Confederate attack was also a factor. “Had he [Meade] known that Lee’s attack would be postponed until 4 p.m., he might have occupied this line in the morning,” wrote Hunt after the war, “but he did not know this, expected an attack at any moment, and, ordere d the occupation of the safe[emphasis in original] line.” A defensive battle was just as likely, and perhaps more likely, to win a victory than an offensive battle. “The additional risks of an offensive battle were out of all proportion to the prospective gains,” concluded Hunt.44
Unfortunately, many of Hunt’s objections were settled upon after he left Sickles at the Peach Orchard. If Hunt’s postwar writing is any indication, he probably gave Sickles mixed signals during their time together. Hunt’s objections became more firmly etched only after he had ridden the length of the proposed line, unaccompanied by Sickles. Even if Hunt had left Sickles with a favorable impression, one thing seems clear: he had not authorized Sickles to advance.45
Perhaps due to his concern for the artillery fire on the right, or perhaps because he felt his inspection responsibilities had ended, Hunt did not pass these additional objections along to Sickles. Instead, he returned to headquarters. Hunt later wrote that he briefly told General Meade that “the proposed line [by Sickles] was a good one in itself, that it offered favorable positions for artillery, but that its relations to other lines were such that I could not advise it, and suggested that he examine it himself before ordering its occupation.” Captain Meade wrote that Hunt advised that “if he [Hunt] were General Meade, he would not order troops out there until he had personally examined the line.” Hunt said that General Meade “nodded assent” and Hunt departed for Cemetery Hill. Once again General Meade received an indication that all was not well on his left flank, but he apparently did not act further on Hunt’s report. He probably assumed that Sickles would not be so presumptuous as to move an entire corps out of line without orders. Still, Meade had repeatedly been given warnings of Sickles’ uncertainty of where to deploy; he would have been wise to have given the matter more attention than he did.46
According to staffer Henry Tremain, “when we returned to Third Corps headquarters, the subject of posting the main line became a practical and imminent one. Moreover, a lively skirmish fire opened on Humphrey’s pickets, and betokened some activity on the part of the enemy…I was sent in that direction for a report.” From a picket post Tremain examined the enemy’s skirmishers. “It was too thick a line to be without significance to my mind. I did not like it, and reported on my return that the enemy were doing something behind their skirmish line; but what [it was] I did not know.” Lt. Col. Clark Baldwin of the 1st Massachusetts had spent much of the morning on the Union picket line. Around noon, he wrote, “from all appearances I was led to believe that the enemy were preparing to advance.”47
As the morning slipped into the afternoon, the Army of the Potomac’s left flank was in the hands of a corps commander who neither liked nor understood his position. Subsequent events would soon convince Sickles that the enemy attack was about to land squarely against him.
Chapter 7
No Relation to the General Line of Battle
Robert E. Lee was initially unsure of his plans that morning. The evening before, Lee considered launching his main offensive from his left flank, against Meade’s right opposite Culp’s and Cemetery Hills. But Richard Ewell and his division commanders, especially Jubal Early, convinced Lee that the terrain in their front did not favor such an assault. Lee then proposed contracting his extended lines by drawing Ewell’s corps around to Longstreet’s right. This too was rejected by Early and company, who did not want to abandon their hard fought ground in the town. They argued that the best chance for success was an attack against the Federal left flank on Cemetery Ridge. Later that night, Lee told Ewell again that he wanted to move Ewell to Longstreet’s right. Ewell convinced Lee again, erroneously as events turned out, to leave him in position as he could carry Culp’s Hill. Lee could not have been happy that none of his subordinates seemed to want to attack the Federal position, but he was now moving toward planning an attack on Meade’s left as July 2 dawned.1
That morning, Generals Lee, Longstreet, Hill, Hood, and Heth consulted near Lee’s headquarters on Seminary Ridge. General Hood remembered Lee as being anxious to attack. “The enemy is here, and if we do not whip him, he will whip us.” But Longstreet remained hesitant, because “the enemy was found in position on his formidable heights awaiting us” and because he was missing his third division, George Pickett’s, which was still bringing up the army’s rear. In studying the visible portions of Cemetery Ridge, Lee and Longstreet had an imprecise knowledge of where the Union left ended. Without Jeb Stuart’s mobile cavalry to scout for him, Lee instead sent out several reconnaissance parties that morning. The most significant of these was led by a staff engineer, Captain Samuel Johnston, who probably departed with a small party between 4:00 a.m. and 5:00 a.m.2
Major General Lafayette McLaws, commanding one of Longstreet’s two available divisions, arrived at the head of his column on Seminary Ridge. Using a map, Lee told McLaws “to place your division across” or perpendicular to the Emmitsburg Road and “get there if possible without being seen by the enemy.” Lee’s objective would have placed McLaws just south of what would later be called the Peach Orchard. McLaws suggested that he would like to reconnoiter, but Longstreet, who was pacing nearby, refused to allow McLaws to leave his division. Longstreet pointed to the map and said, “I wish your division placed so,” running his finger in a direction parallel, rather than perpendicular, to the Emmitsburg Road. Lee disagreed. “No, General, I wish it placed just perpendicular to that,” or “just the opposite.” McLaws reiterated his request to scout with Johnston, but Longstreet again forbade it. Longstreet staffer Moxley Sorrel admitted that the First Corps leader did not approve of Lee’s plans and “failed to conceal some anger.” As McLaws remembered, “General Longstreet appeared as if he was irritated and annoyed, but the cause I did not ask.” McLaws “then went back to the head of my column and sat on my horse and saw in the distance the enemy coming, hour after hour, on to the battle ground.”3
Meanwhile, Captain Johnston was attending to his reconnaissance. Johnston claimed that he moved south along Willoughby Run, crossed the Emmitsburg Road in the vicinity of the Peach Orchard and “got up on the slopes of Round Top, where I had a commanding view.” On his return route, he claimed to have seen three or four Union troopers riding on the Emmitsburg Road. Lee was still in conference with Longstreet and Hill when Johnston returned to Seminary Ridge. Lee seemed surprised to hear that Johnston had reached Little Round Top. Lee instructed Johnston to join Longstreet and aid him “in any way I could.” Johnston thought it about 8:00 a.m. when his conference with Lee ended, and 9:00 a.m. when he joined Longstreet.4
Captain Johnston’s morning reconnaissance has confounded historians since 1863. How had he bypassed John Buford’s cavalry pickets along
the Emmitsburg Road and then reached Little Round Top without seeing any sign of Sickles’ Third Corps or any other Federal troops? Whether he reached Little Round Top or mistakenly ended up on another hill is beyond the scope of this study. What is more important is what Lee learned from the mission. While Johnston’s scout did not discover the location of the Federal left flank, it did provide Lee with information as to where the flank was not, which may have convinced Lee that Meade’s line ended short of the Round Tops. Johnston’s mission helped to convince Lee to use Longstreet in a main attack to drive in the Federal left, while Ewell demonstrated against Meade’s distant right flank.5
Longstreet, however, did not get his troops (two divisions under Lafayette McLaws and John Hood) into motion until about noon. Their objective was to move into a position on the right of A. P. Hill’s Third Corps on Seminary Ridge less than three miles to the south. This would have placed them roughly opposite the left of Humphreys’ division front and the right of Birney’s. But after crossing the Fairfield Road, about 500 yards beyond the Black Horse Tavern, Longstreet’s command reached a small knoll that was visible to Union signal stations on Little Round Top. The divisions were forced to turn around and “counter- march” by another route that would eventually take them along Willoughby Run. During the maneuver, Hood’s division crowded into McLaws’ rear, causing some confusion. The new route was far from ideal and McLaws admitted there was “very considerable difficulty, owing to the rough character of the country in places and the fences and ditches we had to cross.”6
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