If Lee intended to repeat Stonewall Jackson’s stunning Chancellorsville flank attack, he must have been surely disappointed on July 2 at Gettysburg. Both Jackson (at Chancellorsville) and Longstreet (at Gettysburg) started with an imperfect understanding of where the Federal flank was located; but there were significant differences between maneuvering in Virginia and maneuvering in Pennsylvania. Jackson was aided at Chancellorsville by intelligence gathered from both Stuart’s cavalry and friendly locals. Longstreet had neither to help him at Gettysburg. Lee did assign Captain Johnston to assist in guiding Longstreet, but in a comedy of Confederate errors, Johnston claimed to be unaware of any such role and gave Longstreet no help. Unlike at Chancellorsville, Longstreet did not enjoy a dense tangled Wilderness to help screen his march, and he had to burn considerable time trying to avoid being seen by Little Round Top’s signal stations as he approached Sickles’ front. Also, unlike at Chancellorsville, Sickles insisted the enemy was getting ready to attack and not retreat.
As noted previously, when Henry Hunt visited Sickles at the Peach Orchard shortly after 11:00 a.m. he declined to endorse Sickles’ proposed movement. Part of his objection was because the woods west of the Emmitsburg Road were not under Union control. Hunt said it was he who advised Sickles to reconnoiter the woods before making any additional movements. Writing decades later, Henry Tremain suggested that the reconnaissance was ordered because the Third Corps officers feared that the Confederates would use the Millerstown crossroad to hit the left of any Third Corps troops or trains that might be arriving from Emmitsburg. Tremain wrote that his role as a courier on July 1 had given him ample opportunity to worry about this road, and he suggested that he deserved much of the credit for ordering the reconnaissance. Not surprisingly, both Birney and Colonel Hiram Berdan, whose U.S. Sharpshooters conducted the scout, later claimed the idea as their own. (However, since Berdan’s battle report indicates that he received the order from Birney, we can probably rule out Berdan as the source.) Whoever deserved the credit, Berdan received orders to “feel the enemy, and to discover their movements, if possible.” Only two months earlier at Chancellorsville, Berdan’s sharpshooters had led Birney into the unknown against Jackson’s moving column near Catharine Furnace. Now under different conditions, Berdan was called upon again.7
Berdan took four companies of his First U. S. Sharpshooters, approximately 100 men, and an additional 210 men of the 3rd Maine Infantry across the Emmitsburg Road to flush out the suspicious woods. Berdan reported, “I moved down the Emmitsburg road some distance beyond our extreme left and deployed the sharpshooters in a line running nearly east and west, and moved forward in a northerly direction parallel with the Emmitsburg road.” This description would have initially put them in Biesecker’s Woods south of the Millerstown Road, although Birney’s report stated that the group used the Millerstown crossroad itself to reach Warfield Ridge. Lieutenant Colonel Casper Trepp, of the First U. S. Sharpshooters, complained that whatever the actual route, their every move was “in plain view of the enemy… the enemy must have seen every man from the time we reached the road until we entered the woods.”8
While Berdan’s expedition less than stealthily explored the woods west of Sickles’ salient, Henry Tremain rode to General Meade’s headquarters with a status report. Tremain found Meade studying county maps in a “little room with a low ceiling in a small, old fashioned farm house.” Waiting in the room, Tremain became “embarrassed” as Meade refused to acknowledge his presence. After an indeterminable delay, Meade looked up with an inquisitive “Well, sir.” Tremain relayed his brief report to Meade, after which the general silently returned to studying his map. After yet another embarrassingly awkward pause, Tremain offered that “Gen. Sickles requested Gen. Meade’s orders about the Emmitsburg Road.” General Meade replied that “he would send cavalry to patrol it, and that orders had been sent to the trains.” A frustrated Tremain was dismissed and returned to Third Corps headquarters. Perhaps as a result of this meeting, at 12:50 p.m. Butterfield dispatched an order for the Artillery Reserve to “send a battery to report to General Sickles on the left.”9
Berdan’s group probably reached Pitzer’s Woods, “a dense wood” on the west side of the Emmitsburg Road, around noon. “We soon came upon the enemy,” Berdan reported, “and drove them sufficiently to discover three columns in motion in rear of the woods, changing direction, as it were, by the right flank.” Berdan and Trepp’s surprised men collided with three Alabama regiments (the 8th, 10th, and 11th) in Brigadier General Cadmus Wilcox’s brigade of R. H. Anderson’s division. Wilcox’s brigade was on the extreme right of the Confederate army, and Wilcox had orders to refuse his right flank against any potential enemy attacks. In bending back his line, Wilcox fronted southeast and south in the direction of the Peach Orchard and Pitzer’s Woods. Like his Yankee counterparts, Wilcox had been wary of his position and had ordered the 10th Alabama to occupy Pitzer’s Woods, and the 11th to form in line in the open field to the left. He ordered his two regiments to advance behind a line of skirmishers and it was while executing this movement that Berdan and Wilcox collided, giving the Union men the impression that the Confederates were advancing toward the Emmitsburg Road. The spirited firefight lasted for probably twenty minutes until Berdan ordered his men to fall back to the east side of the Emmitsburg Road. The U.S. Sharpshooters suffered some twenty casualties, while the 3rd Maine added another forty-eight.10
Most of the action was visible from the Union’s Round Top signal station. “Enemy’s skirmishers are advancing from the west, 1 mile from here,” Signal Officer A. B. Jerome wrote in a message to Butterfield at 11:45 a.m. Another, more ominous message, followed ten minutes later: “The rebels are in force, and our skirmishers give way. One mile west of Round Top signal station, the woods are full of them.”11
As noted previously, Buford’s cavalry and John Calef’s artillery had been posted on the extreme Union left, along the Emmitsburg Road, since the previous evening. The reports of both Colonel Thomas Devin and Lieutenant Calef indicate they deployed in Berdan’s support, whom Devin said “were engaged in my front.” But shortly thereafter, a blunder occurred within the Union command chain that would significantly influence Sickles’ eventual actions. Meade had issued orders for Buford to “collect all the trains in the vicinity of Taneytown and take them down to Westminster.” Buford’s two brigades on the field had performed hard service throughout the campaign, and on July 1 in particular. Although casualties had been relatively slight, as Captain Meade later pointed out, Buford’s horses through lack of forage and “loss of shoes from continuously hard work, were becoming unserviceable.” Believing that cavalry commander Alfred Pleasonton would bring in replacements, Buford’s cavalry was withdrawn in order to guard the trains and refit. The real error occurred when Pleasonton neglected to bring up any substitutes. The left flank of Meade’s army was now unprotected by any cavalry screen, a situation that justifiably alarmed Sickles when he learned of it.12
Ironically, the reports of Pleasonton, Buford, and Devin all implied they retired because they were relieved by the Third Corps! Buford reported that “the division became engaged with the enemy’s sharpshooters on our left, and held its own until relieved by General Sickles’ corps, after which it moved to Taneytown, and bivouacked for the night.” An “exceedingly annoyed” Meade learned of the mistake and “emphatically” notified Pleasonton at 12:50 p.m. that he did not intend to withdraw all cavalry support from Sickles’ left and that “the patrols and pickets upon the Emmitsburg road must be kept on as long as our troops are in position.” But it would not be until 1:45 p.m. that Pleasonton would send an order to Brigadier General David McM. Gregg, commanding the cavalry’s Second Division, to bring forward a “regiment” to replace Buford’s division. Unfortunately, Gregg was on the right side of Meade’s line, and events unfolded so rapidly that he was unable to arrive in time to support Sickles.13
At 1:30 p.m., the Union’s Round Top signal station spotted
a strong Confederate force, much larger than skirmishers, apparently moving toward Meade’s right flank. The warning read: “A heavy column of enemy’s infantry, about 10,000 strong, is moving from opposite our extreme left toward our right.” This seemed to confirm fears that Lee would move against the Union right. However, what the signal officer saw was in reality Longstreet’s column counter-marching back from the vicinity of Blackhorse Tavern. The signal officer was unaware that after the column had passed from sight, Longstreet changed direction again and was headed toward the Union left. Although Longstreet has received considerable criticism for his long and slow march, he was inadvertently successful in masking his real intentions from the observing Union signal station.14
Meade recorded the arrival of the Sixth Corps at 2:00 p.m. The time of its arrival is significant in that Meade “immediately directed the Fifth Corps to move over to our extreme left, and the Sixth to occupy its place as a reserve for the right.” Had Lee and Longstreet been able to launch the attack before 2:00 p.m., the large Sixth Corps would not have been on the field, and the Fifth Corps might not have been as readily available to provide timely support in defense of Meade’s left. Meade and the Union commanders incorrectly believed they were outnumbered and that the Sixth Corps presence was a necessity before taking any decisive action. By delaying their attack until about 4:00 p.m., the Confederates allowed Meade every available opportunity to concentrate his army.15
Meanwhile, according to Berdan, it was “about 2 o’clock” when he returned to Union lines and reported his “discoveries” to Birney who, in turn, reported to Sickles that “three columns of their forces were found marching to our left.” The message was a pivotal culmination of the morning’s events. With the removal of Buford’s cavalry screen from his left, Berdan’s “important information” must have been the final straw for Sickles. He perceived a continued lack of support from headquarters, and he now believed he had proof that the enemy was making a move toward his left flank. Confederates had been reported near the Millerstown Road and approaching the Emmitsburg Road. If Sickles wanted to prevent the enemy from occupying the Peach Orchard ridge, then he had to get there before they did.16
Unfortunately the significance of Berdan’s firefight and its relevance to Sickles’ actions has been historically muddied by inflated postwar claims that Berdan had stumbled upon and delayed Longstreet’s main attack. The sharpshooters’ regimental history claimed that their 300-man expedition had “stopped the advance of 30,000 foes. No greater display of heroism, no more self-sacrificing spirit of patriotism can be cited in the annals of war…surely, it may be fairly said to be a turning point in the Rebellion.” Berdan himself made similarly boastful postwar claims that he had stalled the lead elements of “Longstreet’s column.” Postwar speeches, such as the one James Longstreet gave at Gettysburg’s twenty-fifth anniversary reunion only added to the fantastic tales: “The firing in question saved Sickles and the day. It caused me a loss of forty minutes, and could I have saved five of those minutes, the battle would have gone against Meade on the 2nd day.” Of course, any claims that Berdan directly delayed Longstreet are patently false. Wilcox’s regiments had no affiliation with Longstreet’s First Corps and were not leading Longstreet into position. Further, given that Longstreet’s main body was moving from the general vicinity of Blackhorse Tavern while the firefight was in progress, there is no way that the sharpshooters could have directly impacted Longstreet’s march while fighting in Pitzer’s Woods. The sight of three Alabama regiments was surely disconcerting to Berdan’s men, but it is unlikely they could have been mistaken for “30,000 foes.”17
Berdan’s intelligence, however, was still significant. Sickles’ detractors often argue that since Wilcox was not actually part of Longstreet’s main flanking movement, then the firefight in Pitzer’s Woods did not discover a potentially significant threat to the Union left. In other words, Berdan’s report should have given Sickles no cause for concern. This reasoning ignores the fact that at the time the discovery was made, Sickles, Berdan, and Birney had no way of knowing that Wilcox was not part of the main attack. This information was only known after the war ended, and was not available to Sickles when he made his fateful decision on July 2, 1863. Limited only to what Sickles knew at the moment he had to make his decision, all he knew was that his reconnaissance had stumbled into woods filled with Rebels reportedly moving in his direction. He had convinced himself all morning that the enemy would make a move toward his left flank, his officers believed it, and Berdan obliged by reporting large “columns” moving in his direction. Unfortunately, the exaggerated postwar claims, which Sickles regrettably supported fully, intentionally distorted the true significance of Berdan’s reconnaissance. Sickles’ conclusion, though based upon a misreading of the true situation, was still accurate: Confederates were moving to attack the Union left.18
Berdan’s report did have a significant psychological impact on Sickles. Sickles alluded to this point in his introduction to Helen Longstreet’s 1905 book Lee and Longstreet at High Tide when he wrote, “the formation and movements of the attacking column had been discovered by my reconnaissance; this exposure put an end to any chance of surprise.” Sickles had not actually “discovered” the “attacking column,” but he believed at that time that he had. Longstreet’s attack had inadvertently lost its element of surprise.19
There is the possibility that Berdan’s discovery of Wilcox impacted Longstreet’s tactical deployment. As we have seen, the initial stages of his march had been attempted in secrecy. When Longstreet was finally ready to place Hood and McLaws’ divisions along Warfield Ridge around 3:00 p.m., he abandoned any further attempts at secrecy. Was Longstreet made aware of Wilcox’s and Berdan’s fight while he moved his divisions into position, and did he conclude that stealth was no longer necessary? As the Confederates burned time looking for an alternate strategy, Sickles wrote, “these circumstances were, of course, known to General Lee; hence he saw no reason to reproach Longstreet for delay.” If that is true, then Berdan inadvertently impacted Longstreet’s actions, though not to the extent that the exaggerated postwar accounts claimed.20
As Birney stated in his report, Sickles ordered him “to change my front to meet the attack. I did this by advancing my left 500 yards, and swinging around the right so as to rest on the Emmitsburg road at the peach orchard.” It would take some time to move his three brigades forward, and he probably wasn’t fully deployed until as late as 3:30 p.m. Birney reported his division was a “line,” but due to the distance he had to cover and his lack of manpower to do so, he never occupied a “line” in the true sense. He anchored Ward’s brigade on his left at Devil’s Den, and Graham’s brigade on the right at the Peach Orchard “with his right on the Emmitsburg road.” Birney’s smallest brigade, under Regis de Trobriand, was inserted in the middle with an expectation to support the other two.21
General Humphreys’ Second Division had spent much of the morning “massed” on Cemetery Ridge. Humphreys did not see Sickles during the morning; he specifically stated that Sickles never sent for him, and as a result he stayed with his division. Humphreys admitted that he had “no knowledge” of Birney’s position, which was hidden from view by trees on his left. Humphreys later testified that his first line was “in a hollow” and “near the foot of the westerly slope” of Cemetery Ridge. Humphreys’ left connected with Birney’s right before Birney advanced, but Humphreys’ right was approximately 500 yards in front of the left flank of John Caldwell’s Second Corps division. At that time of the day, neither Humphreys nor Caldwell were overly concerned by this gap between their divisions.22
It was probably while Birney was advancing on his left that Humphreys was directed by Sickles to move Burling’s brigade to Birney’s right rear “and make it subject to his order for support.” Humphreys “was at the same time authorized to draw support, should I need it” from Caldwell’s Second Corps division, and “was authorized to draw from the Artillery Reserve should I re
quire more.” The detachment of Burling’s brigade to support Birney was consistent with the assumption that a Confederate flank attack would hit Birney before Humphreys. Birney directed the brigade to mass in Trostle’s Woods, where Burling formed in column of regiments closed in mass, suggesting they would be ready to move elsewhere when called upon.23
Humphreys testified that about 4:00 p.m. (this was Humphreys’ later estimate, but the actual time must have been earlier) “in compliance with General Sickles’s orders, I moved my division forward” so that his line now ran along the Emmitsburg road. A common thread that appears throughout Third Corps accounts is explicit in both Humphreys and Birney’s reports. Birney reported that when he moved forward, Sickles “informed me that a division from the Second and one from the Fifth Corps had been ordered to be in readiness to support me.” Humphreys said essentially the same in his report, and later told Congress that he was “authorized to call on General Caldwell…for such support as I might want.” At the same time that he learned that Burling was to support Birney, Humphreys sent to Hancock to inquire whether Caldwell’s division “was ready to support me.” If both Birney and Humphreys’ accounts are accurate, and Humphreys probably had no motivation to fabricate the story, then the question remains open as to exactly how and when Sickles was given the impression that his subordinates could draw upon the other corps for help. This would become a point of contention following the battle.24
Despite the fact that their left was supposed to be connected to Sickles’ right, the men of John Caldwell’s Second Corps division knew little of the Third Corps’ intentions. Josiah Favill, an officer on General Zook’s staff, recorded that about 2:00 p.m. they observed Sickles’ corps make what he described as “several incomprehensible movements.” Lieutenant William Wilson, on Caldwell’s staff, thought it was closer to 4:20 p.m. when “officers and men curiously watched the formation of Sickles’ 3d Corps on the line of the Emmitsburg road. Many were the criticisms made and opinions expressed as to the comparative merits of the line he was directed to take and the one he selected.” General Hancock was with his corps at the time (he thought it was about 4:00 p.m.) and admittedly admired “the spectacle” but is famously alleged to have remarked that it was “beautiful to look at, but gentlemen they will not be there long.”25
James A. Hessler Page 17